# Greenhill Round Robin

# Round 2 – Neg vs. Greenhill Biotech IPR

## 1nc

**The debt ceiling will pass but it will be a fight**

**Washington Post, 9/15/13** (“Congress can turn back to the budget now” <http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/congress-can-turn-back-to-the-budget-now/2013/09/15/e05c975c-1ca5-11e3-82ef-a059e54c49d0_story.html>)

WITH PRESIDENT Obama’s bid for congressional support for a military strike against Syria on hold for the time being, members of the House and Senate can devote their attention to what was previously supposed to have been their priority for September: avoiding a potential political and economic train wreck over the federal government’s finances.

Specifically, Congress needs to fund the government after the current spending law expires on Sept. 30, and it needs to raise the $16.7 trillion debt limit, which will be reached sometime in the second half of October, and which must be increased to avoid the possibility of a U.S. default.

Alas, these two pieces of what should be routine business have become entangled in the politics of Obamacare, which is to say the decreasingly comprehensible politics of the House Republican caucus. A sizable minority of GOP members insists on “defunding” the health care law before the major parts of it begin to take effect in January. According to a recent Congressional Research Service analysis, this is an operationally futile goal. It would be bad policy even if it were possible.

What’s more, it’s bad politics for the GOP to risk a government shutdown in pursuit of this chimera — a fact Speaker John A. Boehner (R-Ohio) recognizes but which has, so far, failed to sway his back-benchers. This is why Democrats are content, for now, to sit back and cheer on the Republicans’ internal feud. Also, that’s easier than countering the Republicans’ anti-Obamacare crusade with realistic budget alternatives.

How this latest impasse plays out is anyone’s guess, though there are plausible scenarios under which Mr. Boehner can give the ultras in his caucus a chance to vote one more time against Obamacare, while engineering Democratic acquiescence in a short-term continuation of the current $988 billion annual spending rate. Such a result would avoid a partial government shutdown — for a few months.

The debt ceiling, too, probably can be finessed, as it has been in the past. Exactly how is admittedly difficult to predict given Mr. Obama’s insistence that raising it is not negotiable and Mr. Boehner’s seemingly incompatible insistence that he won’t increase Washington’s borrowing capacity except in return for progress on deficit reduction. But a default would not be in either side’s political interest.

#### MEXICO—plan unpopular

AP ‘13

(5/2/13, Associated Press, “Obama to Pitch Immigration Overhaul in Mexico” http://www.newsmaxworld.com/Newsfront/obama-immigration-mexico-trip/2013/05/02/id/502393)

For Pena Nieto, Obama's visit is a chance for him to showcase his country's economic gains. After suffering along with the U.S. during the recession, its economy is now growing at a better clip than that of the U.S. Per capita income has gone from an annual $7,900 two years ago to $10,146. ¶ ¶ But Diana Negroponte, a Latin America expert at the Brookings Institution, says corruption remains endemic, human rights are still a problem, and efforts to change and improve the judicial system have been too slow.¶ ¶ "There is concern on our side of the border that greater help needs to be given in order for Mexico to reform its system," she said.¶ ¶ Pena Nieto's changes in the security relationship with the U.S. have prompted some U.S. officials to speculate that the new president might be embracing the policies of his Institutional Revolutionary Party, which long has favored centralized political and bureaucratic control.¶ ¶ Among those watching the new steps is Sen. Patrick Leahy, D-Vt., who has held up $228 million sought by the Obama administration for Mexico under a security cooperation agreement. Under the agreement, known as the Merida Initiative, Congress has already given Mexico more than $1.9 billion in aid since 2008.¶ ¶ But Leahy, chairman of the Senate Appropriations subcommittee that oversees the State Department budget, has been a critic of how the money has been used and with the results.¶ ¶ "Congress has been asked for a significant new investment, but it's not clear what the new Mexican government's intensions are," Leahy said in a statement to The Associated Press. "We're in a period of uncertainty until we know enough to be able to reset that part of our relationship. I'm not ready to sign off on more money without a lot more details."

**Capital is finite and spending it elsewhere prevents a debt ceiling deal**

**Moore, 9/10/13 -** Guardian's US finance and economics editor.(Heidi, “Syria: the great distraction” The Guardian, <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/sep/10/obama-syria-what-about-sequester>)

The country will crash into the debt ceiling in mid-October, which would be an economic disaster, especially with a government shutdown looming at the same time. These are deadlines that Congress already learned two years ago not to toy with, but memories appear to be preciously short.

The Federal Reserve needs a new chief in three months, someone who will help the country confront its raging unemployment crisis that has left 12 million people without jobs. The president has promised to choose a warm body within the next three weeks, despite the fact that his top pick, Larry Summers, would likely spark an ugly confirmation battle – the "fight of the century," according to some – with a Congress already unwilling to do the President's bidding.

Congress was supposed to pass a farm bill this summer, but declined to do so even though the task is already two years late. As a result, the country has no farm bill, leaving agricultural subsidies up in the air, farmers uncertain about what their financial picture looks like, and a potential food crisis on the horizon.

The two main housing agencies, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, have been in limbo for four years and are desperately in need of reform that should start this fall, but there is scant attention to the problem.

These are the problems going unattended by the Obama administration while his aides and cabinet members have been wasting the nation's time making the rounds on television and Capitol Hill stumping for a profoundly unpopular war. The fact that all this chest-beating was for naught, and an easy solution seems on the horizon, belies the single-minded intensity that the Obama White House brought to its insistence on bombing Syria.

More than one wag has suggested, with the utmost reason, that if Obama had brought this kind of passion to domestic initiatives, the country would be in better condition right now. As it is, public policy is embarrassingly in shambles at home while the administration throws all of its resources and political capital behind a widely hated plan to get involved in a civil war overseas.

The upshot for the president may be that it's easier to wage war with a foreign power than go head-to-head with the US Congress, even as America suffers from neglect.

This is the paradox that President Obama is facing this fall, as he appears to turn his back on a number of crucial and urgent domestic initiatives in order to spend all of his meager political capital on striking Syria.

Syria does present a significant humanitarian crisis, which has been true for the past two years that the Obama administration has completely ignored the atrocities of Bashar al-Assad.

Two years is also roughly the same amount of time that key domestic initiatives have also gone ignored as Obama and Congress engage in petty battles for dominance and leave the country to run itself on a starvation diet imposed by sequestration cuts. Leon Panetta tells the story of how he tried to lobby against sequestration only to be told:

Leon, you don't understand. The Congress is resigned to failure.

Similarly, those on Wall Street, the Federal Reserve, those working at government agencies, and voters themselves have become all too practiced at ignoring the determined incompetence of those in Washington.

Political capital – the ability to horse-trade and win political favors from a receptive audience – is a finite resource in Washington. Pursuing misguided policies takes up time, but it also **eats up credibility in asking for the next favor.** It's fair to say that congressional Republicans, particularly in the House, have no love for Obama and are likely to oppose anything he supports. That's exactly the reason the White House should stop proposing policies as if it is scattering buckshot and **focus with intensity** on the domestic tasks it wants to accomplish, **one at a time**.

**Default will destroy the U.S. and global economy**

**Davidson, 9/10/13** – co-founder of NPR’s Planet Money (Adam, “Our Debt to Society” New York Times, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/15/magazine/our-debt-to-society.html?pagewanted=all>)

If the debt ceiling isn’t lifted again this fall, some serious financial decisions will have to be made. Perhaps the government can skimp on its foreign aid or furlough all of NASA, but eventually the big-ticket items, like Social Security and Medicare, will have to be cut. At some point, the government won’t be able to pay interest on its bonds and will enter what’s known as sovereign default, the ultimate national financial disaster achieved by countries like Zimbabwe, Ecuador and Argentina (and now Greece). In the case of the United States, though, it won’t be an isolated national crisis. If the American government can’t stand behind the dollar, the world’s benchmark currency, then the global financial system will very likely enter a new era in which there is much less trade and much less economic growth. It would be, by most accounts, the largest self-imposed financial disaster in history.

Nearly everyone involved predicts that someone will blink before this disaster occurs. Yet a small number of House Republicans (one political analyst told me it’s no more than 20) appear willing to see what happens if the debt ceiling isn’t raised — at least for a bit. This could be used as leverage to force Democrats to drastically cut government spending and eliminate President Obama’s signature health-care-reform plan. In fact, Representative Tom Price, a Georgia Republican, told me that the whole problem could be avoided if the president agreed to drastically cut spending and lower taxes. Still, it is hard to put this act of game theory into historic context. Plenty of countries — and some cities, like Detroit — have defaulted on their financial obligations, but only because their governments ran out of money to pay their bills. No wealthy country has ever voluntarily decided — in the middle of an economic recovery, no less — to default. And there’s certainly no record of that happening to the country that controls the global reserve currency.

Like many, I assumed a self-imposed U.S. debt crisis might unfold like most involuntary ones. If the debt ceiling isn’t raised by X-Day, I figured, the world’s investors would begin to see America as an unstable investment and rush to sell their Treasury bonds. The U.S. government, desperate to hold on to investment, would then raise interest rates far higher, hurtling up rates on credit cards, student loans, mortgages and corporate borrowing — which would effectively put a clamp on all trade and spending. The U.S. economy would collapse far worse than anything we’ve seen in the past several years.

**Nuclear war**

**Friedberg and Schoenfeld 8**

[Aaron, Prof. Politics. And IR @ Princeton’s Woodrow Wilson School and Visiting Scholar @ Witherspoon Institute, and Gabriel, Senior Editor of Commentary and Wall Street Journal, “The Dangers of a Diminished America”, 10-28, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122455074012352571.html>]

Then there are the dolorous consequences of a potential collapse of the world's financial architecture. For decades now, Americans have enjoyed the advantages of being at the center of that system. The worldwide use of the dollar, and the stability of our economy, among other things, made it easier for us to run huge budget deficits, as we counted on foreigners to pick up the tab by buying dollar-denominated assets as a safe haven. Will this be possible in the future? Meanwhile, traditional foreign-policy challenges are multiplying. The threat from al Qaeda and Islamic terrorist affiliates has not been extinguished. Iran and North Korea are continuing on their bellicose paths, while Pakistan and Afghanistan are progressing smartly down the road to chaos. Russia's new militancy and China's seemingly relentless rise also give cause for concern. If America now tries to pull back from the world stage, it will leave a dangerous power vacuum. The stabilizing effects of our presence in Asia, our continuing commitment to Europe, and our position as defender of last resort for Middle East energy sources and supply lines could all be placed at risk. In such a scenario there are shades of the 1930s, when global trade and finance ground nearly to a halt, the peaceful democracies failed to cooperate, and aggressive powers led by the remorseless fanatics who rose up on the crest of economic disaster exploited their divisions. Today we run the risk that rogue states may choose to become ever more reckless with their nuclear toys, just at our moment of maximum vulnerability. The aftershocks of the financial crisis will almost certainly rock our principal strategic competitors even harder than they will rock us. The dramatic free fall of the Russian stock market has demonstrated the fragility of a state whose economic performance hinges on high oil prices, now driven down by the global slowdown. China is perhaps even more fragile, its economic growth depending heavily on foreign investment and access to foreign markets. Both will now be constricted, inflicting economic pain and perhaps even sparking unrest in a country where political legitimacy rests on progress in the long march to prosperity. None of this is good news if the authoritarian leaders of these countries seek to divert attention from internal travails with external adventures.

**A. Interpretation - Engagement is the use of particular means to influence the political behavior of a state – economic means are trade promotion and aid in the form loans or grants**

**Resnik, 1** – Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yeshiva University (Evan, Journal of International Affairs, “Defining Engagement” v54, n2, political science complete)

A REFINED DEFINITION OF ENGAGEMENT

In order to establish a more effective framework for dealing with unsavory regimes, I propose that we define engagement as the attempt to influence the political behavior of a target state through the comprehensive establishment and enhancement of contacts with that state across multiple issue-areas (i.e. diplomatic, military, economic, cultural). The following is a brief list of the specific forms that such contacts might include:

DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS

Extension of diplomatic recognition; normalization of diplomatic relations

Promotion of target-state membership in international institutions and regimes

Summit meetings and other visits by the head of state and other senior government officials of sender state to target state and vice-versa

MILITARY CONTACTS

Visits of senior military officials of the sender state to the target state and vice-versa

Arms transfers

Military aid and cooperation

Military exchange and training programs

Confidence and security-building measures

Intelligence sharing

ECONOMIC CONTACTS

Trade agreements and promotion

Foreign economic and humanitarian aid in the form of loans and/or grants

CULTURAL CONTACTS

Cultural treaties

Inauguration of travel and tourism links

Sport, artistic and academic exchanges(n25)

Engagement is an iterated process in which the sender and target state develop a relationship of increasing interdependence, culminating in the endpoint of "normalized relations" characterized by a high level of interactions across multiple domains. Engagement is a quintessential exchange relationship: the target state wants the prestige and material resources that would accrue to it from increased contacts with the sender state, while the sender state seeks to modify the domestic and/or foreign policy behavior of the target state. This deductive logic could adopt a number of different forms or strategies when deployed in practice.(n26) For instance, individual contacts can be established by the sender state at either a low or a high level of conditionality.(n27) Additionally, the sender state can achieve its objectives using engagement through any one of the following causal processes: by directly modifying the behavior of the target regime; by manipulating or reinforcing the target states' domestic balance of political power between competing factions that advocate divergent policies; or by shifting preferences at the grassroots level in the hope that this will precipitate political change from below within the target state.

This definition implies that three necessary conditions must hold for engagement to constitute an effective foreign policy instrument. First, the overall magnitude of contacts between the sender and target states must initially be low. If two states are already bound by dense contacts in multiple domains (i.e., are already in a highly interdependent relationship), engagement loses its impact as an effective policy tool. Hence, one could not reasonably invoke the possibility of the US engaging Canada or Japan in order to effect a change in either country's political behavior. Second, the material or prestige needs of the target state must be significant, as engagement derives its power from the promise that it can fulfill those needs. The greater the needs of the target state, the more amenable to engagement it is likely to be. For example, North Korea's receptivity to engagement by the US dramatically increased in the wake of the demise of its chief patron, the Soviet Union, and the near-total collapse of its national economy.(n28)

Third, the target state must perceive the engager and the international order it represents as a potential source of the material or prestige resources it desires. This means that autarkic, revolutionary and unlimited regimes which eschew the norms and institutions of the prevailing order, such as Stalin's Soviet Union or Hitler's Germany, will not be seduced by the potential benefits of engagement.

This reformulated conceptualization avoids the pitfalls of prevailing scholarly conceptions of engagement. It considers the policy as a set of **means rather than ends**, does not delimit the types of states that can either engage or be engaged, explicitly encompasses contacts in multiple issue-areas, allows for the existence of multiple objectives in any given instance of engagement and, as will be shown below, permits the elucidation of multiple types of positive sanctions.

**Text: The People’s Republic of China should [do the plan] including modeling the bayh-dole model of the United States,**

**The CP competes and solves the case – China offers a unique model of economic engagement.**

**Hsiang 09** (Antonio C. Hsiang, Associate Professor at Chihlee Institute of Technology in Taiwan China Rising in Latin America: More Opportunities than Challenges” Journal of Emerging Knowledge on Emerging Markets, Volume 1 issue 1 November 2009)-Karla

Because “many Latin American countries no longer look to Washington leadership,” the so- called Washington Consensus “has lost traction”.28 As a global rising power, China offers an alternative model for Latin America’s development. Even though China has been hurt by the 2008 financial crisis, “its economic and financial powers have been strengthened relative to those of the West. China’s global influence will thus increase, and Beijing will be able to undertake political and economic initiatives to increase it further.” 29 In fact, “Washington seemed to adopt a Chinese-style solution to its escalating financial problems: greater state intervention to restrict the movement of capital.”30 Thus, Beijing’s emergence as a global economic power is seen throughout Latin America as offering an alternative from the Washington Consensus model for economic development. The “Beijing Consensus” is the brainchild of Joshua Cooper Ramo, a former senior editor and foreign editor of Time magazine and later a partner at Kissinger Associates, the consulting firm of former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. According to Ramo, the Beijing Consensus has three features. The first is a commitment to innovation and constant experimentation in reforms. The second, a rejection of per capita GDP as the only measure of progress, as sustainability and equality also count. And the third, a commitment to self- determination. Less developed countries should therefore ensure their own financial integrity and keep great powers in check. 31 The Beijing Consensus has evolved to describe a plethora of alternative plans for economic development in the underdeveloped world. Ramo argues that China and India, who “most pointedly” ignored the World Bank and the IMF-championed Washington Consensus, “now have records that speak for themselves.” 32 Consequently, the so-called the “Beijing Consensus” has been attracting attention in Latin America because of “China’s distinctive development model, . . . [which] posits far more state intervention in the economy and a greater concern with political stability and strong government to guide the development process.” 33

**China’s sphere of influence in Mexico is high – that solves the Mexican economy.**

**Fabens 8/14** (Isabella, Research Associate at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, 8/14/13, “CHINA’S LATEST INVESTMENTS IN MEXICO: THE PLIGHT OF MAQUILADORA WORKERS,” http://www.coha.org/chinas-latest-investments-in-mexico-the-plight-of-maquiladora-workers/)//DR. H

Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto, in the course of a trip to Asia last April, initiated important trade discussions on a stopover in China. [1] In return, Chinese President Xi Jinping returned the courtesy during his visit to Mexico on June 4. [2] Mexico is attempting to reduce its trade deficit with China by exporting some of its natural resources. In return, China is stepping up its role in Latin America as a major consumer of primary products. President Xi’s plans include potential investments in the hydrocarbon and natural gas sectors of the Mexican economy. There is every reason to believe that increased trade between the countries will augment Mexico’s economic growth. The trouble is that, to date, there has been no real consideration given to working conditions in Mexican facilities owned by U.S. companies, which too often pay their workers a low wage and overlook the unsafe conditions under which their employees labor.

Mexico and China

Formal relations between Mexico and China began in 1972 when Mexican President Luis Echeverría Álvarez (1970-1976) established diplomatic ties with the Asian nation. [3] Tensions flared in 2011, however, when Mexican President Felipe Calderón Hinojosa (2006-2012) hosted the Dalai Lama in Mexico City, as China has always considered Tibet to be under its jurisdiction. [4]

Since President Peña Nieto took office on December 1, 2012, he has attempted to rebuild bilateral relations with China and to promote economic growth through heightened foreign investment in natural resources. For his part, President Xi hopes to gain influence in Mexico and elsewhere in the region, as the United States and China move into competition for economic hegemony. [5] In response, Washington has launched a somewhat half-hearted effort to establish closer relations with key Asian countries known to be engines of growth. [6] China seems to be winning this competition, moving forward to achieve important economic victories in Mexico, Latin America’s second largest economy.

**plan trades off—they boost cooperation w/ Meixco**

**Chinese influence is key to its economy.**

**Arnson et al. ‘9** (Cynthia Anderson, Mark Mohr, Riordan Roett, writers for Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, “Enter the Dragon? China’s Presence in Latin America”, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/EnterDragonFinal.pdf) (JN)

China’s role in Latin America is, above all, based on trade, despite U.S. concerns about China’s military inﬂuence in Latin America. The major exception to this rule is Cuba, for which China represents a political relationship as well as one based on economic interests. Although Venezuelan authorities may also prefer that its relationship with China have political as well as economic dimensions, it is not clear that China has the same expectations of its relationship with Venezuela. To China, Latin America represents a signiﬁcant source of the necessary natural resources that will help China maintain its economic growth. Due primarily to trade with China, Latin America’s trade volume grew from $2.8 billion in 1988 to $49 billion in 2005. Also, and as publicly announced, China intends to surpass $180 billion in trade with Latin America by 2010, not only due to the country’s need for natural resources, but also as a result of China’s intention to diversify and expand its markets in the region. Thus, Latin America represents a substantial market for Chinese goods.

**That causes nuclear war.**

**Auslin, 9** (“Averting Disaster”, Michael is a resident scholar at AEI, The Daily Standard, 2/6/2009, <http://www.aei.org/article/100044>)

As they deal with a collapsing world economy, policymakers in Washington and around the globe must not forget that when a depression strikes, war can follow. Nowhere is this truer than in Asia, the most heavily armed region on earth and riven with ancient hatreds and territorial rivalries. Collapsing trade flows can lead to political tension, nationalist outbursts, growing distrust, and ultimately, military miscalculation. The result would be disaster on top of an already dire situation. No one should think that Asia is on the verge of conflict. But it is also important to remember what has helped keep the peace in this region for so long. Phenomenal growth rates in Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, China and elsewhere since the 1960s have naturally turned national attention inward, to development and stability. This has gradually led to increased political confidence, diplomatic initiatives, and in many nations the move toward more democratic systems. America has directly benefited as well, and not merely from years of lower consumer prices, but also from the general conditions of peace in Asia. Yet policymakers need to remember that even during these decades of growth, moments of economic shock, such as the 1973 Oil Crisis, led to instability and bursts of terrorist activity

**MARKED**

in Japan, while the uneven pace of growth in China has led to tens of thousands of armed clashes in the poor interior of the country. Now imagine such instability multiplied region-wide. The economic collapse Japan is facing, and China's potential slowdown, dwarfs any previous economic troubles, including the 1998 Asian Currency Crisis. Newly urbanized workers rioting for jobs or living wages, conflict over natural resources, further saber-rattling from North Korea, all can take on lives of their own. This is the nightmare of governments in the region, and particularly of democracies from newer ones like Thailand and Mongolia to established states like Japan and South Korea. How will overburdened political leaders react to internal unrest? What happens if Chinese shopkeepers in Indonesia are attacked, or a Japanese naval ship collides with a Korean fishing vessel? Quite simply, Asia's political infrastructure may not be strong enough to resist the slide towards confrontation and conflict. This would be a political and humanitarian disaster turning the clock back decades in Asia. It would almost certainly drag America in at some point, as well. First of all, we have alliance responsibilities to Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the Philippines should any of them come under armed attack. Failure on our part to live up to those responsibilities could mean the end of America's credibility in Asia. Secondly, peace in Asia has been kept in good measure by the continued U.S. military presence since World War II. There have been terrible localized conflicts, of course, but nothing approaching a systemic conflagration like the 1940s. Today, such a conflict would be far more bloody, and it is unclear if the American military, already stretched too thin by wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, could contain the crisis. Nor is it clear that the American people, worn out from war and economic distress, would be willing to shed even more blood and treasure for lands across the ocean. The result could be a historic changing of the geopolitical map in the world's most populous region. Perhaps China would emerge as the undisputed hegemon. Possibly democracies like Japan and South Korea would link up to oppose any aggressor. India might decide it could move into the vacuum. All of this is guess-work, of course, but it has happened repeatedly throughout history. There is no reason to believe we are immune from the same types of miscalculation and greed that have destroyed international systems in the past.

#### Text: The United States federal government should ratify the Intellectual Property Rights of Mexico. The United States federal government should [plan] if and only if the net revenues Mexico receives from the Intellectual Property Rights are used to finance the Mexican Development Fund.

#### CP solves the case and is key to democracy, US oil independence, and Mexico’s economy.

Alberro 05, José Luis, an arbitrator at the World Bank's International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and the American Arbitration Association, April 2005, “A US-Mexico Partnership in Energy: A Policy Of Convenience,” Web Document)//DR. H

Four years have come and gone in the Mexico-US relationship since the almost simultaneous inaugurations of Presidents Bush and Fox. The optimism bred by their first auspicious meetings has given way to aloofness and/or irritation in the post 9/11 era. Indeed, for some in the United States, Porfirio Díaz’s dictum should be turned on its head to state “poor United States, so far away from God and so close to Mexico.” The fact remains that geography is destiny. Moreover, in the post-9/11, post-PRI environment, Mexico and the United States have complementary needs that could become the foundation of a policy of convenience and be the basis for a commitment to further strengthen their long-term economic ties.

President Bush recently stated that his second administration will “pursue more energy … in our own hemisphere so that we're less dependent on energy from unstable parts of the world." Mexico has the largest conventional crude oil proved reserves in North America.

Two thirds into the Fox administration, it is clearer than ever that per capita GDP will not grow lastingly because structural changes have not been implemented. Stagnation translates into weak job creation and migration to the United States. Turning the Mexican economy around will require considerable will and political imagination to carry out profound institutional reforms, but it also calls for debottlenecking physical infrastructure, as well as human capital and technological development. Such expensive investments are a prerequisite for job creation and poverty alleviation and will not be carried out by the private sector on its own: the Mexican government needs to take the lead, while eliminating the obstacles to private investment. Given Mexico’s weak public revenues, financing such projects can only come from leveraging Mexico’s large hydrocarbon resource base.

Mexico and the United States can help each other while pursuing their own interests: a quid pro quo in which the United States helps finance the development of Mexico’s hydrocarbons reserves so that it can double its exports, has the dual effect of decreasing the United States’ dependence on Middle East oil and provide Mexico with additional revenues to fuel a productivity-based growth strategy. Faster economic growth could lead to job creation, poverty alleviation, slowing down undocumented migration, strengthening the middle class and consolidating democracy.

Once before, the United States and Mexico’s complementary needs led to a marriage of convenience. By late 1994, Mexico found itself with more short-term debt coming due than it could repay and a currency it could not defend given that reserves were insufficient. The specter of a debt default similar to the one that had happened 22 years earlier became a concern for the Clinton administration. The “Tequila Crisis” could have spread to US financial markets, weakened as they were by the doubling of interest rates over the previous year. Self-interest created an opportunity for both countries to cooperate.

Along with international financial institutions, the Clinton administration assembled a rescue package backed by oil revenues worth 50 billions dollars that bolstered Mexican solvency. The Mexican government had to accept supervision of the disbursements and had to commit to make prudent use of the resources before it could use them. Mexico’s access to financial markets was reestablished preventing further blows to tight markets, all loans were repaid and both countries came out ahead.

A decade later, a new opportunity has emerged. Again, it entails having the US government play a key role in assembling a financing package backed by oil revenues. But, in this case, the resources would be used not for conjunctural purposes but to transform the very structure of the Mexican economy: invest in oil production to generate additional revenues to invest in a productivity based growth strategy that will benefit both countries. As before, the disbursement of those funds would have to be contingent on accepting supervision and a commitment to make prudent use of them.

#### Democracy is key to solve nuclear war and extinction

Larry **Diamond**, **Hoover Institution Senior Fellow**, **95**

[Stanford Univ. Political Science and Sociology professor, former Baghdad CPA senior adviser,

"Promoting Democracy in the 1990s," <http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/fr.htm>]

This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness. The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built.

#### The aff creates a perfect world that they order themselves to – this engenders hate for the real world, forcing blame on their neighbor

Paul Saurette, PhD in political theory at John Hopkins U, in 96 "I mistrust all systematizers and avoid them': Nietzshce, Arendt and the Crisis of the Will to Order in INternational Relations Theory." Millenium Journal of International Studies. Vol. 25 no. 1 page 3-6

The Will to Order and Politics-as-Making The Philosophical Foundation of the Will to Truth/Order •. I mistrust all systematizers and avoid them. A will to a system is a lack .of ! integrity."

According to Nietzsche, the philosophical foundation of a society is the set of ideas which give meaning to the phenomenon of human existence within a given cultural framework. As one manifestation of the Will to Power, this will to , meaning fundamentally influences the social and political organisation of a particular community.5 Anything less than a profound historical interrogation of the most basic philosophical foundations of our civilization, then, misconceives the origins of values which we take to be intrinsic and natural. Nietzsche suggests, .therefore, that to understand the development of our modem conception of society and politics, we must reconsider the crucial influence of the Platonic formulation of Socratic thought. Nietzsche claims that pre-Socratic Greece based its philosophical justification of life on heroic myths which honoured tragedy and k competition. Life was understood as a contest in which both the joyful and ordered (Apollonian) and chaotic and suffering (Dionysian) aspects of life were accepted and .affirmed as inescapable aspects of human existence.6 However, this •incarnation of the will to power as tragedy weakened, and became unable to sustain meaning in Greek life. Greek myths no longer instilled the self-respect and self-control that had upheld the pre-Socratic social order. -Everywhere the : instincts were in anarchy; everywhere people were.but five steps from excess: the monstrum-in-animo was a universal danger’. No longer willing to accept the tragic hardness and self-mastery of pre-Socratic myth, Greek thought yielded to decadence, a search for a new social foundation which would soften the tragedy of life, while still giving meaning to existence. In this context, Socrates' thought became paramount. In the words of Nietzsche, Socrates saw behind his aristocratic Athenians; he grasped that his case, the idiosyncrasy of his case, was no longer exceptional. The same kind of degeneration was everywhere silently preparing itself: the old Athens was coming to an end—And Socrates understood that the world had need of him —his expedient, his cure and his personal art of self-preservation. Socrates realised that his search for an ultimate and eternal intellectual standard paralleled the widespread yearning for assurance and stability within society. His expedient, his cure? An alternative will to power. An alternate foundation that promised mastery and control not through acceptance of the tragic life, but through the disavowal of the instinctual, the contingent, and the problematic. In response to the failing power of its foundational myths, Greece tried to renounce the very experience that had given rise to tragedy by retreating/escaping into the Apollonian world promised by Socratic reason. In Nietzsche's words, '[rationality was divined as a saviour...it was their last expedient. The fanaticism with which the whole of Greek thought throws itself at rationality betrays a state of emergency: one was in peril, one had only one choice: either to perish, or be absurdly rational....'9 Thus, Socrates codified the wider fear of instability into an intellectual framework. The Socratic Will to Truth is characterised by the attempt to understand and order life rationally by renouncing the Dionysian elements of existence and privileging an idealised Apollonian order. As life is inescapably comprised of both order and disorder however, the promise of control through Socratic reason is only possible by creating a 'Real World\* of eternal and meaningful forms, in opposition to an 'Apparent World of transitory physical existence. Suffering and contingency is contained within the Apparent World, disparaged, devalued, and^ ignored in relation to the ideal order of the Real World. Essential to the Socratic Will to Truth, then, is the fundamental contradiction between the experience of Dionysian suffering in the Apparent World and the idealised order of the Real World. According to Nietzsche, this dichotomised model led to the emergence of a uniquely 'modern'10 understanding of life which could only view suffering as the result of the imperfection of the Apparent World. This outlook created a modern notion of responsibility in which the Dionysian elements of life could be understood only as a phenomenon for which someone, or something is to blame. Nietzsche terms this philosophically-induced condition *ressentiment*. and argues that it signalled a potential crisis of the Will to Truth by exposing the central contradiction of the Socratic resolution. This contradiction, however, was resolved historically through the aggressive universalisation of the Socratic ideal by Christianity. According to Nietzsche,' ascetic Christianity exacerbated the Socratic dichotomisation by employing the Apparent World as the responsible agent against which the ressentiment of life could be turned. Blame for suffering fell on individuals within the Apparent World, precisely because they did not live up to God, the Truth, and the Real World, As Nietzsche wrote, ‘I suffer: someone must be to blame for it’ thinks every sickly sheep. But his shepherd, the ascetic priest tells him: ‘Quite so my sheep! Someone must be to blame for it: but you yourself are this someone, you alone are to blame for yourself,-you alone are to blame for yourself '-This is brazen and.false enough: but one thing, is achieved by it, the direction of ressentiment is altered." Faced, with the collapse of the Socratic resolution and the prospect of meaninglessness, once again, 'one was in peril, one had only one choice: either to perish, or be absurdly rational.... '12 The genius of the ascetic ideal was that it preserved the meaning of the Socratic Will to Power as Will to Truth by extrapolating ad absurdiuin the Socratic division through the redirection of ressentiment against the Apparent World! Through this redirection, the Real World was transformed from a transcendental world of philosophical escape into a model towards which the Apparent World actively aspired, always blaming its contradictory experiences on its own imperfect knowledge and action. This subtle transformation of the relationship between the dichotomised worlds creates the .Will to Order as the defining characteristic of the modern Will to Truth. Unable to accept the Dionysian suffering inherent in the Apparent World, the ascetic ressentiment desperately searches for 'the hypnotic sense of nothingness, the repose of deepest. sleep, in short absence of suffering According to the ascetic model, however, this escape is possible only when the Apparent World perfectly duplicates the Real World. The Will to Order, then, is the aggressive need increasingly to order the Apparent World in line with the precepts of the moral-Truth of the Real World. The ressentiment of the Will to Order, therefore, generates two interrelated reactions. First, ressentiment engenders a need actively to mould the Apparent World in accordance with the dictates of the ideal Apollonian Real World. In order to achieve this," however, the ascetic ideal also asserts that a 'truer', more complete knowledge of the Real World must be established creating an ever-increasing Will-to Truth. This self-perpetuating movement creates an interpretative structure within which everything must be understood and ordered in relation to the ascetic Truth of the Real World. As Nietzsche suggests, [t]he ascetic ideal has a goal—this goal is so universal that all other interests of human existence seem, when compared with it, petty and narrow; it interprets epochs, nations, and men inexorably with a view to this one goal; it permits no other interpretation, no other goal; it rejects, denies, affirms and sanctions solely from the point of view of its interpretation.''1 The very structure of the Will to Truth ensures that theoretical investigation must be increasingly ordered, comprehensive, more True, and closer to the perfection of the ideal. At the same time, this understanding of intellectual theory ensures that it creates practices which attempt to impose increasing order in the Apparent World. With this critical transformation, the Will to Order becomes .the fundamental philosophical principle of modernity.

#### Risk is inherent – their fear of life robs them of everything worth living for. This creates a negative Will to Power which rejects the “bad” parts of life. James Der Derian, 93 professor of political science at the U Massachusetts-Amherst and prof of IR at Brown 93 "The political subject of violence" ed. David Campbell and Michael Dillon, p 101-105

Nietzsche and Interpretive Realism In the last analysis, "love of the neighbor" is always something secondary, partly conventional and arbitrary—illusory in relation to fear of the neigh-bor. After the structure of society is fixed on the whole and seems secure against external dangers, it is this fear of the neighbor that again creates new perspectives of moral valuation. —Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil Nietzsche transvalues both Hobbcss and Marx's interpretations of securi-ty through a genealogy of modes of being. His method is not to uncover some deep meaning or value for security, but to destabilize the intolerable fiaional identities of the past which have been created out of fear, and to affirm the creative differences which might yield new values for the future.33 Originating in the paradoxical relationship of a contingent life and a certain death, the history of security reads for Nietzsche as an abnegation, a resentment and, finally, a transcendence of this paradox. In brief, the history is one of individuals seeking an impossible security from the most radical "other" of life, the terror of death which, once generalized and nationalized, triggers a futile cycle of collective identities seeking security from alien others—who are seeking similarly impossible guarantees. It is a story of differences taking on the otherness of death, and identities calcifying into a fearful sameness. Since Nietzsche has suffered the greatest neglect in international theory, his reinterprctation of security will receive a more extensive treatment here. One must begin with Nietzsche's idea of the will to power, which he clearly believed to be prior to and generative of all considerations of security. In Beyond Good and Evil, he emphatically establishes the primacy of the will to power: "Physiologists should think before putting down the instinct of self-preservation as the cardinal instinct of an organic being. A living thing seeks above all to discharge its strength—life itself is will to power; self-preservation is only one of the most frequent results."34 The will to power, then, should not be confused with a Hobbesian perpetual desire for power. It can, in its negative form, produce a reactive and resentful longing for only power, leading, in Nietzsche's view, to a triumph of nihilism. But Nietzsche refers to a positive will to power, an active and affective force of becoming, from which values and meanings—including self-preservation—are produced which affirm life. Conventions of security act to suppress rather than confront the fears endemic to life, for "... life itself is essentially appropriation, injury, overpowering of what is alien and weaker; suppression, hardness, imposition of ones own forms, incorporation and at least, at its mildest, exploitation—but why should one always use those words in which slanderous intent has been imprinted for ages."35 Elsewhere Nietzsche establishes the pervasiveness of agonism in life: "life is a consequence of war, society itself a means to war.” But the denial of this permanent condition, the effort to disguise it with a con-sensual rationality or to hide from it with a fictional sovereignty, are all effects of this suppression of fear. The desire for security is manifested as a collective resentment of difference—that which is not us, not certain, not predictable. Complicit with a negative will to power is the fear-driven desire for protection from the unknown. Unlike the positive will to power, which produces an aesthetic affirmation of difference, the search for truth produces a truncated life which conforms to the rationally knowable, to the causally sustainable. In The Gay Science, Nietzsche asks of the reader "Look, isn't our need for knowledge precisely this need for the familiar, the will to uncover everything strange, unusual, and questionable, something that no longer disturbs us? Is it not the instinct of fear that bids us to know? And is the jubi lation of those who obtain knowledge not the jubilation over the restora-tion of a sense of security?\*\*37 The fear of the unknown and the desire for certainty combine to produce a domesticated life, in which causality and rationality become the highest sign of a sovereign self, the surest protection against contingent forces. The fear of fate assures a belief that everything reasonable is true, and everything true, reasonable. In short, the security imperative pro-duces, and is sustained by, the strategies of knowledge which seek to explain it. Nietzsche elucidates the nature of this generative relationship in The Twilight of the Idols-. The causal instinct is thus conditional upon, and excited by, the feeling of fear. The "why?\*1 shall, if at all possible, not give the cause for its own sake so much as for a particular kind of cause—a cause (hat is comforting, liber-ating and relieving. . . . That which is new and strange and has not been experienced before, is excluded as a cause. Thus one not only searches for some kind of explanation, to serve as a cause, but tor a particularly selected and preferred kind of explanation—that which most quickly and frequently abolished the feeling of the strange, new and hitherto unexperienced: the most habitual explanations.38 A safe life requires safe truths. The strange and the alien remain unexamined, the unknown becomes identified as evil, and evil provokes hostility—recycling the desire for security. The "influence of timidity," as Nietzsche puts it, creates a people who are willing to subordinate affirmative values to the "necessities" of security: "they fear change, transitoriness: this expresses a straitened soul, full of mistrust and evil experiences."39 The unknowable which cannot be contained by force or explained by reason is relegated to the off-world. "Trust," the "good," and other common values come to rely upon an "artificial strength": "the feeling of security such as the Christian possesses; he feels strong in being able to trust, to be patient and composed: he owes this artificial strength to the illusion of being protected by a god."40 For Nietzsche, of course, only a false sense of security can come from false gods: "Morality and religion belong altogether to the psychology of error, in every single case, cause and effect are confused; or truth is confused with the effects of believing something 10 be true; or a state of consciousness is confused with its »4l causes. Nietzsche's interpretation of the origins of religion can shed some light on this paradoxical origin and transvaluation of security. In The Gencalo gy of Morals, Nietzsche sees religion arising from a sense of fear and indebtedness to ones ancestors: The conviction reigns that it is only through the sacrifices and accomplish-ments of the ancestors that the tribe exists—and that one has to pay them back with sacrifices and accomplishments: one thus recognizes a debt that constantly grows greater, since these forebears never cease, in their contin-ued existence as powerful spirits, to accord the tribe new advantages and new strength/2 Sacrifices, honors, obedience arc given but it is never enough, for The ancestors of the most powerful tribts are bound eventually to grow to monstrous dimensions through the imagination of growing fear and to recede into the darkness of the divinely uncanny and unimaginable: in the end the ancestor must necessarily be transfigured into a god.4i As the ancestors debt becomes embedded in institutions, the community takes on the role of creditor. Nietzsche mocks this originary, Hobbesian moment: One lives in a community, one enjoys the advantages of communality (oh what advantages! we sometimes underrate them today), one dwells protected, cared for, in peace and trustfulness, without fear of certain injuries and hostile acts to which the man outside, the "man without peace," is exposed . . . since one has bound and pledged oneself to the community precisely with a view to injury and hostile acts.44 The establishment of the community is dependent upon, indeed it feeds upon, this fear of being left outside. As the castle wall is replaced by written treaty, however, and distant gods by temporal sovereigns, the martial skills and spiritual virtues of the noble warrior are slowly debased and dissimulated. The subject of the individual will to power becomes the object of a collective resentment. The result? The fear of the external other is transvalued into the "love of the neighbor" quoted in the opening of this section, and the perpetuation of community is assured through the internalization and legitimation of a fear that lost its original source long ago. This powerful nexus of fear, of external and internal otherness, generates the values which uphold the security imperative. Indeed, Nietzsche locates the genealogy of even individual rights, such as freedom, in the calculus of maintaining security: - My rights - are that pan of my power which others not merely conceded me, but which they wish me to preserve. How do these others arrive at that? First: through their prudence and fear and caution: whether in that they expect something similar from us in return (protection of their rights); or in that they consider that a struggle with us would be perilous or to no purpose; or in that they sec in any diminution of our force a disadvantage to themselves, since we would then be unsuited to forming an alliance with them in opposition to a hostile third power. Then: by donation and cession.45 The point of Nietzsche's critical genealogy is to show that the perilous conditions that created the security imperative—and the western metaphysics that perpetuate it—have diminished if not disappeared; yet, the fear of life persists: "Our century denies this perilousncss, and docs so with a good conscience: and yet it continues to drag along with it the old habits of Christian security. Christian enjoyment, recreation and evaluation."46 Nietzsche's worry is that the collective reaction against older, more primal fears has created an even worse danger the tyranny of the herd, the lowering of man, the apathy of the last man which controls through conformity and rules through passivity. The security of the sovereign, rational self and state comes at the cost of ambiguity, uncertainty, paradox—all that makes a free life worthwhile. Nietzsche's lament for this lost life is captured at the end of Daybreak in a series of rhetorical questions: Of future virtues—How comes it that the more comprehensible the world has grown the more solemnities of every kind have decreased? Is it that fear was so much the basic clement of that reverence which overcame us in the presence of everything unknown and mysterious and taught us to fall down before the incomprehensible and plead tor mercy? And has the world not lost some of its charm for us because we have grown less fearful? With the diminution of our fearrulness has our own dignity and solemnity, our own fiarsomeness, not also diminished?47 It is of course in Nietzsche's lament, in his deepest pessimism for the last man, that one finds the celebration of the overman as both symptom and harbinger of a more free-spirited yet fearsome age. Dismissive of Utopian engineering, Nietzsche never suggests how he would restructure society; he looks forward only so far as to sight the emergence of "new philosophers" (such as himself?) who would restore a reverence for fear and reevaluate the security imperative. Nietzsche does, however, go back to a pre-Christian, pre-Socratic era to find the exemplars for a new kind of securi iv. In The Genealogy of Morals^ he holds up Pericles as an example, for lauding the Athenians for their "rhatbymia"—a term that incorporates the notion of "indifference to and contempt for security."48 It is perhaps too much to expect Nietzsche's message to resonate in late modern times, to expect, at the very time when conditions seem most uncertain and unpredictable, that people would treat fear as a stimulus for improvement rather than cause for retrenchment. Yet Nietzsche would clearly see these as opportune times, when fear could be willfully asserted as a force for the affirmation of difference, rather than canalized into a cautious identity constructed from the calculation of risks and benefits.

#### Our alternative is to “Do nothing in the instance of the plan.” The refusal to act accepts the inevitability of struggle, allowing us to understand pain positively.

**Nietzsche, ‘78** The anti-christ *Human, All too Human.* Aphorism #284 1878

*The means to real peace*.— No government admits any more that it keeps an army to satisfy occasionally the desire for conquest. Rather the army is supposed to serve for defense, and one invokes the morality that approves of self-defense. But this implies one's own morality and the neighbor's immorality; for the neighbor must be thought of as eager to attack and conquer if our state must think of means of self-defense. Moreover, the reasons we give for requiring an army imply that our neighbor, who denies the desire for conquest just as much as does our own state, and who, for his part, also keeps an army only for reasons of self-defense, is a hypocrite and a cunning criminal who would like nothing better than to overpower a harmless and awkward victim without any fight. Thus all states are now ranged against each other: they presuppose their neighbor's bad disposition and their own good disposition. This presupposition, however, is inhumane, as bad as war and worse. At bottom, indeed, it is itself the challenge and the cause of wars, because, as I have said, it attributes immorality to the neighbor and thus provokes a hostile disposition and act. We must abjure the doctrine of the army as a means of self-defense just as completely as the desire for conquests. And perhaps the great day will come when people, distinguished by wars and victories and by the highest development of a military order and intelligence, and accustomed to make the heaviest sacrifices for these things, will exclaim of its own free will, "We break the sword," and will smash its entire military establishment down to its lowest foundations. Rendering oneself unarmed when one had been the best-armed, out of a height of feeling—that is the means to real peace, which must always rest on a peace of mind; whereas the so-called armed peace, as it now exists in all countries, is the absence of peace of mind. One trusts neither oneself nor one's neighbor and, half from hatred, half from fear, does not lay down arms. Rather perish than hate and fear, and twice rather perish than make oneself hated and feared—this must someday become the highest maxim for every single commonwealth. Our liberal representatives, as is well known, lack the time for reflecting on the nature of man: else they would know that they work in vain when they work for a "gradual decrease of the military burden." Rather, only when this kind of need has become greatest will the kind of god be nearest who alone can help here. The tree of war-glory can only be destroyed all at once, by a stroke of lightning: but lightning, as indeed you know, comes from a cloud—and from up high.

**Epidemics won’t cause extinction**

**Coughlan, 13** – Education correspondent, BBC News (Sean, “How are humans going to become extinct?” BBC News, 4/24, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-22002530)//SY

What are the greatest global threats to humanity? Are we on the verge of our own unexpected extinction? An international team of scientists, mathematicians and philosophers at Oxford University's Future of Humanity Institute is investigating the biggest dangers. And they argue in a research paper, Existential Risk as a Global Priority, that international policymakers must pay serious attention to the reality of species-obliterating risks. Last year there were more academic papers published on snowboarding than human extinction. The Swedish-born director of the institute, Nick Bostrom, says the stakes couldn't be higher. If we get it wrong, this could be humanity's final century. Been there, survived it So what are the greatest dangers? First the good news. Pandemics and natural disasters might cause colossal and catastrophic loss of life, but Dr Bostrom believes humanity would be likely to survive. This is because as a species we've already outlasted many thousands of years of disease, famine, flood, predators, persecution, earthquakes and environmental change. So the odds remain in our favour.

**Burn out checks.**

**Posner 05** – Senior Lecturer at University of Chicago (Richard A, “Catastrophe: the dozen most significant catastrophic risks and what we can do about them.”, Winter, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_kmske/is\_3\_11/ai\_n29167514/pg\_2?tag=content;col1)//WL

Yet the fact that Homo sapiens has managed to survive every disease to assail it in the 200,000 years or so of its existence is a source of genuine comfort, at least if the focus is on extinction events. There have been enormously destructive plagues, such as the Black Death, smallpox, and now AIDS, but none has come close to destroying the entire human race. There is a biological reason. Natural selection favors germs of limited lethality; they are fitter in an evolutionary sense because their genes are more likely to be spread if the germs do not kill their hosts too quickly. The AIDS virus is an example of a lethal virus, wholly natural, that by lying dormant yet infectious in its host for years maximizes its spread. Yet there is no danger that AIDS will destroy the entire human race. The likelihood of a natural pandemic that would cause the extinction of the human race is probably even less today than in the past (except in prehistoric times, when people lived in small, scattered bands, which would have limited the spread of disease), despite wider human contacts that make it more difficult to localize an infectious disease. The reason is improvements in medical science. But the comfort is a small one. Pandemics can still impose enormous losses and resist prevention and cure: the lesson of the AIDS pandemic. And there is always a lust time.

**Status quo solves – clinical testing allows co-op on biotech**

**French, 09** – is the Director for the U.S.-Cuba Policy Initiative at the New America Foundation(Anya Landau, “Options for Engagement A Resource Guide for Reforming U.S. Policy toward Cuba” <http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/library/resources/documents/Cuba/USPolicy/options-for-engagement.pdf>)

William LeoGrande, Dean of the American University’s School of Public Affairs and a specialist in Latin American affairs, wrote in a recent article, “In 2004 and 2006, President Bush authorized U.S. biotechnology firms to import Cuban pharmaceuticals for clinical testing, limiting payment to in-kind medical supplies and equipment. Licensing authority could be used to allow less-restrictive partnerships between U.S. biotechnology firms and the Cuban biotech industry in pursuit of medical advances with broad health benefits.”166Another opportunity would be for the Commerce Department to license individuals subject to U.S. jurisdiction to purchase and deal in artworks and handicrafts produced by Cuban artists, artisans and cooperatives (provided they are not part of confiscated art collections), for the purpose of sale in the United States or other countries. Licensing U.S. entities as dealers, brokers or wholesalers of private Cuban works would help increase the demand for such products in the United States, and would have a positive economic effect for Cuban producers. Although the President does not have the authority to add a wholly new travel license category for such activities, he retains the authority to interpret the existing categories. Travel to Cuba of art and handicraft dealers could fit the definition of support for the Cuban people, which is one of 12 categories of allowable travel to Cuba codified by TSREEA. The Obama Administration could also use its licensing authority to allow the import of a limited amount of Cuban origin goods for personal consumption for licensed travelers to Cuba. The Clinton Administration allowed Americans to bring back $100 worth of Cubanorigin goods (though a law championed by Representative Howard Berman (D-CA) exempts artwork and informational materials from such restrictions), but the Bush Administration eliminated this exemption in 2004. Once again allowing Americans to bring back a limited amount of Cuban goods could be cast as a small gesture of good faith, particularly if the Obama Administration were to raise the amount above the Clinton Administration’s limit. Even with an import ban and non-agricultural export ban in place between the United States and Cuba, there are still areas for constructive trade-related negotiations if the two sides are willing. For instance, the Administration could authorize the United States Trade Representative (USTR) to seek talks with Cuba to streamline customs and other procedures in order to facilitate the trade that is already legal.

**Status quo solves.**

**AP 5/2** (Agripulse, comprehensive weekly report of the latest in agricultural information, 5/2/13, “U.S. agriculture welcomes international biotech agreement,” http://www.agri-pulse.com/Agriculture-welcomes-international-biotech-agreement-05022013.doc.asp)//DR. H

In a joint statement issued Wednesday, the United States, joined by the governments of Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada and Paraguay, announced intentions to work to remove global barriers to the trade of agricultural biotechnology.

The governments agreed to work collaboratively to “Promote the application of science-based, transparent and predictable regulatory approaches that foster innovation and ensure a safe and reliable global food supply, including the cultivation and use of agricultural products derived from innovative technologies.”

Allowing for the trade of biotechnology products and removing “unjustified barriers” is expressly written in the statement, as well as working together to “promote synchronization of authorizations by regulatory authorities, in particular for food, feed and processing purposes” in the biotechnology sector.

The American Seed Trade Association (ASTA), American Soybean Association (ASA), Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO), North American Export Grain Association (NAEGA), National Corn Growers Association (NCGA), and National Grain and Feed Association (NGFA) issued a response applauding the step toward greater collaboration.

“The U.S. agriculture sector agrees that a particular area of concern is the timeliness and efficiency of global regulatory systems,” noted the agricultural groups. “In the joint statement, the like-minded governments have highlighted their intention to promote synchronization of authorizations by regulatory authorities - in particular for food, feed and processing purposes.”

They noted that the six countries provide the vast majority of corn and soybean supply in international markets. The joint statement can be found here.

**Ag resilient – policies check**

**Dave et al 12** (Harsha, United Nations Environmental Programme Report, Avoiding Future Famines: Strengthening the Ecological Foundation of Food Security through Sustainable Food Systems,” http://www.unep.org/publications/ebooks/avoidingfamines/portals/19/UNEP\_Food\_Security\_Report.pdf)//DR. H

9. Another way to make the food system more sustainable is to reorient the food-supply chain. Although significant scaling up is still needed, progress is already being made in this direction through:

(i) the application of life-cycle analysis as a tool to identify opportunities for improving resource efficiency in food supply chains,

(ii) programmes for certification and standard-setting by public/private partnerships,

(iii)the adoption of enlightened sustainability policies by some major food manufacturers and retailers including their commitments to purchase products from environmentally friendly food producers,

(vi) policy actions aimed at promoting innovative cooperative solutions between the public, private sector, and farmers at a national and international level.

#### More testing’s key.

**Schulz 6** (Thomas Schulz, Research associate at the Western Austrailian dept. of agriculture, December 2006, <http://www.climatebabes.com/documents/Algae_biodieselTSDec06.pdf>, DS)

R&D has to be done before the production of micro-algae as a stand alone biofuel project can play a competitive role in the fuel industry. One requirement to achieve the potential of the micro-algae industry is the development of long-term large scale demonstration projects so it can be shown that it is commercially viable to produce biofuels through micro-algae. The cost of these projects will be very high. Hence, the initial application of micro-algae mass cultures for renewable energy production and Greenhouse gas abatement are in the area of human, animal and industrial wastes which contain enough nutrients for algal growth. Nevertheless if algae oil can be produced as a by-product of higher valued algal products and carbon credits can be used to increase the revenue side of these businesses algae oil can play much earlier a role in the future transportation fuel mix.

#### Squo solves Richardson et al. 10 (James Richardson, Regents professor and Texas Agrilife Reseach senior faculty fellow, at the Texas A&M Department of agricultural economics, date not specified, 2010 <http://www.agbioforum.org/v13n2/v13n2a04-richardson.htm>, DS)

Presently, the US Department of Energy has requested proposals to fund a three-year research project for inter-disciplinary consortiums to rapidly advance our ability to produce economical biodiesel from algae. Several consortiums have been formed with the top algae researchers in the United States and a large number of industrial partners. The charge is to develop the science to support a sustainable algae industry in the United States. This turn of events confirms there is continued interest in producing algal oil.

#### 4. The counterplan costs a ton more than regular fuel-it links to spending/tradeoff

**Briggs 4** (By Michael Briggs, University of New Hampshire, Physics Department 10/3/04 “Widescale Biodiesel Production from Algae” http://www.americanenergyindependence.com/algaefarms.aspx)

In "The Controlled Eutrophication process: Using Microalgae for CO2 Utilization and Agircultural Fertilizer Recycling"3, the authors

estimated a cost per hectare of $40,000 for algal ponds. In their model, the algal ponds would be built around the Salton Sea (in the Sonora desert) feeding off of the agircultural waste streams that normally pollute the Salton Sea with over 10,000 tons of nitrogen and phosphate fertilizers each year. The estimate is based on fairly large ponds, 8 hectares in size each. To be conservative (since their estimate is fairly optimistic), we'll arbitrarily increase the cost per hectare by 100% as a margin of safety. That brings the cost per hectare to $80,000. Ponds equivalent to their design could be built around the country, using wastewater streams (human, animal, and agricultural) as feed sources. We found that at NREL's yield rates, 15,000 square miles (3.85 million hectares) of algae ponds would be needed to replace all petroleum transportation fuels with biodiesel. At the cost of $80,000 per hectare, that would work out to roughly $308 billion to build the farms. The operating costs (including power consumption, labor, chemicals, and fixed capital costs (taxes, maintenance, insurance, depreciation, and return on investment) worked out to $12,000 per hectare. That would equate to $46.2 billion per year for all the algae farms, to yield all the oil feedstock necessary for the entire country. Compare that to the $100-150 billion the US spends each year just on purchasing crude oil from foreign countries, with all of that money leaving the US economy.

## **2nc/1nr**

#### **Chinese state counselor’s meeting with Mexico’s ministers proves.**

Yi 8/19 (Yang, 8/19/13, “China, Mexico vow to boost strategic partnership,” http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-08/19/c\_132643988.htm)//DR. H

Chinese State Councilor Yang Jiechi met with a delegation led by three Mexican ministers on Monday, vowing to boost bilateral partnership.

Yang met with Secretary of Foreign Relations Jose Antonio Meade, Secretary of Communications and Transportation Gerardo Ruiz Esparza and Secretary of Tourism Claudia Ruiz Massieu Salinas.

Yang said China attaches great importance to the development of friendly and mutually beneficial cooperation with Mexico.

China will work with Mexico to enrich bilateral strategic partnership in order to benefit the people of the two countries, he said.

Meade said Mexico is ready to work with China to implement the agreements reached by the countries' leaders and expand bilateral cooperation in politics, trade and mutual investment in order to achieve common development goals.

**China’s sphere of influence in Mexico is increasing now.**

**Perrault 6/6** (Mike, 6/6/13, “President Xi uses trip to increase China's influence,” http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/06/06/presidential-china-summit-sunnylands/2397129/)//DR. H

When Chinese President Xi Jinping's four-nation tour of the Americas comes here Friday for a two-day summit with President Barack Obama, area economists and economic development officials say China already will have taken fresh steps to bolster its economic influence in nations such as Costa Rica, Mexico, and Trinidad and Tobago.

Xi took office in March and has used the trip to expand China's exports and relations:

• Friday, the Chinese leader met with Prime Minister Kamla Persad-Bissessar of the Caribbean Republic of Trinidad and Tobago — a nation rich in liquefied natural gas — where they announced they had discussed ways to cooperate in key areas of energy, minerals, infrastructure development, telecommunications and agriculture.

• Monday, Xi met Costa Rican President Laura Chinchilla to discuss commercial and energy projects, including upgrading the Central American country's oil refineries and developing a free-trade zone.

• Tuesday, in Mexico, President Enrique Pena Nieto and business leaders met with Chinese delegates to determine ways to reduce Mexico's large trade deficit while strengthening trade links. Mexican officials said while $57 billion of Mexico's imports — 15% — came from China last year, Mexico only exported $5.7 billion — 1.5% — to China.

"The bottom line is everybody is looking for export markets," said Chapman University economist Esmael Adibi, director of the A. Gary Anderson Center for Economic Research in Orange, Calif. "They're asking, 'Where are the markets that are not fully utilized?' and they're putting their efforts there."

Last year, China eclipsed the United States to become the world's biggest trading nation,

as measured by total exports and imports of goods (excluding services), according to figures both countries released earlier this year.

Chinese exports and imports reached $3.87 trillion last year, the Chinese customs administration reported. The U.S. exports and imports combined for $3.82 trillion in 2012, the Commerce Department said.

China's latest efforts to boost export markets in places such as Latin America and Africa don't surprise Wes Ahlgren, chief operating officer for the Coachella Valley Economic Partnership in Palm Springs, Calif. Ahlgren has traveled to China and Europe on trade missions to promote this area's renewable energy and clean technology opportunities.

During a recent conference call with U.S. state, trade and commerce officials who were in Africa at the time, Ahlgren said it was clear China has already made substantial investments in Latin America and Africa, and China continues to look for markets, resources and ways to expand its influence.

"Similarly, the U.S. foreign policy includes a large component of economic development, foreign military sales, direct investment, support for NGOs (non-government organizations), etc.," Ahlgren said. "Perhaps they are taking a page from our playbook and modeling it to their own vision."

At a time when the USA is under financial pressure and has had to cut aid internationally, China is opening its wallet.

"Because (China) is so rich with foreign currency and surplus, they are willing to make direct investments in these countries to improve their ties," Adibi said. "Whereas we have budgetary constraints."

Chinese officials announced last week they would loan Trinidad and Tobago $250 million to build a children's hospital, for instance.

During his visit to Costa Rica, the Chinese president signed an agreement to grant Costa Rica a $400 million line of credit for energy and infrastructure projects, the countries announced. They also formalized a $900 million loan enabling Costa Rica to upgrade its main oil refinery to process 65,000 barrels a day.

Economists said China needs oil not only for the growing number of cars for its middle class but to fuel all facets of its expanding economy.

Unlike the United States, where some 70% of the economy centers around consumer spending, countries such as China and Japan rely far more heavily on exports, Adibi said.

As Latin American ministers and presidents, business executives and others increasingly recognize China's rapidly growing impact on the world economy, countries such as Argentina, Brazil and Chile have expanded bilateral ties, economists said.

Mexico was among the last of the major Latin American countries to sign free-trade agreements with Beijing, which meant it lost out as China became the principal trade partner to regional competitors such as Brazil and Peru.

Finance 8/23/13 – (SriLanka Finance, “China Continues to replicate in all fields by violating IP rights” Information, Investment, and Wealth, Available online @ http://www.srilankafinance.lk/corporate-news/483-china-continues-to-replicate-in-all-fields-by-violating-ip-rights)//ghs-mm

According to the latest report of the commission on the theft of American intellectual property, China has been the principal focus of U.S. intellectual property rights.¶ According to the latest report of the commission on the theft of American intellectual property, China has been the principal focus of U.S. intellectual property rights (IPR) policy, as its economy developed, China built a sophisticated body of law that includes IPR protection. It has a vibrant, although flawed, patent system. For a variety of historical reasons, however, as well as because of economic and commercial practices and official policies aimed to favor Chinese entities and spur economic growth and technological advancement, China is the world’s largest source¶ of IP theft. In China, where many overseas supply chains extend, even ethical multinational¶ companies frequently procure counterfeit items or items whose manufacture benefits from stolen¶ IP, including proprietary business processes, counterfeited machine tools, pirated software, etc.¶ The major studies range in their estimates of China’s share of international IP theft; many are roughly 70%, but in specific industries we see a broader range. The common belief all around the globe is that taking others property by theft is wrong and unethical, but according to certain factories or industries it is totally legitimate and acceptable and ironically core component of China’s successful growth strategy is acquiring science and technology. It does this in part by legal means—imports, foreign domestic investment, licensing, and joint ventures—but also by means that are illegal. National industrial policy goals in China encourage IP theft, and an extraordinary number of Chinese in business and government entities are engaged in this practice. There are also weaknesses and biases in the legal and patent systems that lessen the protection of foreign IP. In addition, other policies weaken IPR, from mandating technology standards that favor domestic suppliers to leveraging access to the Chinese market for foreign companies’ technologies.¶ The bitter truth is that Chinese industries feel pride in violating IP rights and by expressing that we can copy everything except your mother it feels like China has surpassed all the universal business norms and values and also it would hinder for the countries trade relations with other developed countries.

#### China-US Influence in Latin America is Zero-sum –

#### 1. Resources, Purchasing power, and Geographic Proximity.

Valencia 6/24(Robert, Contributing Writer at Global Voices Online and the World Policy Institute, 6/24/13, “US and China: The Fight for Latin America,” http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2013/06/24/us-and-china-fight-latin-america)//DR. H

During the first weekend of June, U.S. President Barack Obama and Chinese President Xi Jinping met in California to discuss cyber espionage and territorial claims in the Pacific Rim. While tension on these topics has hogged the headlines, the fight for influence in another area could be even more important—Latin America. Other emerging markets in Africa, where China has an overwhelming influence due to foreign direct investment in mining and oil, also offer economic opportunities, but Latin America has an abundance of natural resources, greater purchasing power, and geographic proximity to the United States, which has long considered Latin America as its “backyard.”

The key question now is will Latin American countries lean more toward China or the United States, or will it find a way to balance the two against each other? Right now, Latin American countries are increasingly confident thanks to burgeoning economic and political integration by way of trading blocs, and they're demanding to be treated as an equal player.

As a sign of its growing importance, China and the United States have courted Latin America more than usual. In May, President Barack Obama visited Mexico and Costa Rica while Vice President Joe Biden visited Colombia, Brazil, and Trinidad and Tobago. Shortly after these trips, President Xi went to Mexico and Costa Rica to foster economic cooperation.

China’s active involvement in Latin American geopolitics can be traced back to 2009. Chinalco, China’s largest mining company, signed a $2.2 billion deal with Peru to build the Toromocho mine and a $70 million wharf in the Callao port. Since then, Peru has sent 18.3 percent of its exports to China, making China Peru’s largest trading partner. China’s imports to Peru, however, rank second with 13.7 percent of the market while the United States holds first place with 24.5 percent.

China has the upper hand with the Latin American leftist countries in terms of infrastructure and technology. In 2009, Chinese telephone manufacturer ZTE played an instrumental role in assembling the first mobile phone in Venezuela known as “El Vergatario” (Venezuela slang for optimal). Former President Hugo Chávez introduced this new phone to low-income families making it the world’s cheapest phone ($6.99 for a handset). Additionally, China landed rail construction projects in Argentina and Venezuela and has become a major buyer of farm products and metal in South America. Between 2011 and 2012, China purchased nearly 58.02 million tons of soy from Argentina, up from 52 million in 2011 and 2010.

#### 2. U.S. neglect, costs, and politics.

Fergusson 12(Robbie, Masters in China In The International Arena from the University of Glasgow, e-International Relations, 7/23/12, “The Chinese Challenge to the Monroe Doctrine,” http://www.e-ir.info/2012/07/23/does-chinese-growth-in-latin-america-threaten-american-interests/)//DR. H

The Chinese economic threat to the U.S in the region

The U.S is still the most important economic partner for Latin America, but recently many in the region have felt neglected by Washington, whose focus on terrorism and the middle east and ‘rigid U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America has left regional leaders with no option but to look for other patrons. Net foreign direct investment in Latin America has fallen from $78 billion in 2000 to $36 billion in 2003.” [71] This economic neglect is exacerbating the political grievances of the likes of Hugo Chavez, but the more moderate social democratic governments of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, recently extended the designation of Market Economy Status (MES) to China, something the U.S and the E.U have still denied. MES “substantially diminishes the effect of anti-dumping legislation under World Trade Organization rules. Given the preponderance of non-market factors in the P.R.C.’s economy… there can be little doubt that the three countries made their decision almost exclusively on the basis of China’s growing political and economic influence.” [72] This highlights the politico-economic independence of the U.S that Latin America is exerting.

This is also symptomatic of a deep paradox in the American thinking about how to deal with China. On one hand, tying the nominally communist state to the world economy is expected to bring about economic maturity and gradual political change, but on the other, China is still a U.S rival whose influence China is competing against. The situation is reciprocal, as China views the U.S as “[using] its economic leverage to exert political pressure on China, which is one reason that China seeks to diversify its economic relationships.” [73] In this respect, the U.S has what it wants – China is intrinsically tied to the ideals of the open market – as a lower cost, less politicized alternative to the United States.

#### Mexico is a key strategic partner for overall influence.

Dominguez **0**6. [Jorge, Professor @ Harvard’s Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, "China's Relations With Latin America: Shared Gains, Asymmetric Hopes" Inter-American Dialogue Working Paper -- June -- www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/china.pdf]

Mexico is one of China’s “strategic partners” ¶ in Latin America. Its overall trade importance ¶ for China is second only to Brazil’s in this ¶ region. It is China’s principal export market in ¶ Latin America. Compared to the four South ¶ American countries under discussion, China ¶ runs a substantial bilateral trade surplus with ¶ Mexico (see Tables 3 and 4). From 2000 ¶ to 2004, China’s exports to Mexico nearly ¶ quadrupled while its imports from Mexico ¶ quintupled. The dynamic of Sino-Mexican ¶ trade since 2000 is thus closest to that of ¶ Sino-Brazilian trade, except that China’s ¶ bilateral trade surplus with Mexico also tripled in those years. China is also a significant ¶ foreign direct investor in Mexico; in 2004, the ¶ stock of accumulated Chinese direct investment in Mexico exceeded $28 billion, with ¶ clothing manufacturing accounting for a third ¶ and plastic products nearly a fourth of the total.52 Mexico is the most important Latin ¶ American economy for Chinese investment, ¶ much of which is geared for sales throughout ¶ the North American Free Trade Agreement ¶ (NAFTA) area. China has good reasons to ¶ call Mexico a strategic partner.

#### No warming impacts.

Burnett, 12 – Sterling, Ph.D., Senior Fellow in Environment and Energy at the National Center for Policy Analysis (NCPA), “Fraud and Heartland: A Scandal for Climate Alarmists, not Skeptics,” 2-22, http://environmentblog.ncpa.org/fraud-and-heartland-a-scandal-for-climate-alarmists-not-skeptics/.

Sadly (for him), Peter Gleick, the researcher at issue, could have obtained a good deal of the information he sought through a request for Heartland’s 990, a tax document that non-profits have to provide to any who request it. Rather than going through legitimate channels to obtain what information he could or, better still, questioning the veracity of the initial document he received — and there were many reasons to question that document, among them the fact that it was delivered to him anonymously — using someone else’s name, a Heartland board member — he requested internal documents. Despite all the sound and fury surrounding this episode over the last week, really, nothing new was learned in the memos. As Time Magazine summed it up: “The alleged memos seem to confirm that the Heartland Institute is trying to push it’s highly skeptical view of climate science into the public sphere, which is only surprising if you’ve paid exactly zero attention to the climate debate over the past decade.” Gleick admits that his actions were wrong and apologized but said he did it out of “frustration.” One has to ask, frustration over what? Is he perhaps frustrated with the fact that he and his fellow climate alarmists have, as of yet, been unable to convince Americans that the scientific case for climate action is settled and stampede them into calling for policies that forcibly restrict energy use? Daily polls show more American’s are coming to doubt the argument that human actions are causing a warming that would result in catastrophic climate change. Or perhaps he is frustrated with the fact that an increasing number of scientists – scientists with as good or better credentials and reputations as those who argue that humans are causing warming — continue to highlight the weakness, discrepancies and contradictions that continue to plague global warming theory and demonstrate that the case in far from closed. Perhaps Glieck and his ilk are frustrated because they constantly bray that scientists and think tanks that show skepticism concerning one or another critical point of global warming theory are exceedingly well-funded; when the reality is, and Gleick knows it, these scientists and think tanks are very modestly funded when compared to the billions that are spent to on climate research, politics and on politically favored technologies by governments, billionaires and corporations who will benefit from climate policies, and the non-profit foundations and think tanks that want to use fear of global warming to reshape the Western economic system into what they believe would be a more humane, equitable (socialist), global version of society. A society where international bodies, with bureaucracies staffed by “experts” beyond the reach of crass democratic politics and mass opinion will steer the ship of global-state in the direction of the “true” public good. Time magazine notes that if anything, the Heartland memos debunk the idea of a well-funded “. . . vast right-wing conspiracy,” behind global warming skepticism. Who says the Progressive era has passed?

#### No global solvency, MDR TB is in 90 countries

**Shah et al 7** (N. Sarita Shaw, CDC and WHO, Abigail Wright, Gill-Han Bai, Lucia Barrera, Fadila Boulahlbal, 15 other epidemiology experts, Emerging Infectious Diseases, 13:3, March, "Worldwide emergence of extensively drug-resistant tuberculosis", http://origin.cdc.gov/eid/content/13/3/pdfs/380.pdf)

Multidrug-resistant tuberculosis (MDR TB) has been documented in nearly 90 countries and regions worldwide (1); 424,203 cases of MDR TB were estimated to have occurred in 2004, which is 4.3% of all new and previously treated TB cases (2). Treatment for MDR TB patients requires use of second-line drugs for >24 months. These drugs are more costly, toxic, and less effective than first-line drugs used for routine treatment of TB (3–6). As with other diseases, resistance to TB drugs results primarily from nonadherence by patients, incorrect drug prescribing by providers, poor quality drugs, or erratic supply of drugs (7).

#### No risk of spreading

**Collins and Fidel 07** (Lois M. Collins and Steve Fidel Deseret Morning News June 3, 2007 Sunday) http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/document?\_m=f074682274f46d461ed74eb44d822c9a&\_docnum=17&wchp=dGLbVzb-zSkVA&\_md5=3d7b5016a80a5dee75c1b63bd175e216

The frenzy over tuberculosis spawned by a single "extensively drug-resistant" case is capturing headlines. But most people exposed to the airborne bacteria will never develop active disease. The Atlanta attorney's case has health officials concerned because his TB falls into a class of infections that resists two first-line TB drugs and some second-line drugs -- one of only 49 other extensively drug-resistant cases reported in the United States between 1993 and 2006. There's also a class called multidrug-resistant TB, which is easier to treat than cases like this one but more difficult than typical TB. Although it's harder to kill, it's no easier to spread than any other tubercolosis, according to Carrie Taylor, an infection control practice nurse at LDS Hospital. "You have to breathe in air that's coughed." Doctors treat an average of 38 active TB cases each year in Utah, according to the Utah Department of Health. The disease usually settles in the lungs, although it can affect the kidneys, spine, brain and other organs. The disease is caused by Mycobacterium tuberculosis, which spreads person-to-person but only through close contact. Taylor and her colleague Vickie Anderson, also an infectn-control practice nurse at LDS Hospital, describe it as passing from one person's lungs directly into another's. It's not like a cold that is easily spread and fairly hardy. In fact, sunlight kills it. Unless the individual has a drug-resistant TB strain -- "not common in Utah," said Taylor -- it's very treatable, although it takes a long time and several medications. Left untreated, it can kill. At least initially, patients are isolated to avoid spread of the disease. Both chicken pox and measles are more contagious, said infectious disease specialist Dr. John Kriesel of University Hospital. As an example, when a Provo High School student was recently diagnosed with tuberculosis and health officials asked 250 of the student's school contacts to be tested for it, Kriesel predicted "not one of them will test positive for TB." People in casual contact are extremely unlikely to get the disease. Just being exposed doesn't mean you could pass it on, Taylor said. Without symptoms, you can't spread it, even if you have a positive skin test. People who live with a patient are at higher risk, but most won't get it, either.

#### Uncoordinated testing makes resistant TB inevitable

**The Lancet ‘9** (“Crunch time for tuberculosis control", 373:9670, p. 1145, 4-4, ProQuest)

In 2007, there were 9.3 million incident reports of tuber culosis; half in Asia and a third in Africa. Overall, 1.3 million people were co-infected with HIV. 456 000 co-infected individuals died, making tuberculosis the commonest cause of death in people with HIV/ AIDS. Conversely, HIV/AIDS was responsible for almost a quarter of the 1.7 million deaths in people with tuberculosis. 500 000 people were thought to have MDR-TB and perhaps another 40 000 to have XDR-TB. India and China have the world's largest burdens of incident tuberculosis, 2.0 million and 1.3 million people, respectively, and both have over 100 000 people with MDR-TB. The tragedy-some might say folly-is that established procedures for HIV/AIDS co-infection and MDR-TB have not been implemented widely. In 2004, WHO urged more collaboration between HIV and tuberculosis programmes, with routine testing for HIV in people with tuberculosis and for tuber culosis in people with HIV/AIDS. Testing accelerates diagnosis, improves treatment, and protects immunocompromised with HIV from tuber culosis. However, testing and treatment for the two infections often occur at separate sites. In 2007, the Global Plan targets for intensified case finding were missed worldwide. In Africa, the aim was to test 900 000 people with tuberculosis for HIV and 13 million people with HIV for tuberculosis. Only 500 000 and 300 000, respectively, were screened-and few of those diagnosed with co-infection received appropriate treatment. MDR-TB is encouraged by poor case-detection, treatment with inappropriate drug regimens, and lack of clinical supervision. Almost half of treatment relapses in eastern Europe are from drug-resistant strains. Accurate diagnosis of MDR/ XDR-TB requires drug sensitivity testing in a qualified laboratory. Only 2% of the estimated 500 000 people infected with drug-resistant strains were tested in 2007. And even when diagnosed with this more lethal form of tuberculosis, fewer than 3% received treatment recommended by international guidelines. Mechanisms to ensure best practice have failed at many levels in several countries because of lack of discipline, infrastructure, and resources. Clearly the changing nature of tuberculosis epidemiology demands a reassessment and scaling-up of control measures. To redefine and redirect the actions necessary to combat tuberculosis, resolu tions from the Stop TB Partners Forum will be presented in Beijing on April 1-3, when health ministers from the countries most affected by MDR/ XDR-TB will discuss strategies for tackling drug- resistant infection. To succeed they will need to build consensus, establish political will, and secure sustainable funding.

#### HIV is an alt cause

**IPS ‘9** (Inter Press Service, AllAfrica, "Zimbabwe; doctors fear high risk of drug-resistant TB", 3-3,L/N)

Someone in the world is newly infected with tuberculosis (TB) bacilli every second; overall, one-third of the world's population is currently infected with the TB bacillus. TB is spread through the air when infectious people cough, sneeze, talk or spit, they propel TB germs, known as bacilli, into the air. A person needs only to inhale a small number of these to be infected. Left untreated, each person with active TB disease will infect on average between 10 and 15 people every year. But people infected with TB bacilli will not necessarily become sick with the disease. The immune system "walls off" the TB bacilli which, protected by a thick waxy coat, can lie dormant for years. HIV and TB form a lethal combination, each speeding the other's progress. HIV weakens the immune system; someone who is HIV-positive and infected with TB bacilli is many times more likely to become sick with TB. TB is a leading cause of death among people who are HIV-positive. In Africa, HIV is the single most important factor contributing to the increase in incidence of TB since 1990.

#### Migration makes TB inevitable

**Chest Medicine** **2007** ("The changing face of tuberculosis: a new challenge to the developing world." http://www.priory.com/cmol/tbanga.htm, accessed July 24 2007)

Immigration: the developed world's problem Within the developed world immigration is the greatest factor contributing to the increase in cases. In England 60% of cases are in ethnic minority groups, which comprise only 5% of the population. Of these individuals from the Indian Subcontinent form the majority. For the last two years I have had no less than two Indian doctors on treatment for TB at any time. In should however, be remembered that tuberculosis was a disease which killed one in four people in Western Europe 200 years ago and was effectively exported to what is now the developing world through trade and Empire building. There is occurring a reimportation of disease with migration for economic or political reasons.7.Within the developing world migration is also playing a part for example refugees from Somalia in Kenya or from Afghanistan in Pakistan.

#### Taiwan war won’t happen since nobody cares anymore. They ignore new political shifts

**Saunders and Kastner 09** – \*Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National

Defense University, \*Assistant Professor in the Department of Government and Politics

at the University of Maryland and former China Security Fellow at the Institute for National

Strategic Studies (Phillip and Scott, International Security, 33.4, “Bridge over troubled water? Envisioning a China-Taiwan peace agreement”, http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/isec.2009.33.4.87, WEA)

Most observers agree that the issue of Taiwan’s status is not ripe for resolution. China remains committed to the ultimate goal of unification and refuses to renounce the use of force to prevent Taiwan independence. Former President Jiang Zemin emphasized the goal of unification, and China’s policies sometimes implied a timetable for achievement of that objective.2 China’s policy toward the Taiwan issue, however, has undergone a significant shift under President Hu Jintao, who has emphasized the short-to-medium-term goal of deterring Taiwan independence, postponing unification into the indefinite future.3

On Taiwan, public opinion polls consistently show strong (more than 75 percent) public support for maintaining the status quo. Only a small percentage favors either immediate independence or immediate unification with China.4 Although this polling reflects conditional preferences that factor in the likelihood of China using force if Taiwan were to declare independence,5 it accurately reflects the widespread view on Taiwan that permanent resolution of the issue of Taiwan’s status is not presently possible.

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While the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has sought to mobilize voters by highlighting Taiwan’s separate identity and sought ways to emphasize Taiwan’s sovereignty during President Chen Shui-bian’s term in office, the KMT has adjusted the emphasis in its cross-strait policy to more closely match the views of mainstream Taiwan voters. In the 2008 presidential campaign, KMT candidate (and eventual victor) Ma Ying-jeou articulated “three nos” that would govern policy toward China in his administration. These were a pledge that there would be no pursuit of de jure independence, no negotiations with the mainland about unification, and no use of force.6 President Ma reiterated these points in his May 20, 2008, inaugural address.

Collectively, these positions suggest that China and Taiwan may be prepared to defer the issue of Taiwan’s status for resolution at some point in the future. Both sides have expressed the desire to improve relations, expand cross-strait contacts, and negotiate a peace agreement between Taipei and Beijing. These goals were articulated in the joint press communiqué issued following KMT Chairman Lien Chan’s April 2005 meeting with Chinese President Hu Jintao.7 Hu Jintao reiterated China’s willingness to negotiate a peace agreement with Taiwan in his statements at the October 2007 17th Party Congress: “On the basis of the one-China principle, let us discuss a formal end to the state of hostility between the two sides, reach a peace agreement, construct a framework for peaceful development of cross-straits relations, and thus usher in a new phase of peaceful development.”8 Both candidates in Taiwan’s 2008 presidential election called for negotiation of a peace agreement with Beijing, and President Ma repeated the call in his inaugural address.9 Upon assuming office, Ma moved quickly to restart dialogue between Taiwan’s Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and the PRC’s Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS), the semiofficial bodies that previously served as vehicles for cross-strait dialogue.10

#### c) deterrence checks Taiwan war

**Ross 01** – professor of political science at Boston College, associate at the John King Fairbank Center for East Asian Research, Harvard University (Robert, The National Interest, Fall 01, “The stability of deterrence in the Taiwan Strait”, ProQuest, WEA)

There can never be total confidence that deterrence will work. Yet U.S. deterrence of any actual Chinese use of force against Taiwan-outside of a Taiwan declaration of independence-is highly stable. Overwhelming U.S. superiority means that the strategic, economic and political costs to China of U.S. military intervention would be astronomical. U.S. conventional superiority and its strong political commitment to Taiwan mean that the credibility of the U.S. threat to intervene is very high. In an insecure world, the U.S. deterrent posture in the Taiwan Strait is an unusually secure one.

#### d) no escalation – China won’t use nukes

**Pike 04 –** (John, Global Security, China’s Options in the Taiwan Confrontation, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/taiwan-prc.htm)

China would almost certainly not contemplate a nuclear strike against Taiwan, nor would Beijing embark on a course of action that posed significant risks of the use of nuclear weapons. The mainland's long term goal is to liberate Taiwan, not to obliterate it, and any use of nuclear weapons by China would run a substantial risk of the use of nuclear weapons by the United States. An inability to control escalation beyond "demonstrative" detonations would cause utterly disproportionate destruction.

#### e) political shifts and no US-intervention means no escalation

**Pei 06** – (Minxin, senior associate and director of the China program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2/8. “Chen’s Gamble to Stay Relevant” Straits Times, Carnegie Endowment)

Not too long ago, the nightmarish scenario of an armed conflict between mainland China and Taiwan captured the attention of East Asia. After winning his re-election to the presidency under controversial circumstances in March 2004, Taiwan's Chen Shui-bian began a high-stakes gamble to test China's bottom line. He not only escalated the rhetoric about making Taiwan a 'normal nation', but also backed up his words with a plan to hold an island-wide referendum on a new Constitution as a legal vehicle to solidify Taiwan's permanent separation from mainland China. Two years later, things could hardly be more different. The spectre of a war across the Taiwan Strait has receded. In the much improved Sino-American relationship, the contentious Taiwan issue no longer dominates the agenda. In fact, Taiwan was largely an afterthought in recent high-level exchanges between Chinese and American leaders. Topping the discussions between Washington and Beijing today are more pressing global and regional security issues: curbing North Korea's nuclear ambition, pressuring Iran to give up its plans for uranium enrichment and, more importantly, searching for a new framework for US-China relations. The reduction of tensions across the Taiwan Strait comes as welcome news to East Asia. In the past year, a combination of developments has turned the tide against the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). The political fortunes of the DPP, which rose to power in 2000 by championing a new Taiwanese identity and recklessly challenged the fragile status quo in the Taiwan Strait, has been waning. Its leadership has lost credibility, both with a majority of Taiwan's voters and with Washington. Indeed, two years before he moves out of the presidential palace in Taipei, Mr Chen is struggling to stay relevant. Broadly speaking, three seismic changes since President Chen's re-election victory two years ago have greatly altered the short- to medium-term political landscape both in Taiwan and across the Taiwan Strait. First, alarmed by Mr Chen's thinly disguised ploy to seek de jure independence through the passage of a new Constitution enacted by a plebiscite, Taiwan's voters decided to end the President's gambit by refusing to give the DPP a majority in the island's legislative chamber (a condition which would be necessary to give a new Constitution any realistic chance of passage) in the watershed election of December 2004. The DPP's electoral nemesis, the so-called pan-blue alliance, consisting of two opposition parties - the Kuomintang and the People First Party – that advocate a moderate approach to mainland China, managed to retain its slim legislative majority. This stunning rebuke by Taiwan's democratic process halted the momentum of the pro-independence movement almost overnight. Constrained by an opposition-controlled legislature and rising public discontent with his poor governing record, President Chen lost his ability to set Taiwan's policy agenda and direction. Of course, things went from bad to worse at the end of last year when the DPP suffered a massive defeat in local elections. Second, China's new leadership adjusted its Taiwan policy in two dramatic directions. On the one hand, Beijing's new leaders concluded that they must make their threat of military action credible. Consequently, the mainland accelerated military preparations for a conflict with Taiwan in light of Mr Chen's vow to pass a new Constitution. Chinese leaders also set in motion a legislative process to obtain pre-authorisation for the use of force - which culminated in the passage of an 'anti-secession law' in March last year. On the other hand, China's President Hu Jintao coupled the threat of the use of force with a charm offensive, inviting the leaders of Taiwan's main opposition parties to visit the mainland and offering a package of economic benefits and goodwill gestures (a pair of pandas) to Taiwan. While wooing the Taiwanese opposition and business community, Beijing also intensified the isolation of Mr Chen, refusing to deal with him unless he accepts the 'one China' principle, which stipulates that the mainland and Taiwan both belong to the same China. Caught offguard by Beijing's 'panda offensive', Mr Chen's government was unable to counter the mainland's new policy initiatives and could offer no reassuring message to a Taiwanese public that had grown increasingly weary of the DPP's divisive ethno-nationalist policies and was interested in returning the cross-strait relationship to a more stable footing. Third, President George W. Bush, perhaps the most pro-Taiwan American president in history, re-adjusted his policy in late 2004. Although the Bush administration approved the largest arms package for sale to Taiwan in 2001 and substantially upgraded ties with Taiwan in the past five years, Washington was greatly alarmed by Mr Chen's apparent strategy of taking advantage of US support and seeking a dangerous confrontation with mainland China. Obviously, the United States has no interest in fighting for Taiwan's de jure independence even though it continues to deter China from seeking reunification through military means. In addition, with its strategic attention focused on Iraq, the war on terrorism, Iran and North Korea, the Bush administration needs China's cooperation on a wide range of issues and wants to prevent a needless conflict between the mainland and Taiwan. Washington has also grown increasingly impatient with Mr Chen, who has surprised the Bush administration on numerous occasions with statements that were viewed as irresponsible, fickle and reckless. Consequently, Washington cooled its support for Taipei and became explicit in its opposition to the so-called 'unilateral change of the status quo', a veiled reference to Mr Chen's plans to alter Taiwan's constitutional and political status. The cumulative effects of these developments significantly undermined Mr Chen's effectiveness and increased his frustrations. Struggling to regain the political initiative after the DPP's disastrous performance in last December's local polls, Mr Chen recently reshuffled his government. He appointed two heavyweight loyalists, Mr Su Tseng-chang and Ms Tsai Ing-wen, as Premier and Vice-Premier respectively. Both are viewed as hardliners on China policy. Defying public expectations that, chastened by his party's electoral losses, he would adopt a more conciliatory tone towards the mainland, the Taiwanese President has apparently decided to escalate tensions with Beijing (and Washington) again. In the past month, Mr Chen has vowed to tighten cross-strait trade and investment, scrap the symbolic National Reunification Council, seek admission to the United Nations under the name 'Taiwan' (not the Republic of China) as well as enact a new Constitution through a plebiscite. All these steps, if carried out, would re-ignite tensions across the Taiwan Strait. Mr Chen conceivably could benefit from the tensions because these acts would energise his base and allow him to dominate Taiwan's policy agenda again. It is too early to tell whether Mr Chen's gamble will pay off. So far, Beijing has reacted coolly to his latest provocations, relying instead on Washington to restrain Taipei. The Bush administration, surprised again by Mr Chen's pronouncements, has made its irritation public and criticised Taipei for trying to change the status quo. But in Taiwan, Mr Chen's confrontational stance has failed to rally the public. For the short term, his gambit has got him enough public attention to show his political relevance.

# Round 3 – Neg vs. Carrollton Mexico Biofuels Aff

## 1nc

**The debt ceiling will pass but it will be a fight**

**Washington Post, 9/15/13** (“Congress can turn back to the budget now” <http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/congress-can-turn-back-to-the-budget-now/2013/09/15/e05c975c-1ca5-11e3-82ef-a059e54c49d0_story.html>)

WITH PRESIDENT Obama’s bid for congressional support for a military strike against Syria on hold for the time being, members of the House and Senate can devote their attention to what was previously supposed to have been their priority for September: avoiding a potential political and economic train wreck over the federal government’s finances.

Specifically, Congress needs to fund the government after the current spending law expires on Sept. 30, and it needs to raise the $16.7 trillion debt limit, which will be reached sometime in the second half of October, and which must be increased to avoid the possibility of a U.S. default.

Alas, these two pieces of what should be routine business have become entangled in the politics of Obamacare, which is to say the decreasingly comprehensible politics of the House Republican caucus. A sizable minority of GOP members insists on “defunding” the health care law before the major parts of it begin to take effect in January. According to a recent Congressional Research Service analysis, this is an operationally futile goal. It would be bad policy even if it were possible.

What’s more, it’s bad politics for the GOP to risk a government shutdown in pursuit of this chimera — a fact Speaker John A. Boehner (R-Ohio) recognizes but which has, so far, failed to sway his back-benchers. This is why Democrats are content, for now, to sit back and cheer on the Republicans’ internal feud. Also, that’s easier than countering the Republicans’ anti-Obamacare crusade with realistic budget alternatives.

How this latest impasse plays out is anyone’s guess, though there are plausible scenarios under which Mr. Boehner can give the ultras in his caucus a chance to vote one more time against Obamacare, while engineering Democratic acquiescence in a short-term continuation of the current $988 billion annual spending rate. Such a result would avoid a partial government shutdown — for a few months.

The debt ceiling, too, probably can be finessed, as it has been in the past. Exactly how is admittedly difficult to predict given Mr. Obama’s insistence that raising it is not negotiable and Mr. Boehner’s seemingly incompatible insistence that he won’t increase Washington’s borrowing capacity except in return for progress on deficit reduction. But a default would not be in either side’s political interest.

#### Biofuels are unpopular

SustainableBusiness.com, 4.18.13

[“Big Oil Prefers to Crush Renewables Rather Than Invest in Them:, http://www.sustainablebusiness.com/index.cfm/go/news.display/id/24788, accessed: 7/10/13, ML]

BP dropped its long-standing solar and wind divisions, Shell focuses on how wind energy can assist fossil fuel extraction, and Exxon and Chevron have pulled back from biofuels. And with the help of ALEC, the oil industry is attempting to eliminate the US Renewable Fuel Standard and prevent California and the Northeast from implementing local standards. Why? Because big oil has discovered that since they make much bigger money by sticking with their core business, why bother branching out? Instead, it's much easier to crush competing forms of energy. In 2007, when Chevron was exploring biofuels, it helped California Governor Schwarzenegger write the first-in-the-nation Low Carbon Standard, that by 2020 will cut greenhouse gases from cars and trucks by 10% below 2010 levels. It was passed in 2011 and the state is on track to meet the goal. Transportation fuels account for 36% of California's emissions. Now, the company is leading the charge against it because "it is not achievable." Why? Because they can only get 5% returns on biofuels when they get triple that from oil, reports Bloomberg. In the US, transportation fuels are a $500 billion market. "The best outcome for the oil companies is if nothing changes," Paul Bryan, former vice president of biofuels for Chevron, told Bloomberg. "You can make money today making advanced biofuels - you just won't make as much money as the oil companies would like." He left Chevron in 2010 after working there for 15 years. They have since wound down those investments. ExxonMobil Corp., which splashed television ads for years touting their foray into algae-based fuels, has largely retreated from those efforts. While the companies accept the science of climate change and its causes, they say California's law must be stopped because substitute technologies are too far down the road and until then, the result will be much higher gas prices and loss of jobs (since when are they concerned about this?). Several organizations funded by the oil lobby are working against low carbon fuel standards. Fueling California spent over $327,000 in the last two years lobbying against them and the Consumer Energy Alliance runs campaigns instilling fear of losing hundreds of thousands of jobs from these mandates. That resulted in a New Hampshire law passed last year that prohibits participation in the proposed Northeast Clean Fuel Standard without legislative approval, reports Bloomberg. ALEC is urging other states to adopt that same law because it doesn't want the government to "dictate" peoples' choice of fuels. From 2009-2010, when federal climate legislation almost passed, big oil spent half a billion dollars lobbying against it. Nine of the 10 top scientists that produce research questioning climate change are linked to ExxonMobil.

**Capital is finite and spending it elsewhere prevents a debt ceiling deal**

**Moore, 9/10/13 -** Guardian's US finance and economics editor.(Heidi, “Syria: the great distraction” The Guardian, <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/sep/10/obama-syria-what-about-sequester>)

The country will crash into the debt ceiling in mid-October, which would be an economic disaster, especially with a government shutdown looming at the same time. These are deadlines that Congress already learned two years ago not to toy with, but memories appear to be preciously short.

The Federal Reserve needs a new chief in three months, someone who will help the country confront its raging unemployment crisis that has left 12 million people without jobs. The president has promised to choose a warm body within the next three weeks, despite the fact that his top pick, Larry Summers, would likely spark an ugly confirmation battle – the "fight of the century," according to some – with a Congress already unwilling to do the President's bidding.

Congress was supposed to pass a farm bill this summer, but declined to do so even though the task is already two years late. As a result, the country has no farm bill, leaving agricultural subsidies up in the air, farmers uncertain about what their financial picture looks like, and a potential food crisis on the horizon.

The two main housing agencies, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, have been in limbo for four years and are desperately in need of reform that should start this fall, but there is scant attention to the problem.

These are the problems going unattended by the Obama administration while his aides and cabinet members have been wasting the nation's time making the rounds on television and Capitol Hill stumping for a profoundly unpopular war. The fact that all this chest-beating was for naught, and an easy solution seems on the horizon, belies the single-minded intensity that the Obama White House brought to its insistence on bombing Syria.

More than one wag has suggested, with the utmost reason, that if Obama had brought this kind of passion to domestic initiatives, the country would be in better condition right now. As it is, public policy is embarrassingly in shambles at home while the administration throws all of its resources and political capital behind a widely hated plan to get involved in a civil war overseas.

The upshot for the president may be that it's easier to wage war with a foreign power than go head-to-head with the US Congress, even as America suffers from neglect.

This is the paradox that President Obama is facing this fall, as he appears to turn his back on a number of crucial and urgent domestic initiatives in order to spend all of his meager political capital on striking Syria.

Syria does present a significant humanitarian crisis, which has been true for the past two years that the Obama administration has completely ignored the atrocities of Bashar al-Assad.

Two years is also roughly the same amount of time that key domestic initiatives have also gone ignored as Obama and Congress engage in petty battles for dominance and leave the country to run itself on a starvation diet imposed by sequestration cuts. Leon Panetta tells the story of how he tried to lobby against sequestration only to be told:

Leon, you don't understand. The Congress is resigned to failure.

Similarly, those on Wall Street, the Federal Reserve, those working at government agencies, and voters themselves have become all too practiced at ignoring the determined incompetence of those in Washington.

Political capital – the ability to horse-trade and win political favors from a receptive audience – is a finite resource in Washington. Pursuing misguided policies takes up time, but it also eats up credibility in asking for the next favor. It's fair to say that congressional Republicans, particularly in the House, have no love for Obama and are likely to oppose anything he supports. That's exactly the reason the White House should stop proposing policies as if it is scattering buckshot and focus with intensity on the domestic tasks it wants to accomplish, one at a time.

**Default will destroy the U.S. and global economy**

**Davidson, 9/10/13** – co-founder of NPR’s Planet Money (Adam, “Our Debt to Society” New York Times, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/15/magazine/our-debt-to-society.html?pagewanted=all>)

If the debt ceiling isn’t lifted again this fall, some serious financial decisions will have to be made. Perhaps the government can skimp on its foreign aid or furlough all of NASA, but eventually the big-ticket items, like Social Security and Medicare, will have to be cut. At some point, the government won’t be able to pay interest on its bonds and will enter what’s known as sovereign default, the ultimate national financial disaster achieved by countries like Zimbabwe, Ecuador and Argentina (and now Greece). In the case of the United States, though, it won’t be an isolated national crisis. If the American government can’t stand behind the dollar, the world’s benchmark currency, then the global financial system will very likely enter a new era in which there is much less trade and much less economic growth. It would be, by most accounts, the largest self-imposed financial disaster in history.

Nearly everyone involved predicts that someone will blink before this disaster occurs. Yet a small number of House Republicans (one political analyst told me it’s no more than 20) appear willing to see what happens if the debt ceiling isn’t raised — at least for a bit. This could be used as leverage to force Democrats to drastically cut government spending and eliminate President Obama’s signature health-care-reform plan. In fact, Representative Tom Price, a Georgia Republican, told me that the whole problem could be avoided if the president agreed to drastically cut spending and lower taxes. Still, it is hard to put this act of game theory into historic context. Plenty of countries — and some cities, like Detroit — have defaulted on their financial obligations, but only because their governments ran out of money to pay their bills. No wealthy country has ever voluntarily decided — in the middle of an economic recovery, no less — to default. And there’s certainly no record of that happening to the country that controls the global reserve currency.

Like many, I assumed a self-imposed U.S. debt crisis might unfold like most involuntary ones. If the debt ceiling isn’t raised by X-Day, I figured, the world’s investors would begin to see America as an unstable investment and rush to sell their Treasury bonds. The U.S. government, desperate to hold on to investment, would then raise interest rates far higher, hurtling up rates on credit cards, student loans, mortgages and corporate borrowing — which would effectively put a clamp on all trade and spending. The U.S. economy would collapse far worse than anything we’ve seen in the past several years.

**Nuclear war**

**Friedberg and Schoenfeld 8**

[Aaron, Prof. Politics. And IR @ Princeton’s Woodrow Wilson School and Visiting Scholar @ Witherspoon Institute, and Gabriel, Senior Editor of Commentary and Wall Street Journal, “The Dangers of a Diminished America”, 10-28, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122455074012352571.html>]

Then there are the dolorous consequences of a potential collapse of the world's financial architecture. For decades now, Americans have enjoyed the advantages of being at the center of that system. The worldwide use of the dollar, and the stability of our economy, among other things, made it easier for us to run huge budget deficits, as we counted on foreigners to pick up the tab by buying dollar-denominated assets as a safe haven. Will this be possible in the future? Meanwhile, traditional foreign-policy challenges are multiplying. The threat from al Qaeda and Islamic terrorist affiliates has not been extinguished. Iran and North Korea are continuing on their bellicose paths, while Pakistan and Afghanistan are progressing smartly down the road to chaos. Russia's new militancy and China's seemingly relentless rise also give cause for concern. If America now tries to pull back from the world stage, it will leave a dangerous power vacuum. The stabilizing effects of our presence in Asia, our continuing commitment to Europe, and our position as defender of last resort for Middle East energy sources and supply lines could all be placed at risk. In such a scenario there are shades of the 1930s, when global trade and finance ground nearly to a halt, the peaceful democracies failed to cooperate, and aggressive powers led by the remorseless fanatics who rose up on the crest of economic disaster exploited their divisions. Today we run the risk that rogue states may choose to become ever more reckless with their nuclear toys, just at our moment of maximum vulnerability. The aftershocks of the financial crisis will almost certainly rock our principal strategic competitors even harder than they will rock us. The dramatic free fall of the Russian stock market has demonstrated the fragility of a state whose economic performance hinges on high oil prices, now driven down by the global slowdown. China is perhaps even more fragile, its economic growth depending heavily on foreign investment and access to foreign markets. Both will now be constricted, inflicting economic pain and perhaps even sparking unrest in a country where political legitimacy rests on progress in the long march to prosperity. None of this is good news if the authoritarian leaders of these countries seek to divert attention from internal travails with external adventures.

**Mexico is turning towards China for energy dependence.**

**Garcia 8/9** (David, 8/9/13, “Mexico ramping up oil exports to China, India,” http://in.reuters.com/article/2013/08/09/mexico-oil-idINDEE97809B20130809)//DR. H

Mexico is pushing to double crude oil exports to China next year and boost India-bound shipments, the next stage of a long-term plan to diversify oil sales away from an increasingly energy-independent United States.

Mexico is also open to importing light crude supplies from the United States, the country's top oil trade executive said in an interview, a sign that the world's No. 10 oil producer may be ready to give up decades of total crude oil self-sufficiency in order to take advantage of a growing glut of U.S. shale oil.

"We expect to market increasing volumes of our crudes" to both China and India, said Luis Felipe Luna, CEO of P.M.I. Comercio Internacional, the international oil trading arm of Mexico's state oil monopoly Pemex.

Crude oil shipments to China, which have risen from zero in 2010 to more than 20,000 bpd so far this year, will reach a yearly average of 30,000 barrels per day (bpd) but could more than double in 2014, said Luna.

**US influence directly trades off with China – every barrel of oil purchased is a barrel lost.**

**Fergusson 12** (Robbie, Masters in China In The International Arena from the University of Glasgow, e-International Relations, 7/23/12, “The Chinese Challenge to the Monroe Doctrine,” http://www.e-ir.info/2012/07/23/does-chinese-growth-in-latin-america-threaten-american-interests/)//DR. H

American concerns over displacement

The U.S has some reason to be concerned by the economic implications of China’s resource drive in Latin America because “while the United States has traditionally looked to Latin America as its source of numerous raw materials and a market for its finished products, China is fast replacing the United States in these roles.” [37] The United States has no intention of being usurped in its role as chief beneficiary of the regions energy resources, but “for every barrel of oil that China purchases from Latin America, there is potentially one less barrel available for the U.S” [38] It is of course extremely premature to be using words such as usurped as China’s involvement in the region is at a very early stage and its energy interests are not overly well defined, but already, “China’s total consumption of the five basic commodities – grain, meat, oil, coal and steel – has already surpassed that of the USA in all but oil,” [39] leading many analysts such as Hutton to wonder how the global supply of energy can cope with the emergence of such a hungry economy without conflict over increasingly scarce resources. [40]

The development of China and its interests in the region is therefore key. Roett & Paz argue that “what matters most… for Sino-Latin American energy relations is not where China is today but how it compares with its position in the world at the start of the twenty-first century and where it is likely to be in 2030.” [41] Due to the triangular relationship between China, the U.S, and Latin America, any shift of the equilibrium towards China cannot fail to impact upon the United States. Bajpaee moots the idea:

While not a zero-sum game, growing inter-linkages and interdependence between China and Latin America is likely to come at the cost of the United States’ relations with its neighbours, which will only undermine U.S ability to access the region’s energy resources. This will force the U.S to rely on energy resources from more remote and less stable regions, such as West Africa, the Caspian and the Middle East. [42]

**That’s key to Chinese energy security and prevents oil shocks.**

**Xiaoxia 5/6** – (2013, Wen, Economic Observer, Worldcrunch, “IN AMERICA'S BACKYARD: CHINA'S RISING INFLUENCE IN LATIN AMERICA,” http://www.worldcrunch.com/china-2.0/in-america-039-s-backyard-china-039-s-rising-influence-in-latin-america/foreign-policy-trade-economy-investments-energy/c9s11647/)

Initially, China’s activities in Latin America were limited to the diplomatic level. By providing funds and assisting in infrastructure constructions, China managed to interrupt diplomatic ties between poor Latin countries and Taiwan. Since then, with China's economic boom, the supply of energy and resources has gradually become a problem that plagues China -- and its exchanges with Latin America thus are endowed with real substantive purpose. Among the numerous needs of China, the demand for oil has always been the most powerful driving force. In the past 30 years, China has consumed one-third of the world's new oil production and become the world's second-largest oil importer. More than half of China's oil demand depends on imports, which increases the instability of its energy security. Diversification is inevitable. In this context, Latin America and its huge reserves and production capacity naturally became a destination for China. China must better protect its energy supply, and can't just play the simple role of consumer. It must also help solidify the important links of the petroleum industry supply chain. Indeed, the China National Petroleum Corporation frequently appears in Latin American countries, and China’s investment and trade in the Latin American countries are also focused on its energy sector. In the opinion of many European and American scholars, China's current practice isn’t much different from that of Western colonizers of the last century. These scholars believe that China doesn’t care about local human rights or the state of democracy when dealing with countries. All China is interested in is establishing long-term, stable economic relations. This realistic path is exactly opposite to that of America's newfound idealism. Thus China has become a close collaborator of certain Latin American countries, such as Venezuela, that are in sharp conflict with the United States. The global financial crisis of 2008 was a chance for China to become an increasingly important player in Latin American. As Europe and the United States were caught in a financial quagmire, China, with nearly $3 trillion of foreign exchange reserves as backing, embarked on "funds-for-assets" transactions with Latin American countries. So what does China want exactly in entering Latin American? Is it to obtain a stable supply of energy and resources, and thus inadvertently acquire political influence? Or the other way round? Presumably most U.S. foreign policy-makers are well aware of the answer. China's involvement in the Latin American continent doesn’t constitute a threat to the United States, but brings benefits. It is precisely because China has reached "loans-for-oil" swap agreements with Venezuela, Brazil, Ecuador and other countries that it brings much-needed funds to these oil-producing countries in South America. Not only have these funds been used in the field of oil production, but they have also safeguarded the energy supply of the United States, as well as stabilized these countries' livelihood -- and to a certain extent reduced the impact of illegal immigration and the drug trade on the U.S. For South America, China and the United States, this is not a zero-sum game, but a multiple choice of mutual benefits and synergies. Even if China has become the Latin American economy’s new upstart, it is still not in a position to challenge the strong and diverse influence that the United States has accumulated over two centuries in the region.

**Energy insecurity sparks Asian war**

**Clement ’12** [Nicholas, China and India Vie for Energy Security, May 25, <http://www.2point6billion.com/news/2012/05/25/china-and-india-vie-for-energy-security-11177.html>]

The competitive relationship between China and India has become a defining feature of the strategic environment across emerging Asia. While both nations are currently not in direct conflict, there are several areas of strategic interest which could potentially be clashing points in the future. Energy security is one such point; and while escalation between China and India is unlikely, it is important to note that the energy policies of each nation are largely based on geopolitical considerations. First, it is important to recognize that energy cooperation between China and India over the past decade has been increasing. In January 2006, for example, both nations signed a memorandum of cooperation in the field of oil and natural gas which encouraged collaboration between their enterprises, including joint exploration and development of hydrocarbon resources. Escalations in global energy prices and political uncertainties in the Middle East, however, have resulted in both countries looking for long-term arrangements. As China and India are increasingly forced to rely on the global oil market to meet their energy demands, they are more susceptible to supply disruptions and price fluctuations. In response, both countries have partly followed geopolitical energy policies, based on notions of traditional security. Ultimately, what we see is the arrival of military and political planning in trying to solve the issue of natural resource shortages. Energy security is of utmost strategic importance to China and India if they hope to continue to expand their economies. Rapid growth rates in both countries have grown in tandem with increased demand for energy. By 2020, it is estimated that China and India combined will account for roughly one-third of the world’s GDP and, as such, will require vast amounts of energy to fuel their economies. As such, the competition for energy resources such as oil and natural gas will only become fiercer. An important aspect of energy security is maritime control in the Asia-Pacific oceans. The sea lines of communication that run through Asia effectively act as the vital arteries for both countries. Maritime security is thus of major national interest for both China and India, and is directly linked to their energy security. Recent military modernization within China has been focused towards upgrading its naval capabilities, and ultimately moving towards creating a strong and powerful blue-water navy. India’s drive for maritime dominance has resulted in its naval budget increasing from US$1.3 billion in 2001 to US$3.5 billion in 2006, with plans to further increase naval spending 40 percent by 2014. China’s thirst for oil has doubled over the last decade, and is only predicted to rise. Similarly, India relies on the energy shipped through maritime regions to fund its own industrialization. India continues to state its maritime goals in pure geopolitical terms, even explicitly acknowledging in their 2004 Maritime Doctrine that “control of the choke points would be useful as a bargaining chip in the international power game, where the currency of military power remains a stark reality.” Thus it is clear that energy security has been directly translated into a national security issue, which has both political and military implications. The geopolitical rivalry in Myanmar between China and India provides great insight into their adversarial energy relationship. In Myanmar, both Chinese and Indian geopolitical and geoeconomic interests collide, and as such, may become a point of contention between China and India. Myanmar holds vast strategic importance for both China and India due to its location and abundance of natural resources. It has vast reserves of natural gas, so for both China and India it is presented as a source of energy free from the geopolitical risks of the Middle East. There has thus been major competition between China and India for access to the market. India has signed a US$40 billion deal with Myanmar for the transfer of natural gas, and has also had frequent discussions about building a pipeline from Myanmar to India. However, China has increasingly gained the most from Myanmar’s available resources. In 2005, for example, Myanmar reneged on a deal with India, and instead signed a 30-year contract with China for the sale of 6.5 trillion cubic liters of natural gas. For China, Myanmar is also important as it provides a land route to the Indian Ocean that vital resources could be shipped through in place of the Strait of Malacca. The potential for the Malacca Strait to be blockaded by a rival is of great concern to China, since as much as 85 percent of China’s oil is shipped through the region. For India, Myanmar is also of a strategic importance due to its location. China is already on friendly terms with Pakistan and has been expanding its presence in the Indian Ocean, thus giving India a feeling of Chinese encirclement. India’s interest in Myanmar directly relates to the growing presence and influence of China in the region. China’s “string of pearls” strategy refers to attempts to negotiate basing rights along the sea route linking the Middle East with China, including creating strong diplomatic ties with important states in the region. Not only does this contain India’s naval projection of power, it also directly threatens India’s energy access and the regional balance of power. While military confrontation between China and India remains unlikely, it is important to recognize that China and India’s energy policies revolve around traditional ideas of security, which highlight military and political balancing. Their energy policies are largely based on geopolitical and security considerations, and not just with regards to the global oil market. As such, it is critical for there to be ongoing diplomatic engagement between China and India to avoid unnecessary or accidental escalation.

#### The plan engages with non-governmental organizations.

Daga, 13- director of research at Politicas Publicas para la Libertad, in Bolivia, and a visiting senior policy analyst at the Heritage Foundation (Sergio, “Economics of the 2013-2014 Debate Topic: U.S. Economic Engagement Toward Cuba, Mexico or Venezuela”, National Center for Policy Analysis, 5/15, http://www.ncpa.org/pdfs/Message\_to\_Debaters\_6-7-13.pdf)

Economic engagement between or among countries can take many forms, but this document will focus on government-to-government engagement through 1) international trade agreements designed to lower barriers to trade; and 2) government foreign aid; next, we will contrast government-to-government economic engagement with private economic engagement through 3) international investment, called foreign direct investment; and 4) remittances and migration by individuals. All of these areas are important with respect to the countries mentioned in the debate resolution; however, when discussing economic engagement by the U.S. federal government, some issues are more important with respect to some countries than to others.

#### That violates the word “its”.

**Glossary of English Grammar Terms, 05**

(http://www.usingenglish.com/glossary/possessive-pronoun.html)

Mine, yours, his, hers, its, ours, theirs are the possessive pronouns used to substitute a noun and to show possession or ownership.

EG. This is your disk and that's mine. (Mine substitutes the word disk and shows that it belongs to me.)

#### Good is not good enough – precise definition outweighs – don’t allow new 1AR answers to this card.

Resnick 01 – Dr. Evan Resnick, Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yeshiva University, “Defining Engagement”, Journal of International Affairs, Spring, 54(2), Ebsco

CONCLUSION

In matters of national security, establishing a clear definition of terms is a precondition for effective policymaking. Decisionmakers who invoke critical terms in an erratic, ad hoc fashion risk alienating their constituencies. They also risk exacerbating misperceptions and hostility among those the policies target. Scholars who commit the same error undercut their ability to conduct valuable empirical research. Hence, if scholars and policymakers fail rigorously to define "engagement," they undermine the ability to build an effective foreign policy.

#### **Text: The People’s Republic of China should** [do the plan].

#### The CP competes and solves the case – China offers a unique model of economic engagement.

Hsiang 09(Antonio C. Hsiang, Associate Professor at Chihlee Institute of Technology in Taiwan China Rising in Latin America: More Opportunities than Challenges” Journal of Emerging Knowledge on Emerging Markets, Volume 1 issue 1 November 2009)-Karla

Because “many Latin American countries no longer look to Washington leadership,” the so- called Washington Consensus “has lost traction”.28 As a global rising power, China offers an alternative model for Latin America’s development. Even though China has been hurt by the 2008 financial crisis, “its economic and financial powers have been strengthened relative to those of the West. China’s global influence will thus increase, and Beijing will be able to undertake political and economic initiatives to increase it further.” 29 In fact, “Washington seemed to adopt a Chinese-style solution to its escalating financial problems: greater state intervention to restrict the movement of capital.”30 Thus, Beijing’s emergence as a global economic power is seen throughout Latin America as offering an alternative from the Washington Consensus model for economic development. The “Beijing Consensus” is the brainchild of Joshua Cooper Ramo, a former senior editor and foreign editor of Time magazine and later a partner at Kissinger Associates, the consulting firm of former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. According to Ramo, the Beijing Consensus has three features. The first is a commitment to innovation and constant experimentation in reforms. The second, a rejection of per capita GDP as the only measure of progress, as sustainability and equality also count. And the third, a commitment to self- determination. Less developed countries should therefore ensure their own financial integrity and keep great powers in check. 31 The Beijing Consensus has evolved to describe a plethora of alternative plans for economic development in the underdeveloped world. Ramo argues that China and India, who “most pointedly” ignored the World Bank and the IMF-championed Washington Consensus, “now have records that speak for themselves.” 32 Consequently, the so-called the “Beijing Consensus” has been attracting attention in Latin America because of “China’s distinctive development model, . . . [which] posits far more state intervention in the economy and a greater concern with political stability and strong government to guide the development process.” 33

#### Mexico relations are too strong – definitely no chance of collapse for several reasons

Shifter 13 – (Michael, Michael is an Adjunct Professor of Latin American Studies at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and writes for the Council's journal Foreign Affairs. He serves as the President of Inter-American Dialogue, “A More Ambitious Agenda” February 2013 http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD9042\_USMexicoReportEnglishFinal.pdf\\CLans)\*Mexico relations are resilient – there is zero chance Mexican relations will collapse absent the plan, extensive bilateral collaboration between security and police agencies is unprecedented with both governments recognizing public security as a shared responsibility – their own 1ac author cites positive trends for bilateral cooperation as an effect of the status quo

US President Barack Obama was sworn in for his second four-year term on January 20, less than two months after Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto took office for a single term of six years. Their nearly concurrent inaugurations come at an especially auspicious moment for relations between the United States and Mexico. Today, more than at any time since the signing of the NAFTA treaty in 1992, the two nations have the opportunity to substantially upgrade their already robust economic partnership. Mexico’s proposed reform of its energy sector coupled with the oil and natural gas boom taking place in the United States are particularly promising. Together, they could bring North America closer than ever to energy independence. In light of the decisive role of the Latino vote in US elections, the prospects are better than they have been in decades for a sensible reform of US immigration policy—which should produce significant economic gains for both nations while easing a long-standing source of bilateral tension and mistrust. While some progress has been achieved in recent years, Mexico is still searching for more effective strategies for battling organized crime and drug violence. Though the United States and Mexico do not always agree on the right approach, the extensive bilateral collaboration between security and police agencies is unprecedented—with both governments recognizing public security as a shared responsibility. Bilateral cooperation is also increasing on regional and global issues. Challenges to democracy and human rights, the growing security threats in Central America, reforming multilateral organizations, the building of new trade partnerships worldwide, and problems of nuclear non- proliferation and climate change are just a few of the issues that deeply concern both countries. Even if the two countries disagree on many of these matters, they remain natural partners. Indeed, the United States and Mexico can best meet the current challenges of global instability and uncertainty by stepping up efforts toward economic integration. More than anything else, this report of a special Inter-American Dialogue Commission is a call to presidents Obama and Peña Nieto and their administrations to recognize the enhanced opportunities they have to forge cooperative approaches to the multiple challenges their two countries face—and make the most out of the four years they have to work together to address them. Their most important priority should be to deepen their economic partnership, increase the productivity and international competitiveness of both nations, open opportunities for longterm growth and job creation, and set the stage for further economic integration

#### No internal link.

CNN 5/2 (Catherine E. Schoichet, 5/2/13, “U.S., Mexican presidents push deeper economic ties; security issues still key”, http://www.cnn.com/2013/05/02/world/americas/mexico-obama-visit//lm)

Two issues -- security and immigration -- often get too much attention when it comes to talking about the U.S.-Mexico relationship, U.S. President Barack Obama said Thursday.¶ Now, Obama said, it's time to forge deeper economic connections to create more jobs and more trade on both sides of the border.¶ "That's the focus of my visit," he told reporters after meeting with Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto in the country's capital.¶ But even as Obama and Peña Nieto pushed to shift the tone more toward trade and economics, security issues loomed large over Thursday's meeting. Peña Nieto said his government remains committed to fighting organized crime, but that the United States and Mexico must "cooperate on the basis of mutual respect, to be more efficient in our security strategy that we are implementing in Mexico."¶ Obama stressed that the countries will continue to cooperate closely on security, but he didn't specify how.¶ "I agreed to continue our close cooperation on security, even as that nature of that close cooperation will evolve," he said.¶ It's up to the Mexican people, Obama said, "to determine their security structures and how it engages with other nations, including the United States."¶ In the meantime, he said, the United States remains committed to reducing the demand for drugs north of the border, and the southward flow of illegal guns and cash that help fuel violence.¶ "I think it's natural that a new administration here in Mexico is looking carefully at how it's going to approach what is obviously a serious problem," Obama said, "and we are very much looking forward to cooperating in any ways that we can to battle organized crime."¶ High-profile cartel takedowns were a hallmark of former President Felipe Calderon's tenure. Peña Nieto has vowed to take a different approach, focusing more on education problems and social inequality that he says fuel drug violence. The details of his policies are still coming into focus, and analysts say his government has deliberately tried to shift drug violence out of the spotlight.¶ Before Obama's arrival, a spate of news reports this week on both sides of the border detailed changes in how Mexico cooperates with the United States.¶ Under the new rules, all U.S. requests for collaboration with Mexican agencies will flow through a single office, Interior Minister Miguel Angel Osorio Chong told Mexico's state-run Notimex news agency.¶ It is a drastic change from recent years, when U.S. agents enjoyed widespread access to their Mexican counterparts.¶ Critics have expressed concerns that Peña Nieto's government will turn a blind eye to cartels or negotiate with them -- something he repeatedly denied on the campaign trail last year. On Tuesday -- two days before Obama's arrival -- his government arrested the father-in-law of Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman, head of Mexico's Sinaloa cartel and one of the country's most-wanted drug lords.¶ Speaking to reporters after his meeting with Obama on Thursday, Peña Nieto emphasized the importance of reducing violence, and also the importance of Mexico's relationship with the United States extending beyond the drug war.¶ "We don't want to make this relationship targeted on one single issue," he said. "We want to place particular emphasis on the potential in the economic relationship between Mexico and the United States."¶ To achieve that goal, Peña Nieto said, the presidents agreed to create a new high-level group to discuss economic and trade relations between the two nations. The group, which will include Cabinet ministers from both countries and U.S. Vice President Joe Biden, will have its first meeting this fall, Peña Nieto said.¶ Imports and exports between the United States and Mexico totaled nearly $500 billion last year, and before Obama's arrival officials on both sides of the border said economic relations would be a focal point during the U.S. president's visit.¶ "When the economy in Mexico has grown, and people have opportunity, a lot of our problems are solved, or we have the resources to solve them," Obama said Thursday.¶ The emphasis on the economy Thursday was a significant shift, said Jason Marczak, director of policy at the Americas Society and Council of the Americas.¶ "

**Pemex instability’s inevitable.**

**Martin and Longmire 11** – Jeremy Martin is Director of the Energy Program at the Institute of the Americas, Sylvia Longmire is a Mexico Security Expert & President, Longmire Consulting (Jeremy Martin and Sylvia Longmire, Journal of Energy Security, “The Perilous Intersection of Mexico’s Drug War & Pemex”, March 22, 2011, http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2011/03/perilous-intersection-of-mexicos-drug.html) // CB

Pemex exposed and impacted

As discussed previously, oil theft from Pemex pipelines, money laundering by way of service stations, and, worst of all, provocative kidnappings of the company’s executives and those of service companies working with the state firm, are all on the rise.

Unofficial figures place thefts from the Pemex network at roughly $2 billion annually. And security experts point to this as an important source of revenue for drug cartels—especially as the Mexican government continues to crack down on them. Thefts from the Pemex network are not new, but the increase and the strain it is placing on the already-taxed company is important. And the illegal tapping has grown significantly in the areas where the drug war is the most pervasive.

The spike in fuel thefts and illegal trading, as well as kidnappings, has led some to question whether Pemex is fully in charge of all its facilities across the nation.

For some experts following the situation, the answer is a resounding no. Indeed, many analysts indicate that the physical security and monitoring of pipelines belonging to Pemex are severely lacking. According to Mexican daily El Universal, oil looting has occurred in almost every state in Mexico, while the Wall Street Journal, citing Pemex statistics, indicated that between January and November 2010, Pemex discovered 614 illegal siphons—368 in liquid fuels pipelines, 196 in oil pipelines, and 50 in liquefied petroleum gas ducts. Pemex has begun installing systems to detect declines in pressure in some oil product pipelines but the project is expected to take years to complete.

Kidnappings send shudders

Kidnappings of Pemex executives and subcontractors, including workers from international firms, have taken place across the country but most notably in Tabasco, Tamaulipas and Nuevo Leon, sending shudders throughout the company and Mexico.

The kidnappings have terrorized a community where, according to a Los Angeles Times story, jobs on the oil rigs and at the gas wells are handed down, father to son, for generations. “How is it,” asked a relative of a kidnapped worker, “that Pemex, supposedly the backbone of the nation, can be made to bow down like this?”

One analysis, published by Grupo Reforma highlighted the oil town of Reforma, Chiapas, where at least 30 Pemex employees—ranging from executives to laborers—have been kidnapped over the past year.

Mexico Weekly has also reported on other forms of violence that have flared in prime Pemex production zones, such as the Burgos Basin, site of Mexico's biggest natural gas field in Tamaulipas. Last spring, gunmen seized the Gigante Uno gas plant and kidnapped five Pemex workers. Increasingly unsafe conditions are severely hindering Pemex’s ability to produce natural gas in the Burgos Basin.

The Burgos Basin stretches across the northern border state of Tamaulipas, where the Gigante Uno plant is located, and spills into the states of Nuevo León and Coahuila. All three states are experiencing extremely high levels of drug-related violence, especially along these states’ border with Texas. The stretch from Nuevo Laredo to Matamoros is in the midst of a bloody conflict between the Gulf cartel and Los Zetas, former paramilitaries and enforcers for the Gulf cartel who are now one of the more vicious DTOs in their own right. Los Zetas are viewed as largely responsible for the kidnapping of Pemex employees in that region.

“Once Pemex … comes under regular attack from the cartels, rather than just random, disorganized thugs, then you have far more serious national security problems – much worse in the government's eyes than a bunch of homicides in the slums of Ciudad Juárez," said Malcolm Beith, author of The Last Narco, a book about the hunt for Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzmán Loera.

Regrettably, Burgos is becoming synonymous with the perilous intersection of Mexico’s raging drug war with Pemex’s efforts to produce the critical energy supplies the nation and region demand.

The Murphy Energy case

One case of fuel theft from Pemex that’s winding its way through the justice system provides a unique insight into that part of the problem the company is confronting.

According to MarketWatch, federal documents released in August 2010 revealed a Texas chemical plant, owned by German chemical company BASF Corp., bought $2 million worth of petroleum products that had been stolen from Pemex and smuggled across the US border. The documents also showed the stolen condensate passed through several companies' hands before arriving on a barge at the BASF facility in Port Arthur, Texas.

The actual transport of stolen oil from Mexican pipelines into US corporate hands is complicated at best. Donald Schroeder, former president of Trammo Corp., testified that in January 2009, two companies, Murphy Energy Corp. and Continental Fuels, contacted him. Both wanted to sell him stolen condensate. Apparently he agreed to buy it, and the transfers began. “Unnamed import companies” would sell the condensate to intermediary companies like Continental (which has since shuttered its headquarters in Houston). Those import companies would smuggle the condensate across the border and store it in Continental facilities. No details were available on how those trucks managed to successfully cross the US Mexico border. These piecemeal transfers would continue until there was enough oil in the storage facility to fill a barge and ship to BASF.

Jim McAlister, an Assistant US Attorney, said he has no reason to believe that BASF has any involvement in the alleged wrongdoing. The President and founder of Murphy Energy Corp., Matt Murphy, said the company did not know that the condensate was stolen. Josh Crescenzi, the vice president of Continental Fuels, has not been indicted in the case, nor has anyone else from Continental.

This particular case has been a success, resulting in the handover of $2.4 million by US customs authorities to the Mexican government. But the extent of corruption in Mexico—within Pemex, in particular—and the ease with which oil can be stolen from pipelines makes the mitigation of oil looting an almost insurmountable challenge. Adding to the problem is the fact that Mexican cartels are involved. According to Reuters, the Mexican government believes the cartels use stolen jet fuel in their aircraft to cover up any evidence of illicit flights. In August 2009, Mexico’s federal police commissioner Rodrigo Esparza said Los Zetas used false import documents to smuggle at least $46 million worth of oil in tankers to unnamed US refineries. President Felipe Calderón has said that DTOs in northern Mexico are responsible for most oil theft.

On some levels Pemex is not just a victim of oil-thieving DTOs; sometimes, it’s directly involved. In February 2010, Mexican military units seized more than four tons of marijuana at Pemex installations in Reynosa, Tamaulipas. The discovery was made after Pemex security alerted officials that armed men were removing Pemex employees from a fuel supply station. In response, a Mexican Naval helicopter was dispatched to the scene but retreated after receiving heavy weapons fire from the ground. When military units arrived on the ground, they found the marijuana loaded on trucks abandoned at the site.

These alarming facts have led to perhaps the most ominous question of all: Is the company being infiltrated by the perpetrators of the nation’s drug business? In light of the increasing number of incidents President Calderón has acknowledged, there may well be internal operatives at Pemex aiding and abetting the DTOs.

For its part, Pemex is soliciting the help of the Mexican people to try to put a stop to oil looting. Last August, the Mexican government posted a Pemex press release, in which exhorts that oil looting is not just an unpatriotic crime against the company and the government, but against the Mexican people. It also offers the number of a hotline where individuals can anonymously report pipeline breaches.

Why the perilous intersection matters

The relevance of what is happening in Mexico matters on a variety of levels, but in particular, there are three broad reasons that bear discussion.

First, and as best portrayed in Figure 2, Pemex has seen its oil production drop precipitously since 2004. The firm has been struggling for the better part of the last decade to deal with a burdensome tax straitjacket, poor planning at its largest field, a lack of new discoveries of oil and production, and an inability to implement serious reform. Moreover, by the nature of being dragged into—and becoming part of—Mexico’s massive drug war, Pemex is clearly suffering from the additional strain and havoc wrought by the myriad elements of the conflict on its business. From huge financial losses to the increasing inability to control its network and prevent theft to the more serious kidnapping threats, the evidence is only becoming clearer.

The second reason concerns Mexico’s fiscal dependency on oil and Pemex. As assorted struggles impact the company's and the nation’s fiscal well-being, broader and longer term economic growth and employment discussions become ever more complicated for policy makers. These issues are particularly critical as the nation appears far from passage of the necessary and far-reaching national tax and fiscal reforms that could ameliorate some of the burden on Pemex and the nation’s oil dependency.

Third, all of the above leads to the real potential for further erosion of Mexico’s critical role as a secure and constant energy supplier for the United States and the Western Hemisphere. As oil prices steadily rise in early 2011, it is quite rational to revisit the significant energy security aspects of Mexico’s persistent energy woes, which are now clearly exacerbated by the overflow of drug war violence and corruption.

On the heels of yet another State of the Union address in the United States that included elegant rhetoric about the country’s energy imbalance and energy security risks, a comprehensive, all of the above approach and solution remains far from reach.

Conclusion

Clearly oil, and energy more broadly, is not a sector of the economy where Mexico needs any further impediments. Pemex’s huge hurdles derive largely from its inability to replace declining oil production and navigate a burdensome nationalistic legacy. What is now added to the combustible mix is an increasing drain on the company’s finances and, worse, a sense of trepidation among executives in the field. Threats against its executives and loss of its resources are surely not a useful element as the company makes efforts to reform itself.

**No internal link to drug trafficking**

**Fox 9/16,** Fox News, 9/16/13, “Mexican drug traffickers operating in Panama, officials say,” http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/news/2013/09/16/mexican-drug-traffickers-operating-in-panama-officials-say/)//DR. H

At least four Mexican drug trafficking organizations are operating in Panama and have been linked to murders, the La Prensa newspaper reported Monday, citing intelligence reports.

Bureau of Prisons and intelligence reports "confirm the presence ... of the Los Zetas, Beltran Leyva, Sinaloa and Juarez" cartels, which "use Panama as a base of operations for transporting cocaine into Mexico and the United States," the newspaper said.

"(Of) the nearly 2,500 foreigners currently detained in Panama, between 90 and 100 are Mexicans, all in drug cases and linked to narcocartels," La Prensa said.

Panamanian authorities have struck some blows at Mexican cartels in recent years, such as the 2007 seizure of 19.5 tons of cocaine from a Sinaloa cartel network dismantled with U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration assistance, the newspaper said.

Four members of the violent Los Zetas cartel were arrested when they tried to enter Panama from Costa Rica with a shipment of cocaine packed into three vehicles in 2009, while four suspected Juarez cartel members were detained in 2010 when they attempted to smuggle drugs in suitcases with false bottoms, La Prensa said.

Prosecutors are investigating murders with "an elevated degree of violence that appear to have been committed by Colombian or Mexican hitmen, or by Panamanian killers who copy the methods of these individuals," the newspaper said.

"About 20 Mexicans linked to drug cases were murdered in Panama between 2009 and 2012," La Prensa said, citing a National Police homicide investigation unit report. EFE

**No risk of Mexico becoming a failed state anytime soon**

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¶ Mexican officials bristle at the dire forecasts for their country. “The suggestion that Mexico is remotely close to a failed state or is heading in that direction is analytically flawed and therefore simply wrong,” Arturo Sarukhan, Mexico’s ambassador to the United States, said in a statement. “Mexico is today a country with solid institutions, a consolidating and pluralistic democracy, a vibrant civil society, and, despite the global recession, strong economic fundamentals.”¶ ¶ In a separate interview, Sarukhan argued that the heavy toll from the armed confrontations in Mexico is, if anything, a sign of his government’s strength and determination to confront the cartels, which, he adds, have grown increasingly desperate under the army’s assault. “The violence,” Sarukhan said, “is an indication that they’re feeling the pressure and against the ropes.”¶ ¶ Many U.S. experts on Mexico also reject what George W. Grayson, a Mexico scholar at the College of William & Mary, called the “overstated” tone of the recent warnings about Mexico.¶ ¶ “The army is still loyal to the regime,” said Grayson. “Most workers get up and go to their jobs every day, and the major production facilities around the country continue to turn out goods and services.”¶ ¶ Allyson Benton, a Mexico City-based analyst for the Eurasia Group, an international risk analysis firm, said flatly, “Mexico is not a failed state and will not become one.”

#### No risk of nuclear terror.

**Chapman 12** (Stephen, editorial writer for Chicago Tribune, “CHAPMAN: Nuclear terrorism unlikely,” May 22, http://www.oaoa.com/articles/chapman-87719-nuclear-terrorism.html)

A layperson may figure it’s only a matter of time before the unimaginable comes to pass. Harvard’s Graham Allison, in his book “Nuclear Terrorism,” concludes, “On the current course, nuclear terrorism is inevitable.” But remember: After Sept. 11, 2001, we all thought more attacks were a certainty. Yet al-Qaida and its ideological kin have proved unable to mount a second strike. Given their inability to do something simple — say, shoot up a shopping mall or set off a truck bomb — it’s reasonable to ask whether they have a chance at something much more ambitious. Far from being plausible, argued Ohio State University professor John Mueller in a presentation at the University of Chicago, “the likelihood that a terrorist group will come up with an atomic bomb seems to be vanishingly small.” The events required to make that happen comprise a multitude of Herculean tasks. First, a terrorist group has to get a bomb or fissile material, perhaps from Russia’s inventory of decommissioned warheads. If that were easy, one would have already gone missing. Besides, those devices are probably no longer a danger, since weapons that are not maintained quickly become what one expert calls “radioactive scrap metal.” If terrorists were able to steal a Pakistani bomb, they would still have to defeat the arming codes and other safeguards designed to prevent unauthorized use. As for Iran, no nuclear state has ever given a bomb to an ally — for reasons even the Iranians can grasp. Stealing some 100 pounds of bomb fuel would require help from rogue individuals inside some government who are prepared to jeopardize their own lives. Then comes the task of building a bomb. It’s not something you can gin up with spare parts and power tools in your garage. It requires millions of dollars, a safe haven and advanced equipment — plus people with specialized skills, lots of time and a willingness to die for the cause. Assuming the jihadists vault over those Himalayas, they would have to deliver the weapon onto American soil. Sure, drug smugglers bring in contraband all the time — but seeking their help would confront the plotters with possible exposure or extortion. This, like every other step in the entire process, means expanding the circle of people who know what’s going on, multiplying the chance someone will blab, back out or screw up. That has heartening implications. If al-Qaida embarks on the project, it has only a minuscule chance of seeing it bear fruit. Given the formidable odds, it probably won’t bother. None of this means we should stop trying to minimize the risk by securing nuclear stockpiles, monitoring terrorist communications and improving port screening. But it offers good reason to think that in this war, it appears, the worst eventuality is one that will never happen.

#### No food wars, and they don’t escalate

**Salehyan in ‘8**

(Idean, Prof. Pol. Sci. @ North Texas, Journal of Peace Research, “From Climate Change to Conflict? No Consensus Yet”, 45:3, Sage, DOI: 10.1177/0022343308088812)

A few caveats are in order here. It is important to note, again, that the most severe effects of climate change are likely to be felt in the future, and the future is inherently uncertain.4 While fundamental shifts in the environment are not inconceivable, our best bet for predicting what is to come is to look at what has transpired in the past. Since it is frequently argued that climate change will lead to resource scarcities and exacerbate inequality, it is possible to draw upon past evidence regarding these factors to develop a sense of how conflicts might unfold given changes in the Earth’s atmosphere. Additionally, I do not take issue with the claim that climate change will present considerable challenges for human societies and ecosystems more generally. Humanitarian crises stemming, in part, from climate change have the potential to be severe, and steps must be taken quickly to attenuate such contingencies. Rather, my purpose here is to underscore the point that environmental processes, by themselves, cannot explain why, where, and when fighting will occur; rather, the interaction between environmental and political systems is critical for understanding organized armed violence. First, the deterministic view has poor predictive power as to where and when conflicts will break out. For every potential example of an environmental catastrophe or resource shortfall that leads to violence, there are many more counter-examples in which conflict never occurs. But popular accounts typically do not look at the dogs that do not bark. Darfur is frequently cited as a case where desertification led to food scarcity, water scarcity, and famine, in turn leading to civil war and ethnic cleansing.5 Yet, food scarcity and hunger are problems endemic to many countries – particularly in sub-Saharan Africa – but similar problems elsewhere have not led to large-scale violence. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, food shortages and malnutrition affect more than a third of the population in Malawi, Zambia, the Comoros, North Korea, and Tanzania,6 although none of these countries have experienced fullblown civil war and state failure. Hurricanes, coastal flooding, and droughts – which are all likely to intensify as the climate warms – are frequent occurrences which rarely lead to violence. The Asian Tsunami of 2004, although caused by an oceanic earthquake, led to severe loss of life and property, flooding, population displacement, and resource scarcity, but it did not trigger new wars in Southeast Asia. Large-scale migration has the potential to provoke conflict in receiving areas (see Reuveny, 2007; Salehyan & Gleditsch, 2006), yet most migration flows do not lead to conflict, and, in this regard, social integration and citizenship policies are particularly important (Gleditsch, Nordås & Salehyan, 2007). In short, resource scarcity, natural disasters, and long-term climatic shifts are ubiquitous, while armed conflict is rare; therefore, environmental conditions, by themselves, cannot predict violent outbreaks. Second, even if local skirmishes over access to resources arise, these do not always escalate to open warfare and state collapse. While interpersonal violence is more or less common and may intensify under resource pressures, sustained armed conflict on a massive scale is difficult to conduct. Meier, Bond & Bond (2007) show that, under certain circumstances, environmental conditions have led to cattle raiding among pastoralists in East Africa, but these conflicts rarely escalate to sustained violence. Martin (2005) presents evidence from Ethiopia that, while a large refugee influx and population pressures led to localized conflict over natural resources, effective resource management regimes were able to ameliorate these tensions. Both of these studies emphasize the role of local dispute-resolution regimes and institutions – not just the response of central governments – in preventing resource conflicts from spinning out of control. Martin’s analysis also points to the importance of international organizations, notably the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, in implementing effective policies governing refugee camps. Therefore, local hostilities need not escalate to serious armed conflict and can be managed if there is the political will to do so.

#### Your Malthusian nonsense is wrong ---- food scarcity won’t increase conflict

**Buckland in ‘7**

(Benjamin, Research Associate @ Centre for Applied Studies in International Negotiations, “A Climate of War? Stopping the Securitisation of Global Climate Change A contribution to contemporary debates”, June, http://ipb.org/i/pdf-files/A\_Climate\_of\_War\_Stopping\_the\_Securitisation\_of\_Climate\_Change.pdf)

Since the 1970s there have been calls for a broader security framework encompassing environmental issues. As early as 1971 Richard Falk was talking about possible links between environment and security, although climate change was not yet in the frame.4 Falk was followed in the 1980s by scholars such as Essam El Hinnawi, who first introduced the term “environmental refugee”, and in 1987 by the landmark Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development, the “Brundtland Report”.5 Again, not mentioning climate change, the Brundtland Report clearly enunciated links between environmental issues and dangers for human security. These studies form a backdrop to the explosion of interest in the links between the environment and violent conflict that occurred at the end of the Cold War in 1989-91. As national security institutions sought a new raison d’être, scholars like Thomas Homer-Dixon and his Toronto School, Paul Erlich, Rob Swart, and Robert Kaplan gained early traction for their ideas about resource scarcity leading to conflict.6 Often dubbed Neo-Malthusians, due to the intellectual debt owed to the English economist and clergyman Thomas Malthus who, in 1798, argued that exponential population growth combined with linear growth in food output would eventually lead to conflict, war and epidemic, these thinkers moved beyond food scarcity to add a whole host of environmental issues to those linked with conflict. Talking about supply and demand-induced scarcity as well as inequity (so-called structural scarcity), Homer-Dixon and others were quick to identify the links between their earlier work and the new threat of climate change that was beginning to be enunciated by the regular Assessment Reports of the UN’s influential Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.7 As Peter Schwartz and Doug Randall – two leading proponents of this school of thought – made clear: “Violence and disruption stemming from the stresses created by abrupt changes in the climate pose a different type of threat than we are accustomed to today. Military confrontation may be triggered by a desperate need for natural resources such as energy, food and water.”8 These warnings were taken up in-turn by governments and other actors, perhaps most notably by the Pentagon in its above mentioned report of 2003, which sketched an apocalyptic scenario of runaway climate change and war. More recently still, the ongoing conflict in Sudan’s Darfur region has been increasingly mentioned as the first of the future climate change wars. First speculated about by Michael Byers and Nick Dragojlovic in a 2004 editorial in the Human Security Bulletin, this idea has frequently popped up in the popular press ever since.9 Garnering less publicity were early defectors from the climate change and conflict school described above. Most notable is perhaps the State Failure Taskforce, set up in 1994 by the then United States (US) Vice-President Al Gore to look for environmental and political causes of state failure. Against expectations, the Taskforce found no evidence for a link between environmental degradation and violent conflict, conclusions which are cogent with a number of contemporary and more recent studies. A further blow to the environment and conflict link suggested by the Neo-Malthusian thinkers cited above has come in the form of criticism which directly attacks their research design. Perhaps most persuasive among these attacks is the contention that many of the case studies used to support the Neo-Malthusian argument are selected on the dependent variable, that is to say, they treat only cases in which environmental degradation and conflict are both present. Without more comprehensive data, it is argued, their usefulness is reduced to that of well-researched anecdotes – interesting but hardly predictive of conflict elsewhere.10 The second major criticism is that Neo-Malthusian models of conflict are underspecified. In other words, they offer little indication as to which variables may or may not be important in triggering or prolonging conflict – they are simply too elaborate to do so.11 Alternative models and schools of thought (such as that elaborated by the State Failure Taskforce above and the systematic 1998 study of Hague and Ellingsen) emphasise the fact that, while there is consensus on several factors causing conflict, there are many others for which direct causal links simply do not exist.12 With regard to the former category, factors generally agreed to influence the likelihood of intrastate conflict include: levels of economic development, history of conflict and the existence of either ethnic dominance or ethnic polarisation. In the second category, factors that are likely to increase the risk of conflict but that do not act as independent variables are: political instability, the time elapsed since independence, dependency on natural resources, large population size and rough terrain.13 Turning to interstate conflict, the factors on which there is general consensus include: geographical proximity, non-democratic regimes, relative power and a history of conflict.14 What is clear from these two sets of variables is that environmental factors are, at best, of secondary importance.15 Some scholars even go so far as to suggest that resource scarcity may have precisely the opposite effect from that predicted by proponents of Neo-Malthusianism. An example of this is a recent study Aaron T. Wolf which suggests that shared freshwater resources may in fact lead to greater cooperation between riparian states.16 This conclusion is supported by data from the BAR Project Database which lists 1831 waterrelated “events” (either conflict or cooperation) between riparian states. Of these, 1228 are examples of cooperation and many of the others are small-scale disputes rather than full-blown armed conflict. While Wolf’s study, and the many criticisms cited above, mean that the expectations of the Neo-Malthusians are largely unsubstantiated, it does not, of course, immediately follow that climate change will not lead to any conflict at all. Indeed, it is quite plausible that some of the more dire climate change scenarios could result in some instances of conflict.17 As Clionadh Raleigh and Henrik Urdal point out, while it is generally agreed that the resource scarcity and conflict link has been overstated, few would agree that there are no links at all.18 What is important, and what we argue in this paper, is that claims about climate change leading to conflict are highly speculative.19 As Raleigh and Urdal again make clear: “There is every reason to be cautious about the links between climate change and conflict. Existing environment and conflict research has simply not produced sufficient evidence to enable us to make anything but highly speculative claims about the effects of climate change and violent conflict”.20 As we will see in the following sections, it is a dramatic erosion of human security and not the risk of violent conflict that is the real threat of climate change.

**1. Climate leadership theory is false – it doesn’t cause success in international negotiations and having high emissions actually gives a country more leverage in negotiations**

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Nonetheless, there are certain common purposes that cannot be effectively realised without the support of Great Powers, which in this case study also happen to be the major emitters. Yet the US’s ‘success’ at Kyoto in negotiating flexibility instruments, and especially its success at Copenhagen in shaping the new architecture of the Copenhagen Accord, is best understood as success in bargaining, rather as an example of climate leadership. The US’s clear capacity to make a difference has placed it in a strong position to block negotiations and neutralise the climate leadership ambitions of other developed states. In effect, at Copenhagen, the US’s (and China’s) emissions power has overshadowed what Manners has called the EU’s ‘normative power’ (Manners 1992). However, the US has not managed to redirect the ultimate purpose of the climate negotiations or undermine the principles of CBDR, which are reaffirmed in the Copenhagen Accord and still provide the benchmark for judging climate leadership performance. CONCLUSION In this paper I have argued that a leader is an actor or group of actors that performs a socially recognised role in facilitating the achievement of a shared social purpose in a particular constituency. Given the scale of change required to move towards a low-carbon global economy, state climate leaders are necessarily transformational leaders, and their performance and recognition as international leaders, and their ability to attract followers, may be considerably enhanced by climate leadership at the domestic level by including sub-national governments, market actors, civil society actors and social networks. 14 This understanding of leadership sheds light on the modest success of the EU as a climate leader, and the US’s general failure as a climate leader, throughout the negotiations. Leadership should not be conflated with success in bargaining in international negotiations. The US’s influence in the post-2007 negotiations is mainly a function of its ‘emissions power’ which it has used to lower expectations about what the climate regime may achieve.

#### Hegemony is impossible and clinging causes war – empirics are a flawed method because we are the first hegemon with an All-Volunteer Force and that makes us uniquely aggressive

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When I transitioned from fatigues to pinstripes in 2009 and assumed the post as Chief of Mission of the American Embassy in Kabul, the dominant inﬂuence of our military was brought home to me in spades. The civilian–military partnership was a fact in Afghanistan, but it was one between a ﬂyweight and heavyweight boxer. Of course, Afghanistan is a combat zone and perhaps not a good example. I spoke frequently, however, with my fellow ambassadors from around the globe, and they generally expressed distress at the increasing inﬂuence of our defense establishment in foreign policy. One candidly said, ‘‘If I want a meeting with the head of state of the country to which I am assigned, I give theregional U.S. combatant commander a call.’’ Military diplomacy, an important instrument in the foreign policy tool kit, is too often eclipsing State Department-led diplomacy. This disparity comes with negative long-term consequences. EXPLANATORY FACTORS If our foreign policy has been increasingly inﬂuenced by the military—and I recognize some or maybe all of you may disagree with this proposition, why might this be the case? There are four possible explanations First, our nation’s particular historical circumstances may contribute to the frequent use of military resources abroad. Whereas America has been the sole global military superpower since the end of the cold war, the same is not true in regard to the economic domain. Today’s world is militarily unipolar and economically multipolar. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States gained and has since maintained, a huge comparative advantage in the use of coercive power (versus economic and soft power). Military force is now often the most cost-effective instrument of American national power. Such a hypothesis is speculative but is also consistent with historical theories of change in world politics—such as those of Paul Kennedy4 and Robert Gilpin,5 who posit that economically declining hegemonic powers often possess an overreaching military inﬂuence to preserve global systems whose maintenance is considered a matter of vital prestige. Gilpin framed the challenge of the dominant state in the international system well when he stated: To solve the fundamental problem...the balancing of commitments and resources. The...three-way struggle over priorities (protection, consumption, and investment) produces a profound dilemma for society. If it suppresses consumption, the consequence can be severe internal social tensions and class conﬂict.... If the society neglects to pay the costs of defense, external weakness will inevitably lead to its defeat by rising powers. If the society fails to save and reinvest a sufﬁcient fraction of its surplus wealth in industry and agriculture [and I would add education, research & development, and infrastructure], the economic basis of the society and its capacity to sustain either consumption or protection will decline.6 It is possible, at this point on America’s trajectory that, as the dominant global power, we are focused on maintaining the status quo, and compelled by domestic political imperatives to place a premium on protection (that is, security) and consumption rather than to investment. If so, we are most likely on an unsustainable path. The second explanation is that as international security problems have become complex—or more interdisciplinary—our military has been increasingly called upon to facilitate, organize, and even lead interagency responses. U.S. strategic challenges go far beyond state actors such as North Korea, Iran, or China. We live in a world threatened by borderless terrorism, criminal and narcotrafﬁcking activities, pandemic outbreaks, and cyberattacks. Who better to call upon than a well-resourced, superbly organized, agile, ﬂexible, can-do organization, such as the U.S. military? Its current budget comprises over 40 percent of the world’s military spending and exceeds the combined defense expenditures of the next fourteen nations. Our military has become Thor’s magniﬁcent hammer making a growing number of foreign policy problems appear to be simply nails to our civilian leadership. Our military has convening power, and it is used even more frequently now than ever before. A third explanation is that with the transition from a conscript to a volunteer force, the republic’s political ownership of our armed forces has signiﬁcantly eroded. This phenomenon opened the door to military adventurism. As noted earlier, the record shows that after the draft was terminated, military conﬂictrelated deployments increased in frequency ﬁvefold. Princeton professor Julian Zelizer wrote in his excellent work, The Arsenal of Democracy: ‘‘By eliminating the draft, [President] Nixon weakened the most immediate connection that existed between the national security state and average citizens.’’7 If so, why might more frequent military deployments have followed? Let’s consider the two post-1973 All-Volunteer Force interventions unique in breadth and scope: Afghanistan and Iraq II. Together they are: the longest in duration of any American war (the Afghanistan conﬂict alone enjoys this distinction); the seventh most lethal American conﬂict measured in fatalities; second in fatalities (after the MexicanAmerican War) of those conﬂicts fought entirely with volunteer forces; and second only to World War II in expense (and perhaps yet to become the most costly armed intervention in U.S. history). A reasonable argument can be made that the absence of those domestic political constraints inherent in a draft force may have freed otherwise cautious U.S. government decision makers to carry out large-scale extended military operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan. When I have spoken on this topic to various audiences around the country, I ask: ‘‘If we had a conscripted military good enough to accomplish the same missions assigned our current volunteer forces (admittedly a bold assumption), would the U.S. have invaded Iraq in 2003 and had 100,000 troops stationed in Afghanistan one decade after 9-11?’’ Never more than one or two participants offer an afﬁrmative response. The fact is that with well-resourced and capable volunteers supplemented by generally willing reservists, America’s politicians have not faced signiﬁcant organized domestic grassroots opposition to unpopular conﬂicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, quite unlike the Vietnam War experience. Even less politically problematic has been ordering America’s volunteer legions into harm’s way for countless brushﬁre wars and policing actions. The framers of the U.S. Constitution, most notably James Madison, believed that Congress—the voice of the people in this instance—should have extensive authority to take the country to war, and this decree is so codiﬁed in Article 1, Section 8, paragraph 11. Congress, however, has only exercised its constitutional prerogative to declare war ﬁve times in America’s history. Its reassertion of congressional war-making authority in the 1973 War Powers Resolution has been ignored by every president since enactment. Congress has even fewer incentives under the All-Volunteer Force model to assert its constitutional responsibilities against the Executive, especially in the preliminary and initial stages of a military intervention. Without sizable numbers of organized constituents fretting about the personal and family costs of a conﬂict, the legislators’ preferred strategy is to discount the future and to avoid casting a vote against waging war during the ﬂag-waving stage of a crisis. Most members of Congress, always with an eye on reelection, will give pause before contesting strong Executive appeals to commit forces abroad in the stated defense of the national interest. The Gates Commission, named after former Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates and charged by President Nixon to examine the feasibility of an All-Volunteer Force, concluded that adoption of an All-Volunteer Force would: ‘‘actually increase democratic participation in decisions concerning the use of military force.’’8 The Commission further contended, in part, that: ‘‘If tax increases are needed or military spending claims priority over other public spending, a broad public debate is likely. Recent history suggests that increased taxes generate far more public discussion than increased draft calls.’’9 This prediction proved inaccurate for several reasons. The ﬁrst is a matter of scale. U.S. defense outlays today, although huge in absolute terms, consume a much smaller percentage of total federal spending than in 1970 when the Gates Commission report was published. In 1968 (the height of the Vietnam War), defense spending accounted for 45.1 percent of federal outlays, whereas in 2008 (the year marking the maximum combined level of effort in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars) defense spending was only 19.9 percent of the federal budget. This percentage was exceeded by Health and Human Services (23.5 percent), Social Security (21.7 percent), and almost equaled by Treasury’s debt ﬁnancing (18.4 percent). In 1968, defense spending stood at 9.4 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), whereas it comprised 4.6 percent in 2008.10 Unlike the era of the Gates Commission, advocates of robust military spending now argue that defense should be largely immune from the ongoing budget debates. They emphasize that increasingly costly entitlement programs and mounting interest payments on our national debt are the real deﬁcit threats. The second is a matter of context. At least for now, our nation’s unprecedented extended deﬁcit spending spree has removed any serious discussion about current expenditure levels from the public agenda. Gates, who served as a Secretary of Defense under the ﬁscally conservative President Dwight Eisenhower, could never have imagined our current state of affairs. With U.S. federal deﬁcits as a percentage of GDP reaching levels not experienced since the immediate aftermath of World War II, the quest for budget discipline that Gates took as a given has been all but abandoned. The problem was made more acute during the course of the Iraq and Afghanistan conﬂicts as the Bush administration, supported by Congress, actually reduced taxes and made housing credit more plentiful. American citizens could be forgiven for making no connection between their individual tax payments and the real cost of two distant wars. The third reason is structural. The extraordinary and unprecedented use of civilian contractors in conﬂict zones has obscured the actual price of war from the American people who tend to measure costs in number of troops deployed. The use of contractors on battleﬁelds has proliferated during the ﬁrst decade of the twenty-ﬁrst century. It is estimated that between 2007 and 2011, on average, contractors outnumbered deployed military personnel in both Iraq and Afghanistan. This ratio represents a massive increase when compared with Operation Desert Storm in 1991 when only about 4,000 were employed. Of course, the Department of Defense could also employ numerous contractors to augment a conscript force. However, the point is that their large-scale use in support of our volunteer armed forces not only conceals the real scope of conﬂict from the American people, but also reduces pressure on the military’s leadership either to recommend strategies that can be implemented by the extant force or alternatively to request a politically problematic large expansion of the All-Volunteer Force. Thus, closing out the discussion of political ownership of our armed forces, we might reasonably conclude that the establishment of the All-Volunteer Force enabled the ﬁelding of the most lethal and dominant military in world history but also created the conditions for more frequent employment of other forms of national power. A fourth and ﬁnal explanation for the expanding role of the defense establishment in foreign affairs might be that the external oversight and the imposed accountability that has traditionally placed boundaries on the areas of military inﬂuence have gradually atrophied. These facts are perhaps consequences of the move to the All-Volunteer Force. The two most important external sources of imposed accountability on the American military are Congress and the media. Neither has performed with distinction in recent decades. First, consider Congress. The number of serving members of Congress with military experience has decreased signiﬁcantly since the end of conscription in 1973. In the 91st Congress (1969–1971), 398 members had served in the military; in the current 112th Congress (2011–2013), only 118 have served. This discrepancy represents a drop from over 73 percent to about 22 percent.11 In addition, very few members of Congress actually have sons and daughters serving in the Armed Forces. With the attendant loss of expertise, family ties, and perhaps interest, Congress appears less inclined to rigorously challenge senior military ofﬁcers’ advice and question their management practices. Indeed, nearly abject congressional deference to the military has become all too common. A usual response of politicians when asked about their views on the prosecution of an ongoing conﬂict is to routinely assert that they will give the generals and admirals whatever they need—hardly a strong afﬁrmation of civilian control of the military. Concerned about the potential political fallout from charges of ‘‘not supporting the troops’’ and lacking requisite knowledge, members tread cautiously before publicly disagreeing with ranking professional soldiers and the strategies that they advocate. I had an opportunity when serving as the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan to witness this reticence ﬁrst-hand. Visiting members of Congress were generally passive and supportive when receiving brieﬁngs from uniformed military leaders. They placed a hefty premium on photo opportunities with troops throughout their visits. On the other hand, they were always skeptical and occasionally confrontational when in similar sessions with the embassy’s civilian team in Kabul. Having previously served twice as a military commander in Afghanistan, I could plainly see the contrast. To be clear, I think the congressmen were right to challenge our civilian team; we were spending a signiﬁcant amount of taxpayers’ money, our aims were hard to deﬁne, and progress was difﬁcult to measure. Congress’s job is to exercise oversight, and members owed their constituents informed judgments. However, by not subjecting the military—which in Afghanistan was consuming over twenty times the amount of funds spent by the civilian team—to the same rigorous standards of scrutiny, these legislators were applying a double-standard and not faithfully executing their constitutional responsibilities. Let me offer a vignette that illustrates the impact of the All-Volunteer Force on Congress’s exercise of military oversight. Over the past year, over 50 Coalition (mostly American) soldiers were murdered by their supposed allies in the Afghan National Army and Police in some 35 reported attacks. We could assume that with a draft force, families of those killed would have clamored for congressional hearings, and that Congress would have eventually obliged or perhaps even pre-empted. Yet, during this period, only one congressional hearing has been held on this topic. The session was ninety-ﬁve minutes in length, with two civilian Deputy Assistant Secretaries of Defense and two Army brigadier generals (neither serving commanders in the ﬁeld) representing the Department of Defense and Armed Forces. The hearing, which received scant media attention, was not exacting in seeking a balance between displays of deferential respect for the military and the exercise of sober, demanding oversight. The performance of the media, like that of Congress, has been uneven in shining a spotlight on the All-Volunteer Force. I say ‘‘uneven’’ because occasionally excellent press expose´ s, well-researched books, and analytical think tank reports have led to a tightening of accountability. It might be argued, as well, that the lack of tough media reporting on the military may simply reﬂect the high standards achieved by the American Armed Forces; perhaps the good news has crowded out the bad. This scenario is implausible, however, given the fantastic amounts of money being spent by our military in chaotic expeditionary environments where efﬁciencies are impossible to achieve and massive amounts of waste, fraud, and corruption are all but unavoidable. Media interest and focus have diminished over time for several reasons. First, most media compete in a relentlessly timeconstrained news cycle. The loss of access to senior-level military ofﬁcials is a high-risk business proposition in a combat zone. Hence, reporters will be careful to avoid burning bridges to combatant command headquarters. Add to this fact their need to spend most of their time on the story of the day or week, and it becomes evident why some of the most insightful, frank, and surprising stories about senior military commanders and their strategies often appear only intermittently and are usually published by non-mainstream media outlets and by reporters on special assignments. Secondly, the decline in resources that many major media outlets devote to investigative journalism has meant, in turn, fewer hard looks at the military, not to mention other subjects of national concern. This decline is especially true given that the armed forces, an all-volunteer organization, elicit less reader or viewer interest than, say, scandals involving domestic politicians or titillating revelations about Hollywood luminaries. Financially strapped major media also attempt to provide ‘‘I was there’’ frontline reporting through the relatively recent innovation of embedding journalists within combat units. For the immediately engaged parties, embedding is a clear win-win; reporters have access to dramatic stories of hardship and heroism and commanders are better able to control the message. However, as journalist and novelist David Ignatius writes: But embedding comes at a price. We are observing these wars from just one perspective, not seeing them whole. When you see my byline from Kandahar or Kabul or Basra, you should not think that I am out among ordinary people, asking questions of all sides. I am usually inside an American military bubble. That vantage point has value, but it is hardly a full picture. I fear that an embedded media is becoming the norm, and not just when it comes to war.12 Ignatius’s argument can be taken even further. The reporter embedded in an all-volunteer unit manned entirely by those concerned about professional reputations and future careers is acquiring less ground truth than he or she might perhaps realize or admit. Finally, the well-funded Department of Defense and Armed Forces have, over time, developed longterm relationships with various think tanks, analysts, and retired military consultants, whom they periodically ask or encourage to visit theaters of war and to provide assessments. Arrangements in the conﬂict zone, entirely orchestrated by the military, include logistics, security, travel, and scheduling. Not surprisingly, when the travelers return to the United States, they generally support their sponsor’s views in written op-eds and appearances on news shows. What is extraordinary is that although no other government agency has the autonomy or resources to engage in such taxpayer-subsidized self-promotion,

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the Department of Defense and military have not been taken to task. Again, as ambassador from 2009–2011, I marveled at how Defense Department-sponsored consultants would spend weeks at a time in Afghanistan and often conclude that while the military dimension of the then ongoing surge was generally achieving intended results, it was shortcomings found elsewhere that jeopardized overall mission success. The need for extensive, rigorous, and dispassionate oversight of our armed forces is manifest enough. The expenditures involved are immense, the national security stakes are high, and the potential moral and political degradation associated with warfare is extreme. However, with the connective tissue between the U.S. military and society weakened by the All-Volunteer Force construct, two critically important gatekeepers—Congress and the media— have reduced their vigilance. When a reporter who has written skillfully on Afghanistan and Pakistan, Dexter Filkins, was asked during an interview on National Public Radio where all the billions spent on the Afghan Army had gone, he replied: ‘‘The ﬁrst is, you know, it’s Afghanistan and...it’s hard to imagine unless you see it, but if you can imagine a place on the moon, trying to build a base on the moon.’’13 Whether the U.S. military was manned by volunteers or conscripts, both Congress and the media would be moved to praise the daring and courage required to metaphorically build bases on the moon; however, only with a conscript force might Congress, reinforced by the media, feel compelled to question why they were attempting to do so in the ﬁrst place. If America’s foreign policy has become excessively militarized over the past few decades—and I believe it has—and we can identify possible causality—and I think that we reasonably can—I would like to conclude my remarks by posing the question: Is any of this consequential to our republic’s future security and political health? I am convinced the answer is ‘‘yes’’ for three reasons. First, as previously discussed, the great expense and frequent employment of our formidable All-Volunteer Force have become givens within our body politic. The U.S. military, ever versatile and ready to confront new security challenges, has become both the starting and relief pitcher for an ever-increasing number of foreign policy problems. It has not always been this way in the United States, not even during the ﬁrst full decade of the cold war. As Lesley Gelb has written: Truman and Eisenhower carried out their [economic] reforms while holding military spending in check. Pentagon budgets came last, not ﬁrst. Both presidents allocated defense outlays using the ‘‘remainder method,’’ whereby they subtracted necessary domestic spending from tax revenues and gave the leftovers (the ‘‘residual,’’ as Eisenhower called it) to defense.... [They] were particularly conscious of the ill effects of being a debtor nation.14 Yet today, while the domestic implications of our mounting ﬁscal woes seem evident to most Americans, the long-term impact on our international security standing does not. Our relatively insulated defense spending is rarely included in serious debates about a comprehensive security strategy that must be founded upon economic strength and human capital. Secondly, to the extent that America has grown comfortable with frequently deploying its superbly trained and equipped troops into harm’s way, there have been unintended consequences. Some of you have heard the tale of the knight who returned to the castle after a long, hard day of battle and reported proudly to his king, ‘‘Sire, I have been defeating the soldiers and burning the towns of your enemies in the west all day on your behalf.’’ The king, taken aback, exclaimed, ‘‘But I have no enemies to the west!’’ The knight, crestfallen, said, ‘‘Well, you do now, Sire!’’ Sober national assessments about opportunity and reputational costs associated with the use of force have not been sufﬁciently rigorous in recent decades. Finally, and perhaps most signiﬁcant, is the effect that extensive reliance on our military without reference to citizen obligation has had on the civic virtue necessary to sustain a republic. We collectively claim the need for a robust armed forces given the multifaceted threats our country faces, and yet, as individuals, we do not wish to be troubled with any personal responsibility for manning the frontier. The merits of the volunteer force are clear, and few Americans have any desire to return to a draft. Moreover, it may be possible to address certain negative consequences of the All-Volunteer Force through various policy means and approaches separate from reinstating conscription. In fact, given the stakes, we must ﬁnd a way to deal explicitly with the little-discussed shortcomings of the All-Volunteer Force in an incremental, politically pragmatic fashion. Still, as Beth Bailey has noted at the conclusion of her superb study of our volunteer armed forces: ‘‘In a democratic nation, there is something lost when individual liberty is valued over all and the rights and beneﬁts of citizenship become less closely linked to its duties and obligations.’’15 As the world’s leading power priding itself on a willingness to employ its vast military might in the defense of universal democratic values, there is a truth and irony here that should at least be admitted to.

#### Clinging to hegemony results in global war and extinction, while it may have been effective in the past measures of power have changed – a transition now is able to solve by phasing out the dangerous aspects of the global order while keeping the good via mililateralism and small states

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THE STAKES OF HEGEMONY Whenever global politics goes through major flux, the specters of conflict and anarchy raise their fearsome heads. Indeed, when the hierarchy of big powers changes, what is at stake is not just prestige but the stability and even survival of the international system itself. When states seek to advance their national interests, those interests are bound to collide with those of other countries. The collision could be over territory, natural resources, access to water or clean air, shipping lanes, rules governing the movement of people, sheltering hostile groups, or many other subjects of contention. And that clash of interests tends to lead to border wars, proxy wars, territorial disputes, rebellions, nefarious secret-service operations, humanitarian interventions, violations by rogue states, and power grabs of all kinds. History offers stark lessons about what happens when regional powers are not able to prevent or contain such conflicts. For centuries, from the Thirty Years’ War to the Napoleonic Wars to World Wars I and II, the scope and scale of war have advanced in a bleak and bloody progression. Since 1945, many devastating regional conflicts have caused much devastation without expanding into all-out world war. Why this unprecedented extended global peace? A key part of the answer is hegemony. For six decades, countries have had no questions about where they stood in the hierarchy of nations and thus what boundaries they could not cross. In the bipolar system of the Cold War, most of the rest of the world fell more or less firmly into the American or Soviet sphere of influence, and the remaining countries knew better than to challenge this overall frame. And once the Cold War ended, one country, the United States, towered over all the others in military and economic might as well as cultural sway. Hegemonic stability theory, developed in the 1970s by MIT professor Charles Kindleberger, underlies, more or less explicitly, much of today’s debate. Its central insight is that a dominant power that has both the unique ability and the interest to ensure world order is the best antidote to costly and dangerous international chaos. If there is no hegemon, the theory holds, the only way to bring peace and stability is through a system of rules—norms, laws, and institutions that every country agrees to abide by in exchange for the benefits of peace and stability. Needless to say, this is a complicated alternative, no matter how worthy, and hegemony tends to deliver the goods more effectively.10 Writing about the world between the wars, Kindleberger argued that the economic and political turmoil of the time—the collapse of the gold standard, the Great Depression, instability in Europe, and the rise of the fascist threat—showed a failure of hegemony. Great Britain’s willingness and ability to deploy the forces and spend the money to maintain supremacy were in decline. The only credible contender to step into that role, the United States, was locked in an isolationist stance. The absence of a stabilizing hegemon—one with both the ability and the political will to use its power to preserve order—contributed to the spread of the depression and ultimately to World War II. Historians using a wide range of measures to estimate national power, from population and economic output to military spending and industrial capacity, have identified moments when the pure hegemony of one country—basically, the gap between it and everyone else—has been the clearest. Britain in the 1860s and the United States right after World War II, from 1945 to 1955, are two cases that “reflect the greatest concentrations of power in the system leader,” according to the scholar William Wohlforth, who has analyzed these data extensively. But both of them pale in comparison with America after the Cold War. “The United States is the first leading state in modern international history with decisive preponderance in all the underlying components of power: economic, military, technical and geopolitical,” Wohlforth wrote in 1999. He argued—in a view echoed by many other analysts—that the emergence of the United States as an overwhelmingly dominant power with no credible competitor across all the different arenas of international rivalry established a unipolar world. This was an entirely new configuration in world history, and one that had the ingredients not just to deliver global peace and stability but also endure over time.11 THE NEW INGREDIENTS The very success of the United States in providing the world with hegemonic stability helped bring to the fore two new dimensions of power in the world system. One was “soft power”—the idea that a state’s power might be expressed and reinforced through the appeal of its culture and ideas. The other was the extraordinary proliferation of organizations,

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treaties, international laws, and conventions to which more and more countries signed up in the second half of the twentieth century. This growing institutional framework created a system of global cooperation with far more participants, covering far more subjects, than had ever been anticipated. Soft power had its rougher antecedents in imperialism, whether of the Roman, British, or French variety—the mission civilisatrice that sought to indoctrinate colonial subjects into the glories of western civilization, through the seduction of lucre and pomp, or the creation of educational, social, and cultural frameworks. The kinder, gentler, and more egalitarian modern version was posited by political scientist Joseph Nye—later a senior official in the Clinton administration—in a 1990 book titled Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power. The concept took hold, and Nye expanded it in a 2004 book called Soft Power. Its subtitle gives away the plot: The Means to Success in World Politics.12 Soft power as Nye envisions it is a kind of power that is hard to measure but easy to detect: the power of reputation and esteem, the goodwill radiated by well-regarded institutions, a desirable economy to work in or trade with, an attractive culture. This form of power might be less quantifiable than the number of fighter jets, infantry divisions, or billions of barrels of oil reserves, but its value is no less clear. In the 1990s, it was clear that Silicon Valley and Hollywood were adding to America’s soft power by driving global technological innovation and spreading entertainment products laced with American culture. Soft power was not unique to the United States, but in the mid-1990s American dominance in this newly crucial arena of power seemed as thorough as it did in the traditional areas. The world also enjoyed the highest degree of international cooperation in history. Starting with the founding of the United Nations in 1945, governments have steadily invested more and more in new tools of cooperation. From 1970 through 1997 alone, the number of international treaties more than tripled.13 The US State Department publishes a listing of treaties currently in force for the United States that is almost five hundred pages long, listing thousands of treaties covering everything from polar bears and road traffic to nuclear fuel.14 Today’s widely agreed-upon norms of behavior for states and apparatus of treaties and organizations could scarcely have been imagined a century ago. They govern everything from treatment of prisoners of war to the management of fishery stocks and how much you pay for an international telephone call. Trade, finance, communications, migration, outer space, nuclear proliferation, endangered species, epidemics, terrorism, crime—all are underpinned by agreements or organizations that limit the options of nations and create a space to compromise and work out differences. Scholars call this a regime—a set of rules and forums addressing a particular issue of common concern. And when a new global challenge takes shape—a recent example might be climate change or financial contagion—there is a healthy instinct to gather and attempt to construct a regime to deal with it together, rather than let every country fend for itself. It is a far cry from the predatory and narrowly self-interested politics among nations once held as a given by Machiavelli and Hobbes. Today, in a once unimaginable world of almost two hundred separate sovereign states, there is a greater moral consensus about the proper behavior of nations than humanity has ever known before. The combination of hegemony and rules has been good for global stability. The two approaches have functioned together rather than in competition. The United Nations system itself, with its permanent seats and veto powers on the Security Council, was set up to entrench the authority of the winners of World War II, particularly the United States. The United States assumed many classic burdens of hegemony: posting troops in Europe and Asia and acting as global policeman, underwriting the Marshall Plan, contributing the lion’s share of the UN’s budget and that of other international organizations. Its rival, the Soviet Union, used ideology, oil, and weapons to prop up a bloc of satellite states in Eastern Europe and throughout the developing world. Undergirded by the threat of mutually assured nuclear destruction, the standoff between the two left little room for local conflicts to spread. Once the Soviet Union collapsed, the United States was left with all the attributes and burdens of a hegemon. It possessed vast military supremacy; the world’s largest economy and investment and trading ties around the world; a strong and stable political system; a safe and well-defended national territory; and a robust network of diplomats, troops, and spies in every important corner of the world. Meanwhile, the impressive web of global agreements and forums kept disputes from becoming violent and channeled rivalries toward discussion and agreement. The theorists of hegemonic stability seemed vindicated: the hard power of guns and money, the soft power of culture and ideas, and the binding ties of institutions suggested that a long and virtuous Pax Americana lay ahead. IF NOT HEGEMONY, THEN WHAT? A decade later, the picture is more complicated. The body blow of 9/11 shattered America’s illusion of immunity to domestic attack. Intractable conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan showed the limits of its military supremacy. The financial crisis and great recession exposed weaknesses in its economy. Administrations of both of its major parties struggled with polarized domestic politics. Yet, at the same time, no clear rival has emerged. China and India have posted phenomenal growth but are far behind and have severe internal weaknesses. No major alliances or treaties have been signed by powers seeking to exploit America’s vulnerabilities. The classic elements of the balance of power—whereby countries scheme to offset one another’s alliances and limit one another’s zones of influence—remain muted. A few countries are clearly vying for leadership in global talks on everything from trade rules to climate change, but this is a far cry from massing weapons on the border. Since the end of the Warsaw Pact, no military alliance has arisen to oppose American-led NATO. Yet the exercise of hegemony by America, divided politically at home, is uncertain at best. So what is happening? For the last several years this sense of unease has fueled a great deal of speculation and worry.15 One response has been to point to signs of American decline as the country’s economic ability and political will to pay the costs of hegemony decrease. This is a recurring topic. A famous 1987 book by Yale historian Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, described five hundred years of shifts in the world power system and ended with cautions about the fragility of American dominance based on the experience of past empires, which came undone when they could no longer marshal the resources to support their overstretched military operations. The collapse of the Soviet Union seemed to refute Kennedy’s prediction, but in the post-9/11 world it seemed relevant once again. And even boosters of American hegemony worried that the biggest risk to the world order was not the rise of some devious competitor but, rather, America’s failure to live up to its role. In his 2004 book Colossus, prolific British historian Niall Ferguson argued the United States needed to do more to assume its responsibility of leadership as a “liberal empire.” All the postwar rules and regimes were not enough to handle threats from rogue states, terrorism, or disease—all given new force by technology, Ferguson argued. “What is required is an agency capable of intervening . . . to contain epidemics, depose tyrants, end local wars and eradicate terrorist organizations.” In other words, a capable and active hegemon.16 Views about the future of international rivalry span the gamut. Conservative scholar Robert Kagan anticipated that “the twenty-first century will look like the nineteenth,” he wrote, with powers like China, Russia, India, and a unifying Europe jostling for supremacy.17Another view holds that even if the rival powers are not overtly challenging American hegemony, they are using techniques known as “soft balancing”—such as informal agreements, voting blocs in international forums, or turning down American diplomatic and military requests—to limit and undermine it.18 Other thinkers argue that fears like Ferguson’s are overstated, because American hegemony is not that damaged. Even in a world with new rivals and multiple poles of influence—a “post-American world,” as Fareed Zakaria has put it—the United States enjoys unique advantages that reinforce, not diminish, its power.19 Still others fear that changes in the global economy and the way we live have been so radical that neither hegemony nor global rules are even possible anymore. They fear that a form of anarchy—the primeval state of the world system—is once again taking hold. As early as 1994, Robert Kaplan saw anarchy emerging from failed states and ethnic rivalries, the rise of unchecked terrorist and criminal networks, and the vulnerability of an interconnected world to the spread of disease and other catastrophes. An even more dire view is that of political scientist Randall Schweller, who compares changes under way in the world system to the onset, in physics, of the state of entropy, when a system becomes so disorganized that it changes nature in a way that is impossible to reverse. Information overload and the scattering of identities and interests will make international politics essentially random, Schweller argues. “Entropy will reduce and diffuse usable power in the system,” he writes. “No one will know where authority resides because it will not reside anywhere; and without authority, there can be no governance of any kind.”20 Clearly, the world system is in a state of flux. The above debates are important, yet they ring hollow when the main views on where the world is headed are so wildly different and subject to shifting conventional wisdoms. The decay of power helps to clarify the picture. WHO’S AFRAID OF THE BIG BAD WOLF? TRADITIONAL POWER AT BAY Fundamentally, the tools that big powers use to get their way in the international system have not changed much. Weapons, money, and diplomatic ingenuity have usually carried the day. A robust army equipped with state-of-the-art equipment and staffed by a large and competent fighting force; a large economy, advanced technology, and a strong natural resource base; a loyal and well-trained cadre of diplomats, lawyers, and spies; and an attractive ideology or system of values have always been major assets to international influence. In every era of history, such attributes have conferred advantage on the most populous, economically advanced, politically stable and resource-rich nations. It is not the raw assets themselves that are shrinking. What is waning is the effectiveness, usability and impact of the traditional modes of power that they underpin: whether military, economic, or soft power. From Overwhelming Force to the Age of Ad Hoc Allies As we saw in the last chapter, one country—the United States—spends more on its arsenal, troops, and logistics than do all others combined. It is not a fruitless expense. Pax Americana—in which American military supremacy acts as the ultimate guarantor of stability—has been real. Indeed, the United States now formally guarantees the security of more than 50 countries.21 The disparity in military spending between the United States and other countries endures, as does the phenomenal breadth of the US military presence in 130 countries, from large contingents in long-term bases to small units in training, peacekeeping, special operations, and counterinsurgency activities. The United States also leads NATO, the most important military alliance in the world and, with the fall of the rival Warsaw Pact, the only one of its scale. This is as strong an indicator of hegemony as there could be. Alliances were always the core instrument of great-power politics, backing up diplomacy with the credible threat of military action, delineating spheres of influence and no-go areas, and deterring attack by guaranteeing mutual defense. They were, in other words, the building blocks of world order. And for many decades the pattern of alliances in the world remained steady. NATO and the Warsaw Pact enforced a rigid order on either side of the Iron Curtain. In the developing world, newly independent countries quickly got courted, co-opted, or coerced into alliances with the West or the communist bloc. Today, more than a decade after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact by its members in July 1991, NATO stands triumphant. In fact, three former Soviet republics and a further seven former members of the Soviet bloc have joined the alliance. NATO and Russia remain rivals: Russia resists having more of its neighbors join the alliance and opposes the deployment of NATO missile defense in central Europe. But they have also proclaimed themselves partners, not enemies, and since 2002 have had a dedicated council to smooth out their relations and solve any disputes. Beyond Russia, NATO has no other obvious potential enemy—a novel situation for a major alliance, and one that has forced it to seek out new ways to remain relevant. The chief case in point is its mission in Afghanistan, in which all twenty-eight member-states plus another twenty-one countries have supplied troops. But its apparent supremacy conceals mounting weaknesses that reflect both the absence of an existential threat and the dilution of power among its participants. The Afghanistan mission has been heavily dominated by the United States, with many countries making modest or symbolic contributions. Several countries have withdrawn. Domestic opposition to the continued presence of Dutch troops in the mission contributed to the fall of the Netherlands government in February 2010, presaging withdrawal. Participants such as France and Germany have demurred at American requests for additional troops. Moreover, each contingent in Afghanistan has operated under different rules imposed by its own national military command departments or even its country’s legislature. A provision hammered out in parliament in Prague or The Hague might limit what actions a NATO soldier might take in the field fighting the Taliban, training Afghan soldiers, or combating the opium trade. Such restrictions have prompted some American soldiers to rechristen the so-called International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) as “I Saw Americans Fight.”22 While NATO strains under these contradictions, coordination among its members is rivaled by parallel structures. A long-standing defense organization, the Western European Union, overlaps with NATO. The European Union has its own official defense policy apparatus, including the European Defense Agency and other bodies; it carries out its own overseas missions including peacekeeping, military assistance, and contributions to multinational forces. Of course, each EU member-country has retained its own military. Between NATO, national governments, and the many layers of EU bureaucracy, the Atlantic alliance is increasingly a hodgepodge of jurisdictions and forums with overlapping memberships, but with no decision-making hierarchy or clear lines of command. The rise of the “coalition of the willing” as a new kind of multinational military enterprise testifies to the diminished force of alliances. The most notorious manifestation of this decline was the ad hoc group of countries who agreed to participate in or otherwise support the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. But it aptly describes the Afghanistan operation as well as security, peacekeeping, and humanitarian efforts from earthquake relief to patrolling the sea lanes off Somalia—where countries have pooled military forces despite no formal alliance having been triggered, and with no overarching authority forcing them to take part. Because the “willing” sign up on an ad hoc basis, their support is contingent on political developments in their respective countries, their continued willingness to pay the financial costs, and the side deals they can negotiate in exchange for taking part—in the case of several nations participating in the Iraq operation, for example, streamlined visa procedures for their citizens to enter the United States. As for the actual new alliances that have sprung up in the world under Pax Americana, some are simply forums for military cooperation among members of a regional organization, similar to the EU. The African Union, for instance, has its own peacekeeping force to intervene in regional conflicts. A South American Defense Council is building military ties in Latin America. But these fall short of traditional alliances that are built on tight cooperation, sharing plans and technology, and the promise of mutual defense. One might have expected the rise of new alliances around a large rival power, such as China or Russia, in an effort to recreate a rival in place of the Warsaw Pact. Instead, the most active efforts—albeit largely unsuccessful—were those by Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez to form a military alliance with Cuba, Bolivia, and other sympathetic nations as a regional counter-power to the United States. The more representative “alliances” today are in fact between states and nonstate actors that they support—for instance, Iran’s support of Hezbollah and Hamas, and Venezuela’s reported role as intermediary between the Colombian FARC and organizations like the Basque militant group ETA.23 One military arena in which some of the traditional hierarchies remain intact is arms sales—at least of the traditional kind. The same dominant suppliers—the United States, Russia, China, France, Germany, Italy—still account for the overwhelming majority of arms deals, in a top tier that has held intact for decades. But official sales backed by government financing are only one part of the actual global arms business. As the UN secretary-general’s April 2011 report puts it, “In recent decades, the arms trade has seen a shift from mostly direct contact between Government officials or agents to the ubiquitous use of private intermediaries, who operate in a particularly globalized environment, often from multiple locations.”24 This part of the arms trade, unregulated and often stateless, is out of control, and points to the diminished grasp of national defense ministries in the environment of armed conflict—yet another symptom of the decay of power. The Decline of Economic Diplomacy Alongside military alliances, great powers have traditionally used economic inducements as a way to get other countries to support their interests. The most direct method is bilateral aid—that is, directly from one government to another—in the form of loans, grants, or preferential trade or resource deals. Economic diplomacy can be punitive as well, in the form of trade barriers against a targeted country, boycotts, embargoes, or sanctions against their economic institutions. Here again the methods persist, but their effectiveness as a means of power projection has diminished. For starters, thanks to the integration of the world economy, the dependence of any one country on supplies, customers, or financing from any one other country has loosened enormously. Falling trade barriers and more open capital markets were long-held goals of the United States and other rich nations in international trade talks. Their victory—along with the widespread promotion of the “Washington consensus” as a condition for lending by the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and other institutions—has had the paradoxical effect of weakening the hold that the United States or former colonial powers like Britain and France once had over countries in their sphere of influence. The imposition of sanctions against Iran in an effort to bring its nuclear program into compliance with international regimes is the exception that proves the rule. The United Nations, the United States, the European Union, and several other countries have imposed a widening array of restrictions on commerce with Iran, including an embargo on Iranian oil, curtailment of transactions with its central bank, and restrictions on travel and tourism. But the United States has had to grant exemptions to several of its allies who depend on Iranian oil and has faced the difficult dilemma of whether to impose penalties on friendly countries such as South Korea and India, and on rivals with significant retaliatory capacity such as China, for their unwillingness to curtail purchases. The targeted use of state power through the allocation of aid to favored countries has become enormously diffuse as well. At the end of World War II, only five or six national aid agencies existed. Today there are more than sixty. In the 1950s, an overwhelming 88 percent of aid disbursed came from three countries: the United States (58 percent), France (22 percent), and Britain (8 percent). The bilateral aid field saw its first major expansion in the 1960s when Japan, Canada, and several European countries set up overseas aid agencies. The Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries soon became major players, contributing a greater share relative to their national income than did the United States, Britain, or France. In the 1970s, the oil windfall allowed Arab countries to set up development assistance funds that they used to support projects in Muslim countries and throughout Africa. The landscape expanded again in the 1990s, with Eastern European countries becoming donors; large emerging nations like India and Brazil have also become major aid issuers in their own right.25 By 2009, the United States, France, and the UK accounted for only 40 percent of total official development assistance.26 And that is just the bilateral part of the picture, which accounts for 70 percent of aid flows. There are at least 263 multilateral aid agencies,27 from the World Health Organization to regional groupings like the Nordic Development Fund or specialty agencies like the World Fish Center or the International Council for Control of Iodine Deficiency Disorders. On top of all this is the vast expansion of private aid through nongovernmental organizations that follow their own agenda. In 2007, total official development assistance (bilateral and multilateral) was about $101 billion, and private aid was about $60 billion.28 The global private aid industry is estimated to employ more staff than the government and multilateral organizations with which it competes more and more effectively. The proliferation of sources means that the typical recipient country is dealing with a great many partners, rather than a few that monopolize the scene and can exercise disproportionate influence on its government. In the 1960s, there were on average twelve donors channeling foreign government funds into each recipient country; in 2001–2005, the number had almost tripled to thirty-three.29 The dispersion of economic power is even more pronounced when it comes to foreign investment. The days when the United Fruit Company acted as a transmission belt for US interests in the “banana republics” are well over. Multinational companies are no longer national champions for their home country, extending its interests and sometimes serving as more or less complicit agents in its foreign policy. Between the expansion of global markets, outsourcing and manufacturing facilities, the wave of mergers and acquisitions, and investment by individual tycoons, multinationals are as unmoored from the foreign policy of “home” countries as they have ever been. What specific national interest, for instance, would you attribute to the world’s largest steel company, Arcelor Mittal, given that it is based in Europe, its shares are listed in the stock exchanges of six countries, and yet it is owned primarily by an Indian billionaire? In fact, if any countries have seen their interests expand through foreign investment in recent years, it is emerging economies whose companies have become active international investors, especially in agriculture, natural resources, construction, and telecommunications. Brazil’s Petrobras or China’s CNOOC in oil, Malaysia’s Sime Darby in rubber, Mexico’s CEMEX in cement and Bimbo in food, South Africa’s MTN or India’s Bharti Airtel in mobile phone service are just a few of the many companies involved in the so-called South-South foreign direct investment (FDI) supported by increasingly strong investment promotion agencies, export-import banks, or political risk insurance. An estimated twenty-thousand multinational companies have their headquarters in emerging markets. Investments originating in developing countries are still a minority of global foreign investment, but they have skyrocketed from only $12 billion in 1991 to $384 billion in 2011. Of this, a growing proportion has gone to investments in other developing countries. In 2011, emerging-market investors accounted for more than 40 percent of global merger and acquisition activity. The ensuing distribution of executives, personnel, and brand-name visibility gives the lie to the antiquated idea of foreign investment as a political tool of rich nations.30 Economic diplomacy still has the best chances of translating to political clout in places where the needs are greatest and competition from other partners and the private sector is lowest. In recent years that has meant Africa, where China and the West are facing off in the closest thing we now have to an old-fashioned scramble for influence, against a background of promising oil reserves and political instability. Chinese influence in Africa has grown in the last decade, as the country has built roads, hospitals, and other infrastructure, lavishly outbidding Western firms for oil concessions and turning projects around rapidly—with few or none of the onerous policy or management conditions imposed by Western funding agencies. One of China’s most recent high-profile gifts was a $200 million headquarters for the African Union in Addis Ababa. This generosity combined with professions of support for the sovereignty of recipient countries and a blind eye to rebellions and political unrest have earned China credit among African political elites and created strong competition for French and US companies and agencies. But as fast as Chinese influence in Africa grows, it too is vulnerable to decay as other countries—notably India, South Africa, and the Arab countries—expand their investments on the continent. SOFT POWER FOR ALL If the military and economic clout of the great powers has become diluted, their soft power dominance has been equally affected, though this is difficult to measure. The Pew Global Attitudes project, which has polled in an increasing number of countries since 2002, confirms that the global image of the United States declined in most parts of the world during the George W. Bush administration, particularly after the invasion of Iraq, and appeared to have improved—sometimes returning or exceeding 2002 levels, sometimes not—after Barack Obama’s election. In Germany, for instance, 60 percent of those polled in 2002 had a favorable view of the United States, compared to only 30 percent in 2007, and 64 percent in 2009. In Turkey, favorable views of the United States dropped from 30 percent in 2002 to 9 percent in 2007, and rose back to 14 percent in 2009. Measured this way, America’s soft power is far from uniform: in 2009 American favor-ability was 78 percent in Nigeria, 69 percent in Britain, 47 percent in China, 38 percent in Argentina, and 25 percent in Jordan. Moreover, by 2012, the “Obama dividend” was declining in many countries. The same question posed of China offers similarly ambiguous results, with the biggest improvements in China’s image reported in Nigeria (from 59 percent favorable in 2006 to 85 percent in 2009) compared with a drop in Turkey (from 40 percent in 2005 to 16 percent in 2009) and tepid results, in the 40–50 percent range, in many of the countries polled. Tellingly, in 2011, Pew reported that a majority or plurality of respondents in fifteen out of twenty-two nations said that China either will replace, or has replaced, the United States as the world’s leading superpower. Opinions of the EU have been mixed—its overall image declined in thirteen of twenty countries from 2010 to 2011—while views of Russia tend to be negative and opinions of Iran even more so, with a few salient exceptions (for instance, in 2009, 57 percent of Lebanese had a favorable opinion of Russia, and 74 percent of Pakistanis thought highly of Iran).31 All this suggests that soft power is, at the very least, a volatile concept, highly vulnerable to short-term twists in world affairs, in an environment where news travels more rapidly than ever. That has not stopped numerous countries from embracing the concept and looking into ways to increase their soft power. The scholar Joshua Kurlantzick traces China’s shift to a soft power strategy to 1997, when the country couched its refusal to devaluate its currency as “standing up for Asia.” Since then, China has become the major provider of aid to many Southeast Asian countries, expanded aid and projects in Africa, accelerated distribution of its national television programs, and opened Confucius Institutes for language teaching and cultural programs around the world. In February 2012, China Central Television launched an effort to produce programming for the United States, opening a studio in Washington, DC, with more than sixty international staff.32 China is also becoming a destination for global artists and architects; and a sense of its growing importance is prompting parents around the world to consider enrolling their children in Mandarin classes. For China, soft power is an explicit strategy.33 In India, by contrast, soft power is less a policy priority and more a concern among analysts who hope that the country has already amassed a soft power advantage by virtue of being a democracy and having attracted generations of Western tourists, seekers, and now investors. “India has an extraordinary ability to tell stories that are more persuasive and attractive than those of its rivals,” argues Shashi Tharoor, the author and former UN high official turned Indian government minister and politician.34 The head of India’s overseas culture programs cited the popularity of yoga as a component of soft power.35 Vague as all this can sound, one area in which India’s soft power is generally accepted is Bollywood, the world’s largest film exporting industry; it has won fans across Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe for decades and is now breaking into the Western commercial mainstream. If media penetration and popularity are among the more reliable indicators of soft power, as evidenced by both Hollywood and Bollywood, they also reveal a landscape where telenovelas from Mexico and Colombia, low-budget films from Nigeria, and reality shows from South Africa are broadening the range of influences. In Russia and Eastern Europe, just as the end of the Cold War threw huge arsenals of surplus weapons onto the world market, the end of state television monopolies created a vast vacuum for cheap telenovelas from Latin America to fill, giving birth to addictions—and also markets. In Southeast Asia, a whole generation of fans knows South Korea not for its confrontation with the North nor for its time under dictatorship in the 1970s, but for its video games, pop music stars, and the Winter Sonata TV series. The Korean government capitalizes on this by sponsoring concerts and offering language and cooking classes at its cultural centers in the region. Once an opportunity to extend soft power comes into view, capitalizing on it is easy—and often very cheap.36 The latest Korean cultural beachhead is the United States, where the rapper Psy created a sensation with his “Gangnam Style” dances and songs. (Gangnam is a posh neighborhood in Seoul.) “K Pop,” another Korean superstar, also won over legions of fans: the New York Times reported that R&B singer Jay Park’s songs and albums have hit No. 1 on the R&B/Soul charts on iTunes in the United States, Canada, and Denmark since 2010. Together with the global spread of consumer names such as Samsung, Hyundai, Kia, and LG, these cultural inroads are helping to strengthen South Korea’s global brand: in the Anholt GfK Roper Nation Brands Index, which surveys twenty thousand people in twenty countries to put together a ranking of the top fifty country brands, South Korea has risen from thirty-third in 2008 to twenty-seventh in 2011.37 THE NEW RULES OF GEOPOLITICS One of the best examples of smaller countries that have used coalitions of the willing, economic diplomacy (i.e., a lot of money), and soft power to advance their interests must surely be Qatar. It led the way in toppling Libya’s Moammar Qaddafi by supplying rebels with money, training, and more than twenty thousand tons of weapons, and called early for the arming of rebels in Syria.38 It has attempted mediation in Yemen, Ethiopia, Indonesia, and Palestine and—importantly—in Lebanon. Through an $85 billion investment fund, Qatar has bought into businesses from Volkswagen to the Paris St. Germain Football Club. And it is not only behind what is perhaps the most influential new news organization, the network Al Jazeera, but has been building up its reputation as a cultural center with top-rated museums of Islamic and Middle Eastern art as well as high-profile purchases of pieces by the likes of Warhol, Rothko, Cezanne, Koons, and Lichtenstein.39 But you don’t have to be sitting on top of a small fortune in hydrocarbon resources to play with the big boys. A small group of countries that are not necessarily neighbors or bound by a common history can achieve results more quickly by simply choosing to work together than by going through cumbersome international organizations. And a more geographically ambitious foreign policy, one focused only on immediate neighbors, is within reach of a larger number of countries now; countries that lag in grasping this opportunity stand to lose their competitive edge. None of these principles denies the value of a large military or a commanding resource base. But all of them flow logically from the decay of power, and they form the basis for a new kind of international politics. JUST SAY NO When they set up the United Nations’ system, the winners of World War II made sure to design it in ways that would protect their interests. The United States, Soviet Union, China, France, and Britain, for example, gave themselves permanent seats on the Security Council, the body that was to handle the most serious international crises. They also ensured that they would retain the power to veto any resolution. This arrangement was an innovation in international affairs and, in this case, it worked as its designers had hoped it would. The ability of the five permanent members (all of them nuclear powers) to block any action that threatened their interests gave them another useful tool to wield in the complex rivalry that resulted from the division of the world between the Western and Soviet spheres of influence. Of 269 uses of the veto between 1946 and 2012, more than 225 came before 1990.40 The Soviet Union was the most active veto wielder in the 1950s and 1960s, and the United States thereafter, mainly to stop resolutions condemning Israeli policy vis-à-vis Lebanon or the Palestinians. In the past decade, the Security Council veto has rarely been used; neither France nor Britain has employed it at all in over fifteen years. Since 2006, however, China and Russia have used their veto power to defend rogue nations such as Zimbabwe, Myanmar, and Syria from censure and sanctions. But if the UN veto by traditional great powers is mostly dormant, other veto powers are flourishing. One arena in which the veto has proved extremely effective for individual nations is the European Union. In 1963, when the community had only six members and was dominated by the French-German alliance, Charles de Gaulle vetoed Britain’s application to join. He renewed his opposition in 1967—even though all five of France’s partners supported the British application. Only after de Gaulle died in 1969 did France soften its stance, resulting in the admission of Britain, Denmark, and Ireland in 1973. The French veto was an example of a major power—one of the two dominant players in the European Economic Community of the time—using the veto to stop others from usurping its national interest, not unlike the Security Council instrument. As a result of the steady expansion of the EU and the principle of unanimity for key decisions, considerable power was given to one new nation after another, to the extent that some analysts have wondered why the existing members were so eager to admit new ones at all. Each wave of new members has gotten benefits, often financial, by threatening to hold up new initiatives. Fear of a British referendum on EEC participation in 1975 got France and Germany to agree to new financial terms of membership that were far more favorable to the UK. Later Greece, which joined in 1981, and Spain and Portugal, which joined in 1986, were able to get financial benefits from their fellow members in exchange for not blocking new treaties aimed to advance integration, such the Maastricht Treaty and the development of the common currency. The EU now uses a system of “qualified majority voting” with a complicated formula that apportions votes to each country by population and requires 255 out of 345 votes for a measure to pass in the Council of Europe. This still creates safeguards for smaller states, preventing a small number of large countries from ramming any initiatives through. But key issues such as new common policies and further expansion of the union still require absolute unanimity, and each year finds small countries using this veto power to hold up various measures. For instance, Poland vetoed a key EU-Russia trade partnership in 2007, until Russia lifted a ban on imports of Polish meat. Lithuania vetoed the same deal until its EU partners agreed to endorse its position on a variety of disputes with Russia, including the issue of compensation for Lithuanians who were deported to Siberian labor camps. The Netherlands has blocked EU accession talks for Serbia over failure to hand over accused war criminals to the International Criminal Court in The Hague. In these ways, small countries have used their veto power to gain concessions—sometimes on major issues, but sometimes on ones that might seem parochial—from larger EU states or from other nations seeking to deal with the EU as a whole. By digging in their heels, small countries can hold up any number of international initiatives—and they are not hesitating to do so. The failure of the Copenhagen climate summit in December 2009 was blamed on many factors—the reluctance of the United States and China to make a deal, the intransigence of large industrial or developing countries—but in the end, what stopped the adoption of even a weak accord was the objection by a previously unimagined coalition: Venezuela, Bolivia, Sudan, and the tiny Pacific island nation of Tuvalu. The Sudanese representative likened rich-country proposals to the Holocaust, while the Venezuelan representative cut her hand on purpose to ask if it would take blood to be heard.41 Their acts were dismissed as farcical, but their nations’ objections added to the mood of confusion and dissent of what already was a fractious meeting. In the end, the summit did not adopt the accord but, rather, “took note” of it—making a mockery of the efforts of the United States, EU, China, Brazil, India, and other big-country negotiators and sending a discouraging signal about global commitment to a common approach to climate change. The EU succeeded in forging an agreement at the UN’s Durban climate talks in December 2011—only to find its own climate-change policy thrown over three months later by a veto from Poland, which is heavily dependent on coal.42 Why do vetoes work so well for small nations today? One major and paradoxical reason is the proliferation of organizations intended for international cooperation on numerous issues. The more of these, the more opportunities for a country to potentially take a stand on a parochial, ideological, or even whimsical issue, often for short-term domestic political reasons rather than because of any defense of principle. But small-country vetoes also work because large countries no longer have the same range of carrots and sticks to force compliance. The decay of military and economic power makes small countries less vulnerable to strong sanctions from traditional patrons and trading partners. And the proliferation of news and communication channels allows small countries new ways to make their case directly to the global public, fomenting sympathy and support, rather than see it limited to closed-door negotiations. FROM AMBASSADORS TO GONGOS: THE NEW EMISSARIES “American ambassadors—an obsolete species?” The question was posed as early as 1984 by Elmer Plischke, a distinguished practitioner of that now-fading field, diplomatic history. Plischke pointed out the changes that were eroding the primacy of ambassadors as representatives of their nation, including easier travel and communications technology, the rise of ways for governments to communicate directly with publics in other countries, and the diluting effect of the proliferation of nation-states, including so many very small ones, each with its own diplomatic corps deployed.43 All of these transformations, of course, have only accelerated in the ensuing three decades. The idea of diplomacy as a field in decline is not new. In 1962 the scholar Josef Korbel, a Czech emigré and Madeleine Albright’s father, wrote about the “decline of diplomacy” as old values and procedures developed over centuries in the diplomatic profession began to crumble. Among these were discretion, manners, patience, thorough knowledge of the relevant topics, and the shunning of premature publicity. “The modern diplomatic world has trespassed much too frequently against these basic rules of diplomacy,” Korbel wrote, “and one is compelled regretfully to add that the sin cannot be attributed exclusively to its Communist sector.” In addition to the decay of these traditional values, Korbel pointed out the bypassing of diplomats by politicians at summit meetings and state visits, when for many years heads of state and even foreign ministers rarely traveled abroad. And he pointed out that democratic regimes create spaces for other countries to present their case directly, even when they do not reciprocate; thus, he noted, Soviet leaders had access to the American press while Americans enjoyed no such direct access to the Soviet population.44 These days, those direct-access channels have exploded into a cornucopia of political, ethnic, and religious advocacy groups; pleas by well-to-do immigrant communities on behalf of their home nation, or emigrants on behalf of their host; friendly news coverage and public relations inserts in newspapers; sponsored events by cultural or tourism organizations; the activities of paid lawyers and lobbyists; and a wellspring of blogs, forums, advertising, and propaganda in cyberspace. For some nations, the leading edge of overseas advocacy is not the embassy staff, with its protocol and security restrictions, but the Gongo. What is a Gongo? It is a government-organized nongovernmental organization: an impostor that purports to be part of civil society but is in fact instigated, funded, or directed by a government or people acting on its behalf.45 One Gongo, for instance, occupies a pleasant, innocuous office building in Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo, close to the Imperial Palace. Chongryon, the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan, has about 150,000 members and serves an ethnic community several times larger. It runs about sixty schools, including a university; it also owns businesses, including banks and gaming interests in Japan’s popular pachinko parlors. But it delivers passports as well. That’s because Chongryon serves as the de facto embassy in Tokyo for North Korea, which has no diplomatic relations with Japan. In its schools, it faithfully advances the ideology of Kim Jong-Un’s regime. Over the years North Korea has become isolated and impoverished, but Chongryon has carried on. It lost direct North Korean government funding, and Japan withdrew some of its tax privileges. When it fell into debt, a former Japanese intelligence officer tried to swindle it out of its headquarters. Chongryon encourages Japan’s Koreans to maintain their national identity and shun Japanese institutions, but it was happy to see the Japanese courts rule to restore its ownership of the building.46 Not all Gongos are pernicious: America’s National Endowment for Democracy, a private nonprofit created in 1983 to support democratic institutions around the world, is funded by the US government. That makes it a Gongo. And its work as such has drawn the ire of antagonists including Egypt (which imprisoned and sought to try several of its staff), the Russian government, and a Chinese newspaper that called US-backed democracy promotion “self-serving, coercive and immoral.”47 Other Gongos work in the cultural sphere; among these are the British Council, Alliance Française, Goethe-Institut, and Instituto Cervantes, which promote the arts and teach the language of their respective countries overseas. Numerous religious groups operating in foreign countries have the backing of Saudi Arabia, Iran, and other countries that seek to advance not just the Islamic faith but a particular geopolitical agenda. Gongo ventures can be extremely creative: one, for instance, is the annual program by the Chavez government in Venezuela to subsidize cheap heating oil for thousands of families in the northeast United States, through gifts from the Venezuelan state oil company to a Boston energy company run by former congressman and political scion Joe Kennedy. As these examples show, Gongos are a mixed bag—and they are not going away anytime soon. Why? Because lower political, economic, and information barriers make them vastly preferable to the rule-hobbled work of a deputy chief of mission, political officer, or science attaché. Deploying a Gongo on a subject of immediate concern can be much cheaper than ramping up personnel and resources in the diplomatic corps—or, for that matter, paying an expensive lobbyist or public relations firm. And cyberspace generates its own Gongos, in the form of bloggers, videographers, and other online voices that advance a country’s point of view and may be amenable to friendly encouragement and underwriting. ALLIANCES OF THE FEW The multiplication of working partnerships, some more formal than others, among countries involved in one issue or another reflects the shifting lines of power in geopolitics today. The Cairns Group, founded in 1986 to reform agricultural trade, gathers nineteen food-exporting countries, including Canada, Paraguay, South Africa, Argentina, and the Philippines, that push for cutting both tariffs and subsidies. And the BRICS group, which, as noted, is an acronym for five large emerging markets—Brazil, Russia, India, China, and now South Africa—held its first summit meeting in Russia in 2009, though the acronym was coined by a banker for Goldman Sachs eight years earlier and had spread in financial circles before the politicians latched on. Russia also belongs to the G-8 of industrial nations; Mexico and South Africa joined Brazil, India, and China as the “plus 5” in the expanded G8+5. There are two different G-20s, one consisting of finance ministers and central bank governors of nineteen large nations, plus the EU; the other a grouping of developing countries that are now more than twenty in number. The memberships of the two overlap. New trade blocs and regional cooperation agencies are simmering in all parts of the world. And the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA), an alliance begun by Venezuela and Cuba in 2005, has seven members including Ecuador, Nicaragua, and the Caribbean nations of St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Dominica, and Antigua and Barbuda. It resembles a trade pact but has larger political aspirations, and among the benefits it shares among nations are eye care (provided by Cuba and subsidized by Venezuelan oil).48 The key common feature is that none of these groups is trying to be a universal alliance. By allowing admission only to members with a common outlook or concerns, they more resemble the “coalitions of the willing” in America’s Iraq and Afghanistan wars than they do the United Nations or the international climate-change negotiations. In March 2012, for example, the members of BRICS discussed the creation of a common development bank to mobilize savings between the countries and promote the opening of further trade links, particularly between the other members and Russia and China.49 Such groupings also have a higher chance of accomplishing whatever it is they set out to do. Truly global agreements have grown exceedingly rare—especially ones that actually work. The last global trade deal was in 1994, with the agreement to create the World Trade Organization; the United States has yet to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, and many signatories have missed their targets; and the United Nations Millennium Declaration, signed by 192 countries in 2000, set out numerous global social goals to be achieved by their target date of 2015. The Copenhagen fiasco, with its vast expenditure of diplomatic effort for barely a symbolic outcome, is far more characteristic of multilateral initiatives that aim for universal adherence. The alternative is what I have called minilateralism. At its most fine-tuned, minilateralism consists of gathering the smallest number of countries necessary to make a major change to the way the world addresses a particular issue—for instance, the ten largest polluters, the twenty largest consumers of endangered fish stocks, the dozen major countries involved in aid to Africa as donors or recipients, and so on. Minilateralism can serve small countries too, when it takes the shape of alliances of the few that have a greater chance of succeeding, but also of not being shut down by dominant powers whose leverage is diminished. In turn, minilateralism is vulnerable to the decay of power. Because many of these associations are ad hoc and lack the moral pressure of global membership, they are also more vulnerable to dissolution or defection when a member-government falls, its population dissents, or its policy preferences change.50 ANYONE IN CHARGE HERE? The leveling of hierarchy means that a small number of dominant nations (let alone a single hegemon) no longer hold sway over the direction of international cooperation and how the world will handle present and future crises. It also means the bypassing of the traditional diplomatic establishment—foreign ministries, embassies and their staff, national aid agencies, and other bilateral services—that has controlled the terms of engagement across borders. Diplomats were once the gatekeepers and guardians of certain norms of interaction. Now they have been disinter-mediated, and the advantages of traditional statecraft blunted, in a landscape of small-country initiatives, promotion by nonstate actors, and channels of direct access to overseas public opinion. The edifice of cooperation and deterrence built in the last seven decades has been strong enough to see through decolonization, ward off invasions and conquests, and limit secessions. The dissolution of unwieldy unions that had been held together by ideology and force—the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia—stand as the exceptions that confirm the rule. So sovereign states remain, and they still possess the trappings of sovereignty, which are not insignificant: armies, border controls, currencies, economic policy, taxation. The rivalry among states—along with its expression through the Great Game of negotiations, alliances, agreements, propaganda, and confrontation—is here to stay. The tail will not always wag the dog, either. The power of the United States or China is vastly superior to that of a small European, Latin American, or Asian state both on paper and almost always in practice. It is the effectiveness of that power that is lagging, not its potential. The American president will have his or her phone call taken at any hour anywhere in the world. He can barge into a meeting of fellow leaders and redirect the conversation. The clout of the Chinese premier by that measure is growing. These are the dynamics that unfold at international conferences and summit meetings, and they have an impact on the outcome. Keeping tabs on them is more than a matter of jingoism or attachment to bygone ways: it does make a difference. But the decay of power means that obsessing about which great power is on the rise and which one is declining, as if geopolitics in the end reduced to a zero-sum game among a global elite, is a red herring. Yes, each issue on which they face off is significant on its own merits. The alignment of military forces between the United States, Russia, and China is certainly worthy of concern. So is the nature of China’s response to American entreaties that it manage its currency differently. So are differences between the United States and the European Union on trade policy, agricultural subsidies, and the prosecution of war criminals. So are the stances of India and China on carbon emissions. But none of this signifies the fall of one hegemon and the rise of another in its place. Future superpowers will neither look nor act like those of the past. Their room for maneuver has tightened, and the capability of small powers to obstruct, redirect, or simply ignore them will continue to grow. So, does this mean that the alternative view is correct? Is the world spiraling toward an updated, twenty-first-century version of Hobbes’s war of all against all, made more complicated by the cross-cutting and blurred lines between nation-states, nonstate actors, unmoored financial flows, charities, NGOs and Gongos, and free agents of all kinds? The default answer is yes—unless, and until, we adjust to the decay of power and accept that the ways we cooperate across borders, both inside and outside the framework of governments, must change. There is no reason we cannot do so. The collapse of the world system has been repeatedly predicted at times of technological change and cultural and demographic flux. Thomas Malthus predicted that the world could not carry an expanding population. Yet it did. Witnessing the industrial revolution and the expansion of global markets and trade in the nineteenth century, the Marxists anticipated a collapse of capitalism under the weight of its internal contradictions. It did not. World War II and the Holocaust deeply shook our faith in the moral character of humanity, yet the norms and institutions the world established in response have endured to this day. Nuclear annihilation, the cardinal fear of the 1950s and 1960s, failed to occur. Today’s panoply of international threats and crises—from global warming and resource depletion to nuclear proliferation, trafficking, fundamentalism, and more—come as the hierarchy of nations is in flux and the very exercise of state power is no longer what it used to be. The juxtaposition can be jarring. Each new massacre, bombing, or environmental disaster jolts us anew, and the laborious, ambiguous results of conferences and summit meetings seem to offer little consolation or hope. It may seem that no one is in charge. That feeling, and the trends that provoke it, will continue. But looking for a current or new hegemon or a committee of elite nations to reassert control is a fool’s errand. The solutions to the new challenges of international cooperation—ultimately, of sharing the planet—will emerge in a landscape where power is easier to obtain and harder to use or even to keep.

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**Quickly turns leadership**

**Harl, 10** al Harl, professor economics, Iowa State Univ. 11.20.10

[http://www.desmoinesregister.com/article/20101120/OPINION01/11200313/-1/SPORTS12/Guestcolumn-A-perfect-fiscal-storm-may-be-brewing]

Another way to begin is to refuse to raise the federal debt limit, as some key Republicans propose. The consequences of that could be breathtakingly tragic. If the government is unable to pay interest on the debt and to refinance expiring issues, the obvious result is default. The consequences of a default would do untold damage to the standing of the United States as a debtor nation and would raise the specter of another Greece. But the impact would be several times greater, with any meaningful rescue beyond the financial ability of any nation - or group of nations. And it could happen fast.

**T-bond crisis causes food price spikes**

**Min 10** – Associate Director for Financial Markets Policy, Center for American Progress (David, "The Big Freeze", 10/28, <http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/10/big_freeze.html)>

A freeze on the debt ceiling could erode confidence in U.S. Treasury bonds in a number of ways, creating further and wider panic in financial markets. First, by causing a disruption in the issuance of Treasury debt, as happened in 1995-96, a freeze would cause investors to seek alternative financial investments, even perhaps causing a run on Treasurys. Such a run would cause the cost of U.S. debt to soar, putting even more stress on our budget, and the resulting enormous capital flows would likely be highly destabilizing to global financial markets, potentially creating more asset bubbles and busts throughout the world.

Second, the massive withdrawal of public spending that would occur would cause significant concern among institutional investors worldwide that the U.S. would swiftly enter a second, very deep, recession, raising concerns about the ability of the United States to repay its debt. Finally, the sheer recklessness of a debt freeze during these tenuous times would signal to already nervous investors that there was a significant amount of political risk, which could cause them to shy away from investing in the United States generally.

Taken together, these factors would almost certainly result in a significant increase in the interest rates we currently pay on our national debt, currently just above 2.5 percent for a 10-year Treasury note. If in the near term these rates moved even to 5.9 percent, the long-term rate predicted by the Congressional Budget Office, then our interest payments would increase by more than double, to nearly $600 billion a year. These rates could climb even higher, if investors began to price in a “default risk” into Treasurys—something that reckless actions by Congress could potentially spark—thus greatly exacerbating our budget problems.

The U.S. dollar, of course, is the world’s reserve currency in large part because of the depth and liquidity of the U.S. Treasury bond market. If this market is severely disrupted, and investors lost confidence in U.S. Treasurys, then it is unclear where nervous investors might go next. A sharp and swift move by investors out of U.S. Treasury bonds could be highly destabilizing, straining the already delicate global economy.

Imagine, for example, if investors moved from sovereign debt into commodities, most of which are priced and traded in dollars. This could have the catastrophic impact of weakening the world’s largest economies while also raising the prices of the basic inputs (such as metals or food) that are necessary for economic growth.

In short, a freeze on the debt ceiling would cause our interest payments to spike, making our budget situation even more problematic, while potentially triggering greater global instability—

perhaps even a global economic depression.

**It will be a fight but the GOP will probably lose**

**Epso, 9/18/13** (David, “Dodge default, defund Obamacare, GOP leaders say” <http://www.greenwichtime.com/news/texas/article/Dodge-default-defund-Obamacare-GOP-leaders-say-4825548.php>)

WASHINGTON (AP) — House Republicans vowed Wednesday to pass legislation that would prevent a partial government shutdown and avoid a historic national default while simultaneously canceling out President Barack Obama's health care overhaul, inaugurating a new round of political brinkmanship as critical deadlines approach.

Obama swiftly condemned the effort as attempted political extortion, and the Republican-friendly Chamber of Commerce pointedly called on lawmakers to pass urgent spending and borrowing legislation — unencumbered by debate over "Obamacare."

The two-step strategy announced by House Speaker John Boehner marked a concession to his confrontational rank and file. At the same time, it represented a challenge to conservatives inside the Senate and out who have spent the summer seeking the votes needed to pull the president's cherished health care law out by its roots. They now will be called on to deliver.

"The fight over here has been won. The House has voted 40 times to defund, change Obamacare, to repeal it. It's time for the Senate to have this fight," said Boehner, an Ohio Republican.

As outlined by several officials, Boehner and the leadership intend to set a House vote for Friday on legislation to fund the government through Dec. 15 at existing levels while permanently defunding the health care law. The same bill will include a requirement for Treasury to give priority to Social Security and disability payments in the event the government reaches its borrowing limit and cannot pay all of its obligations.

A second measure, to be brought to the floor as early as next week, would allow Treasury to borrow freely for one year.

That same bill is also expected to be loaded with other requirements, including the construction of the Keystone XL Pipeline from Canada to the United States, a project that environmentalists oppose and that the Obama administration has so far refused to approve. Other elements will reflect different Republican budget priorities, including as-yet-undisclosed savings from health care and government benefit programs and steps to speed work on an overhaul of the tax code.

Prospects for passage of the two bills are high in the House, where Republicans have a majority and leaders pronounced the rank and file united behind the strategy.

But both measures are certain to be viewed as non-starters by majority Democrats in the Senate.

Some **Republicans appeared to concede** during the day that the legislation that eventually reaches the White House will leave the health care law in effect.

"I don't think that any reasonable person thinks there's anything to be gained by a government shutdown," said Sen. John Cornyn, R-Texas. "Rather than a shutdown of government, what we need is a Republican victory in 2014 so we can be in control. I'm not sure those are mutually compatible."

But a fellow Texas Republican, Sen. Ted Cruz said it was important to hold fast. He said Democrats appear at present to have the votes to restore funds for the health care law, adding, "At that point, House Republicans must stand firm, hold their ground and continue to listen to the American people."

Given the differences, it is unclear how long it will take Congress and the White House to clear the measures, and how close the government will come to a partial shutdown or a market-rattling default over the next three weeks.

**Business pressure will change minds – but Obama’s capital is key to mobilizing it**

**Sink, 9/18/13** (Justin, The Hill, “Amid fiscal fights, Obama courting business leaders”

<http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/322883-amid-fiscal-fights-obama-courting-business-leaders>)

President Obama will address the Business Roundtable (BRT) on Wednesday as he works to get corporate leaders on his side during this fall’s fiscal showdowns with the GOP.

The White House is hoping that Obama can rally the influential organization, made up of conservative chief executives from the nation’s largest corporations, to help build pressure on congressional Republicans.

According to a White House official, the president will ask business leaders "to help send the message to Congress that a default would be disastrous for our economy and for businesses across the country."

"Some Republicans in Congress are playing a reckless political game by threatening to leave the economy hanging in the balance for an ideological agenda that has no chance of becoming law—a game that last time had real consequences, hurting growth and business confidence," the official said.

Obama is expected to note that during debt ceiling negotiations in the summer of 2011, the stock market decreased 17 percent, the nation's credit rating was downgraded, and consumer confidence dropped to its lowest level since the financial crisis. He'll argue to the assembled corporate executives that failure to strike a deal would again endanger the economy — and their bottom lines.

“The president’s focus, as is always the case when he meets with this group, is what we can do together to keep the American economy growing,” White House press secretary Jay Carney said on Tuesday.

But **the sell will not be an easy one** — the association’s officials have been critical of the president, and members of the group are wary of the administration’s aggressive regulatory push on labor and environmental issues.

And congressional Republicans are accusing the president of employing "scare tactics" to gain leverage.

"No one is threatening to default," said Brendan Buck, a spokesman for House Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio). "The president only uses these scare tactics to avoid having to show the courage needed to deal with our debt crisis. Every major deficit deal in the last 30 years has been tied to a debt limit increase, and this time should be no different."

Obama has leaned on the organization in the past. Shortly after the president’s last visit in December for a speech and closed-door discussion, the CEOs sent a letter to congressional leaders arguing all options — including tax increases — should be on the table as negotiators sought a “fiscal-cliff” deal.

That gesture, a reversal from the group’s stance just five months earlier, ratcheted up pressure on congressional Republicans. The GOP subsequently stumbled, and Obama struck a deal that many Democrats embraced.

**It will pass but it will consume all time and attention to get it done and the perception of political weakness will cause the opposition to dig in their heels**

**Gerson, 9/18/13 -** served as a senior adviser to President George W. Bush(Michael, Virginian Pilot, “The politics of paralysis” lexis)

The remainder of **legislative time and attention** that hasn't been spent on Syria this year will now be consumed by the budget and debt-ceiling debates - in which the best possible outcome is the avoidance of self-inflicted wounds.

Republican leaders seem prepared to combine the continuing resolution and debt-ceiling increase, extend both for a year with the budget at level spending, and impose a one-year delay in implementing Obamacare. They won't get the last part - Obama would veto anything including it - but the Republican base insists.

The Obama administration, in return, offers nothing. It is continuing the practice of starting a negotiation process by refusing to negotiate.

Coming to an eventual compromise between one side that demands the moon and the other side that demands and offers nothing at all won't be easy. The protection of Obamacare is the one "red line" the administration holds absolutely sacred.

But conservatives sense opportunity in a weakened president and a deeply unpopular law. And Speaker John Boehner's room to maneuver is extremely limited by a small faction of his party that is just big enough to paralyze him. It is a recipe for confidence-shaking, market-spooking, down-to-the-wire confrontation.

In the shadow of this conflict, little else will grow. According to Yuval Levin of the Ethics and Public Policy Center, "only things that have to pass - or else the government shuts down or the economy crashes - are going to pass this year."

**The GOP will lose the fight now**

**Sherman, 9/17/13** (Jake, Politico, “House GOP doubles down on bad hand” <http://www.politico.com/story/2013/09/house-republicans-government-shutdown-96968.html>)

The House Republican leadership’s decision to try to defund Obamacare this week in its government funding bill, and their promise to wage a a no-holds-barred fight to delay the health care law as part of the debt ceiling fight, is a double-barreled strategy that could set Boehner, Cantor, Majority Whip Kevin McCarthy (R-Calif.) and the House Republican Conference up for two big defeats.

Nearly everyone in Washington — except a group of conservative Republicans and their allies — admits that the Senate isn’t going to vote to defund the Affordable Care Act. President Barack Obama showed his own determination on Monday not to give in, speaking just minutes after a shooting rampage in Washington to remind the nation he’s not interested in negotiating over the debt ceiling.

(PHOTOS: 25 unforgettable Obamacare quotes)

Boehner and his top lieutenants have tried managing expectations about what’s achievable in a divided Washington, with Republicans running the House and Democrats holding the Senate and White House. But those efforts aren’t swaying the rank and file.

“Republicans control the House. Conservatives control the House,” said Rep. Mick Mulvaney (R-S.C.). “Our job is to reflect the people who sent us here. That means sending a good, conservative bill out of this House. We’ll worry about the Senate after the Senate actually does something.

Now, House Republicans are now staking out two positions on which they’re almost sure to come out on the losing end.

But Boehner, Cantor and McCarthy may have no other option. They tried it their way: Leadership pushed a clean government funding bill, alongside a resolution to defund Obamacare that would’ve been defeated and sent to the president with no further say from the House. House Republicans rejected it, forcing leaders to shelve the plan.

Now, the leadership is tacking hard to the right — a provision defunding Obamacare in the $988 billion spending bill — in a move to get 217 House Republican votes and put the heat on Senate Republicans to filibuster any government funding package that doesn’t derail the Affordable Care Act.

After the planned passage of a continuing resolution Friday or Saturday that would keep the government funded through Dec. 15, House GOP leadership’s goal is to begin crafting a debt ceiling plan that could get a vote as soon as next week.

That way, when the Senate sends a CR back across the Capitol that doesn’t defund Obamacare, they hope House Republicans will see the debt cap as a more attractive place to dig in. Republicans say Democrats will eventually see the wisdom of using the debt ceiling to strike a deal that cuts the deficit and fixes sequester cuts. This would allow Republicans to avoid being blamed for a government shutdown and shift the focus to the struggle over boosting the $16.7 trillion debt ceiling.

Boehner and the GOP leadership will spend the next two weeks crafting a plan to raise the nation’s borrowing limit that will include piles of conservative goodies. Basically, if a Republican lawmaker has an idea for what should be included, leadership will throw it in.

The options include jump-starting construction of the Keystone XL pipeline, major structural reforms to entitlement programs like Medicare and Medicaid, an outline of tax reform principles and rolling back environmental regulations.

**Even if a deal is eventually reached to prevent hitting the ceiling a protracted fight is economic sabotage – collapse growth, markets and confidence.**

**Johnson, 9/4/13 -**  Campaign for America's Future (Dave, “Fresh Hell When Congress Returns”, <http://truth-out.org/opinion/item/18597-fresh-hell-when-congress-returns>

There are two different levels of economic damage from a debt-ceiling fight. First there is the cost of the fight itself, as the world worries over whether Republicans would actually pull the trigger. The fact that they would talk about this at all causes considerable damage to growth and confidence. But the other level of damage – far more serious – comes if they actually do it. If the U.S. defaulted, the consequences to the country’s and world’s economic system are literally unimaginable. In January, The Washington Post looked at reports of the economic damage caused by the last debt-ceiling fight – the one that led to the economic damage of the “sequester.” The Post report summarized: The protracted, unsettling nature of the negotiations between the White House and Republicans dramatically slowed the recovery, economists conclude, looking back at the episode. Consumer confidence collapsed, reaching its worst level since the depths of the financial crisis. Hiring stalled, with the private sector creating jobs at its slowest pace since the economy exited the recession. The stock market plunged, sending the Standard & Poor’s 500-stock index down more than 10 percent. In the last debt-ceiling hostage battle, the government spent an extra $1.3 billion to borrow because of lender uncertainty over whether they would be paid back, according to the Government Accounting Office (GAO). Following the battle the Standard & Poor’s credit agency “downgraded” the U.S. credit rating, saying that any country that would even discuss default does not deserve the top rating. On top of that, the 10-year cost of higher interest rates from that fight is $18.9 billion. The unemployment rate increased as job growth was cut in half by the fight. Consumer confidence plunged “more than it did following the collapse of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. in 2008.” The consequences of actually letting the country default would begin with a panic in the stock market. And there would likely be a “run” on money markets, because the safety of the U.S. dollar is the foundation of the entire financial system. Next, many of the things the U.S. government must pay for would not be paid for. Because raising the debt ceiling is about allowing the government to get the money to pay for the things Congress has already spent money on, existing invoices would not be paid. So the government would default on paying for contracts, hospitals and doctors who had already performed services, fuel purchases, everything right up to payments to Social Security recipients and people trying to redeem their government bonds. The government would have to prioritize who to pay based on what is coming in from tax receipts, fees and market transactions, which would all drop dramatically as the world’s economy exploded. In any event, the government doesn’t have the computer systems in place to prioritize payments, and wouldn’t have the time or funds to get those running. There would be a dramatic rise in interest rates for borrowing. The United States would no longer be a “safe” borrower, so the price of loans – the interest rate – would go up. That would ripple out to the price of a loan to a business, a mortgage, a car loan and everything else that Americans finance. No matter how fast a default of the country was resolved, the shock to the confidence of the entire economic system would not go away. If the United States was no longer a “safe haven,” then a restructuring of the world’s core understanding of debt and repayment would follow. With the effect of the last fight now understood, any new fight has to be seen for what it is: “economic sabotage.”

**Delay risks economic collapse**

**Puzzanghera, 9/18/13** (Jim, “Delay in raising debt limit risky, Lew says” Los Angeles Times, lexis)

As the nation fast approaches its debt limit, Treasury Secretary Jacob J. Lew issued his strongest warning yet to Congress about the economic consequences of waiting until just before the deadline to pass an increase.

"Trying to time a debt-limit increase to the last minute could be very dangerous," Lew told the Economic Club of Washington on Tuesday. "We cannot afford for Congress to gamble with the full faith and credit of the United States of America."

Republicans are balking at raising the $16.7-trillion debt limit, which Congress must do by as early as mid-October, unless the Obama administration agrees to major concessions including deep spending cuts and a delay in implementing the healthcare reform law.

During a meeting last week, House Speaker John A. Boehner (R-Ohio) gave Lew a list of times in the past when the White House and Congress used the need to raise the debt limit as a way to find bipartisan solutions on fiscal issues, Boehner's office said.

Boehner has said that any increase in the debt limit must be offset by budget cuts or spending reforms at least as large as the increase.

But Lew reiterated Tuesday that President Obama would not negotiate over raising the debt limit because it involves paying for bills already authorized by Congress and because the notion of a federal government default should not be a bargaining chip.

Lew specifically ruled out a delay in the healthcare law, the Affordable Care Act, a move being pushed by some House conservatives.

"That's just not reality, and they're going to have to start dealing in reality," he said.

But as the Treasury runs out of the accounting maneuvers it has used since the spring to continue borrowing to pay the nation's bills, Lew said lawmakers needed to act.

Since the U.S. technically reached its debt limit in the spring, the Treasury has been using so-called extraordinary measures, such as suspending investments in some federal pension funds, to juggle the nation's finances to pay bills. Those measures will be exhausted by the middle of October.

Lew noted that Washington politicians like to wait until they are up against a deadline to act, as they often do with spending bills and did last year with the so-called fiscal cliff, the combination of automatic tax increases and government spending cuts.

But the debt limit is different, Lew said, because of the complexity of identifying an exact date when the nation would run out of borrowing authority -- and because of the consequences of a first-ever federal government default.

Lew said a default would be "a self-inflicted wound that can do harm to our economy right at a moment when the recovery is strengthening."

A bitter battle over the debt limit in 2011, resolved at the last minute, raised fears of a first-ever U.S. government default. The lengthy standoff led Standard & Poor's to downgrade the nation's credit rating for the first time and triggered financial market turmoil along with a deep drop in consumer confidence.

"Some in Congress seem to think they can keep us from failing to pay our nation's bills by simply raising the debt ceiling right before the moment our cash balance is depleted," Lew said. Such a view is misguided, he said.

The Treasury Department doesn't know with precision the exact day that it won't have enough incoming cash to make all the required outgoing payments once it runs out of borrowing authority.

Lew formally told Congress last month that the Treasury would run out of borrowing authority in mid-October. At that point, the government would be able to pay bills only with cash on hand of about $50 billion on any given day.

An analysis released last week by the Bipartisan Policy Center, which also cited the difficulty of pegging an exact date, estimated that the U.S. would run out of borrowing authority between Oct. 18 and Nov. 5.

The vagaries of the debt-limit issue mean that Congress must act sooner rather than later, Lew said.

"I'm nervous about the desire to drive this to the last minute when the last minute is inherently unknowable and the risk of making a mistake could be catastrophic," he said.

**Obama’s weakened but still strong enough to win the debt ceiling fight**

**Garrett, 9/19/13 -** National Journal Correspondent-at-Large and Chief White House Correspondent for CBS News(Major, National Journal, “A September to Surrender: Syria and Summers Spell Second-Term Slump” <http://www.nationaljournal.com/all-powers/a-september-to-surrender-syria-and-summers-spell-second-term-slump-20130917>)

There are no “obstructionist” Republican fingerprints on the conspicuous and power-depleting defeats for Obama. He never sought a vote on Syria and therefore was not humiliated. The same is true for Summers. But Obama lost ground on both fronts and ultimately surrendered to political realities that, for the first time in his presidency, were determined by his own obdurate party.

This does not mean Obama will lose coming fights over the sequester, shutdown, or debt ceiling. But he is visibly weaker, and even his sense of victory in Syria is so unidimensional, it has no lasting sway in either Democratic cloakroom. More important, Democrats are no longer afraid to defy him or to disregard the will of their constituents—broadly defined in the case of Syria; activist and money-driving in the case of Summers. This, of course, indirectly announces the beginning of the 2016 presidential campaign and an intra-party struggle over the post-Obama Democratic matrix.

This shift—a tectonic one—will give Republicans new opportunities on the fiscal issues and in coming debates over immigration and implementation of Obamacare. Republicans have never known a world where Democratic defections were so unyielding and damaging.

This does not mean Republicans will find a way to exploit these fissures. The GOP’s current agony over delaying or defunding Obamacare and the related shambling incoherence around the sequester/shutdown/debt ceiling suggest not.

**Agency links to politics- influenced by Congress- backlash would shift to Obama for Agency flip flop**

**Datla and Revesz 12** (Kirti and Richard, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

PUBLIC LAW & LEGAL THEORY RESEARCH PAPER SERIES WORKING PAPER NO. 12-44 LAW & ECONOMICS RESEARCH PAPER SERIES WORKING PAPER NO. 12-23t, “Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and Executive Agencies)”, August 2012 \\CLans)

The ability of agency heads to adopt policies somewhat indepen- dently of presidential monitoring and control matters only if agency heads will diverge from the President’s preferences in the absence of direct presidential control. One might ask why the preferences of an agency head would ever diverge from those of the President who ap- pointed him, given that the President presumably appoints agency heads who share his policy preferences. But the President is not the only “principal” of an agency head. Congress, political parties, regu- lated interest groups, and the agency staff exert influence on the agency head.257 Congress primarily exerts influence over agency heads (and pre- sumably also conveys the preferences of the political parties) through the power of the purse. Thus “[an] agency has an incentive to shade its policy choice toward the legislature’s ideal point to take advantage of that inducement.”258 The preferences of members who serve on the agency’s appropriations committee will presumably carry more weight than those of Congress generally. Congress also can influence agencies through hearings and legislative proposals. Political parties also influence agency heads and can cause an agency head to diverge from the President’s preferences. Because agency heads tend not to retire from public life after their tenure, they therefore consider the impacts of their decisions on future career prospects.259 Agency heads will consider the preferences of their po- litical party, which controls (or at least influences) their potential for advancement. Decisions that will “optimize the agency head’s future stream of income and reputational benefits will not necessarily be compatible with the [P]resident’s agenda at all times.”260 Interest groups also exert influence over agency heads. The phe- nomenon of interest group influence is commonly referred to as agency capture. The capture thesis recognizes that because interest groups representing regulated entities tend to be overrepresented in the agency decision-making process compared to interest groups rep- resenting public interests, the outputs of agencies will tend to be bi- ased in favor of those interests.261 Interest groups are overrepresented in agency decision making because they are well or- ganized, well funded, possess an information advantage over the agency, and can offer perks such as future employment.262 Finally, agency staff members are able to influence agency heads as a result of several factors. First, “government administrators will seek employment at an agency because of an ideological identification with that agency’s mission.”263 Then, as agency heads serve in their positions, they gain expertise and “adopt the preferences and perspec- tives of agency careerists on policy issues”—called “going native.”264 Finally, the agency staff simply spends more time with the agency head than the President or his advisors can

**Alternative mechanisms still get spun as blame and drain pc**

**Weaver 13** (Kent, Professor at Georgetown University and a Senior Fellow in Governance Studies at the Brookings Institution, “Policy Leadership and the Blame Trap:

Seven Strategies for Avoiding Policy Stalemate”, March 2013 http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2013/3/29%20policy%20leadership%20blame%20weaver/weaverpolicy%20leadership%20and%20the%20blame%20trapv5032813.pdf\\CLans)

Negative messaging is not without potential costs to its perpetrators, of course. The most important policy consequence of negative messaging is that it constrains future opportunities for compromise. If Republicans blame Democrats for raising taxes and pledge never to support any tax increase, for example, it will be difficult for them to agree to tax increases without appearing to be liars, hypocrites, or a flip-floppers—all of which are charges that are likely to be made by future opponents in Republican primaries. But in today’s polarized political climate, many politicians actually view this as an advantage: by creating a narrow “zone of acceptable outcomes” for themselves, they hope to force the other party to move closer to positions that they favor. America’s politicians, in short, appear to be caught in what can be called the “blame trap”: they generate blame against their opponents in order to appease their political supporters and win enough support from undecided voters to win elections. But the usual policy result, given America’s system of multiple veto points, is policy stalemate, which generates more public cynicism and makes blamegenerating appeals even more credible for the electorate.

**Renewables unpopular with Republicans – empirics prove they intend to crush the budget**

**Spross, Thinkprogress, Blogger 6-29-13**

[Jeff Spross, 6-29-13, Climate Progress, “House Republicans Want To Cut Nearly $1 Billion In Renewable Funding For 2014”, http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2013/06/29/2233591/house-republicans-want-to-cut-nearly-1-billion-in-renewable-funding-for-2014/?mobile=nc, accessed 7-07-13 AMS]

This past Tuesday, President Obama unveiled his second-term plan for cutting carbon emissions, and delivered a bracing call for the American economy to advance into a clean energy future. This past Wednesday, House Republicans responded by moving a bill out of the Appropriations Committee that would cut investments in renewables by nearly a billion dollars.

The legislation in question is the Energy and Water appropriations bill, which is the fifth of twelve spending bills the House must pass to establish the discretionary budget for 2014. Sequestration — the across-the-board spending cuts that went into effect earlier this year — set a top-line level of $967 billion for that spending. But Republicans are attempting to ease the cuts to the military by slicing even deeper into other programs. That led to a party-line vote in the committee to cut renewable investments in the bill by $911 million from their level in 2013.

**Oil lobbies**

**Shauk, Houston Chronicle, 12**

[Zain, 7-25-12, Fuel Fix, “Oil Lobby Chalanges Renewable Fuel Mandate”, http://fuelfix.com/blog/2012/07/25/oil-lobby-group-challenges-renewable-fuel-mandate/, accessed 7-10-13, HG]

The American Petroleum Institute filed a lawsuit Tuesday claiming the government is requiring refiners and gasoline importers to purchase renewable fuels that don’t exist. The lawsuit, which was filed in a federal court in Washington, argued that the Environmental Protection Agency’s mandates are unreasonable, according to the API, an energy industry trade and lobbying group. “EPA’s unattainable and absurd mandate forces refiners to pay a penalty for failing to use biofuels that don’t even exist,” Bob Greco, the API’s director of downstream and industry operations, said in a statement. The EPA did not immediately respond to inquiries about the disputed renewable – cellulosic biofuel — ethanol fermented from products other than corn, which is the main source of U.S. biofuel now. The agency has said that wood chips, wood residue, grasses, agricultural residue, animal waste and municipal solid wastes can also be used to produce cellulosic biofuels. In 2012, the EPA will require gasoline producers and importers to displace 0.006 percent of their total gasoline production with the purchase of cellulosic biofuels. As is the case with other EPA-supported biofuel incentive programs, biofuel makers can sell a credit to gasoline producers for each gallon of biofuel they make. But no credits have been generated for cellulosic biofuels this year, or ever, according to the EPA’s website. In the absence of credits, the EPA will allow gasoline producers to purchase cellulosic biofuel waivers at a cost of 78 cents a gallon to meet obligations at the end of the year. Oil and gas lobbyists are arguing that the incentive program will require refiners and importers to pay for 6.6 million gallons of the “nonexistent biofuel.” The agency has mandated cellulosic biofuel credit purchases since 2010, but no credits were available, so companies were required to buy waiver credits from the government. In total, the credits have cost the industry about $14 million over two years, Greco said in a telephone interview. “That’s, in effect, a tax,” Greco said. “We’re having to pay for a fuel that doesn’t exist when the EPA could have adjusted the mandate to reflect that reality.” The API filed a petition with the agency last year, asking the EPA to reconsider the 2012 mandates because of the limited availability of cellulosic biofuels. The agency has stuck with the mandate, with the intent of creating an incentive for more production of the fuel. “API supports a realistic and workable (Renewable Fuel Standard) and continues to recommend that EPA base its prediction on at least two months of actual cellulosic biofuel production in the current year when establishing the mandated volumes for the following year,” the lobbying group said in a statement. “This approach would provide a more realistic assessment of potential future production rather than simply relying on the assertions of companies whose ability to produce the cellulosic biofuel volumes EPA hopes for is questionable.”

# Round 6 – Neg vs. Bronx Law Cuba Salsa Aff

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**The affirmative contends that a discussion of the “plantations of the past and the plantations of the present” serves as a pre-requisite to any discussion of economic engagement with Cuba. Specific proposals and impact stories hold no weight in the absence of a discussion of the actual conditions of the Cuban plantations.**

**However, the affirmative’s focus on the role of race in shaping the history of the Cuban plantation is misplaced. Their contention that “anti-blackness” was the foundation of the Middle Passage, and thus of civil society, is historically inaccurate. A historical frame that analyzes the Cuban plantation through the lens of capitalist development, rather than racialized violence, serves as a better foundation for seeking a strategy of liberation.**

**The affirmative identifies three major historical points of focus in their discussion of Cuba: the Middle Passage, the 1912 revolution of the Partido Indepiendiente de Color, and the emergence of the Castro regime. We will discuss each in turn.**

**Part One: The Middle Passage.**

**The Middle Passage was shaped by economics, not racism. A shift in economic conditions made African slavery more cost-effective than white indentured servitude, producing the Atlantic slave trade. Slavery produced anti-blackness, not the reverse.**Lance **Selfa**, **2010**. Editor of and contributor to International Socialist Review, quoting Eric Williams, D.Phil from Oxford, first Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago, “The roots of racism,” http://socialistworker.org/2010/10/21/the-roots-of-racism.

Racism is a particular form of oppression. It stems from discrimination against a group of people based on the idea that some inherited characteristic, such as skin color, makes them inferior to their oppressors. Yet the concepts of "race" and "racism" are modern inventions. They arose and became part of the dominant ideology of society in the context of the African slave trade at the dawn of capitalism in the 1500s and 1600s. Although it is a commonplace for academics and opponents of socialism to claim that Karl Marx ignored racism, Marx in fact described the processes that created modern racism. His explanation of the rise of capitalism placed the African slave trade, the European extermination of indigenous people in the Americas and colonialism at its heart. In Capital, Marx writes: The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement and entombment in mines of the indigenous population of the continent, the beginnings of the conquest and plunder of India, and the conversion of Africa into a preserve for the commercial hunting of black skins are all things that characterize the dawn of the era of capitalist production. Marx connected his explanation of the role of the slave trade in the rise of capitalism to the social relations that produced racism against Africans. In Wage Labor and Capital, written 12 years before the American Civil War, he explains: What is a Negro slave? A man of the black race. The one explanation is as good as the other. A Negro is a Negro. He only becomes a slave in certain relations. A cotton spinning jenny is a machine for spinning cotton. It only becomes capital in certain relations. Torn away from these conditions, it is as little capital as gold by itself is money, or as sugar is the price of sugar. In this passage, Marx shows no prejudice to Blacks ("a man of the black race," "a Negro is a Negro"), but he mocks society's equation of "Black" and "slave" ("one explanation is as good as another"). He shows how the economic and social relations of emerging capitalism thrust Blacks into slavery ("he only becomes a slave in certain relations"), which produce the dominant ideology that equates being African with being a slave. These fragments of Marx's writing give us a good start in understanding the Marxist explanation of the origins of racism. As the Trinidadian historian of slavery Eric Williams put it: "Slavery was not born of racism: rather, racism was the consequence of slavery." And, one should add, the consequence of modern slavery at the dawn of capitalism. While slavery existed as an economic system for thousands of years before the conquest of America, racism as we understand it today did not exist. From time immemorial? The classical empires of Greece and Rome were based on slave labor. But ancient slavery was not viewed in racial terms. Slaves were most often captives in wars or conquered peoples. If we understand white people as originating in what is today Europe, then most slaves in ancient Greece and Rome were white. Roman law made slaves the property of their owners, while maintaining a "formal lack of interest in the slave's ethnic or racial provenance," wrote Robin Blackburn in The Making of New World Slavery. Over the years, slave manumission produced a mixed population of slave and free in Roman-ruled areas, in which all came to be seen as "Romans." The Greeks drew a sharper line between Greeks and "barbarians," those subject to slavery. Again, this was not viewed in racial or ethnic terms, as the socialist historian of the Haitian Revolution, C.L.R. James, explained: [H]istorically, it is pretty well proved now that the ancient Greeks and Romans knew nothing about race. They had another standard--civilized and barbarian--and you could have white skin and be a barbarian, and you could be black and civilized. More importantly, encounters in the ancient world between the Mediterranean world and Black Africans did not produce an upsurge of racism against Africans. In Before Color Prejudice, Howard University classics professor Frank Snowden documented innumerable accounts of interaction between the Greco-Roman and Egyptian civilizations and the Kush, Nubian, and Ethiopian kingdoms of Africa. He found substantial evidence of integration of Black Africans in the occupational hierarchies of the ancient Mediterranean empires and Black-white intermarriage. Black and mixed race gods appeared in Mediterranean art, and at least one Roman emperor, Septimius Severus, was an African. Between the 10th and 16th centuries, the chief source of slaves in Western Europe was Eastern Europe. In fact, the word "slave" comes from the word "Slav," the people of Eastern Europe. This outline doesn't mean to suggest a "pre-capitalist" Golden Age of racial tolerance, least of all in the slave societies of antiquity. Empires viewed themselves as centers of the universe and looked on foreigners as inferiors. Ancient Greece and Rome fought wars of conquest against peoples they presumed to be less advanced. Religious scholars interpreted the Hebrew Bible's "curse of Ham" from the story of Noah to condemn Africans to slavery. Cultural and religious associations of the color white with light and angels and the color black with darkness and evil persisted. But none of these cultural or ideological factors explain the rise of New World slavery or the "modern" notions of racism that developed from it. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - The African slave trade The slave trade lasted for a little more than 400 years, from the mid-1400s, when the Portuguese made their first voyages down the African coast, to the abolition of slavery in Brazil in 1888. Slave traders took as many as 12 million Africans by force to work on the plantations in South America, the Caribbean and North America. About 13 percent of slaves (1.5 million) died during the Middle Passage--the trip by boat from Africa to the New World. The African slave trade--involving African slave merchants, European slavers and New World planters in the traffic in human cargo--represented the greatest forced population transfer ever. The charge that Africans "sold their own people" into slavery has become a standard canard against "politically correct" history that condemns the European role in the African slave trade. The first encounters of the Spanish and Portuguese, and later the English, with African kingdoms revolved around trade in goods. Only after the Europeans established New World plantations requiring huge labor gangs did the slave trade begin. African kings and chiefs did indeed sell into slavery captives in wars or members of other communities. Sometimes, they concluded alliances with Europeans to support them in wars, with captives from their enemies being handed over to the Europeans as booty. The demands of the plantation economies pushed "demand" for slaves. Supply did not create its own demand. In any event, it remains unseemly to attempt to absolve the European slavers by reference to their African partners in crime. As historian Basil Davidson rightly argues about African chiefs' complicity in the slave trade: "In this, they were no less 'moral' than the Europeans who had instigated the trade and bought the captives." Onboard, Africans were restricted in their movements so that they wouldn't combine to mutiny on the ship. In many slave ships, slaves were chained down, stacked like firewood with less than a foot between them. On the plantations, slaves were subjected to a regimen of 18-hour workdays. All members of slave families were set to work. Since the New World tobacco and sugar plantations operated nearly like factories, men, women and children were assigned tasks, from the fields to the processing mills. Slaves were denied any rights. Throughout the colonies in the Caribbean to North America, laws were passed establishing a variety of common practices: Slaves were forbidden to carry weapons, they could marry only with the owner's permission, and their families could be broken up. They were forbidden to own property. Masters allowed slaves to cultivate vegetables and chickens, so the master wouldn't have to attend to their food needs. But they were forbidden even to sell for profit the products of their own gardens. Some colonies encouraged religious instruction among slaves, but all of them made clear that a slave's conversion to Christianity didn't change their status as slaves. Other colonies discouraged religious instruction, especially when it became clear to the planters that church meetings were one of the chief ways that slaves planned conspiracies and revolts. It goes without saying that slaves had no political or civil rights, with no right to an education, to serve on juries, to vote or to run for public office. The planters instituted barbaric regimes of repression to prevent any slave revolts. Slave catchers using tracker dogs would hunt down any slaves who tried to escape the plantation. The penalties for any form of slave resistance were extreme and deadly. One description of the penalties slaves faced in Barbados reports that rebellious slaves would be punished by "nailing them down on the ground with crooked sticks on every Limb, and then applying the Fire by degrees from Feet and Hands, burning them gradually up to the Head, whereby their pains are extravagant." Barbados planters could claim a reimbursement from the government of 25 pounds per slave executed. The African slave trade helped to shape a wide variety of societies from modern Argentina to Canada. These differed in their use of slaves, the harshness of the regime imposed on slaves, and the degree of mixing of the races that custom and law permitted. But none of these became as virulently racist--insisting on racial separation and a strict color bar--as the English North American colonies that became the United States. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Unfree labor in the North American colonies Notwithstanding the horrible conditions that African slaves endured, it is important to underscore that when European powers began carving up the New World between them, African slaves were not part of their calculations. When we think of slavery today, we think of it primarily from the point of view of its relationship to racism. But planters in the 17th and 18th centuries looked at it primarily as a means to produce profits. Slavery was a method of organizing labor to produce sugar, tobacco and cotton. It was not, first and foremost, a system for producing white supremacy. How did slavery in the U.S. (and the rest of the New World) become the breeding ground for racism? For much of the first century of colonization in what became the United States, the majority of slaves and other "unfree laborers" were white. The term "unfree" draws the distinction between slavery and servitude and "free wage labor" that is the norm in capitalism. One of the historic gains of capitalism for workers is that workers are "free" to sell their ability to labor to whatever employer will give them the best deal. Of course, this kind of freedom is limited at best. Unless they are independently wealthy, workers aren't free to decide not to work. They're free to work or starve. Once they do work, they can quit one employer and go to work for another. But the hallmark of systems like slavery and indentured servitude was that slaves or servants were "bound over" to a particular employer for a period of time, or for life in the case of slaves. The decision to work for another master wasn't the slave's or the servant's. It was the master's, who could sell slaves for money or other commodities like livestock, lumber or machinery. The North American colonies started predominantly as private business enterprises in the early 1600s. Unlike the Spanish, whose conquests of Mexico and Peru in the 1500s produced fabulous gold and silver riches for Spain, settlers in places like the colonies that became Maryland, Rhode Island, and Virginia made money through agriculture. In addition to sheer survival, the settlers' chief aim was to obtain a labor force that could produce the large amounts of indigo, tobacco, sugar and other crops that would be sold back to England. From 1607, when Jamestown was founded in Virginia to about 1685, the primary source of agricultural labor in English North America came from white indentured servants. The colonists first attempted to press the indigenous population into labor. But the Indians refused to be become servants to the English. Indians resisted being forced to work, and they escaped into the surrounding area, which, after all, they knew far better than the English. One after another, the English colonies turned to a policy of driving out the Indians. The colonists then turned to white servants. Indentured servants were predominantly young white men--usually English or Irish--who were required to work for a planter master for some fixed term of four to seven years. The servants received room and board on the plantation but no pay. And they could not quit and work for another planter. They had to serve their term, after which they might be able to acquire some land and to start a farm for themselves. They became servants in several ways. Some were prisoners, convicted of petty crimes in Britain, or convicted of being troublemakers in Britain's first colony, Ireland. Many were kidnapped off the streets of Liverpool or Manchester, and put on ships to the New World. Some voluntarily became servants, hoping to start farms after they fulfilled their obligations to their masters. For most of the 1600s, the planters tried to get by with a predominantly white, but multiracial workforce. But as the 17th century wore on, colonial leaders became increasingly frustrated with white servant labor. For one thing, they faced the problem of constantly having to recruit labor as servants' terms expired. Second, after servants finished their contracts and decided to set up their farms, they could become competitors to their former masters. And finally, the planters didn't like the servants' "insolence." The mid-1600s were a time of revolution in England, when ideas of individual freedom were challenging the old hierarchies based on royalty. The colonial planters tended to be royalists, but their servants tended to assert their "rights as Englishmen" to better food, clothing and time off. Most laborers in the colonies supported the servants. As the century progressed, the costs of servant labor increased. Planters started to petition the colonial boards and assemblies to allow the large-scale importation of African slaves. Black slaves worked on plantations in small numbers throughout the 1600s. But until the end of the 1600s, it cost planters more to buy slaves than to buy white servants. Blacks lived in the colonies in a variety of statuses--some were free, some were slaves, some were servants. The law in Virginia didn't establish the condition of lifetime, perpetual slavery or even recognize African servants as a group different from white servants until 1661. Blacks could serve on juries, own property and exercise other rights. Northampton County, Virginia, recognized interracial marriages and, in one case, assigned a free Black couple to act as foster parents for an abandoned white child. There were even a few examples of Black freemen who owned white servants. Free Blacks in North Carolina had voting rights. In the 1600s, the Chesapeake society of eastern Virginia had a multiracial character, according to historian Betty Wood: There is persuasive evidence dating from the 1620s through the 1680s that there were those of European descent in the Chesapeake who were prepared to identify and cooperate with people of African descent. These affinities were forged in the world of plantation work. On many plantations, Europeans and West Africans labored side by side in the tobacco fields, performing exactly the same types and amounts of work; they lived and ate together in shared housing; they socialized together; and sometimes they slept together. The planters' economic calculations played a part in the colonies' decision to move toward full-scale slave labor. By the end of the 17th century, the price of white indentured servants outstripped the price of African slaves. A planter could buy an African slave for life for the same price that he could purchase a white servant for 10 years. As Eric Williams explained: Here, then, is the origin of Negro slavery. The reason was economic, not racial; it had to do not with the color of the laborer, but the cheapness of the labor. [The planter] would have gone to the moon, if necessary, for labor. Africa was nearer than the moon, nearer too than the more populous countries of India and China. But their turn would soon come. Planters' fear of a multiracial uprising also pushed them towards racial slavery. Because a rigid racial division of labor didn't exist in the 17th century colonies, many conspiracies involving Black slaves and white indentured servants were hatched and foiled. We know about them today because of court proceedings that punished the runaways after their capture. As historians T.H. Breen and Stephen Innes point out, "These cases reveal only extreme actions, desperate attempts to escape, but for every group of runaways who came before the courts, there were doubtless many more poor whites and blacks who cooperated in smaller, less daring ways on the plantation." The largest of these conspiracies developed into Bacon's Rebellion, an uprising that threw terror into the hearts of the Virginia Tidewater planters in 1676. Several hundred farmers, servants and slaves initiated a protest to press the colonial government to seize Indian land for distribution. The conflict spilled over into demands for tax relief and resentment of the Jamestown establishment. Planter Nathaniel Bacon helped organize an army of whites and Blacks that sacked Jamestown and forced the governor to flee. The rebel army held out for eight months before the Crown managed to defeat and disarm it. Bacon's Rebellion was a turning point. After it ended, the Tidewater planters moved in two directions: first, they offered concessions to the white freemen, lifting taxes and extending to them the vote; and second, they moved to full-scale racial slavery. Fifteen years earlier, the Burgesses had recognized the condition of slavery for life and placed Africans in a different category as white servants. But the law had little practical effect. "Until slavery became systematic, there was no need for a systematic slave code. And slavery could not become systematic so long as an African slave for life cost twice as much as an English servant for a five-year term," wrote historian Barbara Jeanne Fields. Both of those circumstances changed in the immediate aftermath of Bacon's Rebellion. In the entire 17th century, the planters imported about 20,000 African slaves. The majority of them were brought to North American colonies in the 24 years after Bacon's Rebellion. In 1664, the Maryland legislature passed a law determining who would be considered slaves on the basis of the condition of their father--whether their father was slave or free. It soon became clear, however, that establishing paternity was difficult, but that establishing who was a person's mother was definite. So the planters changed the law to establish slave status on the basis of the mother's condition. Now white slaveholders who fathered children by slave women would be guaranteed their offspring as slaves. And the law included penalties for "free" women who slept with slaves. But what's most interesting about this law is that it doesn't really speak in racial terms. It attempts to preserve the property rights of slaveholders and establish barriers between slave and free which were to become hardened into racial divisions over the next few years. Taking the Maryland law as an example, Fields made this important point: Historians can actually observe colonial Americans in the act of preparing the ground for race without foreknowledge of what would later arise on the foundation they were laying. [T]he purpose of the experiment is clear: to prevent the erosion of slaveowners' property rights that would result if the offspring of free white women impregnated by slave men were entitled to freedom. The language of the preamble to the law makes clear that the point was not yet race. Race does not explain the law. Rather, the law shows society in the act of inventing race. After establishing that African slaves would cultivate major cash crops of the North American colonies, the planters then moved to establish the institutions and ideas that would uphold white supremacy. Most unfree labor became Black labor. Laws and ideas intended to underscore the subhuman status of Black people--in a word, the ideology of racism and white supremacy--emerged full-blown over the next generation. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - "All men are created equal" Within a few decades, the ideology of white supremacy was fully developed. Some of the greatest minds of the day--such as Scottish philosopher David Hume and Thomas Jefferson, the man who wrote the Declaration of Independence--wrote treatises alleging Black inferiority. The ideology of white supremacy based on the natural inferiority of Blacks, even allegations that Blacks were subhuman, strengthened throughout the 18th century. This was the way that the leading intellectual figures of the time reconciled the ideals of the 1776 American Revolution with slavery. The American Revolution of 1776 and later the French Revolution of 1789 popularized the ideas of liberty and the rights of all human beings. The Declaration of Independence asserts that "all men are created equal" and possess certain "unalienable rights"--rights that can't be taken away--of "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." As the first major bourgeois revolution, the American Revolution sought to establish the rights of the new capitalist class against the old feudal monarchy. It started with the resentment of the American merchant class that wanted to break free from British restrictions on its trade. But its challenge to British tyranny also gave expression to a whole range of ideas that expanded the concept of "liberty" from being just about trade to include ideas of human rights, democracy, and civil liberties. It legitimized an assault on slavery as an offense to liberty. Some of the leading American revolutionaries, such as Thomas Paine and Benjamin Franklin, endorsed abolition. Slaves and free Blacks also pointed to the ideals of the revolution to call for abolishing slavery. But because the revolution aimed to establish the rule of capital in America, and because a lot of capitalists and planters made a lot of money from slavery, the revolution compromised with slavery. The Declaration initially contained a condemnation of King George for allowing the slave trade, but Jefferson dropped it following protests from representatives from Georgia and the Carolinas. How could the founding fathers of the U.S.--most of whom owned slaves themselves--reconcile the ideals of liberty for which they were fighting with the existence of a system that represented the exact negation of liberty? The ideology of white supremacy fit the bill. We know today that "all men" didn't include women, Indians or most whites. But to rule Black slaves out of the blessings of liberty, the leading head-fixers of the time argued that Blacks weren't really "men," they were a lower order of being. Jefferson's Notes from Virginia, meant to be a scientific catalogue of the flora and fauna of Virginia, uses arguments that anticipate the "scientific racism" of the 1800s and 1900s. With few exceptions, no major institution--such as the universities, the churches or the newspapers of the time--raised criticisms of white supremacy or of slavery. In fact, they helped pioneer religious and academic justifications for slavery and Black inferiority. As C.L.R. James put it, "[T]he conception of dividing people by race begins with the slave trade. This thing was so shocking, so opposed to all the conceptions of society which religion and philosophers had, that the only justification by which humanity could face it was to divide people into races and decide that the Africans were an inferior race." White supremacy wasn't only used to justify slavery. It was also used to keep in line the two-thirds of Southern whites who weren't slaveholders. Unlike the French colony of St. Domingue or the British colony of Barbados, where Blacks vastly outnumbered whites, Blacks were a minority in the slave South. A tiny minority of slave-holding whites, who controlled the governments and economies of the Deep South states, ruled over a population that was roughly two-thirds white farmers and workers and one-third Black slaves. The slaveholders' ideology of racism and white supremacy helped to divide the working population, tying poor whites to the slaveholders. Slavery afforded poor white farmers what Fields called a "social space" whereby they preserved an illusory "independence" based on debt and subsistence farming, while the rich planters continued to dominate Southern politics and society. "A caste system as well as a form of labor," historian James M. McPherson wrote, "slavery elevated all whites to the ruling caste and thereby reduced the potential for class conflict." The great abolitionist Frederick Douglass understood this dynamic: The hostility between the whites and blacks of the South is easily explained. It has its root and sap in the relation of slavery, and was incited on both sides by the cunning of the slave masters. Those masters secured their ascendancy over both the poor whites and the Blacks by putting enmity between them. They divided both to conquer each. [Slaveholders denounced emancipation as] tending to put the white working man on an equality with Blacks, and by this means, they succeed in drawing off the minds of the poor whites from the real fact, that by the rich slave-master, they are already regarded as but a single remove from equality with the slave. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Slavery and capitalism Slavery in the colonies helped produce a boom in the 18th century economy that provided the launching pad for the industrial revolution in Europe. From the start, colonial slavery and capitalism were linked. While it is not correct to say that slavery created capitalism, it is correct to say that slavery provided one of the chief sources for the initial accumulations of wealth that helped to propel capitalism forward in Europe and North America. The clearest example of the connection between plantation slavery and the rise of industrial capitalism was the connection between the cotton South, Britain and, to a lesser extent, the Northern industrial states. Here, we can see the direct link between slavery in the U.S. and the development of the most advanced capitalist production methods in the world. Cotton textiles accounted for 75 percent of British industrial employment in 1840, and, at its height, three-fourths of that cotton came from the slave plantations of the Deep South. And Northern ships and ports transported the cotton. To meet the boom in the 1840s and 1850s, the planters became even more vicious. On the one hand, they tried to expand slavery into the West and Central America. The fight over the extension of slavery into the territories eventually precipitated the Civil War in 1861. On the other hand, they drove slaves harder--selling more cotton to buy more slaves just to keep up. On the eve of the Civil War, the South was petitioning to lift the ban on the importation of slaves that had existed officially since 1808. Karl Marx clearly understood the connection between plantation slavery in the cotton South and the development of capitalism in England. He wrote in Capital: While the cotton industry introduced child-slavery into England, in the United States, it gave the impulse for the transformation of the more or less patriarchal slavery into a system of commercial exploitation. In fact, the veiled slavery of the wage-laborers in Europe needed the unqualified slavery of the New World as its pedestal. Capital comes dripping from head to toe, from every pore, with blood and dirt. The close connection between slavery and capitalism, and thus, between racism and capitalism, gives the lie to those who insist that slavery would have just died out. In fact, the South was more dependent on slavery right before the Civil War than it was 50 or 100 years earlier. Slavery lasted as long as it did because it was profitable. And it was profitable to the richest and most "well-bred" people in the world. The Civil War abolished slavery and struck a great blow against racism. But racism itself wasn't abolished. On the contrary, just as racism was created to justify colonial slavery, racism as an ideology was refashioned. It now no longer justified the enslavement of Blacks, but it justified second-class status for Blacks as wage laborers and sharecroppers. Racist ideology was also refashioned to justify imperialist conquest at the turn of the last century. As a handful of competing world powers vied to carve up the globe into colonial preserves for cheap raw materials and labor, racism served as a convenient justification. The vast majority of the world's people were now portrayed as inferior races, incapable of determining their own future. Slavery disappeared, but racism remained as a means to justify the domination of millions of people by the U.S., various European powers, and later by Japan. Because racism is woven right into the fabric of capitalism, new forms of racism arose with changes in capitalism. As the U.S. economy expanded and underpinned U.S. imperial expansion, imperialist racism--which asserted that the U.S. had a right to dominate other peoples, such as Mexicans and Filipinos--developed. As the U.S. economy grew and sucked in millions of immigrant laborers, anti-immigrant racism developed. But these are both different forms of the same ideology--of white supremacy and division of the world into "superior" and "inferior" races--that had their origins in slavery. Racism and capitalism have been intertwined since the beginning of capitalism. You can't have capitalism without racism. Therefore, the final triumph over racism will only come when we abolish racism's chief source--capitalism--and build a new socialist society.

**Two: The 1912 Revolution.**

**The affirmative’s understanding of the role of anti-blackness in the 1912 Cuban revolution is fundamentally flawed. The actual revolution was only vaguely connected to the Partido Independiente de Color. The party represented the interests of affluent Afro-Cubans and focused exclusively on the under-representation of Afro-Cubans in positions of government. The revolution that came to be known as “la guerra de razas” was driven by economic factors, not racial ones. Peasants in eastern Cuba were being displaced by foreign capital and driven into extreme unemployment and poverty. These issues confronted both white and black Cuban peasants. Describing the 1912 revolution as driven by race was a strategy intended to undermine class solidarity and protect the interests of bourgeois Cubans.**

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These developments were hardly noticed in 1899, for Cubans were then preoccupied with matters of greater urgency. The war was over, and all Cubans who had survived the conflict, participants and pacificos alike, were anxious to resume their lives. Vast numbers returned to their origins: the land. And for the vast majority of Afro-Cuban veterans, the land of their origins was Oriente Province. Generations of Cubans of color had found hope and haven in the east- ern province. Oriente offered improvement for the impoverished,.oppor- tunity for the oppressed. It also offered land to the landless and livelihood to the unemployed. The lure was irresistible. Fugitive slaves and freed slaves,6 after emancipation in 1886 former slaves and after 1898 former soldiers, migrated eastward. Between 1887 and 1899, years during which all of Cuba suffered a io percent population decline, Oriente experienced a 20 percent population increase: from 272,379 residents to 327,716.7 In the years following emancipation, thousands of landless former slaves mi- grated east, in search of work and land. Between 1887 and 1899, the total population of color in the three western provinces declined by i6.6 per- cent; the number of colored males diminished by 25.7 percent. During these same years, the total population of color in Oriente increased by 22.4 percent, while the number of colored males grew by 23.6 percent.8 Oriente was a place of parity and proportion, of equity and equality. The sex ratio was exactly 50/50: 163,845 males, 163,870 females the only province in Cuba where the number of women actually exceeded the number of men. Cubans of color constituted almost as large a portion of the population as native whites, and nowhere in Cuba was it higher: 44.7 percent to 51.2 percent.9 Greater diversity of agriculture persisted in Ori- ente than elsewhere, and this diversity guaranteed a greater variety of land-tenure forms. Sugar was only one of many products cultivated in the east. Oriente enjoyed an agrarian economy that was remarkable for its variation and versatility. Ingenios coexisted with cafetales, cacao fincas, banana plantations, fruit orchards and coconut groves, vegetable farms, tobacco vegas, and cattle ranches. 10 The effects of this diversity in land use were striking. Whereas the sugar latifundio emerged as the principal agricultural form in the west, mixed small farms persisted as the prevalent form of land tenure in the east. No other province had a lower population ratio per finca than Ori- ente: Oriente, 15.2 persons per farm, followed by Pinar del Rio with i6.6, Santa Clara, 22. 1, Camagiley 37.0, Matanzas 49.5, and Havana 68. 9. The 1899 census data underscored the contrast between the west and east. Not including Camagfiey province, where land was given extensively to cattle grazing, Matanzas had the smallest number of farms (4,o83) with the largest average acreage (247 acres). Havana followed with 6,159 farms at 135 acres. Oriente, at the opposite end, contained the largest number of farms with the smallest average acreage. Only .05 percent of the farms in Oriente were over 330 acres, comprising only 26.9 percent of the total area of land under cultivation. The average size of the 21,550 farms in 1899 was approximately 8o acres:" [Table failed to copy; see original article] Oriente claimed not only the highest number of individual landowners, but also the highest number of renters, a total of 43,721. But it was not only that more land was worked by more people. Strik- ing, too, was the social character of land tenure. Nowhere else in Cuba did tenure patterns reflect as accurately the racial composition of the island as in Oriente. Afro-Cuban managers, both as owners and renters, operated 41 percent of the farms. This was almost numerical parity with white pro- prietors. A somewhat less striking, but no less noteworthy, aspect of ten- ure in Oriente was that 26 percent of the total land in use was under Afro- Cuban cultivation. Set against the total acreage under Afro-Cuban man- agement elsewhere on the island, the percentage in Oriente was nothing short of remarkable. Pinar del Rio was the second highest, with Afro- Cubans working 11.4 percent of the land, followed by Santa Clara (6.7 percent), Camagiiey (4.5 percent), Matanzas (3.8 percent), and Havana (3 percent). Oriente was also well above the national total of i1o.8 percent. Put another way, almost 75 percent of the total land owned outright by blacks in Cuba and nearly 50 percent of land worked by Afro-Cubans as renters were located in Oriente. 12 The distribution of the total number of farms in Oriente was as follows: 13 [Table failed to copy; see original article] The pattern repeated itself in the size and number of the 5,218 ingenios in Oriente. Not including Camagfiey, Oriente had the smallest average acreage, among the largest number of sugar estates, and the largest num- ber of white and colored owners and renters farming the smallest tracts of land: 14 [Table failed to copy; see original article] One other aspect of agriculture in Oriente displayed a significant feature. In the production of coffee and cacao, among the principal crops of the small farmer, colored cultivators constituted a decisive majority: 16 [Table failed to copy; see original article] Similar patterns prevailed in other small-scale agriculture, where 47 per- cent of the total malanga acreage was cultivated by Cubans of color. So was 42 percent of rice and 42 percent of yams nameses. Traditional land tenure systems survived in the east, and the oppor- tunities for all Cubans, white and black, were nowhere greater. But there was more. One other important feature distinguished the east from the west. It was not only the adaptability of land tenure, it was the availability of land: nowhere else was more land available. This was in large measure the principal source of attraction for migration to the east. As late as the 1870s, official maps of the island described vast areas of the province as "waste and uninhabited mountains" and "uncultivated and unexplored re- gions." 17 Inl 1899, only 22 percent of the total area of the province was ill the possession of private farms, and only 1L percent of this total (203,914 acres) was under cultivation. '" Large parts of Oriente remained undevel- oped and unowned. Indeed, the full dimension of these lands was itself unknown. What was known, however, was that it was huge. Long after public lands had ceased to exist in Pinar del Rio, Havana, and Matanzas, vast expanses of land in Oriente remained in the public domain. Fully more than twice the area under cultivation in 1899, approximately 500,000 acres, was held in the form of public lands. Much of this land was forest and woodlands, located in the remote and inaccessiIule interior regions of the province. Boundary lines were vague and often ill defined, and in many instances detailed surveys of state lands had never been completed. Thus, estimates of the total area of public land were only approximate, and many believed the actual size of the state patrimony to be far in ex- cess of official calculation.1 In 1899, Oriente was still a land of opportunity, and most of all it was an opportunity of land. And the opportunity appeared almost limitless. Oriente was the place for Cubans to start anew. For decades tens of thou- sands of Cubans had migrated to Oriente in search of new occupations and new land. This was the promise that lured thousands to the province, from the desperate to deserters, the displaced and dispossessed, soldiers, settlers, and squatters fiom all regions of Cuba. They were not disap- pointed. That had always been the promise of the east: a place of new beginning, but most of all, a new freedom. The attraction of Oriente con- tinued after the war. Indeed, after the war, the attraction increased. The postwar surge of population in Oriente was nothing short of spectacular. By 1907, the province neared the half million mark, increasing by more than 127,000-almost a 40 percent increase, from 327,716 in 1899 to 455,o86 in 1907, and almost a 70 percent increase in the two decades since 1887.20 The Changing Face of Oriente It was not only that there were more people arriving to Oriente. Numbers were not a problem. Purpose was. Cubans were not the only ones to recognize the promise of Oriente. North Americans, too, saw the opportunities in the province, and their presence was at once ubiquitous and overwhelming. They arrived first in 1898 in the form of an army of conquest and a government of occupation. They arrived later as brokers and vendors, homesteaders and settlers, speculators and investors, and they all came for the same thing: land. **They arrived with capital resources well out of proportion to their numbers, and with an equally dispropor- tionate advantage in an impoverished economic environment**. They pos- sessed the capital to buy up what land was available, and the political conl- nections to make available what land could not be bought. Vast expanses of land passed under control of foreigners. And in this new order of things, it was not entirely clear what place Cubans would occupy what place they could occupy. The signs boded ill. Impressionistic observa- tions at the time tended both to confirm these developments and foresee their consequences. Remarked a North American traveler to Cuba in 1911: "Foreigners own ninety percent of all the land in Cuba that is worth working, and, since this is the case, the more foreign capital that comes in, the better for the country. In other words, the only outlook for the Cuban is to serve as a hired manl." 21 Transactions and transfer of land in the east proceeded rapidly during the first decade of independence. The form of land tenure was changing, so was the character of land tenants-all at once, **from public to private, from miniftindio to latifundio, from communal to corporate**, **fiom Cuban to foreign**. And it happened quickly. Railroad construction proceeded apace, and served to accelerate at once the transfer of land and the trans- formation of land use. The expansion of transportation facilities set in mo- tion a succession of interrelated developments. The Cuba Company line connected Santiago with Santa Clara in 1goo. Two years later, Santiago was connected directly to Havana, completing the rail linkage of all six provinces. Provincial railroad expansion followed quickly thereafter. In 1905, Alto Cedro was connected to Nipe Bay, giving rise to the new port city of Antilla. A year later, a rail link joined Cacoctin with Holguin. Rail service was also established between Marti in Camagiley east through the Cauto Valley to Bayamo, Palma Soriano and San Luis. Shortly thereafter, Bayamo was linked with Manzanillo.' The process thrived on its own success. The expansion of railroads made other developments possible. Sugar estates expanded rapidly dur- ing these years. So did mining. Real estate speculators and land de- velopers acquired some of the most productive land in Cuba, and every- where in Oriente North American colonization schemes were in full development. An inexorable, and fateful, cycle ensued. Across Oriente, farmers and peasants were losing control of the land. It was especially pronounced in the southeast. Land passed under the control of railroad companies-for terminals, for construction zones, for town and depot sites, and for rights of way. Mining companies expanded.23 During the early 1900s, North American settlers established 12 agricultural colonies in Oriente, ac- counting for tens of thousands of acres. The Cuban Agricultural and De- velopment Company alone acquired 135,000 acres in Guailtdilai-no. But most of all land passed under the control of the sugar latifuindios. It mattered little whether it was in the form of corporate-owned land (ad- ministration cane) or colono-owned estates. The results were the same. Farmers and peasants were displaced, pushed deeper onto the interior sabanas or higher into the foothill regions of the northern and southern mountain chains. All forms of peasant land tenure were subject to usurpation, but none more than the hacienda contunera, a system of joint ownership dis- tributed in allotments and held in the form of shares (pesos de posesi6n). At the turn of the century, the hacienda comntunera was one of the prin- cipal forms of land tenure in eastern Cuba. Pesos de posesi6n guaranteed an owner (cornunero) title to a certain portion of the tract, but not a good and clear title to any specified part of the land. Pesos de posesi6n provided a right to the land, to some of it somewhere within the larger boundaries of the tract. The land itself was not divided; rather, comitneros obtained a right to work the land in direct proportion to the number of pesos de posesi6n owned. Rights to the land multiplied in the course of time, and ownership was often hopelessly confused and continuously contested, in- evitably creating a chaotic web of ownership and occupancy. Tracts of land were rarely surveyed and boundaries were inexact, unofficial, and not easily verifiable. Boundaries consisted typically of a forest, hill, stream, marsh, or other natural features or arbitrary points mutually agreed on. A cut in a tree or fallen log or a small creek often served as boundary points. And just as often when the tree with the mark was felled, or the log rotted away, or when the creek changed course, all traces of landmarks disap- peared. Sometimes boundaries were known only in tradition, in the col- lective memory of the community. In one litigation in 1909, when farmers were asked how they recognized the boundary of their finca, one co- mune7-o responded: "the line has been there fiom time immemorial and has been respected by the co-owners. "24 It was precisely this type of ambiguity that made peasant lands sus- ceptible to usurpation. To the already confused conditions of ownership and boundary demarcations, the war of independence-fought the long- est in the eastern province-contributed even further. Deeds and titles had disappeared during the war. Vast numbers of titles were hopelessly tied up in uncertain ownership and unclear possession, and every uncer- tain claim was vulnerable to litigation. These conditions favored the large and powerful over the small and powerless. Real estate speculators, railroad companies, and sugar corpo- rations were quick to challenge local ownership. For the large numbers whose titles were imperfect, incomplete, or otherwise flawed, the ad- judication process was usually the first step toward dislodgement and dis- placement. The procedures required the completion of a judicial survey (deslinde) by a court-appointed tribunal in which the validity of the pesos de posesi6n was examined. Expensive judicial surveys, commissioned by the plaintiff, fixed new and detailed boundaries. Attorneys and surveyors petitioned courts to ratify new boundaries and sanction new titles of ownership. The outcome was usually a foregone conclusion. Wrote soci- ologist Lowry Nelson after several years of fieldwork in rural Cuba: The sugar companies purchased land from the peasants where the latter could show a title, but where titles were in question-as so many of them were-recourse was had to the courts. There can be no doubt that the contest in the courts was one-sided affairs in which the companies had overwhelming advantage. They could employ the best lawyer who knew the loopholes in Cuban land law. They could if necessary corrupt the officials, high and low with bribes.25 The loss of land occurred at the same time as a dramatic increase in population. The pressure would eventually affect all Oriente, but it was experienced first in the southeastern region of the province, in the cluster of the five contiguous municipios of Alto Songo, El Caney, Guantcinamo, San Luis, and Santiago. The southeast had long served as a place of ref- uge in the late nineteenth century for runaway slaves before emancipa- tion and freed slaves afterwards. In the early twentieth century, it became refuge for the veterans of the war as well as for the victims of the war. In fact, outcasts of all social types over three generations had found oppor- tunity in the southeast. The municipios were located largely within the impenetrable high country, within or near the foothills and valleys of the Sierra Maestra mountain range-"a terra incognita," wrote one geographer in 1907, "unexplored, undescribed, and unmapped." 26 It was broken land, irregular, a succession of rising terraces, traversed and inter- sected by countless small valleys. It was also fertile land, bountiful and productive, without rival anywhere else in Cuba.

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Developments in Oriente were simultaneous with mounting discon- tent elsewhere. The deteriorating condition of people of color in Oriente was not dissimilar to those experienced by Afro-Cubans everywhere oin the island. Cubans of color had not fared well in the republic. For many, in fact, conditions had actually deteriorated. Their contribution to the cause of Cuba Libre had been on a scale well out of proportion to their numbers. Their compensation from free Cuba was well below the propor- tion to their numbers. They had been promised political equality and so- cial justice. They received neither. "During the colonial days of Spain," Arthur A. Schomburg wrote during a visit to Cuba in 1905, "the Negroes were better treated, enjoyed a greater measure of freedom and happiness than they do to-day." Schomburg continued: Many Cuban Negroes curse the dawn of the Republic. Negroes were welcomed in the time of oppression, in the time of hardship, during the days of the revolution, but in the days of peace . . . they are deprived of positions, ostracized and made political out- casts. The Negro has done much for Cuba. Cuba has done nothing for the Negro.52 "After the war ended," ex-slave Esteban Montejo later recalled, "the ar- guments began about whether the Negroes had fought or not. I know that ninety-five percent of the blacks fought in the war, but they started saying it was only seventy-five percent. Well, no one got up and told them they were lying, and the result was the Negroes found themselves out in the streets-men brave as lions, out in the streets. It was unjust, but that's what happened."53 The condition of Afro-Cubans in the early years of the republic was exacerbated by the vast flow of immigration, particularly Spaniards. Be- tweenIL 1902 and 1912, an estimated 250,000 Spaniards emigrated to Cuba.5 Competition for employment on this scale served at once to expel blacks from the labor market and to increase the urgency to accommodate Afro- Cubans within the expanding state bureaucracy. In fact, however, white Cubans were facing similar pressures, and showed little disposition to share public revenues with black Cubans. The effects were striking. Afro-Cubans were underrepresented in elected office, in appointed positions, in the armed forces, and in the civil service. Cubans of color made up 30 percent of the total population, ap- proximately 6io,ooo out of 2 milliOnl. Census information in 1907 offers only suggestive data concerning the status of Afro-Cubans in the public life of the republic. Three census categories clearly defined as public positions were teachers, soldiers and policemen, and "government fuinc- tionaries" (fulncionarios de gobierno). Cubans of color were underrepre- sented in each: 55 [Table failed to copy; see original article] A profound sense of betrayal settled over the Afro-Cuban community. Black political leaders had initially joined the established political parties. Apart from the success of a small number of individual Afro-Cuban poli- ticians, however, conditions did not improve for blacks. Appeals to white political leaders and elected officials fell onl deaf ears. As early as 1902, Afro-Cuban political leaders met with President Tomais Estrada Palma to protest the shabby treatment of blacks in the new republican govern- ment. Liberal party leader Generoso Campos Marquetti complained that the meager numbers of blacks in the rural guard and police, and the dis- crimination against blacks by the civil departments of government, under- scored the neglect "towards a race that had valiantly spilled its blood in defense of the Cuban cause." "The truth is, Mr. President," Campos Marquetti protested, "this is not what we expected fiom the Revolution and things can not continue like this." 56 In 1907, many black political leaders took the first step toward a por- tentous political realignment. They withdrew fiom the established politi- cal parties to organize a new movement, first in the form of the Agrupa- ci61n Independiente de Color and later into a full fledged political party, the Partido Independiente de Color. The new party advocated honest government, improved working conditions, and free university educa- tion. Its principal concerns, however, centered on issues of race, specifi- cally demands for increased representation of Afi-o-Cubans in elected office and public positions, including the armed forces, the diplomatic coi-ps, the judiciary, and all civil departments of government.57 The organization of the Partido Independiente de Color challenged the existing parties for control of the black vote. This challenge was pai- ticularly serious to the ruling Liberal party, for its status as a majority party was dependent directly upon the vital margin of support provided by the Afro-Cuban electorate. The Liberal administration of Jose Miguel Gomez (1908- 1912) did not hesitate. In 1910, the Afro-Cuban Liberal leader of the Senate, Martin Moruia Delgado, introduced legislation to proscribe the new party. The passage of the Morula law prohibited the organization of political parties along racial lines. By 1912, Cuban politics had polarized around the issue of race. The formation of the Partido Independiente de Color served to direct attention to a wide range of injustices to the fact that the color of Cubans was as much an unsettled issue in the republic as it had 1)een in the colony. But Afro-Cuban political objectives found little endorsement and less enthusiasm among vast numbers of people of color in Oriente. Efforts at political organization in Oriente were unsuccessful. Most of the 200,000 people of color in Oriente (approximately 40 percent of the pro- vincial electorate) looked on indifferently to the party's appeal. Indeed, the independientes failed to secure even the minimum number of signa- tures required to nominate candidates in the 9go8 provincial elections.51 In fact, the source and substance of Afio-Cuban grievances in the re- public were varied, and they were not all the same for all people of color. Significant social distinctions existed within the population of color. **The new Partido Independiente de Color tended to represent the interests of Afro-Cuban politicians, former ranking officers of the Liberation Army, professionals, and intellectuals, generally** **representatives of black petite bourgeoisie-those Cubans who aspired to gain entree into the expand- ing state bureaucracy**, through either elected positions or appointed posts. The independientes directed their attention to institutional racism, to the formal practice of racial discrimination that obstructed their participation in the public life of the republic they had contributed to creating. The party charter addressed itself almost exclusively to matters political: it ad- dressed grievances to government authorities and the leaders of the rdl- ing political parties. **These were issues of only marginal interest to Afio-Cuban farmers, peasants, and rural workers in Oriente, who were, in any case, at the time of the party's formation, in serious crisis and preoccupied with urgent matters of subsistence and survival**. It was not that they were unsym- pathetic with the political purpose of the new party. Rather, they were essentially unconcerned with political matters in the republic. Their lives were in disarray, their communities were in despair. Southeastern Oriente was in the throes of social unrest. Lawlessness was on the increase, announcing the onset of disintegration and disrup- tion. "There exists at Guantainanmo, and the surrounding country," re- ported the United States consul at Santiago, Ross E. Holaday, "a state of lawlessness that is calculated to cause considerable apprehension among the good citizens." Traveling through Guantanamno in 1910, Holaclay learned that resident foreign businessmen had "received letters demand- ing money, and threatening to burn their property, or take their lives, or that of some member of their family, if they refused to comply with the demands of the unknown writer."" The accumulating ills were compounded by immediate ones. Disorders in May 1912 coincided with the onset of the tempo muterto, and the immie- diate sources of the disturbances were no less compelling than the long- term ones. In a very real sense, they were one and the same. The peas- ants and farmers were losing their sources of livelihood even as they lost the claims on the land. With every passing year the crisis deepened. Tiempo muerto had always brought on hard times, but times became harder as the opportunities for subsistence agriculture became fewer. "The result is," United States Minister John B. Jackson reported fully two years before the uprising, "that when the crop is over there are many idle persons left in the country districts with practically no means of support. The majority of these are improvident negroes, not well to do at any time, but especially 'hard-up' this year." Jackson warned in concluding: "It seems certain that there will be a good deal of real destitution during the coming summer. All this will contribute to a general discontent.""6 Frustration ran deep and wide among the dissident Afro-Cuban poli- ticians, and rebellion offered one last desperate recourse for a movement apparently doomed to defeat and disintegration. The Independent Party of Color had not fared well in the arena of electoral politics. Established Afro-Cuban Liberals and Conservatives publicly repudiated racial poli- tics. At the same time, mainstream black politicians seized the indepen- diente challenge to the ruling party to further their own political fortunes. They effectively parlayed the threat of racial polarization into sinecures and patronage for their Afro-Cuban constituencies. Not without some irony, the independiente movement did indeed produce political oppor- tunities for blacks, but in a fashion calculated to counteract the appeal of the new party of color. Then, too, the Mori'a law was having the desired effects. In municipal and provincial elections, the independientes were systematically barred from seeking office; but the lack of recorded popular protest revealed they were without significant political support, even in precincts with predominantly Afro-Cuban electorates. The Rebellion The uprising began as an organized political protest, an armed move- ment designed to force the Gomez administration to repeal the Morilia law. However, the purpose of the independiente leadership was never clearly defined or well publicized. In a published newspaper interview in late May, party leaders Evaristo Estenoz and Pedro Ivonet announced their intention to provoke United States intervention as a means of top- pling the Liberal government if the Gomez administration refused to ab- rogate the Moruia law. "They want equal rights with whites," the corre- spondent concluded tersely, "or they will put an end to the Republic."' The rebellion appeared organized around a plan for separate but coor- dinated and simultaneous uprisings centered in Pinar del Rio, Matanzas, Las Villas, and Oriente. Everywhere outside Oriente province, however, the movement was either stillborn or shortlived. Mass arrests of party leaders and suspected sympathizers in Pinar del Rio, Matanzas, and Santa Clara ended all prospects for a coordinated national rebellion. Scattered armed bands took to the field in some western zones, largely in Las Villas province around Cienfuegos, Sagua la Grande, and Cruces, but these were early and easily defeated by government forces.62 It was different in Oriente. Disorders in the east broke out sometime in early or mid-May. Newspaper accounts were not clear, possibly because the kind of desultory lawlessness that announced the onset of rebellion had for so long been part of the recurring daily disorders in the east./3 What was certain, however, was that by the end of the month conditions had intensified, by which time it was also apparent that disorders were no longer sporadic and scattered incidents of individual discontent but some- thing akin more to a spontaneous and sustained outburst of collective rage. In Oriente, the original independiente movement quickly became something larger. Political grievances ignited social protest. They were not unrelated, but they were separate. Afro-Cuban politicians demanded a place in the republic, and mobility. Afro-Cuban peasants demanded a place on the land, and permanence. Not for unrelated reasons, they were failing at both. But **the origins of these grievances in 1912 were suffi- ciently distinct and markedly different**. The uprising in the east spread swiftly spontaneously it seemed. Disturbances were extensive in Oriente, and particularly intensive in southeastern Oriente. The example of rebellion spread rapidly by word of mouth, from town to town, without the separate bands concertina a com- mon policy or coordinating a common action. Many of the original insur- gents were the party functionaries and the rank and file.-' Their political grievances were real, and by 1912 despair and frustration ran deep and wide among the local independientes. But party members were not the only participants. In fact, it is not certain that they were the majority. The uprising baffled observers: no pronouncements, no proclamations, no pal- pable purpose. "It [is] highly improbable, commented United States Minister Arthur M. Beaupre in late May, "that the negroes at the head of the Independent Colored Party would be capable of engineering a move- ment of this scale. The negroes now in revolt are of a very ignorant class."65 Several weeks later, Beaupre wrote again: "I can only say that the entire situation is surrounded by a pronounced element of mystery. It is quite impossible to determine who is responsible for the present move- ment, what are the intentions of the negro leaders or what danger there is of disturbance in Havana and other provinces.""" It soon became apparent that this was no simple political disorder. Something more was stirring. One North American military observer dis- cerned an important distinction between the independientes in arms and other Afro-Cubans in the field. The disturbance in Alto Songo, Makjor Henry C. Davis reported in June, was caused "by small bands of men whom it appears difficult to identify as revolutionists; they are acting rather as outlaws and I am of the opinion they are nothing but bands or- ganized to steal."67 The United States consul in Santiago had a better un- derstanding of the character of the uprising and its implications. Wrote Ross E. Holaday: That there is much danger to be apprehended on account of the present disturbed political condition admits of no doubt because, however good may have been the intentions of the leaders of this movement not to destroy or take life, the mere fact that their thou- sands of irresponsible followers are continually obliged to live by pillaging and to continually evade authorities of the law will, if allowed to continue, result in anarchy and a complete overthrow and derogation of organized society under the law throughout the province. The leaders will not be able to control them or their ac- tions for any considerable period of time and they will not hesitate in a short time to destroy property.' **What occurred in eastern Cuba in 1912 was only marginally related to the armed movement organized by the Partido Independiente de Color**. The independiente protest set in motion a larger protest. The political spark ignited the social conflagration, and the countryside was set ablaze. Disorders quickly assumed the proportions of a peasant jacquerie: an out- burst of rage and the release of a powerful destructive fury directed gen- erally at the sources and symbols of oppression. As is often the case with peasant movements, the uprising possessed a formless and desultory character. It was a popular outburst, born of social distress and directed not at government but at local social groups and specific conditions of abuse. It was without a program of reform, without cominitm-ent to a uni- fying program, without organization, without defined policy, and without formal leadership.69 The protest gave expression to collective rage, and for all its spontaneity and ambiguity, it was not without method and mean- ing. As an outcry against injustice, it sought at once to destroy the dis- possessors and expel the expropriators in one surge of violence and de- struction. The protesters attacked property, they plundered and pillaged mostly foreign property, and mostly sugar property, and together these activities served to define the essential character of the uprising. The yearning for the old ways served as the source for the destruction of the new ones. These were veterans of the war of liberation: they had once before waged war with fire. Arson was a weapon of rural protest long familiar to the farmers and peasants of Oriente, and they used it to great effect. "It is daily becoming more apparent," reported the United States consul in Santiago, "that those in revolt are not insurgents but incendiaries who may destroy in an hour property representing millions of dollars in value and that has taken years to construct."70 And most especially the target of insurgent incendiarism was the cane fields and the sugar mills. The de- struction of sugar property was the most common insurgent gesture. Everywhere company stores were sacked and livestock stolen. All prin- cipal sugar mills in Guantanamo reported damages. Nearly ioo,ooo dol- lars worth of standing cane on the "Esperanza" estate was destroyed. The "Santa Cecilia" mill reported extensive damage to the company railroad lines. The "Limones" estate was torched and 2,500 tons of cane went up in smoke. The "Romelie" mill was attacked several times. Several build- ings of the "Confluente" mill complex were destroyed. The manager of Fidelity Commercial and Trading Company in Guantanamo reported that the insurgents were "burning up our cane, buildings, stealing our horses and cattle and sacking three of our stores." 71 Property was attacked everywhere. Railroads made easy targets. Tracks were destroyed, rail bridges were burned, railroad stations were razed.72 Trains were halted and held up. On a number of occasions they were de- railed, and then held up. The larger coffee fincas were destroyed. The "Olimpo" cafetal in Alto Songo was torched.73 Country stores, the bodegas and cantinas, largely Spanish-owned, suf- fered high losses. Spaniards were the merchants and shopkeepers, and collectively these rural retailers were party to transactions that took in 70 percent of the wages paid to local laborers. Shopowners served as local financial agents, lending money and providing credit. They also frequently charged usurious rates of interest, and moved easily into the role of vil- lain as mounting indebtedness pushed peasants and workers ineluctably into indigence. "They are money-lenders in the small districts," wrote one traveler of Spanish merchants in 1911, "and furnish the farmers, at exorbitant rates of interest, with the means of raising and marketing their crops."74 Perceived as one more source and symbol of oppression, the rural bodegas and cantinas were plundered everywhere, freely and frequently. Shops and stores were sacked, in Guantanamo, San Luis, San- tiago, La Maya, El Caney, Alto Songo, El Cobre, Daiquiri, Palina Sori- ano, and Holguin. The attackers made off with money, machetes, tools, arms and ammunition, clothing, supplies, and food. The shops were looted, and then razed." The insurrectionary torch was also applied to towns and villages. The towns of La Maya and Jarahueca in Alto Songo were all but totally de- stroyed. Insurgents sacked Caney del Sitio in the municipio of Palma Soriano, razing a good part of the village and making off with an estimated 100,000 dollars in money and merchandise. The town of Palma Soriano was threatened more than once; so were San Luis and El Cobre.7" The attacks against the towns were not solely for plunder. An even more important purpose impelled the insurgents toward urban centers. Farmers and peasants had lost their lands in litigation and in the courts, they were bested by documents and depositions, and the new order of things was duly recorded and ratified in municipal registries and records offices. Hence, every successful incursion into municipal centers resulted in the destruction of the local archives and records offices. The insurgents fell on public records purposefully, and not as wanton acts of destruction. At every opportunity, public buildings were razed. It was a particular type of destruction, and taken together the acts suggest method and meaning. The gesture was at once symbolic and substantive, an instru- mental act designed to destroy the documents that had ratified the des- poliation of their lands. The first building destroyed in La Maya was the land registry office. The archives of Tacamara, San Juan, and Bijarti in the municipio of Holguin were destroyed. The records of San Ramon de las Yaguas in El Caney were saved only because a local judge had removed the documents before the destruction of the registry office.77 Reports from the disaffected regions underscored the socioeconomic sources of the disturbances. "Whatever may have been the immediate ob- ject of the threatened uprising of the blacks," reported one North Ameri- can naval officer, "its real cause was due to the existing economic condi- tion of the blacks."78 One marine brigade commander arrived at a similar conclusion, if in slightly different terms: "So called rebels [are] malcon- tents and men out of employment, fighting in order to loot and riot with- out cause or justification."79 An estimated 1o,ooo Afro-Cubans participated in the uprising, largely in southeastern Oriente province. The assault was against property, not persons. The Cuban press, for all the lurid accounts of the "race war," attributed few deaths to insurgents. Rebels did not engage government troops. On the contrary, they sought to avoid all contact with the army. The insurgents, La Lucha editorialized as late as June 27, "have limited themselves to fleeing every time they see a glimpse of the yellow [army] uniform, without offering even one serious battle." 8) At another point, La Lucha accurately if unwittingly underscored the character of disorders: Robbery, looting, and fire are the weapons with which they fight; that is to say that **it is a war against property and private wealth, not a war for a political ideal nor to overturn a government** . . .: everywhere, rural shops and stores sacked and burned, bridges destroyed, and sugar mills under the power of the torch of the rebels who exact money under the threat of death and destruction. 8' The extent of the popular support given locally to the insurgents is not clear. Not a few observers believed they enjoyed widespread sympathy from the noncombatant population.82 The United States minister reported learning that "many of the so-called peaceful elements are in more or less open sympathy with the rebels and may at times join forces with them." 3 "Given the enormous extension of the vast zone," La Lucha editorialized in June, "the most dangerous insurgents are not those in the woods, but those who are pacific in the villages, who by day gather intelligence con- cerning the movement of the armed forces, pass it on to the insurgents, and by night join them to plunder and pillage."84 The Cuban army com- mand apparently concurred, and in early June the government suspended constitutional guarantees for all of Oriente and ordered all noncombatants out of disaffected zones.85 Reconcentration camps reappeared in Oriente. For the second time in as many decades, thousands of peasant families were forcefully removed fiom the countryside, and contending forces laid siege on the nroduictive capabilities of the land. Order was restored at a terrible cost. In late May, the United States landed marines in Oriente province to protect North American property. Released from the responsibility of garrison duty, the Cuban armed forces undertook a ruthless and grisly pacification. The armed forces killed indis- criminately: by decapitation, by hanging, and by firing squads. Unknown numbers were killed, allegedly while "trying to escape." Military authori- ties let it be known, one observer in Palma Soriano reported, that the army "was cutting off heads, pretty much without discrimination, of all negroes found outside the town limits." 8" "They have lopped off the heads of probably some six thousand negroes in this province," reported one North American resident in Guantdnamo, "and the rest as a whole have had the fear of God drilled into their soUls."87 "It is reported by parties coming from San Luis, " cabled the United States consul in Antilla, "that prisoners falling into the hands of the government forces are shot down or beheaded unmercifully without any form of trial, my information being that not a single prisoner was allowed to escape alive at that place." One naval officer later reported: Since the withdrawal of the constitutional guarantees several ne- groes . . . have been hanged, presumably by the soldiers, but no one believes that these negroes were really rebels. As a rule the bodies are left hanging to the trees, or left lying by the roadside, no effort being made to bury them or to fix the responsibility for the executions. The execution of innocent negroes may have served the purpose of intimidating the disaffected ones.89 When it was all over, the final casualties revealed the magnitude of the carnage: murder, massacres, and mass graves everywhere in Oriente. Race and gender converged in deadly combination: black men were killed sumnmarily.' Nor were security forces inclined to make distinctions be- tween black Cubans and black foreigners. Scores of Haitian contract workers fell victim to government repression.' Few prisoners were taken, and only in the larger provincial towns. The government reported modest casualties: two rural guards dead, a few wounded.92 By the end of the summer, peace returned to Oriente. "The movement fell away," wrote a slightly baffled Hugh Thomas 6o years later, "almost as mysteriously as it had begun."93 Just in time, too, for preparations for the 1912-13 zafra were about to begin. The events of 1912 were portents, stirrings of discontent everywhere on the increase. They announced the approaching end of a way of life, **not only for Afro-Cuban peasants in Oriente, but for all peasants in Oriente**. A decade after independence, eastern Cuba was undergoing rapid social and economic change. It was not occurring everywhere at once. A variety of diverse agricultural activities survived into the twentieth century, and although the sugar latifundio had expanded its control over land, tradi- tional tenure forms persisted. Coffee fincas, cacao farms, tobacco vegas, ranches, banana fields, fruit and vegetable farms, and forests flourished in different regions of the province. So did family renters, owners, and squatters. Yet all this was changing, gradually, but steadily. The events of 1912 suggested that change had affected some districts and some Cubans more adversely than others. The southeast, and especially Guantanamo, had been particularly hard hit. To be sure, in 1912 grievances were not clearly articulated, only acted out, with the inevitable result that the meaning of those actions was left to others to explain. Not unexpectedly, nor perhaps even with the in- tention to deceive and dissimulate, **the explanations advanced at the time, as well as subsequently, failed either to appreciate adequately the source of rebellion or interpret correctly its significance**. **The issue of race blurred the meaning of the uprising and obscured the implications of the protest**. The uprising of 1912 was seen as one in a series of many political protests in the early republic. **Class was subordinated to race, the social was eclipsed by the political**. Even sympathetic renderings of 1912 did little more than to put a more favorable light on the same story line. The emphasis on race had one other effect, if not function. The por- trayal of the uprising at the time as the work of disgruntled black poli- ticians and, concomitantly and as the inevitable corollary, the view that the protest was a race war, **served to divide the peasantry along racial lines**. It was clear that the rebels were mainly black, **but it was not clear that the source of the rebellion was entirely racial**. Not that the issue of race was unimportant. On the contrary, the independientes' protest un- derscored the other attribute that many of growing numbers of dispos- sessed peasants shared in common: race. And, indeed, with the prepon- derance of the population in southeastern Oriente facing indigence made up of people of color, it was not at all unreasonable for many to perceive race as the source of their plight. It also offered a basis of unity for black peasants. But what served to unite black peasants contributed to dividing the oriental peasantry. **Cuban authorities had compelling motives to rep- resent the uprising as a race war**. The construct served to unify the white majority in Oriente, and this unity tended to cut across class lines. It set black peasants apart fiom white peasants. **It served as the basis of repres- sion more, it facilitated repression**. The conditions that drove black peasants to rebellion in 1912 were present everywhere in Oriente. **The rendering of the protest as a "guerra de razzas" directed by the Partido Independiente de Color, however, allowed white peasants to interpret the dispute as a political one and the cause a racial one-neither one of which had very much to do with them**. Far-reaching changes were overtaking eastern Cuba. Although it was not immediately apparent, 1912 was the first collective response to those changes.

**Part Three: The Castro Regime.**

**The affirmative’s blanket assertion that the Communist Revolution did not change the nature of the planation also fails to stand up to scrutiny. The fact that racism still exists in Cuba does not deny the incredible advances in racial equality made possible by the Revolution. Cuba in fact serves as a guide for “workers in black skin” in other capitalist countries.**

August **Nimtz**, **2013**. Ph.D. in Political Science, Indiana University, Professor @ University of Minnesota. “Foreword,” in Race in Cuba: Essays on the Revolution and Racial Inequality, p. 7-12.

Toward the end of 2009 sixty African Americans, some quite prominent, signed a letter to “draw attention to the conditions of racism and racial discrimination in Cuba that have hitherto been ignored.” The signatories accused the Cuban government of “increased violations of civil and human rights for those black activists in Cuba who dare raise their voices against the island’s racial system…Racism in Cuba…is unacceptable and must be confronted!” Some of us, African Americans and others, who have long defended the Cuban Revolution, countered these charges with the facts of the Revolution both at home and abroad.1

But perhaps nothing refutes these accusations better than the publication of Professor Esteban Morales’s new book by one of Cuba’s most prestigious publishers. Its very existence gives the lie to the claims of the sixty. *Desafios de la problematica racial en Cuba II* (Challenges of the Racial Problem in Cuba II) is, as the title suggests, the sequel to an earlier book published in 2007, so coveted that it is virtually impossible to find a copy for purchase. It was the first book published on the question of race on the island of Cuba in more than four decades. The charge, therefore, of the sixty that “racial discrimination has hitherto been ignored” in Cuba might have some merit had it been made before the publication of the first book. But that too would ignore Morales’s prior publications on the topic which are, fortunately, included here.

In a speech in New York City in September 2000 to a largely African American and Latino audience, Comandante en Jefe Fidel Castro said:

I am not claiming that our country is a perfect model of equality and justice. We believed at the beginning that when we established the fullest equality before the law and complete intolerance for any demonstration of sexual discrimination in the case of women, or racial discrimination in the case of ethnic minorities, these phenomena would vanish from our society. It was some time before we discovered that marginality and racial discrimination with it are not something that one gets rid of with a law or even with ten laws, and we have not managed to eliminate them completely in forty years.

Those of us who had the priviledge of being there to hear what he said and who had some sense of the Revolution’s history and what it was being subjected to at the time felt a sense of relief. For defenders of the Revolution from within the proverbial “belly of the beast,” it was reassuring to hear Fidel acknowledge what we all suspected to one degree or another. The worst economic crisis in modern Cuban history, the “Special Period,” had taken a disproportionate toll on black and mestizo Cubans, revealing just what Fidel admitted. His honesty made it easier for us to defend a project, a work still in progress, that advanced, unlike any ever before, the status of blacks not only in Cuba but elsewhere, especially in Africa.

As a young African American on the picket lines in New Orleans demanding the end of the Jim Crow system of racial segregation, I was won forever to the Cuban Revolution when I learned that within months of the triumph of the Reovlution in January 1959 the new government ended almost immediately the kinds of practices we protested against. I hung on to every snippet of news about the Revolution and cheered with every indication that it was surviving. I’ll never forget the joy of visiting the Cuban Pavilion at the World Exposition in Montreal in 1967. The facility lacked the flashiness of other other exhibits, which for me only added to the credibility of the Revolution; the very graphic slogans and texts about the process on its stark walls livened up by Cuban musicians, *congris*, and, of course, Havana Club rum sealed my fate. That would be my initial physical contact with the Revolution but not the last.

The first major international attack on the Revolution for its alleged failings in regard to racial equality was made in 1972 by Carlos Moore, a black Cuban.2 I was fortunate to have been living in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania’s capital, because it was the virtual headquarters for the southern African liberation movement at the time. And exactly because of Cuba’s well-known assistance to it, Moore’s allegations fell on deaf ears of those within and around the various movements housed there. This was especially important for African Americans of my generation who were inspired by the African revolution but who tended to look at politics solely through the lens of race and skin color, as does Moore. To hear the movement’s leaders and leading supporters, such as the Afro-Guyanese revolutionary Walter Rodney, denounce Moore was instructive.

Yet we were still vulnerable to Moore’s charges, especially the one about the racial composition of the Cuban Revolution’s leadership; that is, the underrepresentation of blacks and mestizos. And when we began to visit Cuba—my first visit was in 1983—it was almost impossible to find any books, journals, et cetera, that provided an analysis of the race question. The “silence” after 1962 that Morales speaks of was all so evident. At the same time, it was clear—provided one had historical perspective—that black and mestizo Cubans had made tremendous advances after 1959. Conversations with those were born long before then provided confirmatory evidence. We could, therefore, suspend judgment about the “silence” as long as the advances continued. Most encouraging was Fidel’s report to the Third Party Congress in 1986 that called for the recruitment of more blacks and mestizos, along with women and youth, into the party leadership—“affirmative action,” as it was then called in the United States. Three years later the Revolution was responsible for the most important advance in the global struggle for racial equality in the last quarter of the twentieth century, the defeat of the South African army in Cuito Cuanavale, Angola, which paved the way to the end of the apartheid regime in 1994. Thus, three decades after the overthrow of the U.S.-backed Batista dictatorship, defenders of the Cuban Revolution could rightly feel confident that racial equality in Cuba was within grasp. But then came the Special Period and the consequences that Fidel’s admission in 2000 alluded to.

Morales’s writings are in many ways a very detailed analytical elaboration of Fidel’s 2000 comments in New York City. They also address, even more importantly, “What is to be done?” His earliest essay in this collection, “Un modelo para el analisis de la problematica racial cubana contemporanea” (A Model for the Analysis of the Racial Problem in Contemporary Cuba), was written in the second half of 2002. For those of us who had the opportunity to read various drafts of it, we realized that there was—perhaps for the first time—a serious discussion under way in Cuba on the race question, one that had begun in the Cuban National Union of Artists and Writers (UNEAC) in 1998 with the participation of Fidel. His comment in New York City reflected, I suspect, that discussion. If the signatories of the letter of the sixty were apparently unaware of it, their counters in Cuba certainly were not. Morales was an active participant in these initial deliberations. What motivated the discussion was the increasing racial disparity in economic opportunities that came with the openings to capitalist penetration via tourism and international trade that Cuba was forced to allow in order to survive the very excruciating economic crisis of the 1990s. Unless this new development was addressed and confronted, it threatened to undermine a key bulwark of the Revolution, the support of blacks and mestizos.4

Morales is very frank, elaborating on the admission that Fidel made in 2000 that “we have not managed to eliminate [marginality and racial discrimination] completely in forty years.” From the overrepresentation of blacks and mestizos in prisons to their underrepresentation on television or in administrative posts, he speaks the truth. At the heart of the problem, he argues, is the lack of consciousness about how not only race but skin color relate to such issues. The most recent census, 2002, he notes, typifies this shortcoming. Thought an advance over the 1981 census it failed in this regard to ask the necessary questions to fully get at the problem and therefore provide an evidentiary basis for solutions. Some defenders of the Cuban Revolution abroad may be uncomfortable with these admissions. But what Morales does in salutary. He teaches us that we don’t have to be cheerleaders, overlooking its shortcomings, to defend the Revolution.

Morales leaves no doubt that despite what it still has yet to achieve the Cuban Revolution constitutes a real advance for its black and mestizo denizens: “In spite of the racism that still exists in Cuban society, we can argue that the black and mulatto population on the island is the most educated and healthy group of African descendants in this hemisphere, and that no other country has done so much to eliminate racial injustice and discrimination as has Cuba.” He reiterates this insight in the all-important interview in the December 2009 Trabajadores—the most widely read publication on the island after Granma and Juventud Rebedle—in response to the charge of the sixty: “Cuba is the only country in the world in which blacks and mestizos have the state and the government as their ally. If there had not been a revolution, blacks would have had to make on in order to reach the level that more than a few of us have achieved.”

Morales does not exaggerate about “this hemisphere.” No better evidence for his claim is what happened in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans and environs in 2005—a tragedy and crime that impacted my own family. The more than 1,600 individuals who lost their lives, disproportionately African Americans and in stark to the handful of Cubans of similar race and skin color who suffer a similar fate when even more powerful hurricanes strike, speaks volumes about what a difference a revolution makes. The post-Katrina social crisis revealed exactly what African Americans lack and what their sisters and brethren in Cuba have, which is “the state and government as their ally.” What Morales correctly calls for is more conscious use of those instruments on behalf of Cuban blacks and mestizos for achieving full equality. Though the discussion Morales is helping to lead is primarily for Cuban eyes and ears, its significance goes far beyond the shores of the island. The larger context for this ongoing discussion, it must be emphasized, is the global crisis of capitalism from which Cuba is not immune. Evidence continues to mount that the crisis, the deepest since the Great Depression, is still in its initial stages. Defenders of capitalism admit the seriousness of the crisis but argue that whatever toll it takes on the world’s toilers there is no viable alternative to the market system. Hasn’t history shown, they claim, that the socialist option has failed? It is precisely this question that makes what takes place in Cuba, the only country in the world whose leadership and working masses in their vast majority are still committed to a non-capitalist world, so important. And nothing, I argue, is as crucial to the fulfillment of that commitment as the race question. It is true that in order for Cuba to survive the crisis, its economy will have to grow and that the measures its leadership are instituting to that end are most significant. But growing the economy requires in the long run a society in which all workers see themselves as equal participants in all the decisions to advance the socialist project. The “what is to be done” that Morales advocates will go a long way to make that effort a reality.

In the United States no segment of the working class will be as interested in the outcome of this effort as—to use the language of Marx and Engels—“workers in black skin.” Despite the skin color of the present occupant of the White House, African Americans continue to shoulder the worst features of everything from unemployment to the mortgage crisis, deteriorating health, and diminishing educational opportunities. Black workers in the United States also have a long history—as is true in Cuba—of resistance and revolutionary action. “From the Civil War until today…the vanguard role and weight of workers who are black in broad, proletarian-led social and political struggles in the United States…is amazing.”5 There is no reason to assume that history is an interesting artifact of the past, given the still and increasingly oppressive reality that blacks face. They will not only be less willing to dismiss the socialist alternative as capitalism’s defenders would hope but be more open to it if it can be shown that a socialist revolution actually opens up the possibility of full racial equality—not just in the electoral arena—for the first time in the history of the United States.

**This counter-history implies an alternative role for your ballot. Rather than a focus on “uprooting the plantation,” we must universalize our struggle against capitalism. Your ballot should go to the team that provides the best methodology for breaking down capitalist modes of relation. Only a materialist interpretation of history that foregrounds the role of capital can provide the necessary intellectual groundwork.**

John **Foster**, **2006**. Teaches Soc. – U. Oregon. “In Defense of History: Marxism and the Postmodern Agenda”, Ed. Ellen Wood and John Foster, p. 188-193.

After World War II it became common for liberal historians and philosophers to insist that all speculative, a priori approaches to history—a sin they associated principally with the great systems of Hegel and Marx—be excluded from the realm of valid historical interpretation. For example, Sir Isaiah Berlin argued in 1954 in his influential essay Historical Inevitability that Hegel and Marx, along with thinkers as varied as Bacon, Condorcet, Saint Simon, Fourier, Owen, Comte, H.G. Wells, Bernard Shaw, and Toynbee, fell prey to forms of "determinism"—"whether they be teleological, metaphysical, mechanistic, religious, aesthetic, or scientific"—which had the "common conclusion" that the "individual's freedom of choice is ultimately an illusion." In conceiving an objective logic (or lawful character) to history, these thinkers, Berlin argued, had succumbed to a "determinism" which denied both free will and the role of accident in history. 11 Yet, as E.H. Carr replied in his What is History?, such criticisms of Hegel and Marx (not to mention the bulk of the Enlightenment tradition) were erroneous. As Carr explained, philosophical determinism—the doctrine that all effects are traceable to either a single cause or a hierarchy of causes, and could not have happened differently unless the conditions had changed—in no way contradicts the postulate of human freedom, nor denies the role of contingency in human affairs, since both of these can be seen as part of a larger chain of causality. Such philosophical determinism (not to be confused with the fatalistic notion that history is in some way predetermined, or crude monocausal conceptions of the historical process) "is a condition of our capacity to understand what is going on around us. The nightmare of Kafka's novels lies in the fact that nothing that happens has any apparent cause, or any cause that can be ascertained: this leads to the total disintegration of the human personality." Although history has no single, definite, predetermined logic independent of human action and changing conditions, this is no reason to jettison the notion that everything ultimately has a cause(s); or the idea that the logic of historical inquiry involves precisely the search for those causal relationships, or determinate boundaries and framing of events, which we can ascertain. 12 "That historical explanation cannot deal in absolutes and cannot adduce sufficient causes," E.P. Thompson has written, greatly irritates some simple and impatient souls. They suppose that, since historical explanation cannot be All, it is therefore Nothing: it is no more than a consecutive phenomenological narration. This is a silly mistake. For historical explanation discloses not how history must have eventuated but why it eventuated in this way and not in other ways; that process is not arbitrary but has its own regularity and rationality; that certain kinds of events (political, economic, cultural) have been related, not in any way one likes, but in particular ways and within determinate fields of possibility; that certain social formations are—not governed by "law" nor are they the "effects" of a static structural theorem—but are characterized by determinate relations and by a particular logic of process.... Our knowledge may not satisfy some philosophers, but it is enough to keep us occupied.13 Even in the present skeptical age, most historians and historically oriented social scientists have not altogether abandoned the search for causality in history, but are rather distinguished primarily by the peculiar hierarchy of causes that they attribute to historical events. "Every historical argument," as Carr states, "revolves around the question of the priority of causes." For Weber it was the evolution of rationality, for Marx the organization of productive relations. The main liberal objection to Marx has not been that he saw causality (one might even say a certain logic) underlying history, but rather that he saw a particular type of causality—i.e. the class struggle—as playing a central role in the determination of history; and that as a result Marx viewed the present itself as a transitory historical phase. Where Marx dealt with class conflict, liberals have tended to focus on the individual and the evolution of human rationality (as manifested in individuals), pointing to an end to ideology and history in the idealized and eternal present. According to contemporary possessive individualism there is no beyond—except in the technological sense. 14 Postmodernists have walked away from this great debate, arguing that reason itself is open to question, and that all that is left is the irony of discourse: signs and signifiers without significance. **The very concept of ideology is to be avoided**, according to Foucault, because "like it or not, it always stands in virtual opposition to something else which is supposed to count as truth" and requires "drawing the line between that in a discourse which falls under the category of scientificity or truth and that which comes under some other category."15 At best postmodernist thought **contends that there is no center to history**, and that power is scattered—so attention should be given to the micro-aspects of history and to the mental margins, where power/knowledge relations can still be discerned, albeit in a disconnected fashion. Anything else, we are told, smacks of "foundationalism" or "essentialism." For Foucault "the true historical sense confirms our existence among countless lost events, without landmark or a point of reference." As opposed to "traditional history," **inspired by attention to epoch-making events** and to the "heights" of the historical process (thereby relying, Foucault argues, on "metaphysics"), "effective history" or "genealogy" "shortens its vision to those things nearest to it—the body, the nervous system, nutrition, digestion, and energies; it unearths the periods of decadence." "Genealogy," Foucault insists, echoing Nietzsche, "is history in the form of a concerted carnival."16 Foucault's standpoint here speaks to the strengths and weaknesses of postmodernist thought. Its rejection of grand historical narratives, of any central struggles that define history, indeed of any historical subject, coupled with its insistence on the constitution of our knowledge within diffused power relations, leads it to "genealogical" investigations of power "nearest to the body"—areas that social theory has been insufficiently attentive to in the past. Its concentration on discourse, as the sole constitutive element in social relations, has revealed much about the role of language in the ordering of power. Its researches have thus increased our critical understanding of many aspects of society previously neglected. In particular, it has had a deep influence on feminist analysis, racial formation theory, cultural theory, political conceptions of surveillance and control, etc. Its emphasis on what is most personal has struck a chord in a period in which the personal has become political. Its stress on difference has seemed to suggest a political and theoretical openness lacking in other theoretical perspectives— though this is illusory given postmodernism's own closures or negations. Its unending skepticism, even nihilism, and rejection of Enlightenment modernity, has given it a radical cast, while at the same time keeping it free from any radical project. But the only possibility that remains open to such a perspective in the end—as Foucault's work itself suggests—is a kind of "micro-politics: local struggles, around particular issues—anything more is suspected of leading to improper `totalizations,' and thus to totalitarianism." 17 The weaknesses of postmodernism—from an emancipatory perspective— thus far overshadow its strengths. Missing from Foucault's analysis, like that of postmodernism generally, is any conception of a counter-order to the disciplinary orders described. In the more extreme case of "textual postmodernists"—those postmodernist thinkers like Derrida, as distinct from Foucault, who deny any reality outside the text—the political and historical weaknesses from a left perspective are even more glaring. **By undermining the very concept of history—in any meaningful sense beyond mere story-telling—such theorists have robbed critical analysis of what has always been its most indispensable too1**. 18 The denial within postmodernist theory of the validity of historical critique covers up what is really at issue: **the denial of the historical critique of capitalism, leading to a convergence between** left thought infected by Nietzsche and the dominant liberal "end of history" conception. The danger of such ahistorical or anti-historical views, as E.P. Thompson observed, is that one loses sight not of "reason in history" in some abstract sense, but rather of "the reasons of power and the reasons of money."19 **Historical materialism at its best provides a way out of this dilemma.** This is not to ignore the fact that Marxism—which has sometimes given rise to its own crude interpretations and historical travesties, as in the case of Stalinism—has frequently been identified with the kind of "totalizations" and "essentialisms" that postmodernist theorists have singled out. As Thompson pointed out in a 1977 essay on Christopher Caudwell, Marxism has sometimes relied on " 'essentialist' tricks of mind," the "tendency to intellectualize the social process"—"the rapid delineation of the deep process of a whole epoch." These are things that the historian (and social scientists in general) should guard against. But to abandon theory and historical explanation entirely in order to avoid "essentialism" and "foundationalism" is a bit like throwing out the baby in order to keep the bathwater clean. Marx himself provided another model, actively opposing theory (even "Marxist" theory) that purported to be "suprahistorical." In his Theses on Feuerbach, he presented what still ranks as the most thorough going critique of what he called the "essentialist" conception of human beings and nature. Indeed, historical materialism has long engaged in its own self-critique, precisely in order to expel the kinds of "essentialisms," "positivisms," and "structuralisms" that have intruded on the philosophy of praxis itself—a self-critique that has produced the insights of theorists like Gramsci, Sartre, Thompson, and Raymond Williams. 20 These thinkers distanced themselves from the positivistic "official Marxism" that grew out of the Second International and later turned into a caricature of itself in the form of Stalinism. Yet they held firm to the critique of capitalism and their commitment to the struggles of the oppressed. Moreover, these particular examples tell us that if what has sometimes been called "the postmodern agenda"—consisting of issues like identity, culture, and language—is to be addressed at all, this can only be accomplished within a historical context. And here one might openly wonder with Foucault "what difference there could ultimately be between being a historian and being a Marxist." When placed within a more holistic historical materialist context—animated by the concept of praxis—the problems raised by postmodernism look entirely different. As David McNally says, "Language is not a prisonhouse, but a site of struggle." What the contributions in this volume have in common is the insistence that issues like language, culture, nationality, race, gender, the environment, revolution, and history itself are only effectively analyzed within a context that is simultaneously historical in character, materialist (in the sense of focusing on concrete practices), and revolutionary. **Such analyses do not abandon the hope of transcending capitalism, nor of the notion of human progress as a possible outcome of historical struggles**. It is said that Nicholas I, Czar of Russia, issued an order banning the word "progress." Today we no longer believe, in a nineteenth century sense, in automatic human progress, embodying some definite content—the idea that the Czar found so threatening. But this does not mean, as the philosopher Michael Oakeshott contended with respect to political activity in the 1950s, that we "sail a boundless and bottomless sea" that has "neither starting-point nor appointed direction" and that our only task is "to keep afloat on an even keel." History—as centuries of struggle and indeed progress suggest—is more meaningful than that. **To abandon altogether the concept of progress, in the more general sense of the possibility of progressive human emancipation, would only be to submit to the wishes of the powers that** **be.** Such political disengagement by intellectuals on the left in the present epoch could only mean one thing: the total obeisance to capita1.21 The irony of post-modernism is that while purporting to have transcended modernity, it abandons from the start all hope of transcending capitalism itself and entering a post-capitalist era. Postmodernist theory is therefore easily absorbed within the dominant cultural frame and has even given rise recently to texts such as Postmodern Marketing, which attempts to utilize the insights of thinkers like Foucault, Derrida, Lyotard, and Baudillard to market goods within a capitalist economy. Perhaps this will be the final destiny or postmodernist theory—its absorption by the vast marketing apparatus of the capitalist economy, adding irony and color to a commercial order that must constantly find new ways to insinuate itself into the everyday lives of the population. Meanwhile, **historical materialism will remain the necessary intellectual ground for all those who seek, not to revel in the "carnival" of capitalist productive and market relations, but to transcend them**.22

**Analyses of the experience of oppression in terms of the body provide no foundation for universalism --- we must focus on the oppression created by capitalist exploitation.**

Teresa **Ebert**, November **1996**. Associate Prof. Critical Theory – SUNY Albany, College English, “For a Red Pedagogy: Feminism, Desire, and Need”, 58.7, JSTOR.

But grounding pedagogy on the free expression of "desiring selves" does not produce a very productive classroom, even in its own terms. As Tompkins admits, "the course was in some respects a nightmare. There were days when people went at each other so destructively that students cried after class or got migraine headaches" (658). She passes over this quickly without any critical analysis, seem- ing to accept it as a natural part of people expressing their feelings. But, in fact, nur- turing pedagogy raises a number of problems for a politically effective feminism. It so reifies an anti-intellectual and transsocial individualism that it supplants any social and collective knowledge with an acting-out, a performing of emotions. The reason the students' emotional outpourings are so destructive in ludic classrooms is because they have not been provided with concepts and frames of intelligibility for understanding and explaining the social constructedness, historical causes, and political situationality of their seemingly most private, unique, individual feelings and desires. This is what the socialist thinker Dorothy Healey calls asking "sub- stantive questions about the meaning of our own experience" (58). Instead each stu- dent's feelings are considered both unique and equal to everyone else's-to question or challenge them is seen as an unleashing of violence, as a direct attack on the stu-dent herself. The nurturing pedagogical situation provides no way to understand critically, evaluate, or explain how one student's emotions and desires may be oppressive of other students-no way to understand how seemingly unique feelings participate in and reproduce unequal and unjust social relations (for a sustained dis- cussion of the consequences of the pedagogy of pleasure as a pedagogy of the care of the self, see the "Symposium: The Subject of Pedagogical Politics/The Politics of Publication"). At best it can describe how the student "feels" about any suffering she may have experienced, but it is unable to explain the way the student's pleasures, desires and suffering are constructed out of the existing socioeconomic power rela- tions. As Sue Clegg has argued, Oppression is experienced in terms of being black, or being a woman, or being Irish, or being gay, but it cannot be explained by virtue of this experience. **For that we need an analysis that goes beyond experience. These oppressions ... are connected to the central dynamics of capitalist exploitation**. (112) Such knowledge, however, requires critique, and critique is largely dismissed as "attack" in nurturing pedagogy and as oppressive in erotic pedagogy; it is, in short, considered antithetical to pleasure and even to feminism itself. In fact, cri- tique, especially feminist critiques of other feminists, is dismissed as "trashing" by Jane Gallop, Marianne Hirsch, and Nancy Miller, in the published transcript of their well-known "conversation," "Criticizing Feminist Criticism." The new avant-garde of libidinal pedagogy is the pedagogy of the body or corporeal pedagogy with its body studies, body discourses, body criticism. Among the lead- ing articulators of this new bodyism and corporeality-not only for feminism but for cultural studies generally-is Elizabeth Grosz in her latest work, Volatile Bodies. The specificity of the female body, its fluids, flows, differences are for Grosz the basis on which women can "develop autonomous modes of self-understanding and positions from which to challenge male knowledges and paradigms" (19). Grosz's corporeal feminism is based on the notion of "the pure differ- ence . . . constituting all modes of materiality" (208), including subjectivity and sexed bodies. This "pure difference" is a new ludic essentialism grounded in the arche essence of an absolute, ahistorical ontological difference and articulated through discursive practices and significations. The logic is itself conflicting and indeterminate, for Grosz also asserts "a material specificity and determinateness to bodies" that "exert. . . resistance. . . to the processes of cultural inscription" (190). In other words, materiality is not the historical objectivity of the structure of class antagonisms produced by labor divisions; it is that which resists inscription by lan- guage. Grosz thus replays the same ludic confusions as Judith Butler (Bodies): mate- riality is reduced to the "pure" (ontological and discursive) differences that "constitute" it. Thus despite all her claims for a theory of the historical specificity of "bodies-male or female, black, brown, white, large or small" erases the "real" historical, material specificity of bodies: the materiality constituted not by an abstract, "pure" (ontological or textual) difference but by the historical struggles over the relations of production and divisions of labor and property. We see this erasure of materiality in her "experiment" with a "Deleuzian femi- nism" (Grosz 180) in which she deploys Deleuze and Guattari's binary of the "rhi- zomatic" and "arboreal" in spite of her own injunctions against dualities. The outcome of her experiment is predictable: the arboreal (the systematic understanding of society, as in historical materialism) is put aside in the interest of "rhizomatics"- a concrete, specific, discontinuous, heterogeneous description of bodies in terms of their "intensities and flows" (160-83). Bodies in such a rhizomatics are "assemblages" of differences, "fragments of a desiring machine" (167-68)-"heterogeneous, dis- parate, discontinuous alignments or linkages" (167). They have (and here she quotes Deleuze and Guattari directly) "neither base nor superstructure" but follow the "imperative of endless experimentation, metamorphosis, or transmutation" (167-68). Such a theory of "bodies," and thus of subjectivities, as the effects of transhistorical, endlessly metamorphosing "assemblages" of differences or "desiring machines" does not displace base and superstructure, but simply reverses them and, in a profoundly idealist move, articulates bodies only in terms of superstructural processes. We see the idealism and oppressive class politics of this libidinal knowledge of corporeal flows, fluids, and intensities when we examine the politics of breasts. Grosz cites what she calls the "definitive phenomenological study of the experience of being/having breasts" (204), Iris Young's "Breasted Experience," as an instance of this corporeal knowledge. Deploying an "Irigarayan metaphorics of flu- ids... [that] befuddles and complicates Cartesian ontology" (Grosz 204) and deconstructing the common coding and alienating objectification of the female body, Young argues that if we imagine the woman's point of view, the breasted body becomes blurry, mushy, indef- inite, multiple and without clear identity. ... A metaphysics generated from femi- nine desire, Luce Irigarary suggests, might conceptualize being as fluid.. . [and] would tend to privilege the living, moving, pulsing over the inert dead matter of the Cartesian world view. (Young 192-93) In other words, a corporeal knowledge that "traces the libidinal pathway," "corporeal flows," and trajectories of fluids "across women's bodies" is seen as a lib- eratory deconstruction of the binaries of Western metaphysics and its alienating codings of women's bodies. But what is omitted here is the determined materiality of the body as the effect of social struggles brought about by the forces and rela- tions of production-the divisions of labor and exploitation. Such valorized mean- ings are, to a large degree, the privilege of prosperity: they are class specific. They erase the laboring body, the body of need.

## 2nc/1nr

**Race oppression is used by capital to ideologically justify economic exploitation --- the eradication of racism requires a totalizing critique of capitalism.**

Robert **Young**, Winter **2006**. Red Critique, “Putting Materialism Back into Race Theory,” Winter/Spring, http://www.redcritique.org/WinterSpring2006/puttingmaterialismbackintoracetheory.htm.

This essay advances a materialist theory of race. In my view, race oppression dialectically intersects with the exploitative logic of advanced capitalism, a regime which deploys race in the interest of surplus accumulation. Thus, race operates at the (economic) base and therefore produces cultural and ideological effects at the superstructure; in turn, these effects—in very historically specific way—interact with and ideologically justify the operations at the economic base [1]. In a sense then, race encodes the totality of contemporary capitalist social relations, which is why race cuts across a range of seemingly disparate social sites in contemporary US society. For instance, one can mark race difference and its discriminatory effects in such diverse sites as health care, housing/real estate, education, law, job market, and many other social sites. However, unlike many commentators who engage race matters, I do not isolate these social sites and view race as a local problem, which would lead to reformist measures along the lines of either legal reform or a cultural-ideological battle to win the hearts and minds of people and thus keep the existing socio-economic arrangements intact; instead, I foreground the relationality of these sites within the exchange mechanism of multinational capitalism. Consequently, I believe, the eradication of race oppression also requires a totalizing political project: the transformation of existing capitalism—a system which produces difference (the racial/gender division of labor) and accompanying ideological narratives that justify the resulting social inequality. Hence, my project articulates a transformative theory of race—a theory that reclaims revolutionary class politics in the interests of contributing toward a post-racist society. In other words, the transformation from actually existing capitalism into socialism constitutes the condition of possibility for a post-racist society—a society free from racial and all other forms of oppression. By freedom, I do not simply mean a legal or cultural articulation of individual rights as proposed by bourgeois race theorists. Instead, I theorize freedom as a material effect of emancipated economic forms. I foreground my (materialist) understanding of race as a way to contest contemporary accounts of race, which erase any determinate connection to economics. For instance, humanism and poststructuralism represent two dominant views on race in the contemporary academy. Even though they articulate very different theoretical positions, they produce similar ideological effects: the suppression of economics. They collude in redirecting attention away from the logic of capitalist exploitation and point us to the cultural questions of sameness (humanism) or difference(poststructuralism). In developing my project, I critique the ideological assumptions of some exemplary instances of humanist and poststructuralist accounts of race, especially those accounts that also attempt to displace Marxism, and, in doing so, I foreground the historically determinate link between race and exploitation. It is this link that forms the core of what I am calling a transformative theory of race. The transformation of race from a sign of exploitation to one of democratic multiculturalism, ultimately, requires the transformation of capitalism.

#### 2. Extinction is inevitable --- capitalism creates a profit-based motive for endless resource consumption --- this guarantees imperialist conflict over resources and also an endless increase in human consumption that will destroy the biosphere Mandel 86 Ernest. Prof. Emeritus – Free U. Belgium and Marxist Political Theorist, “The Meaning of the Second World War”, p. 169-175.

The legacy of destruction left by World War II is staggering. Eighty million people were killed, if one includes those who died of starvation and illness as a direct result of the war — eight times as many as during World War I. Dozens of cities were virtually totally destroyed, especially in Japan and Germany. Material resources capable of feeding, clothing, housing, equipping all the poor of this world were wasted for purely destructive purposes. Forests were torn down and agricultural land converted into wasteland on a scale not witnessed since the Thirty Years War or the Mongol invasion of the Islamic Empire. Even worse was the destructive havoc wreaked on human minds and behaviour. Violence and barbaric disregard of elementary human rights — starting with the right to life — spread on a larger scale than anything seen during and after World War I — itself already quite disastrous in this regard. The climax to the rise of barbarism was the advent of the Bomb — a veritable epitome of late capitalism's basic destructive thrust. Since 1945 the shadow of final annihilation has hovered over humankind's fate in the form of the ominous mushroom cloud. That shadow itself is already poisoning hundreds of thousands of human beings, — their bodies and their descendants' — and poisoning their minds. Even the direct long-term radiation and fall-out results of nuclear bombs or experimental explosions are incalculable — and largely unknown. Was all the destruction pointless? Has international capitalism emerged from World War II with all the fundamental contradictions which led to the conflict unresolved – not only structurally, but even conjuncturally? Many observers would have categorically denied such a statement ten years ago, when it seemed that in contrast to the inter-war period, the international capitalist economy had experienced two decades (in the Anglo-Saxon countries, nearly three) of unprecendented growth, interrupted only by minor recessions, and a long historical period of high levels of employment and impressive rises in the material standard of living of the toiling masses in the imperialist countries. Today, it is obvious that the twenty to twenty-five years of the postwar boom were only an interlude, a 'long expansive wave' of the capitalist economy following the 'long depression' of the interwar period, which will itself be followed by a 'long depression' of even longer duration than the 1913-39 period.' To be sure, that interlude witnessed a new leap forward of the productive forces – the third technological revolution – and a great increase in the material wealth and average skill and knowledge of the international working class, not to mention a big expansion in the number of wage-earners. Even if the material and intellectual progress was very unevenly divided as between the more and less developed capitalist countries, it enlarged the base from which world socialism can be built. The material preconditions for a socialist world of plenty and a global withering away of the social division of labour between 'bosses' and 'bossed' were much more considerable in 1970 than in 1939, let alone 1914. They are even more so in 1985. At the same time, however, the price humankind must pay for the delay of world socialism, for the survival of decaying capitalism, becomes more and more frightening. The tendency for the productive forces to be transformed into forces of destruction not only asserts itself periodically in crises of over-production and world wars.' More and more it asserts itself unrelentingly in the fields of production, consumption, social relations, health (including mental health), and above all in the uninterrupted succession of `local' wars. This global price in human suffering, death, and threats to the very physical survival of humankind, is again staggering. It outstrips anything seen during the First or Second World Wars.' Two outstanding examples are sufficient to underscore this point (many others could be quoted). Since 1945, not a single year has passed without 'local' wars occuring in some part of the globe, often in many parts simultaneously. Most of these are imperialist counter-revolutionary wars of intervention against unfolding national liberation movements and unfolding or victorious social revolutions. The total number of victims of these already equals or surpasses that of World War I. The perversion of human consumption and human wants through profit-oriented standardised mass production is imposing a growing burden of illness and death upon humankind. Not only does it involve a simultaneous growth of overproduction and artificial curtailment of food production in the West, and of hunger and starvation in the South. It also involves a rising flood of useless, harmful, poisoned consumer goods, including poisoned food, in the West itself. The result is a dramatic increase in so-called 'civilization diseases', like cancer and coronary occlusion, caused by poisoned air, water and bodies. Again, the death toll is staggering. And the threat which poisoned air, seas, water and forests pose to the very physical survival of humanity is similar to the threat of nuclear world war. In that sense, the Second World War indeed solved nothing, i.e. removed none of the basic causes of the intensifying crisis of survival of human civilization and humankind itself. Hitler has disappeared, but the tide of destructiveness and barbarism keeps rising, albeit in more variegated forms and a less concentrated way (if World War III can be avoided). 4 For the underlying cause of that destructiveness remains. It is the expansionist dynamic of competition, capital accumulation and imperialism increasingly turned against itself, i.e. boomeranging from the 'periphery' into the 'centre', with all the destructive potential this expansion and self-assertion harbours in the face of growing resistance and defiance from millions, if not hundreds of millions, of human beings. The militarization of the United States reflects the permanence of that expansionism and destructiveness, specific historical circumstances notwithstanding. Joseph Schumpeter asserted against Marxists that the roots of imperialism were essentially precapitalist, semi-feudal—absolutist-militarist – and not capitalist business interests. 5 He tried to prove his point by noting that the world's strongest capitalist country, the United States of America, had no army or military establishment to speak of. He went so far as to reiterate that argument, first advanced immediately after World War I, during World War II, in his classic Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1943 – one of the few bourgeois historical studies of the last fifty years worth mentioning, and vastly superior to Popper's critique of Marx, let alone von Hayek's anti-socialist rantings.) 6 It is true that the historical specificity of US capitalism — its frontier in North America and the weakness of the client states in its Latin American sphere of influence — made it possible for it to expand geographically with comparatively little use of force (significantly less, in any case, than was employed by various European capitalist powers or Japan). Later, after World War I, the tremendous industrial and financial superiority of US imperialism again made 'peaceful' expansion (not without the use of the 'big stick' here and there, of course) a more efficient way of ruling than outright territorial occupation and large-scale military adventures. The outcome of World War II changed all that. To begin with, the very global hegemony US imperialism had conquered implied that it increasingly had to play the role of world gendarme of capitalism. In this way, the contradiction between the internationalisation of the productive forces and the survival of the nation-state was partially and temporarily surmounted. But it was impossible to perform that role without a powerful and expanding military establishment. US imperialism literally had to confront all the contradictions of international capitalism — and, increasingly, to confront them with repressive threats and means. Under capitalism — especially imperialism and its 'late-capitalist' phase, characterised by huge quantities of capital permanently in search of additional fields for investment — an expanding military establishment means a burgeoning sector of industry and capitalist firms geared to weapons production. These have a vested interest in such production, for they receive a large slice of the profits, guaranteed by the state, thanks to constantly escalating armaments output. Hence the birth of the 'military-industrial complex', to quote the phrase aptly coined by Eisenhower, himself a general turned President of the United States. So Schumpeter was quite wrong, and Marxists correct after all, in the (exemplary) case of the United States. For all its historical peculiarities and 'uniqueness', the militarisation of the United States directly derived from the needs of US Big Business and imperialism, albeit with half a century's delay behind Britain, France, Germany, Japan and Italy. But that is by no means the end of the story. Powerful as it was, US imperialism could not single-handed simultaneously confront the Soviet Union, the process of permanent revolution in the colonial and semi-colonial countries, and a periodically restive and explosive working class in several imperialist countries, with its own manpower and military resources. It needed allies and it had to cultivate them, in the first place financially. As a result, US imperialism saw the law of uneven and combined development assert itself for the first time against the United States. When the US launched the reconstruction and consolidation of West German and Japanese imperialism (just as it had previously assisted in the reconstruction and consolidation of their French and Italian counterparts), it initiated a process which, as a consequence of the defeat and destruction these powers had suffered, offered them the possibility of achieving faster growth in average industrial labour productivity and a more modern industrial profile than the USA itself. Thus the build-up of the American military machine also performed the function of pressurizing the US's reluctant allies not to overstep certain bounds of financial, commercial and industrial autonomy within the alliance — a function which was itself gradually undermined by a change in the financial and industrial balance of forces to the detriment of US imperialism. So in spite of American military hegemony, the 'reign of the dollar' and predominant American ownership/control of multinational corporations did not last longer than twenty years after World War II. And if one bears in mind the growth in Soviet industrial and military power, which broke the American monopoly on nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them in the 1950s, the 'American Century' scarcely lasted for more than a decade. Bretton Woods, the reign of the dollar,' the reign of US-controlled multinational corporations, did enable American and world capitalism to avoid economic collapse on the scale of the Great Depression after 1945-48. But they were gradually eroded, eventually leading to the long depression which commenced at the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s. 8 The postwar boom itself was not the automatic result of US imperialism's opting for 'peaceful' commercial and financial expansion, i.e. the Marshall Plan, massive capital exports, and everything that flowed from them. Its precondition was the termination of the post-war workers' upsurge in several key imperialist countries, especially Italy, France and Japan, where the militancy was largely channelled by the CPs and therefore perceived as a direct threat by American imperialism. But it occurred in the USA too, 9 if at a lower level of politicisation and radicalisation. Under these circumstances, the class struggle in the key capitalist countries and on an international scale became intertwined with the evolution of relations between the great powers and the Cold War in a specific — and discontinuous — manner. Some of the main industrial struggles were largely divorced from the latter — for example, the post-war strike wave in the USA and the first massive wildcat strikes in Belgium and France, which resulted in the CPs having to leave the coalition governments under working-class pressure (and not under that of American imperialism or the European bourgeoisie). But the partial defeats of these struggles, combined with growing repression by capital (of which the Taft- Hartley Act and the gradual erosion of union strength in the USA was the most significant example), and the turn made by the CPs from government coalition politics to ultra-leftist gestures, led to a general decline in working-class militancy — even in Britain, where the Labour government, with a large parliamentary majority and important reform legislation behind it, had the best chance of avoiding fundamental disorientation. Whilst the stabilization of capitalism in the main imperialist countries enabled the boom to commence on a favourable basis — the retreat of the first post-war wave of workers' radicalisation and militancy — it imparted a peculiar twist to the developing balance of class forces, quite unlike that after 1923. No working class in an imperialist country suffered a crushing defeat. While the Cold War caused great ideological and organizational divisions inside the labour movement, it also forced imperialism to pay a high price for keeping its 'home front' relatively quiescent. As a result of the post-war boom in Western society — accompanied by a new growth in wage labour, i.e. industrialisation — and of workers' rising expectations and consistent efforts to realise them via trade-union struggles and political initiatives (except in the USA), the strength of the organized labour movement constantly grew in the imperialist countries. It reached unprecedented levels, both in and outside the factory. For a period, this very growth seemed to fuel the boom by spreading mass consumption of consumer durables and the purchase of housing. But from a certain peak, symbolized by May 1968, the contradictions between that growth and the normal functioning of the capitalist economy became obvious. On the other hand, the very conditions in which the 'American century' was ushered in — the reign of the multinational corporations and the implications of the third technological revolution in the field of raw materials (a gradual substitution of man-made for `natural' ones) — facilitated imperialism's shift from direct to indirect rule over the 'third world' (from colonialism to neocolonialism) without any marked redistribution of world profits (world surplus-value) in favour of the third-world ruling classes. A constant drain of value from the South to the North continued to be the rule in the whole post-war period, fuelling both the 'boom' itself and a revolt against such super-exploitation in the shape of national liberation movements. The old colonial empires collapsed. But the attempt to stabilize a new, 'indirect' US Empire was gradually worn down. '° From this point of view too, then, the Second World War has solved nothing, at a structural level for capitalism. Capitalism stabilized and prospered in the West between 1948 and 1968. But the price paid was continuous crisis in the Third World and the build-up of increasingly explosive material in Western Europe, which erupted in 1968. The crisis of imperialism had not been solved. Neither had the crisis of capitalist relations of production. The respite could not be used to repair the dikes. The breaches were widening. And through them the flood of revolution would start to flow again. It remains the best chance — in fact the only chance — of avoiding World War III. Humankind can only be saved from destruction by establishing rational control over international and domestic affairs, i.e. by abolishing class and national conflicts and competition. And only a democratic socialist world federation can achieve that goal.

#### 3. History must be a priori --- the affirmative methodology is explicitly a “starting point.” They argue that the use of salsa best understands the foundation of economic engagement with Cuba. It is unclear what exactly their “methodology” of salsa entails. Their Aparacio evidence indicates that salsa music like Quimbara and Azucar Negra reminds Latin Americans of their African roots and also serves as a way of bonding. Does this mean that their methodology is to simply play salsa music until oppression goes away? Obviously not; the affirmative believes that their advocacy is a pre-requisite to understanding Cuba and researching the resolution. If we win that their interpretation of history is inaccurate, then we have turned their starting point. Even if the alternative has no specific prescription, neither does the aff. Our “discussion” is superior and ensures that we will have the right starting point for moving towards liberation.

Robert Young 01, Winter. Professor of English @ University of Alabama. “The Linguistic Turn, Materialism and Race: Toward an Aesthetics of Crisis,” Callaloo, 24(1), Winter 2001, pp. 334-345, Project MUSE.

Postmodernists reunderstand the subject, not as the rational cause of social meaning, but rather the effect of the articulation of various discursive practices. Roland Barthes makes this point clear in *S/Z* when he says, “ I is not an innocent subject, anterior to the text, one which will subsequently deal with the text as it would an object to dismantle or a site to occupy. This ‘I’ which approaches the text is already itself a plurality of other text, of codes which are infinite or, more precisely, lost” (10). Michel Foucault also points up the constructedness of the subject when he argues that: “The individual is not a pregiven entity which is seized on by the exercise of power. The individual, with his identity, is the product of a relation of power exercised over bodies, multiplicities, movements, desires, forces” (73-74). Perhaps the classic poststructuralist view of the subject, though, is found in Jacques Derrida. For Derrida, “The subject (in its identity with itself, or eventually in its consciousness of its identity with itself, its selfconsciousness) is inscribed in language, is a ‘function’ of language, becomes a speaking subject only by making its speech conform . . . to the system of the rules of language as system of differences, or at very least by conforming to the general laws of difference” (15).

The view of the subject as a language construct has framed postmodern discourses of race. For example, Henry Gates argues that “Race has become a trope of ultimate, irreducible difference between culture . . . [and thus] Race is the ultimate trope of difference because it is so very arbitrary in its application” (*Race* 5). In the *Signifying Monkey* Gates develops his project of investigating rhetorical structures and privileges the mechanics of the meaning-making process and foregrounds the “materiality” and “willful play” of the signifier (59). Thus for Gates “blackness is produced in the text through a complex process of signification” and therefore “There can be no transcendent blackness, for it can not and does not exist beyond manifestations in specific figures” (237).

Theorizing race as text has led to proclamations, such as the one by Anthony Appiah, that race is a fiction: “The truth is that there are no races” (Appiah 35). The politics of such a discourse is perhaps clearest in Kobena Mercer’s essay “‘1968’: Periodizing Politics and Identity,” where he, too, recognizes the meaninglessness of race and marks how “the [race] signifier itself became the site for the making and remaking of meanings” (430). Thus politics becomes a matter of semiotic freedom and democracy is seen as a “struggle over relations of representation” (Mercer 429) and not the relations of production. In short, what is offered as emancipation is not equal access to economic resources but the pleasure of disrupting dominant and oppressive meanings. While such discursive intervention is important, especially for an historically marginalized group, it is urgent to recognize that social change will come about not by emancipating signs from totalities but by displacing the relations of production, for although the relations of production do not evade, they nevertheless always exceed the fate of signs.

Not only do such postmodern discourses reify culture, in what Kenan Malik calls “cultural formalism,” but in their anti-totality move and privileging of the logic of indeterminacy postmodernists suppress notions of causality. Postmodern discourses of race merely assert the constructedness of the (race) sign and bracket the political economy of race, and consequently the text is set as the limit of intelligibility. In arguing for the “constructed-ness” of race but locating it textually there is a theoretical problem in accounting for the textual inscription of race or its extra-textual effects in daily life under capitalism (and we must account for extratextual effects because for people of color it is a matter of life and death).

Postmodernists are unable to explain why race has acquired its oppressive social meaning in the first place and across various localities—that is race is a translocal articulation. Reading race as essentially constructed but not accounting for its production, race is mystified and metaphysics is reintroduced; in fact, in a recent symposium on race and racism Howard Winant asserts that “Race remains a mysterious phenomenon”(7). Race is not a mystery as it operates today as a material practice in marking racially coded subjects for differential levels of surplus extraction and violence and it has an historical emergence. As Alex Callinicos indicates, “Racism as we know it today developed during a key phase in the development of capitalism as the dominant mode of production on a global scale—the establishment during the 17th and 18th centuries of colonial plantations in the New World using slave labour imported from Africa to produce consumer goods such as tobacco and sugar and industrial outputs such as cotton for the world market” (11). As Eric Williams succinctly put it, “Slavery was not born of racism: rather, racism was the consequence of slavery” (7).

While most postmodern discourses have moved away from ontologically based inquiries, a recent essay by Linda Alcoff attempts to (re)configure race as an “ontological” category. Her intervention opens the possibility for foregrounding the nexus between race and materialism. This possibility is quickly closed down as her discourse moves away from materialism and thus for Alcoff “Race is a particular, historically and culturally located form of human categorization . . .” (7). The question again is why? Why is race a form of human categorization? And is race identity really a matter of language games? And are these games essentially self-originating and autonomous? Of course not. These “games” are always already situated within and the effect of the prevailing economic / political /cultural /ideological conditions. As Malik points out “Racial differentiation emerges out of real social and economic mechanisms” (10), and they are not ontologically pre-given.

In other words, this human categorization is an historical articulation of racialized division of labor structuring asymmetrical access to surplus. Alcoff reduces thought about the real to the real itself and this articulates an empiricist idealism. Therefore what is really at stake here is not so much the question of ontology and the related question of objectivity—which puts one on the road to materialism—as much as it is the articulation of what Roy Bhaskar has called the “epistemic fallacy” and consequently the recuperation of experience. One must remember Alcoff’s original concern was not only to “validate hybrid identity or hybrid positionality against purist, essentialist accounts” but also to “take into account the full force of race as a lived experience” (9). Of course, as I also pointed out earlier, it is politically urgent to mark such experiences but an ontological reinscription of race reifies race and as such disables a transformative project—a project aimed at negating the deployment of race as a structure for exploitation. Under way, then, is the alliance of postmodern discourses, which de-essentializes identity, with this humanist identity. These two apparently antagonistic discourses are actually colluding in suppressing the political economy of race. The trajectory—from the postmodernist constructed identity to the humanist subject—may be clearly mapped out in a series of works by Gates.

#### The slave was always-already a participant in modernity. They theorize the slave as a total object – we recognize the slave as both object and subject of modernity.

Trouillot 03 Michael-Rolph Trouillot, Anthropology @ Chicago ‘3 *Global Transformations* p. 41-43

Differently Modern: The Caribbean as Alter-Native I have argued so far that **modernity is structurally plural** inasmuch as it requires a heterology, an Other outside of itself. I would like to argue now that the modern is also historically plural because it always requires an Other from within, an otherwise modern created between the jaws of modernity and modernization. That plurality is best perceived if we keep modernity and modernization as distinct yet related groups of phenomena with the understanding that the power unleashed through modernization is a condition of possibility of modernity itself. I will draw on the sociohistorical experience of the Caribbean region to make that point. Eric Wolf once wrote in passing, but with his usual depth, that the Caribbean is "eminently a world area in which modernity first deployed its powers and simultaneously revealed the contradictions that give it birth." Wolf's words echo the work of Sidney W. Mintz (1966, 1971b, 1978, 1983, 1996, 1998) who has long insisted that the Caribbean has been modern since its early incorporation into various North Atlantic empires. Teasing out Wolf's comments and drawing from Mintz's work, I want to sketch some of the contradictions from the Caribbean record to flesh out a composite picture of what I mean by the Otherwise Modern. Behold the sugar islands from the peak of Barbados's career to Cuba's lead in the relay race-after Jamaica and Saint-Domingue, from roughly the 1690s to the 1860s. At first glance, Caribbean labor relations under slavery offer an image of homogenizing power. Slaves were interchangeable, especially in the sugar fields that consumed most of the labor force, victims of the most "depersonalizing" side of modernization (Mintz 1966). Yet as we look closer, a few figures emerge that suggest the limits of that homogeneity. Chief among them is **the slave striker**, who helped decide when the boiling of the cane juices had reached the exact point when the liquid could be transferred from one vessel to the next.2 Some planters tried to identify that moment by using complex thermometers. But since the right moment depended on temperature, the intensity of the fire, the viscosity of the juice, the quality of the original cane, and its state at the time of cutting, other planters thought that a good striker was much more valuable than the most complex technology. The slave who acquired such skills would be labeled or sold as "a striker." Away from the sugar cane, especially on the smaller estates that produced coffee, work was often distributed by task, allowing individual slaves at times to exceed their quota and gain additional remuneration. The point is not that plantation slavery allowed individual slaves much room to maneuver in the labor process: it did not. Nor is the point to conjure images of sublime resistance. Rather, Caribbean history gives us various glimpses at the production of a modern self-a self producing itself through a particular relation to material production, even under the harshest possible conditions. **For better and for worse**, a sugar striker was a **modern identity**, just as was being a slave violinist, a slave baker or a slave midwife (Abrahams 1992:126-30; Debien 1974; Higman 1984). That modern self takes firmer contours when we consider the provision grounds of slavery. Mintz (1978) has long insisted on the sociocultural relevance of these provision grounds, small plots on the margins of the plantations, land unfit for major export crops in which slaves were allowed to grow their own crops and raise animals. Given the high price of imported food, the availability of unused lands, and the fact that slaves worked on these plots in their own free time, these provision grounds were in fact an indirect subsidy to the masters, lessening their participation in the reproduction of the labor force. Yet Mintz and others-including myself-have noted that what started as an economic bonus for planters turned out to be a field of opportunities for individual slaves. I will not repeat all those arguments here (Trouillot 1988, 1996, 1998). Through provision grounds, slaves learned the management of capital and the planning of family production for individual purposes. How much to plant of a particular food crop and where, how much of the surplus to sell in the local market, and what to do with the profit involved decisions that required an assessment of each individual's placement within the household. The provision grounds can be read not only as material fields used to enhance slaves' physical and legal conditions-including at the time the purchase of one's freedom-they can also be read as symbolic fields for the production of individual selves by way of the production of material goods. Such individual purposes often found their realization in colonial slave markets, where slaves-especially female slaves-traded their goods for the cash that would turn them into consumers. One can only guess at the number of decisions that went into these practices, how they fed into a slave's habitus, or how they impacted on gender roles then and now in the Caribbean. Individual purposes also realized themselves through patterns of consumption, from the elaborate dresses of mulatto women, to the unique foulard (headscarf) meant to distinguish one slave woman from another. The number of ordinances regulating the clothing of nonwhites, both free and enslaved, throughout the Caribbean in the days of slavery is simply amazing. Their degree of details-e.g., "with no silk, gilding, ornamentation or lace unless these latter be of very low value" (Fouchard 1981 [1972] :43) is equally stunning. Yet stunning also was the tenacity of slaves who circumvented these regulations and used clothing as an individual signature. Moreau de St-Mery, the most acute observer of Saint-Domingue's daily life, writes: It is hard to believe the height to which a slave woman's expenses might rise .. . In a number of work gangs the same slave who wielded tools or swung the hoe duringthe whole week dresses up to attend church on Sunday or to go to market; only with difficulty would they be recognized under their fancy garb. The metamorphosis is even more dramatic in the slave woman who has donned a muslin skirt and Paliacate or Madras kerchief. .. (in Fouchard 1981 [1972]:47). Moreau's remarks echo numerous observations by visitors and residents of the Americas throughout slavery's long career. If modernity is also the production of individual selves through patterns of production and consumption, Caribbean slaves were modern, having internalized ideals of individual betterment through work, ownership, and personal identification with particular commodities. It was a strained and harsh modernity, to be sure. Otherwise modern they were; yet still undoubtedly modern by that definition.

#### The African slave was never purely the object of modernity – but also an agent in the construction of modern concepts of universal humanity.

Miller 10 Paul MILLER French & Italian @ Vanderbilt ’10 Elusive Origins: The Enlightenment in the Modern Caribbean Imagination p.75-76

Toussaint for James undoubtedly represented, as we have shown, the embodiment of the best ideals of the Enlightenment. David Scott’s *Conscripts of Modernity* bears the subtitle *The Tragedy of Colonial Enlightenment*, but his study favors the category of modernity over that of the Enlightenment and seems to conflate the two: “My point, in short, is simply this, that however many slaves preserved individual memories of nonmodern practices from their African homelands…the fact is that they were now obliged to conduct these remembered lives in conditions brought into being by the categories and institutions of the modern world.” It is not clear to me what is at stake in this emphasis on a widespread notion of institutional modernity, with its anti- or non-modern tribal antithesis, and the depiction of African slaves, whether docile or rebellious, as passive “conscripts.” This seems to me precisely the kind of **binary trap** prescribed by the logic of Enlightenment**.** A counterexample or alternative to this approach might be found in Nick Nesbitt’s discussion of the Chartre du Mandé, a 1222 oral declaration of the Mandé nation in what is today the Republic of Mali. The charter according to Nesbitt, “founded a society based upon the universal and unqualified rights of all human beings to be free from enslavement.” The 1222 charter, contemporaneous with the Magna Carta (1215) and centuries before the *Declarations of the Rights of Man* (1789) or the eighteenth-century constitutions, proclaims, “Every human life is a life.” Nesbitt hypothesizes that this proclamation of universal equality could have survived the Middle Passage and was known to Toussaint through the common Kreyol proverb (and title of Jean-Betrand Aristide’s autobriography) “Tout moun se moun.” Though this account relies on speculation to a certain degree, since it is based on an oral document that did not leave written traces, it is certainly plausible enough to allow us at least to imagine a scenario in which African slaves were not mere **passive enlistees in the game of modernit**y, but rather impacted and helped shape the unfolding of modern culture through a process that Fernando Ortiz calls transculturation, but rather the “consequent creation of new cultural phenomena.”

#### Their performance becomes commodified by capital. The affirmative invokes Celia Cruz as an idol of counter-hegemonic resistance --- her performance actually evokes a pro-capitalist ideology that appeals to White Cubans at the expense of her working-class black roots – their evidence.

Frances R. Aparicio, 99. “THE BLACKNESS OF SUGAR: CELIA CRUZ AND THE PERFORMANCE OF (TRANS)NATIONALISM,” Cultural Studies 13.2, p 223-236.

Celia Cruz has been very vocal about her exile politics both in interviews and in her own musical repertoire and performances on stage. In interviews she has acknowledged her painful departure from the island and the personal repercussions that the exile status has imposed on her (Fernández, 1996; Nacif, 1997; Rath, 1995). In her recordings, she has consistently included songs that either evoke a pre-socialist Cuba or imagine a post-socialist Cuba, a lyrical and desired reclaiming that has **musically vocalized the hegemonic political agenda of the Cuban exile community in Miami**. 2 Her stance has been overtly expressed in public performances and has informed, for example, the controversy over the visit of Silvio Rodríguez to Puerto Rico. As the opening act for the Concierto de las Américas in 1994, Celia Cruz sang José Martí’s verses and publicly exhorted all presidents to bring Fidel Castro down. This appropriation of José Martí’s discourse in the context of liberating Cuba from its socialist state is not unique to Celia Cruz, but a discursive strategy common to many Cuban singers in exile, such as Gloria Estefan and Willie Chirino (Guevara, 1997). With regard to class and race, it is interesting, although not necessarily contradictory, that despite Celia’s urban, working-class black origins, **she was to become a central spokesperson for the politics of the early, white bourgeois, landholding Cuban exile community**. The fact that in Cuba she sang to white audiences helps to explain this stance, since the revolution initially dismantled the economic infrastructure of the music clubs in which La Sonora Matancera performed (Fernández, 1996). Her exile politics were clearly illustrated during her concert in Ann Arbor, Michigan, in November 1997. Celia responded to the presence of the Cuban community signalled by a large, Cuban flag in the audience. Following the dialogic modes of Afro-Caribbean music and exemplifying the power of her vocality, that is, the ‘vital interrelationship between vocalization and audition’ (Dunn and Jones, 1994: 2), Celia sang predominantly Cuban music: guajiras, sones, guarachas, mambos, many of them expressing a nostalgic and national sentiment towards Cuba. She picked up a little Cuban flag, which she held in her hand throughout the long performance, and enveloped herself in the large Cuban flag that the Cuban listeners offered her. Interspersed among songs and commentary, Celia would utter in Spanish comments against socialist Cuba and coded allusions about Fidel Castro. Speaking in Spanish during the whole concert in a region where Spanish is far from being a public language, these comments served as coded messages that privileged a particular Cuban exile ideology. Yet they were also received by a Hispanophone or bilingual public who may not have been politically in agreement with her, but who nevertheless enjoyed the politically imbued rhythms and the sonorous arrangements. Indeed, this particular concert established an unprecedented carnival-like environment,a dialogue between the singer and the audience, that fostered free and communal dancing in the aisles, listeners standing up and clapping, and some angry audience members who expected to see the show from their seats undisturbed by a participatory auditorium. Celia Cruz’s unique musical style and collective performativity truly tropicalized Hill Auditorium in Ann Arbor, yet this transculturative event was mediated by the discourse of the Cuban exile. Perhaps the Queen of Latin Music felt safe and comfortable expressing her nostalgia for a pre-revolutionary Cuba to a highly responsive, warm and heterogeneous audience in a small, midwest college town far from the Latino politics of either coast. Yet ironically, her political and politicized performance, like her traditional rumbera dresses and the new digitalized recordings of her performances with La Sonora Matancera, serve as visual and sonorous re-creations of that Cuba of the past. The image of ‘azúcar negra’ comes to mind, as Celia’s black body, Afro-Cuban rhythms and voice together indexed the cultural survival of slaves in Cuba **while she simultaneously vocalized the discourse of a pro-capitalist, white Cuban bourgeoisie while embodying colonial desire with her blonde wig**.

#### Failure to perform isn’t a solvency deficit --- even their appeal for the inclusion of performance must be made through rational argument.

Douglas Torgerson, 99. Politics @ Trent. The Promise of Green Politics p. 163-164.

Besides an ecological ethos, there would need to be a discursive ethos, sealed perhaps by what Hannah Arendt indicates as the power of "mutual promise."l! This need raises questions, though, of rationality and genre. With its epistemological challenges to industrialism, green discourse certainly throws technocratic rationalism into question. Is this questioning simply for the sake of a more comprehensive rationality, though, or does it portend a thorough break with rationality, a displacement of the genre of rational argumentation by some qualitatively different genre? In its diversity, green discourse includes both the form of rational argumentation and forms of communication that appear to be sharply at variance with all rationality. These other genres, however, are not necessarily irrelevant to argument. A big question is whether these other genres actually threaten rationality or somehow enrich it. Norbert Kostede is especially alert to the threat of green anti-intellectualism: "Even where the limits of human knowledge are themselves concerned ... we still have to remain on the territory of rational discourse, and must resist the temptation to enter the realm of meditation or spiritual insight. In their private individual or collective lives, people are of course free to do as they wish; if approaches which are valid here were to be applied in the public sphere of politics and were to become the basis of political strategies, this would be a recipe for disaster."12 For Kostede, the territory of rational discourse offers a safe haven from anti-intellectual intrusions into the public sphere. Argument is thus privileged as a public genre, displacing all others. From this rather Habermasian perspective, personal adventures in meditation and spiritual insight can have no public standing. Strictly speaking, however, even in terms of rational argumentation as conceived by Habermas, neither meditation nor spiritual insight could be ruled out as an experiential basis for arguable propositions. The question would be whether good reasons could be explicitly and coherently stated in the course of debate. Similarly, whether such things as meditation and spiritual insight have any appropriate relationship to the green public sphere would be an issue for public debate-a debate that would require explorations and understandings going beyond mere rationalistic prejudice. The genre of serious, rational argument cannot stand as an a priori roadblock to unsettling possibilities, but can serve simply as a crucible. Even in this limited capacity, however, the genre of rational argumentation would enclose the green public sphere with a singular homogeneity. The rational argument would have the final word, beyond which there would be no appeal. Objecting to Habermasian homogeneity in public life, Iris Marion Young suggests the possibility of "heterogeneous publics of passion, play and aesthetic interest" promoting issues for public discussion. In this context, even "the practice of such discussion" serves to affirm "the proper place of passion and play in public." Young thus suggests the possibility of a form of open discourse not restricted to the genre of argumentation, but admitting other gestures, for example, "guerilla theatre and costumes," "chants, music, song, dancing." Such forms of communication also serve, she says, "to make political points."l3 If followed in the shaping of a green public sphere, Young's suggestions would encourage a diversity of expression. She insists that playfulness, passion, and a multiplicity of genres have a "proper place" in public life. Notably, though, **she does not make this claim by chanting, singing, or dancing**, but by **rationally arguing**: giving and defending reasons in an explicit and coherent manner. She thus assumes, at least implicitly, that rational argumentation does have some justified privilege in this connection, though it may not be the privilege of an ultimate trump card. In effect, she affirms an intellectual seriousness that does not rule out playfulness.

**Masking takes out their solvency --- the end of African colonialism proves the end of colonial rule doesn't end oppression --- their focus on race in fact splits the working class and undermines the weight of our historical analysis of class.**

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In contrast to both Critical Race Theorists and revisionist socialists/left liberals/equivalence theorists, and those who see caste as the primary form of oppression, Marxists would agree that objectively- whatever our “race” or gender or sexuality or current level of academic attainment or religious identity, whatever the individual and group history and fear of oppression and attack- the fundamental objective and material form of oppression in capitalism is class oppression. Black and Women capitalists, or Jewish and Arab capitalists, or Dalit capitalists in India, exploit the labour power of their multi-ethnic men and women workers, essentially (in terms of the exploitation of labour power and the appropriation of surplus value) in just the same way as do white male capitalists, or upper-caste capitalists. But the subjective consciousness of identity, this subjective affirmation of one particular identity, while seared into the souls of its victims, should not mask the objective nature of contemporary oppression under capitalism – class oppression that, of course, hits some “raced” and gendered and caste and occupational sections of the working class harder than others. Martha Gimenez (2001:24) succinctly explains that “class is not simply another ideology legitimating oppression.” Rather, class denotes “exploitative relations between people mediated by their relations to the means of production.” Apple’s “parallellist,” or equivalence model of exploitation (equivalence of exploitation based on “race,” class and gender, his “tryptarchic” model of inequality) produces valuable data and insights into aspects of and the extent and manifestations of gender oppression and “race” oppression in capitalist USA. However, such analyses serve to occlude the class-capital relation, the class struggle, to obscure an essential and defining nature of capitalism, class conflict. Objectively, whatever our “race” or gender or caste or sexual orientation or scholastic attainment, whatever the individual and group history and fear of oppression and attack, the fundamental form of oppression in capitalism is class oppression. While the capitalist class is predominantly white and male, capital in theory and in practice can be blind to colour and gender and caste – even if that does not happen very often. African Marxist-Leninists such as Ngugi wa Thiong’o (e.g., Ngugi wa Thiong’o and Ngugi wa Mirii, 1985) know very well that when the white colonialist oppressors were ejected from direct rule over African states in the 1950s and 60s, the white bourgeoisie in some African states such as Kenya was replaced by a black bourgeoisie, acting in concert with transnational capital and/or capital(ists) of the former colonial power. Similarly in India, capitalism is no longer exclusively white. It is Indian, not white British alone. As Bellamy observes, the diminution of class analysis “denies immanent critique of any critical bite,” effectively disarming a meaningful opposition to the capitalist thesis (Bellamy, 1997:25). And as Harvey notes, neoliberal rhetoric, with its foundational emphasis upon individual freedoms, has the power to split off libertarianism, identity politics, multiculturalism, and eventually narcissistic consumerism from the social forces ranged in pursuit of justice through the conquest of state power. (Harvey, 2005:41) To return to the broader relationship between “race,” gender, and social class, and to turn to the USA, are there many who would deny that Condoleeza Rice and Colin Powell have more in common with the Bushes and the rest of the Unites States capitalist class, be it white, black or Latina/o, than they do with the workers whose individual ownership of wealth and power is an infinetismal fraction of those individual members of the ruling and capitalist class? The various oppressions, of caste, gender, “race,” religion, for example, are functional in dividing the working class and securing the reproduction of capital; constructing social conflict between men and women, or black and white, or different castes, or tribes, or religious groups, or skilled and unskilled, thereby tending to dissolve the conflict between capital and labor, thus occluding the class-capital relation, the class struggle, and to obscure the essential and defining nature of capitalism, the labor-capital relation and its attendant class conflict.

**The permutation must fail. The question of starting point determines the efficacy of critique. Our criticism derives from the objective reality of capitalist exploitation. Their inability to stand outside of interpretation functions as a mystification that deprives Marxist criticism of any transformative potential.**

**Ebert 96** Teresa, November 1996. Associate Prof. Critical Theory – SUNY Albany, College English, “For a Red Pedagogy: Feminism, Desire, and Need”, 58.7, JSTOR.

A Red Feminist pedagogy is a pedagogy of materialist critique developed out of the classical Marxist tradition of historical materialism. The project of critique itself has come under increasing attack by ludic feminists who argue that in the postmodern moment we no longer can separate the critic from what she critiques. For ludic the- orists, critical distance-which marked the modernist tradition and became the hallmark of the critical practices of Horkheimer, Adorno, and other neo-Marxists of the Frankfurt School-is no longer obtainable in a fully commodified postmod- ern culture. The grounds of critique are seen as being put in question historically as well as epistemologically. Derrida and others have argued that there is no "out- side" (separate from the economy of signification of the inside) from which to cri- tique (see e.g. Derrida 30-73). Instead of critique-which explains the world in order to change it-all we have is what Rorty calls "redescription" (Rorty 45). Cri- tique, in other words, is seen as a project of modernity that is no longer viable in the post-al moment: it is an act of totalization. Challenging this post-al position, Mas'ud Zavarzadeh has argued that there is indeed an "outside" from which a materialist critique can be articulated ("Stupid- ity" 98-99). There is, according to Zavarzadeh, an "unsurpassable objectivity which is not open to rhetorical interpretation and constitutes the decided foundation of cri- tique" and that "is the 'outside' that Marx calls the 'Working Day' " (98). Marx's argument in Capital 1 (340-416) as read by Zavarzadeh is that there is a contradic- tion between the appearance and the reality of the working day. The worker appears to receive a fair wage for her day's labor, but this is a mystification. What the owner is really buying is not the worker's labor but her labor power-that is, the owner is buying the worker's capacity to produce more value than the worker is paid for. The working day, as Zavarzadeh points out, is the scene of the fundamental contradiction in capitalism: "it is a divided day, divided into 'necessary labor'-the part in which the worker produces value equivalent to his wages-and the 'other,' the part of 'surplus labor'-a part in which the worker works for free and produces 'surplus value' " (98). This surplus labor is the source of profit and accumulation of capital for the owner. Thus, " 'surplus labor' is the OBJECTTIE FACT of capital- ist relations of production: without 'surplus labor' there will be no profit, without profit there will be no accumulation of capital, and without accumulation of capi- tal there will be no capitalism" (98). In other words, capitalism is a global economic and sociocultural system based on the priority of profit, and profit is the appropri- ation-the "theft" as Marx says-of workers' surplus labor. But the goal of bour- geois knowledge, especially economics, is to conceal this "theft," to mystify the "objective reality" of the working day and the fact of "surplus labor." This contradiction of surplus labor is in no way a supplementary relation; it is instead, as Zavarzadeh emphasizes, the "objective, unsurpassable 'outside' that can- not be made part of the economies of the 'inside' without capitalism itself being transformed into socialism" ("Stupidity" 98). However, the function of ludic theory, including ludic feminism, is to occlude the objective facts of exploitation (the foun- dation of critique), rendering them a matter of undecidable interpretation by trying to subsume them, through a supplementary reading, to the "inside" of signification and the flows of libidinal economy. Rejecting this ludic strategy as another form of bourgeois mystification, Red Feminist critique is a "revolutionary critique": it is grounded, as Zavarzadeh argues, **"in this truth-objectivity" of surplus labor "since all social institutions and practices of capitalism are founded upon the objectivity of surplus labor"** (99). Revolutionary critique is both a mode of knowing and a politi- cal praxis. This means that "the role of a revolutionary pedagogy of critique," as Zavarzadeh clearly states, "is to produce class consciousness" (99). **Materialist critique, then, is fundamental to a transformative feminist politics and to Red Feminist pedagogy. Critique is the cornerstone of feminist political practice and struggles against exploitative orders of differences produced in global patriarchal-capitalism**. For through critique the subject develops historical knowl- edges of the social totality: she acquires, in other words, an understanding of how the existing social institutions ("motherhood," "child care," "love," "paternity," "taxation," "family" ... ) are part of the social relations of production; how they are located in exploitative relations of difference, and how they can be changed. Cri- tique, in other words, is that knowledge-practice that historically situates the con- ditions of possibility of what empirically exists under patriarchal-capitalist relations of difference-particularly the division of labor-and, more importantly, points to what is suppressed by the empirically existing: what could be, instead of what actu- ally is. Critique indicates, in other words, that what "is" is not necessarily real or true but only the existing actuality constructed to justify the interests and power of one class against another. Since it is constructed, it is thus transformable. The role of critique in Red Feminist critique-al pedagogy is exactly this: the production of historical knowledges of the social totality (class consciousness), knowledges that mark the transformability of existing social arrangements and the possibility of a different social organization-an organization free from exploitation. Quite simply then, critique is a mode of social knowing that inquires into what is not said, into the silences and the suppressed or missing, in order to uncover the concealed operations of economic and political power underlying the myriad details and seemingly disparate events and representations of our lives. It shows how apparently disconnected zones of culture are in fact linked through the highly dif- ferentiated and dispersed operation of a systematic logic of exploitation of the divi- sion of labor informing all practices of culture and society. It reveals how seemingly unique experiences are in fact the "common" effect of social relations of produc- tion in wage-labor capitalism. In sum, critique disrupts that which represents itself as what is, as natural, as inevitable, as the way things are; it exposes the way "what is" is historically and socially produced out of social contradictions and supports inequality. Critique enables us to explain how social differences-specifically gender, race, sexuality, and class-have been systematically produced and continue to operate within regimes of exploitation-specifically the international division of labor in global capitalism-so we can change them. It is, in short, the means for producing politically effective and transformative knowledges. Fundamental to Red Feminist critique and the production of transformative knowledges is that particular mode of critique which is known as ideology critique, for ideology is the means by which social differences are naturalized and contained. It is through ideology that particular practices and subjectivities are historically sit- uated in specific social differences developing out of and supporting the divisions of labor-differences not only of class, but also of race, gender, sexuality-and these relations are represented as inevitable and "true." It is thus through the critique of ideology and its operation that the materiality of these naturalized relations-the way they are produced by the relations of production-can be effectively exposed and contested. If feminism-as an ensemble of contesting ways of knowing and political prac- tices-is to continue to develop, it must be self-critical. It needs to understand that the critique of its own historical situation and limits is vital to its ongoing struggle against patriarchal capitalism-especially at a time when patriarchal capitalism is increasing its exploitation of women, intensifying its appropriation of feminism, and developing its backlash against both. Feminists have to ask themselves a diffi- cult set of questions: in what way have the frames of our knowledges and pedagog- ical practices contributed to the hegemony of patriarchal capitalism, or, at the very least, hindered us from seeing the relation between (white) middle-class privilege and pleasure and the exploitation of poor women and most women of color at "home" and globally? What is the relation between the historical condition of dif- ferent groups of women and feminist theory and practices? Critique examines those relations and demonstrates the linkages among seemingly disparate events. Femi- nism needs to ask difficult questions about how its ideas are disseminated and used: such critiques are fundamental to any political theory and to any feminist pedagogy. Why then do so many feminists regard critique as trashing? Perhaps we can find some insight into the problem by returning to the Gallop, Hirsch, and Miller con- versation, "Criticizing Feminist Criticism."

**Slavery was not a graft that was purified from capitalism --- Cuban plantation slavery was inherently a form of capitalist accumulation.**

Paula **Beiguelma**, Summer **1978**. “The Destruction of Modern Slavery: A Theoretical Issue,” Review (Fernand Braudel Center), Vol. 2, No. 1, JSTOR.

In Cuba, the development of internal opposition to the slave trade began in the mid-1840's because of the growing overproduction of sugar for the international market. The older planters, already saturated with slaves, came to see its termination as both a curb on overproduction and a means to increase the value of slaves. While the battle over the slave trade intensified during the period 1850-1860, the traditional correlation between the increase in sugar production and the number of sugar plantations was broken. The cultivation of sugar was separated from its transformation; the sugar-mills (engenhos) diminished in number but increased in productive capacity.  That process evolved in the context of absolutist metropolitan domination. Thus, despite the Spanish political reforms of the 1830's, Cuba and Puerto Rico continued to have no parliamentary representation and to be subject to the exclusive control of metropolitan administration. From the end of the first half of the century, attempts were made to obtain either independence or annexation of the island to the United States. Despite the prospect of the elimination of colonial taxes, the separatist movement elicited limited local support, allowing one to assume that it was tied to the dissatisfaction of the older sectors with the continuation of the slave trade. Against this, the métropole was favored by the indifference of most of the remaining population. Absolutism in the colony, with control exercised by representatives of the Crown who connived with the slave trade, was seen as the mode of government most likely to prevent the restrictive intervention of those sectors already saturated with slaves. Under those circumstances, the termination of the Cuban slave trade became effective only in the mid-1860's, when an ample supply of slave labor in the interior of the island had become available. It was during the course of the 1860's, when the process of concentration accelerated, that the problem of the relations between the métropole and the colonies was decisively placed on the agenda. In 1865, a Colonial Reform Commission was established in Madrid to consider the constitutional reform for Puerto Rico and Cuba. At the same time, a campaign in favor of the liberation of Puerto Rican slaves started. In the context of the change in status quo of the colonies, a liberal revolution broke out in Spain in 1868, which in turn introduced new elements into the situation. Thus, in the critical situation created in the métropole, an insurgent separatist movement was unleashed in Cuba, which appealed to a complex of liberal ideas, including an attack on slavery. The program of the insurgents led to the promulgation of an emancipation law for Cuba in 1870, ordering the freedom of unborn children and sexogenerians. In 1873, a subsequent law abolished the small slave contingent in Puerto Rico. During the Cuban civil war, which lasted for ten years, the destruction of a large number of small sugar-mills (engenhos) was accelerated, thus hastening the separation between cultivation and transformation with the construction of large central sugar-mills (engenhos), given the task of milling cane supplied by the farmers. At the same time, abolitionist propaganda grew, and, when the war was over, abolition was decreed in 1880, with the freed men, however, still bound to the land. In 1886, a new revolution achieved the freedom of labor which, accom- panied by the ruin of the large slave owners, constituted in its turn an acceler- ating element in the process of concentration. Considering the abolition within a sugar economy as a moment in the process of concentration, the law of 1870 can be viewed as a preliminary step, both necessary and viable. In effect, by encouraging the statistical decrease in existing slavery (through deaths and freedom for the oldest slaves without a correspond- ing compensation through births) it prevented the growth of new interests in favor of the institution. Furthermore, since it did not affect the slave labor force immediately, there was no significant opposition to it. On the other the hand, considering the importance of the interests linked to Cuban slavery, it was possible to assume that only in a revolutionary conjuncture, like that from tensions with the metropole, would it have been possible to bring about either preliminary servile reform or abolition itself. As part of these developments in the Cuban slavery situation, there was a shift of the island into the orbit of the United States. Before the U.S. Civil War, North American interest in Cuba had usually been defined by the Southern bloc as the annexation of one more slave state. With that period over, the United States came instead to focus on the question in terms of the reduction of the price of Cuban sugar, once it was free from paying taxes to the métropole, thus bringing into view the prospect of investments in the sugar industry in the process of concentration. That point of view was to translate itself politically as a stimulus for the independence of the island, sufficient to integrate it into the North American economic system. Annexation had been abandoned, since it would have meant the admission of a new agricultural state into the Union. However, the incorporation of Cuba necessitated, first of all, abolition, and the complementary readjustment of the sugar economy. Considering that abolition was promulgated in the context of colonial insurrection, the late independ- ence of the island (1898) assumed the character of an historical recourse which was facilitated by the destruction of slavery, and consequently the passage of Cuba into the North American orbit.1

II. Theoretical Discussion

The problematic of the destruction of Negro slavery in America during course of the nineteenth century is usually discussed in terms of a progressive purification of capitalism. Since capitalism is a system based on free labor, slavery is sometimes considered to be a graft that commercial capitalism could originally tolerate, but which had to be eliminated at a more advanced stage. Once this had occurred, furthermore, it would result in the expansion of the system, integrating still more areas into the capitalist world. In order to discuss such a proposal, it becomes necessary, first of all, to place modern slavery in relation to the classical sequence of "Ancient slavery-feudalism-capitalism,” systems respectively characterized based on the existence of: 1) the worker as commodity; 2) the worker bound by compulsory economic payments to a lord; and 3) the worker who is owner of his own labor-power. It is with reference to capitalism that modern slavery must be defined. In fact, **while theoretically it is based on the existence of free labor, capitalism also historically or empirically has involved the establishment of a particular constellation that included Negro slavery in the colonial world, as a mode of capital accumulation**. **Modern slavery, therefore, is essentially capitalist**. Under such conditions, although it is formally analogous to slavery in the Ancient world (since it assumes the existence of the worker as commodity), functionally it may be distinguished from it by the fact that slave labor in the Ancient world was the fulcrum of the total system, while modern slavery is integrated into a complex which is defined by the presence of wage-labor. What we have established then, is that while theoretically the capitalist system might be defined with regard to free labor, empirically or historically colonial slavery must be considered a constituent part of it. From this it follows that a process of progressive purification is not what happens, since slavery does not represent a non capitalist component (as do, for example, feudal relations, which were eliminated with the advance of capitalism) but, on the contrary, constitute a capitalist creation. Nor is it possible to speak, in this case, of the extension of the system to the periphery of the capitalist world, since slavery turns out to be the form in which capitalism is realized in the colonial economy.

**The affirmative focus on identity and culture debilitates any possible struggle against capitalism. Only a focus on the universal confrontation with capital can serve as the basis for an effective politics of liberation.**

Jeremy **Smith**, **2004**. Member of Democratic Socialist Perspective in Austrian Socialist Alliance and Lecturer in social Sciences – U. Ballarat. “The rise and malaise of postmodernism”, http://links.org.au/node/32.

What does the postmodernist style of philosophy offer emancipatory or liberationist politics? The consequences are disarming. Before turning to them, however, I want to make some points about the relationship of historical materialism to Western philosophy. Certainly, Marxism represents a radicalisation of the Enlightenment. But Marx himself also had a complicated relationship to Romanticism that is sometimes not fully appreciated. He could not halt at naive endorsement of the optimistic vision of the eighteenth century philosophes. Truth, reason and progress were problematic after all. As Marx demonstrated in the Communist Manifesto, they could be put to monstrous uses just as well as they could be mobilised in the service of revolutionary capitalist expansion. This suggests a two-sided relationship to modern philosophy, or a two-sided theory of modernity. Marx's own relationship to the prevailing creed of progress that the Enlightenment radiated was not straightforward. He spanned Romanticism and the Enlightenment in his critique of modernity, weaving together appreciation of capitalism's progressive role with abhorrence at some of its results. The result is not a "reconciliation" of Romanticism and the Enlightenment or a happy medium struck between the two poles.21 Instead, each is surpassed by a philosophy that reflects on dynamics that seem simultaneously progressive and retrograde. This is a complex dialectic—despite postmodernist claims to the contrary—that stresses the contradictory development of modern capitalist societies. It explains the relationship of material and social conditions and culture in terms of the internal contradictions of the social formation. The rise of Enlightenment thought, Romanticism and indeed Marxism itself is systematically explained, by situating the development of each in the context of the expansion of capitalist social relations. This is implicit in Marx's philosophical insight into modern knowledge. He was able to see that historical materialism, along with the philosophical currents that had informed its formation, was embedded in the social relations that it was trying simultaneously to explain and overcome. To be successful, Marxism could not stand "outside history" as science alone, nor could it remain solely at the level of existing working-class consciousness as a historically bound ideology. It therefore had both to understand itself and to constitute itself as a practical philosophy of change. Historical materialism, in Marx's eyes, was therefore a special kind of theory: a theory of history, of revolution and of proletarian praxis all at once. Thus, Marx could not settle for a Romantic critique of capitalist advancement, nor could he act as benign witness to capitalism's expansion. The philosophy and politics that he inaugurated sought a path beyond both. Marxism's relationship to the Enlightenment is therefore not as simple as it seems. Its approach is anchored in a dialectical stress on the conflict of opposites. This of course incorporates the opposites that are internal to modern philosophical reflection itself. Reason and nature, object and subject, identity and nonidentity, unity and difference can be understood as dialectically interrelated and not just the formal "binary opposites" that postmodernists disavow. Underpinning this is a Marxian dialectic of Enlightenment values and Romantic critique, as argued above. There is a depth here of which postmodernism is incapable. French post-structuralism rejected one side of modern philosophy when it spurned the critical disposition of the Enlightenment as the tyranny of the Western tradition. **In rejecting this, it ruled out a dialectical engagement with the problems posed by social theory**. Its framework is not given to considering both sides of any contradiction, as opposites are always seen as detached and not interrelated in contradiction. Consequently, analyses of the complexity of late capitalism that draw on postmodernist assumptions risk oversimplification and one-sidedness. What kind of politics can this philosophical framework generate for its adherents? The withdrawal of its major proponents from political commitment is well known, but this in itself is hardly a cutting criticism. Many postmodernists bid for the mantle of radical politics on the grounds that all universalist ideologies that have emerged from Europe are inescapably bound up in the dominant discourses of capitalism and imperialism. This includes Marxism, social democracy, many forms of feminism and even antiracisms. Instead, political action must mean resistance. Resistance is most effective at the margins, whether through the use of irony or deconstruction in art, literature, film or media or in localised struggles of some social movements that confront marginalisation. Terry Eagleton characterises this as "cultural politics" in which culture is reduced to politics. In turn, he calls for a politics of culture.22 While this is a forceful argument, it is also the case that politics, as it is recast in cultural politics, also falls prey to reductionism. The post-structuralist **focus on culture reduces politics to aesthetics and presumes that this is the major battleground**. The fully fledged version of this argument is Baudrillard's, which aestheticises a social world in which meaning is simulated so often that reality is no longer relevant. **In this vision of culture, any capacity for more generalised critique is annulled, and the obvious conclusion must be that critique and praxis are futile**. If there is any power in this prescription at all, then the very least that can be said in response is that this unacceptably narrows the range of critical politics. Identity politics flows logically from this broader censure of universalism. It is derived from the postmodern condition of fragmentation and decentring, according to postmodernists. At the level of description, this basic argument does have some force. Capitalism drives towards totalisation (as some postmodernists might put it) in its pursuit of unlimited capital growth, markets and resources. It unifies different societies and spheres of human endeavour by subsuming them under capital's rule. Yet, it is quite clear that the major fluctuations of late capitalism—unemployment, the roller-coaster ride of global markets—are experienced by their victims as fragmenting and decentring. The destabilising effects of capitalism result from its central contradictions, and yet these contradictions impact on everyday lives in ways that seem incoherent. This appearance is most visible in the OECD countries where, not by coincidence, postmodernism has flourished. It is in the most developed zones of world capitalism that the penetration of all spheres of human life by capitalist social relations is at its greatest. However, fragmentation is not due to the dominance of the text, discourse or the Hyper-reality of postmodern life. There are other causes. While there is some validity in the description of contemporary life as seemingly volatile and disconnected, this condition should not be taken for granted. The underlying and complex reasons for it, and not just its surface effects, must be pursued. However, identity politics is much more than just the experience of late capitalism's instability. It is also a personal assertion of identity based on a condition of marginality. The assertion of identity is no longer part of political activity; it can constitute the entire arena of activity. Politics becomes a matter of "style" and a contest of competing and proliferating identities. **This risks political impotence, if the sole emphasis is on difference at the expense of any principle of equality**. Under those circumstances, **identity politics becomes hostile to any idea of a universal basis for social justice and a revolutionary transformation of society**. But not all identities are treated equally. The more traditional identity of class is disavowed. It has always been interpreted as a foundation for solidarity, rather than fragmentation. The "new" identities have emerged in such a way that they displace this traditional category, according to the postmodernists.23 The Marxist notion of class rests ultimately on a theory of exploitation that assumes that the social formation has an underlying logic or coherence. In contrast, identity politics assumes multiple bases of power that generate multiple forms of oppression. These are seen as the sites in which power is contested, but rarely in forms of alliance or with reference to a broader political vision. As the category of class is discarded, so also are forms of political organisation and the connections between struggles that it implies. Indeed, even many of the grassroots campaigns of social movements that combated marginality in the 1970s and 1980s become suspect for the broad fronts that they entered. The institutional basis of marginalisation (racism, sexism, heterosexism) is neglected in this style of politics. Postmodern concerns with body, identity and difference displace the focus of theory, analysis and action from the institutional sites of power, such as the family, the state, work and school. All that remains, as a political orientation, is the mobilisation of identity in an ironic stance towards the institutions of power. The use of irony and a certain attitude to life is pitched as a gesture in itself towards power, one that avoids forming a counter-power. If this view has any value at all, some political judgment as to why one ironic posture is more potent or effective than any other would have to be exercised. But, it is not clear how postmodernists might do this, when the possible foundations of judgment debated by philosophers are themselves held in contempt. **The political corollary of postulating all identities as unstable and fragmented is dissipation of opposition to capitalism as a whole**: In a fragmented world composed of "decentred subjects", where totalizing knowledges are impossible and undesirable …[w]hat better escape, in theory, from a confrontation with capitalism, the most totalizing system the world has ever known, than a rejection of totalizing knowledge? **What greater obstacle, in practice, to anything more than the most local and particularistic resistances to the global, totalizing power of capitalism than the decentred and fragmented subject**? What better excuse for submitting to the force majeure of capitalism than the conviction that its power, while pervasive, has no systemic origin, no unified logic, no identifiable social roots?24 In this passage, Ellen Meiksins-Wood draws attention to the political implications of postmodernism. If her description of postmodernism holds, then it is possible to go one step further: postmodernism can be characterised as an anti-politics. It is not anti-politics because it does not offer strategy, for it does after a fashion. **It is antipolitical because it does not tell us much about what to confront capitalism with. What social, ethical and economic substance can we adopt to develop a vision of another possible world**? Is such a vision possible without a basis for universalism? The most forceful versions of postmodernism can only shrug their collective shoulders ironically, so to speak, when confronted with these questions. We can't really even know the system, much less try to critically articulate credible alternatives to it. To try to change it involves an orientation to state power, and that is fraught with danger. For this reason, the intractable versions of postmodernism avoid politics and offer only an anti-politics dressed up as a localist strategy and not a revolutionary orientation at all. How postmodernists have, in hindsight, treated the movements of 1968 and the possibility of revolution can itself be seen as a test of this anti-politics: What the ideologues supply after the fact is a legitimation of the limits (of the ultimate limitations; in the last analysis of the historic weaknesses) of the May movement: you did not try to seize power and you were right, you did not even try to establish a counter-power. and you were once again right, because to say counter-power. is to say power and so on. At the same time, **what the ideologues furnish us with is a retrospective legitimation of withdrawal, renunciation, non-commitment or of a punctilious and measured commitment**: in any case, we are told that history, the subject, autonomy are only western myths.25 A "politics" of identity without substance and with strategy that addresses only the local and particular corresponds with this withdrawal after 1968. Postmodernism now The attraction reached a peak with collapse of the Soviet Union and the triumphal proclamations of right-wing ideologues. The "end of history" was celebrated by neo-liberals; it was also a good time for postmodernism. If history is over and there is no more ideological struggle, we are left with liberal capitalism as the ultimate form of human society. Ideas can circulate freely as commodities. There is nothing more at stake than the interplay of perspectives. In this context, it was odd, though significant, that Jacques Derrida revised his political views in 1993.26 In an attack on Francis Fukuyama's proclamation of the end of history, Derrida "deconstructed" the new mood as "manic triumphalism". Instead, he said that this was the darkest of times. Global capitalism has created more misery than ever. What is needed is a return to the "Marxian spirit of opposition" in the name of a promised justice and democracy (as opposed to their actually existing forms). On the face of it, this represented a new engagement with Marxism and even a call for practical political involvement. Indeed, this is a sort of turn to politics. However, the Marxian spirit that Derrida is trying to revive is a "ghostly" or spectral one. Realist approaches to knowledge abandoned by postmodernists, and which are vital to socialist politics, are still unwanted. He remains true to his stance on the metaphysics of presence. However, this intervention marks postmodernist doubt about its own role in debates about culture and politics. It anticipated developments at the turn of the millennium that have rendered postmodernist analysis and identity politics less relevant. The revolt against corporate capitalism that spread through the rich world after the 1999 Seattle protests created a climate in which earlier postmodernist ideas were not going to appeal. The climate became even less favourable as the momentum against Bush's war mobilised tens of millions around the war in a new global opposition to imperialism. Anti-corporate and antiwar movements are drawing the links and bringing into focus the institutional order of modern imperialism. Their "rhetoric" variously stresses equality, human rights, peace and social justice—values that echo the critical traditions derived from the Enlightenment. Postmodernist relativism can offer little guidance to the way the activists in these movements understand the world and try to act in it. In fact, nothing could be further removed from postmodernism than the widespread Anti-corporate and antiwar sentiment that has emerged. The shared positions of Anti-corporate movements show this in a stark manner. They include debt cancellation, opposition to privatisation, solidarity in the face of the large agribusinesses' grab for control of agriculture via the introduction of genetically modified organisms and a unified moral repugnance at the gross inequalities of the world. Far from being merely an "anti-globalisation" movement, as it is often simplistically characterised, these movements exhibit an extraordinary global consciousness. Their opposition is often directed at the totalising logic of the neo-liberal institutions: the IMF, WTO, World Economic Forum and the World Bank. Even the debates over whether these institutions can be fixed at all (or simply "nixed") or whether "fair trade" is achievable suggest a widespread recognition of the global weight of the international financial institutions of capital. This is, in turn, accompanied by recognition by many that social change needs to be more far-reaching and go beyond mere tinkering at the edges of capitalism. Anti-corporate campaigning has a wider orientation to the totality of capitalism, and this orientation informs the debates amongst progressively minded people. Postmodernism does little to assist this, and indeed socialist views hold greater appeal in this new environment than they did in the early 1990s. The mistrust of the governments of the rich world deepened with the so-called war on terror that drew the us and its allies into wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The mobilisations against war added to the anti-imperialist outlook developed in the movements against corporate power, rather than detracting from it. A salient lesson of this upsurge in antiwar activity lies in one of the main debates played out in the Western media: did Bush and company lie about weapons of mass destruction? The evidence that they did is overwhelming and irrefutable. What is interesting is that truth and falsehood are squarely on the agenda of public consciousness. It seems to all observers that they have been the main concern of ordinary discussion during and after the war. The antiwar movements based their opposition to the war on anti-imperialist sentiment to a fair degree, but there can be little doubt that a great number of people were mobilised simply by the blatant deceit of Blair, Bush and Howard. In 2003, the leaders' declaration that they held the documented truth about WMDs was widely contested, and opinion polls variously indicate that they were contested successfully. In these circumstances, it's a bit hard to see why Foucault's thoughts on truth and power are a better read than Pilger or Chomsky on the duplicity of governments.

**Furthermore, the capitalist process of accumulation through colonization created the basis for the African slave trade and the emergence of the Cuban plantation economy.**

Adelaida **Zorina**, **1975**. “On the Genesis of Capitalism in Nineteenth-Century Cuba,” Latin American Perspectives 2.4, Supplement Issue. Cuba: La Revolucion en Marcha, p. 7-20.

Only in recent times have Cuban scholars begun to study the economic history of Cuba, but neither Cuban nor Soviet historiographers have as yet given an adequate explanation of the emergence and development of capitalist relations in colonial society. No work has analyzed the complex and important problems related to this question. Studies dedicated to the economic and politi- cal history of Cuba have examined only the general features of the genesis of capitalism (Le Riverend, 1965; Guerra y Sdnchez, 1952: Vol. I, chapter 10; Ortiz, 1963; Pino Santos, 1964). The investigation of such an interesting and contem- porary theme is difficult because of the absence of the necessary statistical data and archival material. Several considerations have conditioned the genesis of capitalism in Cuba in a way that makes that process different from the development of capitalism in the other Spanish colonies of America. Among these considerations are the long and complicated process of interaction between internal and external forces in the evolution of socio-economic relations in Cuba; the coexistence of the latifundia and the small-scale natural economy; the market-oriented slave plantation economy and the establishment in the nineteenth century of factory production. This article does not pretend to give an exhaustive explanation of the en- tire problematic, but is dedicated to an examination of the fundamental tend- encies of the socio-economic development of Cuba and the peculiarities of the formation of capitalism. The colonization of Cuba by the Spanish conquistadores was accompanied by the cruel and relentless extermination of the indigenous population. By 1550 as a consequence of inhuman forced labor, hunger, and disease, only some five or six thousand of the 100,000 Indians, calculated to have existed at the beginning of the sixteenth century survived (Pino Santos, 1964:70-77). The Indians were the first victims of the bloody epoch of colonization and the orig- inal accumulation of capital. There followed the unbridled exploitation and gradual but systematic extermination of entire generations of black slaves, whose bones paved the road to the development of capitalist relations in Eu- rope and Cuba. In the stage of primitive accumulation a close relationship existed between development of capitalism in Europe and slavery in the colonies. In character- izing the significance of slavery in the colonies as an economic category, Marx wrote in 1846 to P. V. Annenkov: "Direct slavery is a pivot of our contempor- ary industrialism, the same with machinery, credit, etc.. . . It is slavery which has endowed the colonies with value, it is the colonies that have created world commerce, and world commerce is the necessary condition of large-scale mechanized industry" (Marx and Engels, 1966, Vol. II:452). Respondent to the demands of capitalism that developed in Spain and other countries of Europe, the enslavement of blacks in Cuba - the form of exploitation most generally applied in plantations - contributed to primitive accumulation of capital and the genesis of capitalism not only in Europe but in Cuba as well. **It was precisely European capitalism, interested in the maximum plunder of the over- seas colonies that "gave new life to the institution of slavery,** which had long disappeared in Europe, **and laid the basis for the African slave trade"** (Marx and Engels, 1961, Vol. XX:497).

**their 2AC Eltis ev says that whites were cheaper b/c of transportation costs-- Even Eltis concedes economics were crucial --- the slave trade only emerged when the costs of European indentured servants rose above slaves.**Stephen **Behrendt**, David **Eltis**, **and** David **Richardson**, **2001**. “The costs of coercion: African agency in the pre-modern Atlantic world,” Economic History Review, LIV 3.

Of these four steps, policing or coercion seems particularly important to the first and second, and as long as the slave trade remained open, the cost of acquiring slaves in Africa and delivering them into the hands of plantation owners underpinned the price of all slaves in the Americas. Initially, the cost of European indentured servants and indigenous labour, adjusted appropriately for the term of work, fell below the cost of bringing unwilling people from Africa, and the transatlantic slave trade was small or non-existent. A slave trade began only when this situation was reversed. Likewise, the slave traffic ended only when the costs imposed by its suppression exceeded the cost of obtaining alternative (non-slave) labour from Asia, and to a much lesser extent from Europe, or when the slave population began to increase naturally. Higher fixed costs from slave resistance would make the switch from indentured to slave labour in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries occur later, and the switch from slave labour to Asian contract labour in the nineteenth century earlier than would have been the case without resistance. If the costs of controlling resistance were built into the price of the slave delivered to the Americas, then the central question for assessing the impact of resistance is the proportion of the price that policing absorbed, and how this proportion varied. Delivering a slave to the Americas had four cost components, capture, coastal factoring, transoceanic transport, and distributing the human commodity in the Americas. In the eighteenth century, transport made up about half of the sum of these components with most of the remainder accounted for by the price of the slave on the African coast. In the previous section it was estimated that coercion made up about 18 per cent of middle passage costs. Although little information exists about cost structures for delivery of slaves to the coast, it is unlikely that coercion costs would be any lower during this initial phase of the movement of slaves to the Americas.

# Round 7 – Neg vs. Lexington NADBank Border Infrastructure Aff

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**The debt ceiling will pass but it will be a fight**

**Washington Post, 9/15/13** (“Congress can turn back to the budget now” http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/congress-can-turn-back-to-the-budget-now/2013/09/15/e05c975c-1ca5-11e3-82ef-a059e54c49d0\_story.html)

WITH PRESIDENT Obama’s bid for congressional support for a military strike against Syria on hold for the time being, members of the House and Senate can devote their attention to what was previously supposed to have been their priority for September: **avoiding a potential political and economic train wreck over the federal government’s finances**.

Specifically, Congress needs to fund the government after the current spending law expires on Sept. 30, and it needs to raise the $16.7 trillion debt limit, which will be reached sometime in the second half of October, and which must be increased to avoid the possibility of a U.S. default.

Alas, these two pieces of what should be routine business have become entangled in the politics of Obamacare, which is to say the decreasingly comprehensible politics of the House Republican caucus. A sizable minority of GOP members insists on “defunding” the health care law before the major parts of it begin to take effect in January. According to a recent Congressional Research Service analysis, this is an operationally futile goal. It would be bad policy even if it were possible.

What’s more, it’s bad politics for the GOP to risk a government shutdown in pursuit of this chimera — a fact Speaker John A. Boehner (R-Ohio) recognizes but which has, so far, failed to sway his back-benchers. This is why Democrats are content, for now, to sit back and cheer on the Republicans’ internal feud. Also, that’s easier than countering the Republicans’ anti-Obamacare crusade with realistic budget alternatives.

How this latest impasse plays out is anyone’s guess, though there are plausible scenarios under which Mr. Boehner can give the ultras in his caucus a chance to vote one more time against Obamacare, while engineering Democratic acquiescence in a short-term continuation of the current $988 billion annual spending rate. Such a result would avoid a partial government shutdown — for a few months.

The debt ceiling, too, probably can be finessed, as it has been in the past. Exactly how is admittedly difficult to predict given Mr. Obama’s insistence that raising it is not negotiable and Mr. Boehner’s seemingly incompatible insistence that he won’t increase Washington’s borrowing capacity except in return for progress on deficit reduction. But a default would not be in either side’s political interest.

#### The plan’s aura of spending ensures loss of PC — political opposition turns the case

Reilly 13 — reporter at Federal Times (Sean Reilly, Federal Times, 03-06-2013, “Private investors sought for border infrastructure”, http://www.federaltimes.com/article/20130306/DEPARTMENTS03/303060009/Private-investors-sought-border-infrastructure, Accessed 07-31-2013 | AK)

Cross-border trade is booming, but federal building money to expand and enhance border crossings **has dried up**.

In response, a spate of proposals aim to leverage private funding to make up the difference, particularly along the U.S.-Mexico border.

The Department of Homeland Security has created a task force to look at ways to encourage private investment in roads and other infrastructure at border crossings. In a recently proposed overhaul of the immigration system, the Obama administration also suggested allowing DHS to accept donations from citizens, businesses, and state and local governments to enhance border crossings, officially known as land ports of entry, according to a copy of the package obtained by USA Today, a sister paper of Federal Times.

On a separate track, Sen. John Cornyn, R-Texas, in January reintroduced a bill that would allow Customs and Border Protection, part of DHS, to charge fees in return for providing extra customs and immigration services. The bill would also order the General Services Administration, which owns or leases about three-quarters of the 168 land ports of entry in CBP’s inventory, to set up a process for evaluating cost-sharing proposals for upkeep or construction of new infrastructure. The idea is to ensure that proposals for such alternative financing arrangements “no longer **sit on desks in Washington for decades**,” Cornyn said in a news release.

Customs and Border Protection estimates it would take some $6 billion to fully modernize its ports of entry, which are more than 40 years old on average and lack the capacity to handle steadily growing traffic volumes.

But as **lawmakers crack down on federally funded construction**, ports of entry projects have gotten **no money** from GSA’s Public Buildings Fund since 2010, according to numbers provided by the Texas Border Coalition, an advocacy group.

“We think it’s a big deal,” John Cook, mayor of El Paso, Texas, and a backer of Cornyn’s bill, said in a phone interview. “Our No. 1 economic driver is international trade. Anything we can do to enhance and protect it is in our best interest.”

There are no rules forbidding public-private partnerships, said Chris Wilson, a trade expert at the Mexico Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. “It’s more a matter of creating a stable legal framework that everyone can refer to.”

One example of how this could work is underway along the California-Mexico border, where a group of investors have government approval to build an enclosed pedestrian bridge from San Diego to the Tijuana airport. In return for paying a toll, users will be able avoid traffic tie-ups elsewhere along the border. The walkway is scheduled to open next year.

Congress has yet to act on any specific legislation to spur similar endeavors. And even if it does, **permitting requirements** and other hurdles means that new projects probably won’t take off for **five more years**, Wilson said.

**Capital is finite and spending it elsewhere prevents a debt ceiling deal**

**Moore, 9/10/13 -** Guardian's US finance and economics editor.(Heidi, “Syria: the great distraction” The Guardian, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/sep/10/obama-syria-what-about-sequester)

The country will crash into the debt ceiling in mid-October, which would be an economic disaster, especially with a government shutdown looming at the same time. These are deadlines that Congress already learned two years ago not to toy with, but memories appear to be preciously short.

The Federal Reserve needs a new chief in three months, someone who will help the country confront its raging unemployment crisis that has left 12 million people without jobs. The president has promised to choose a warm body within the next three weeks, despite the fact that his top pick, Larry Summers, would likely spark an ugly confirmation battle – the "fight of the century," according to some – with a Congress already unwilling to do the President's bidding.

Congress was supposed to pass a farm bill this summer, but declined to do so even though the task is already two years late. As a result, the country has no farm bill, leaving agricultural subsidies up in the air, farmers uncertain about what their financial picture looks like, and a potential food crisis on the horizon.

The two main housing agencies, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, have been in limbo for four years and are desperately in need of reform that should start this fall, but there is scant attention to the problem.

These are the problems going unattended by the Obama administration while his aides and cabinet members have been wasting the nation's time making the rounds on television and Capitol Hill stumping for a profoundly unpopular war. The fact that all this chest-beating was for naught, and an easy solution seems on the horizon, belies the single-minded intensity that the Obama White House brought to its insistence on bombing Syria.

More than one wag has suggested, with the utmost reason, that if Obama had brought this kind of passion to domestic initiatives, the country would be in better condition right now. As it is, public policy is embarrassingly in shambles at home while the administration throws all of its resources and political capital behind a widely hated plan to get involved in a civil war overseas.

The upshot for the president may be that it's easier to wage war with a foreign power than go head-to-head with the US Congress, even as America suffers from neglect.

This is the paradox that President Obama is facing this fall, as he appears to turn his back on a number of crucial and urgent domestic initiatives in order to spend all of his meager political capital on striking Syria.

Syria does present a significant humanitarian crisis, which has been true for the past two years that the Obama administration has completely ignored the atrocities of Bashar al-Assad.

Two years is also roughly the same amount of time that key domestic initiatives have also gone ignored as Obama and Congress engage in petty battles for dominance and leave the country to run itself on a starvation diet imposed by sequestration cuts. Leon Panetta tells the story of how he tried to lobby against sequestration only to be told:

Leon, you don't understand. The Congress is resigned to failure.

Similarly, those on Wall Street, the Federal Reserve, those working at government agencies, and voters themselves have become all too practiced at ignoring the determined incompetence of those in Washington.

Political capital – the ability to horse-trade and win political favors from a receptive audience – is a finite resource in Washington. Pursuing misguided policies takes up time, but it also **eats up credibility in asking for the next favor.** It's fair to say that congressional Republicans, particularly in the House, have no love for Obama and are likely to oppose anything he supports. That's exactly the reason the White House should stop proposing policies as if it is scattering buckshot and **focus with intensity** on the domestic tasks it wants to accomplish, **one at a time**.

**Default will destroy the U.S. and global economy**

**Davidson, 9/10/13** – co-founder of NPR’s Planet Money (Adam, “Our Debt to Society” New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/15/magazine/our-debt-to-society.html?pagewanted=all)

If the debt ceiling isn’t lifted again this fall, some serious financial decisions will have to be made. Perhaps the government can skimp on its foreign aid or furlough all of NASA, but eventually the big-ticket items, like Social Security and Medicare, will have to be cut. At some point, the government won’t be able to pay interest on its bonds and will enter what’s known as sovereign default, the ultimate national financial disaster achieved by countries like Zimbabwe, Ecuador and Argentina (and now Greece). In the case of the United States, though, it won’t be an isolated national crisis. If the American government can’t stand behind the dollar, the world’s benchmark currency, then the global financial system will very likely enter a new era in which there is much less trade and much less economic growth. It would be, by most accounts, the largest self-imposed **financial disaster in history.**

Nearly everyone involved predicts that someone will blink before this disaster occurs. Yet a small number of House Republicans (one political analyst told me it’s no more than 20) appear willing to see what happens if the debt ceiling isn’t raised — at least for a bit. This could be used as leverage to force Democrats to drastically cut government spending and eliminate President Obama’s signature health-care-reform plan. In fact, Representative Tom Price, a Georgia Republican, told me that the whole problem could be avoided if the president agreed to drastically cut spending and lower taxes. Still, it is hard to put this act of game theory into historic context. Plenty of countries — and some cities, like Detroit — have defaulted on their financial obligations, but only because their governments ran out of money to pay their bills. No wealthy country has ever voluntarily decided — in the middle of an economic recovery, no less — to default. And there’s certainly no record of that happening to the country that controls the global reserve currency.

Like many, I assumed a self-imposed U.S. debt crisis might unfold like most involuntary ones. If the debt ceiling isn’t raised by X-Day, I figured, the world’s investors would begin to see America as an unstable investment and rush to sell their Treasury bonds. The U.S. government, desperate to hold on to investment, would then raise interest rates far higher, hurtling up rates on credit cards, student loans, mortgages and corporate borrowing — which would effectively put a clamp on all trade and spending. The U.S. economy would collapse **far worse than anything we’ve seen** in the past several years.

**Nuclear war**

**Friedberg and Schoenfeld 8**

[Aaron, Prof. Politics. And IR @ Princeton’s Woodrow Wilson School and Visiting Scholar @ Witherspoon Institute, and Gabriel, Senior Editor of Commentary and Wall Street Journal, “The Dangers of a Diminished America”, 10-28, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122455074012352571.html]

Then there are the dolorous consequences of a potential collapse of the world's financial architecture. For decades now, Americans have enjoyed the advantages of being at the center of that system. The worldwide use of the dollar, and the stability of our economy, among other things, made it easier for us to run huge budget deficits, as we counted on foreigners to pick up the tab by buying dollar-denominated assets as a safe haven. Will this be possible in the future? Meanwhile, traditional foreign-policy challenges are multiplying. The threat from al Qaeda and Islamic terrorist affiliates has not been extinguished. Iran and North Korea are continuing on their bellicose paths, while Pakistan and Afghanistan are progressing smartly down the road to chaos. Russia's new militancy and China's seemingly relentless rise also give cause for concern. If America now tries to pull back from the world stage, it will leave a dangerous power vacuum. The stabilizing effects of our presence in Asia, our continuing commitment to Europe, and our position as defender of last resort for Middle East energy sources and supply lines could all be placed at risk. In such a scenario there are shades of the 1930s, when global trade and finance ground nearly to a halt, the peaceful democracies failed to cooperate, and aggressive powers led by the remorseless fanatics who rose up on the crest of economic disaster exploited their divisions. Today we run the risk that rogue states may choose to become ever more reckless with their nuclear toys, just at our moment of maximum vulnerability. The aftershocks of the financial crisis will almost certainly rock our principal strategic competitors even harder than they will rock us. The dramatic free fall of the Russian stock market has demonstrated the fragility of a state whose economic performance hinges on high oil prices, now driven down by the global slowdown. China is perhaps even more fragile, its economic growth depending heavily on foreign investment and access to foreign markets. Both will now be constricted, inflicting economic pain and perhaps even sparking unrest in a country where political legitimacy rests on progress in the long march to prosperity. None of this is good news if the authoritarian leaders of these countries seek to divert attention from internal travails with external adventures.

#### China’s sphere of influence in Mexico is high – the plan trades off

**Fabens 8/14** (Isabella, Research Associate at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, 8/14/13, “CHINA’S LATEST INVESTMENTS IN MEXICO: THE PLIGHT OF MAQUILADORA WORKERS,” http://www.coha.org/chinas-latest-investments-in-mexico-the-plight-of-maquiladora-workers/)//DR. H

Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto, in the course of a trip to Asia last April, initiated important trade discussions on a stopover in China. [1] In return, Chinese President Xi Jinping returned the courtesy during his visit to Mexico on June 4. [2] Mexico is attempting to reduce its trade deficit with China by exporting some of its natural resources. In return, China is stepping up its role in Latin America as a major consumer of primary products. President Xi’s plans include potential investments in the hydrocarbon and natural gas sectors of the Mexican economy. There is every reason to believe that increased trade between the countries will augment Mexico’s economic growth. The trouble is that, to date, there has been no real consideration given to working conditions in Mexican facilities owned by U.S. companies, which too often pay their workers a low wage and overlook the unsafe conditions under which their employees labor.

Mexico and China

Formal relations between Mexico and China began in 1972 when Mexican President Luis Echeverría Álvarez (1970-1976) established diplomatic ties with the Asian nation. [3] Tensions flared in 2011, however, when Mexican President Felipe Calderón Hinojosa (2006-2012) hosted the Dalai Lama in Mexico City, as China has always considered Tibet to be under its jurisdiction. [4]

Since President Peña Nieto took office on December 1, 2012, he has attempted to rebuild bilateral relations with China and to promote economic growth through heightened foreign investment in natural resources. For his part, President Xi hopes to gain influence in Mexico and elsewhere in the region, as the United States and China move into competition for economic hegemony. [5] In response, Washington has launched a somewhat half-hearted effort to establish closer relations with key Asian countries known to be engines of growth. [6] **China seems to be winning this competition,** moving forward to achieve important economic victories in Mexico, Latin America’s second largest economy.

**Chinese influence is key to its economy.**

**Arnson et al. ‘9** (Cynthia Anderson, Mark Mohr, Riordan Roett, writers for Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, “Enter the Dragon? China’s Presence in Latin America”, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/EnterDragonFinal.pdf) (JN)

China’s role in Latin America is, above all, based on trade, despite U.S. concerns about China’s military inﬂuence in Latin America. The major exception to this rule is Cuba, for which China represents a political relationship as well as one based on economic interests. Although Venezuelan authorities may also prefer that its relationship with China have political as well as economic dimensions, it is not clear that China has the same expectations of its relationship with Venezuela. To China, Latin America **represents a signiﬁcant source of the necessary natural resources** that will help China **maintain its economic growth**. Due primarily to trade with China, Latin America’s trade volume grew from $2.8 billion in 1988 to $49 billion in 2005. Also, and as publicly announced, China intends to surpass $180 billion in trade with Latin America by 2010, not only due to the country’s need for natural resources, but also as a result of China’s intention to diversify and expand its markets in the region. Thus, Latin America represents a substantial market for Chinese goods.

#### Weak economy is the only incentive for aggressive foreign policy and great power involvement.

**Chuang 2001** (Major Liow Boon, Singapore Armed Forces, Pointer (The Journal of Singapore’s Armed Forces), “A Weak or Strong China: Which Is Better for the Asia-Pacific Region?” Volume 27, Number 1, January-March,

http://www.mindef.gov.sg/safti/pointer/back/journals/2001/Vol27\_1/7.htm)

'In the past, a weak China, beset by social disorder, inflation and civil war attracted foreign intervention by the great powers. The result was turbulence and instability inside China and at its borders'. China was invaded twice and suffered from several decades of civil wars and occupation by Japan.25 A loosening of China's political system has already been brought about by economic liberalization, more will follow as communications and education improve with economic growth. Indeed, lessons from Europe and the Soviet Union have taught that a rapid political liberalization unsupported by economic growth can easily lead to social disintegration, which if it divides China, will jeopardize the stability of the whole Asia-Pacific.26 Slow growth of the economy could increase the level of social discontent that would result in political instability. Chinese leaders will attempt to implement the structural reforms necessary to provide a sound framework for sustained future economic growth while minimising political unrest. China's leadership understand that for China to achieve great power status, economic power with a commensurate amount of military power will be the key.

It is commonly asserted that national leaders who are unable to overcome domestic difficulties sometimes pursue an aggressively extroverted foreign policy to distract their people from the problems at home. Samuel S. Kim seems to have this idea in mind when he argues that 'Today the main danger to the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region stems more from China's domestic weakness than from its external assertiveness a weak, reactive, insecure and fragmenting China is more unpredictable and dangerous than a strong, confident and cohesive China.'27

There are already signs of unrest and secessionist movements in China, and if China is weak economically and governed by a weak government that does not handle these problems well, an internal break-up could occur and it could precipitate the fall of the country. Controlling the widening income gap between city dwellers and peasants is one pressing problem the Chinese government has to tackle, and keeping the secessionist movement of Muslims in Xinjiang Province and the banned Falungong cult under control are some urgent tasks.

#### Text: All relevant states sharing a border with Mexico should substantially increase their infrastructure assistance toward Mexico through an investment mechanism modeling the North American Development Bank.

#### The CBI is a block grant program which allows states to finance border infrastructure – this includes cross-border cooperation and implementation with Mexico

FHWA 10 – last date cited, the FHWA is the Federal Highway Administration that runs the CBI (“Fact Sheets on Highway Provisions: COORDINATED BORDER INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAM” http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/safetealu/factsheets/borders.htm)

COORDINATED BORDER INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAM

Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Authorization $123M $145M $165M $190M $210M

Program Purpose

To improve the safe movement of motor vehicles at or across the land border between the U.S. and Canada and the land border between the U.S. and Mexico. This program replaces the TEA-21 Coordinated Border Infrastructure discretionary program which ends after 2005.

Statutory References

SAFETEA-LU Section(s): 1101(a)(11), 1303

Funding/Formula

Funded by contract authority, funds are subject to the overall Federal-aid obligation limitation, not transferable except as permitted for transfer to GSA (see below), and remain available until expended.

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Funded by contract authority, funds are subject to the overall Federal-aid obligation limitation, not transferable except as permitted for transfer to GSA (see below), and remain available until expended.

Funds are to be apportioned among border States based on factors related to the movement of people and goods through the land border ports of entry within the boundaries of the State as follows:

* 20% based on number of incoming commercial trucks
* 30% number of incoming personal motor vehicles and buses
* 25% based on weight of incoming cargo by commercial trucks
* 25% based on number of land border ports of entry

For FY 2005, $140 million is provided for the combination of the National Corridor Planning and Development and Coordinated Border Infrastructure discretionary programs under Sections 1118 and 1119 of TEA-21 to be administered under the terms of those sections.. [1101(a)(19)]

Eligible Use of Funds

States may use funds in a border region, defined as any portion of a border State within 100 miles of an international land border with Canada or Mexico, for the following types of improvements to facilitate/expedite cross border motor vehicle and cargo movements:

* improvements to existing transportation and supporting infrastructure
* construction of highways and related safety and safety enforcement facilities related to international trade
* operational improvements, including those related to electronic data interchange and use of telecommunications
* modifications to regulatory procedures
* international coordination of transportation planning, programming, and border operation with Canada and Mexico.

Program Features

Projects in Canada or Mexico – a border State may use these funds to construct a project in Canada or Mexico if the project directly and predominantly facilitates cross-border vehicle and cargo movement at an international port of entry in the border region of the State. Canada/Mexico must assure that the project will be constructed to standards equivalent to those in the US, and be maintained and used over the useful life of the facility only for the purpose for which the funds were allocated.

Transfers to General Services Administration (GSA) – if a border State requests, the Secretary approves, and GSA agrees, up to 15% or $5M (whichever is less) of the State's border program funds may be transferred to GSA to carry out 1 or more eligible projects. The State must provide the non-Federal share directly to GSA.

Federal Share

The Federal share is generally 80 percent, subject to the sliding scale adjustment. When the funds are used for Interstate projects to add high occupancy vehicle or auxiliary lanes, but not other lanes, the Federal share may be 90 percent, also subject to the sliding scale adjustment. Certain safety improvements listed in 23 USC 120(c) have a Federal share of 100 percent.

#### Neoliberalism is dying in Latin America- we should resist attempts at triage like the affirmative

Dr. Ronn **Pineo**, Senior Research Fellow at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, and Professor and Chair of the Department of History at Towson University – Posted on April 11, 20**13** - See more at: http://www.coha.org/22227/#sthash.L5CsywQs.dpuf

Poverty in Latin America has been reduced substantially in the last three decades. In the late 1980s, nearly half of Latin America’s population lived in poverty. Today the fraction is about a third. [21] This marks important progress, and it has continued in some area nations. However, it is worth noting that between 2002 and 2008, poverty contracted most in Venezuela, Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Argentina, countries which had largely **abandoned neoliberalism**; in Brazil, which had at least partially rejected neoliberalism; and in only two other states, Honduras and Perú, which still remained, at least partially, committed to free market polices. [22] It was mostly factors **beyond economic policy** that helps to account for recent declines in the rate of Latin American poverty. One factor was increasing remittances from Latin Americans laboring in the developed world, especially in the United States. Total remittances from Latin American workers rose from $12 billion USD in 1995, to $45 billion in 2004, and $68 billion in 2006. [23] However, “by far the main contributor to the reduction in the poverty rate,” as Jaime Ros has noted, was “the fall in the dependency ratio.” [24] The indicator measures the number of non-working age people—children and the elderly—who are supported by the working age population. The higher the dependency number, the greater the economic burden. Source: foreignpolicyblogs.com Latin America’s past demographic history underlies this shift in the dependency ratio. The late 1940s in Latin America witnessed lower overall death rates (the number of people who died a year divided by the total population), especially due to lower infant and childhood mortality rates. Initially, birth rates stayed high even as death rates fell, but after a generation passed Latin America’s birth rates began to drift downward to match the lower death rates. The time gap between the fall in death rates beginning in the late 1940s and the eventual fall in birth rates by the late 1970s resulted in an unprecedented population explosion. Latin America’s population rose from 167 million in 1950 to 285 million by 1970. As this population cohort has aged, Latin America’s dependency ratio fell too, dropping from a very high rate of 87.3 in the years 1965-1970, to 55.0 for 2005-2010, an all-time low for the region. The people born during the population explosion are of working age now, bringing the region a historic but one-time economic advantage, the “demographic bonus” or “demographic dividend.” As a result, Latin America temporarily enjoys a situation of a very large number of workers providing for a greatly reduced number of dependent people. The region’s demographic bonus means that there is, for the moment, less poverty due, in large part, to the increased number of working age people per household. [25] A drop in the dependency ratio carries with it greater female participation in the workforce, for lower fertility means there are fewer children to care for, freeing women to enter the paid workforce. Lower fertility also means better overall lifetime health for women, resulting in more years spent in the paid workforce for adult females. The fertility rate (the number of children born per woman per year) fell in Latin America from 5.6 for the years from 1965 to1970, to 2.4 for the years 2005 to 2010. The resulting demographic bonus has provided a significant, but fleeting, economic asset. By 2025, as the current population ages, Latin America will need to support a very large elderly dependent population. [26] It is fair to conclude that the reduction of poverty in Latin America in recent years was produced mainly by some short-term victories in the commodity lottery (as explained in Part I, the commodity lottery refers to short-term price rises for selected raw material exports), as well as a spike in remittances, and most of all, a one-time reduction in the dependency ratio. Income inequality data for Latin America is less positive. In the 1980s and 1990s, inequality increased significantly in Latin America. For example, from 1984 to 1994, the income of the top 10 percent of the Mexico’s population rose by 21 percent, while the income of the country’s bottom 10 percent fell by 23 percent. Nevertheless, there have been improvements, albeit modest ones, in lowering the Gini coefficient (a measure of economic inequality with 0 being the least inequality—everyone has the same income, and 1.0 being the most inequality—one person has all the income). Source: norlarnet.uio.no From 2002 to 2008, the Gini coefficient improved in seven Latin American states; five of these seven countries—Venezuela, Argentina, Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Paraguay—have traveled the farthest in rejecting neoliberalism. Outside of these nations inequality stayed the same or even increased, including in the largely neoliberal states of Colombia, the Dominican Republic, and Guatemala. In 1970, the richest 1 percent of Latin Americans earned 363 times more than the poorest 1 percent. By 1995, it was 417 times more. Latin America continues to show, by far, the greatest income inequality of any region in the world. Of the 15 most unequal economies in the world today, 10 are in the area. If Latin America’s income were only as unevenly distributed as that of Eastern Europe or South Asia, its recent economic growth, though sometimes anemic, would have reduced the percentage of those living in poverty to 3 percent of the population. [27] The Economist, in its 2010 review of the Latin American economic situation, concluded that the region was “well on the way to building middle-class societies.” [28] The evidence, however, contradicts this assertion. The informal sector—where people arrange irregular employment in itinerant retail sales, as day workers, or other loosely arranged jobs—today accounts for more than half of all workers in Latin America. More than eight of ten new jobs in Latin America are in the informal sector. [29] Informal sector workers enjoy no protective regulation or benefits. They live by their wits, striving to scratch out a living, day by day. Meanwhile, union membership among active workers in Latin America fell from around one-fourth in the 1980s to under one-sixth in the 1990s. Source: laht.com Moreover, significant areas of severe poverty remain in Latin America, expressed along class, racial, gender, and regional divides Poverty underlies poor health, contributing to elevated rates of infant, childhood, and maternal mortality. Of those living in poverty in Latin America, nearly half are children. Due to their undernourishment, a quarter of Latin American children (and as many as half in rural Perú and Guatemala) are stunted in their development. Across Latin America malnutrition is an underlying cause in more than half of the deaths of children under the age of five. In Guatemala maternal mortality among indigenous women is 83 percent higher than the national average. Among the poorest fifth of the Perú’s population, 85 percent of births are not attended by trained personnel, compared to only 4 percent among the wealthiest fifth. Two-thirds of Latin American municipalities do not treat their sewage prior to dumping it into adjacent rivers or the sea. In Panamá, three in ten homes lack access to improved sanitation (sewage disposal), and in Perú, nearly four in ten lack this essential service. Yet with all this effluvium flowing out, still three-quarters of Latin America municipalities do not check public drinking water supplies for impurities. One-quarter of Latin Americans do not have in-home potable water. [30] In Latin America nearly two-thirds of hospital admissions are due to diseases related to the lack of sanitation. Diarrhea accounts for six of every ten deaths of children under the age of five in Latin America. Fresh water can save lives; for each percentage point increase in potable water coverage, the infant mortality rate drops 1 death per 1,000 live births. Yet, Latin America is falling behind in terms of life expectancy. Life expectancy in Latin America was five years longer than East Asia in the mid-1960s, but by the mid-1990s, it was 1.2 years shorter. [31] The weight of this evidence leads to an inescapable conclusion. Cambridge economist Ha-Joon Chang has put it most succinctly, “Over the last three decades, economists…provid[ed]…theoretical justifications for financial deregulation and the unrestrained pursuit of short-term profits…[T]hey advanced theories that justified the policies that have led to slower growth…[and] higher inequality…[**E]conomics has been worse than irrelevant. Economics, as it has been practiced in the last three decades, has been positively harmful for most people**.” [32] The Twilight of Neoliberalism “There is no alternative [to free market policies],” the late British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher once pronounced, but across Latin America, there has been a steady erosion of support for the free market model. At present three-quarters of Latin America governments can be fairly characterized as being governed by center-left or left-oriented leaders. Moreover, there has been a far-reaching reassessment of the relevance of IMF advice, especially after the organization’s punishingly controversial response to the 1997-1998 Asian economic crisis. The Asian economic meltdown brought the reflexive recommendations from the IMF in the form of harsh austerity measures. However, the pro-cyclical policies demanded by the IMF of its client states so plainly worsened the economic situation and needlessly caused considerable human misery that the IMF’s reputation was badly damaged. In the wake of IMF’s subsequent mishandling of the 1998 economic crises in Russia and Brazil, large private lenders, especially among the European ones, stopped requiring IMF assurances that borrowing nations follow neoliberal strictures. As Richard Peet has noted, “the…[IMF]’s reputation has never recovered, even in circles that the Fund values. [...] The power of the IMF has been reduced by failed crisis management, [with] countries paying up as quickly as possible and distancing themselves” from the IMF. [33] European lenders concluded that new loans to non-neoliberal Latin American states would perform handsomely, which, in fact, they have. The IMF’s power to impose neoliberal policies on debtor nations has been seriously compromised. Source: herslookingatyousquid.worldpress.com Argentina, following its severe economic crisis in 2001-2002, proved that a nation could successfully challenge the IMF. Argentina defaulted on its $100 billion USD foreign debt and renegotiated its obligations, paying off its loans at a fraction of the original cost. Buenos Aires finished retiring its debt to the IMF in 2005, benefitting greatly from Venezuelan assistance. In offering the money, the late Hugo Chávez promised that, “if additional help is needed to help Argentina finally free itself from the claws of the International Monetary Fund, Argentina can count on us.” [34] Other Latin American nations looked on as Argentina defied the IMF, and continued to watch as Argentina’s economy soared, growing faster than any other nation in the Western Hemisphere after it abandoned IMF-imposed economic policies. Soon a stampede of those flouting IMF mandates followed, with each new defection providing courage to all those nations rejecting neoliberalism. Other international lenders appeared as well. Venezuela loaned money to other countries in the region, including Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua, but only if they ignored the counsel of the IMF. The Bank of the South, established in 2007, joined Venezuela with Brazil, Argentina, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Paraguay as an alternative source for credit. China, which does not particularly care what the IMF recommends, is also supplying capital. Furthermore, some primary commodity export prices have increased, in part due to the demand for Chinese imports (for example, Argentine soya). This has allowed several Latin American states to build up their financial reserves, making new foreign borrowing less pressing. Today the IMF can coerce only the most feeble economies, mainly now in sub-Sahara Africa. The political landscape has shifted too. By the late 1990s, many of the aging left-wing political parties built around organized labor had been flattened by the assault on unions mounted under neoliberalism. At first voters were willing to give candidates who supported the neoliberal program a chance; nevertheless, as it became increasingly clear that these policies were failing, those who spoke out against neoliberalism were elected in growing numbers. The trouble was that once in office they too often carried out neoliberal programs anyway, as for example with Abdalá Bucaram (1996-1997) or Lucio Gutiérrez (2003-2005) in Ecuador, either because they secretly favored such policies, because the IMF persuaded them to do so, or both. With the traditional left-leaning parties marginalized in several countries and the abandonment of anti-neoliberal promises by elected politicians, ordinary citizens had to develop new political methods to defend themselves. Neoliberal policies so savaged the working class, as well as the urban marginalized and the hard-pressed peasantry, that they had no choice but to organize and fight back. To this end, they created new organizations and, in some cases, used them to seize power. By pressing the neoliberal agenda, the Latin American élites appeared to have overplayed their hand, and they paid for it by losing control of governments that they had controlled for many years, in Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, and beyond. A 2009 Latinobarómetro Survey found that support for democracy (as preferable to all other forms of government) was the strongest in countries that flatly rejected neoliberalism. Of the top five nations in popular support of democracy, four were governed by progressive leaders: Venezuela, Bolivia, Uruguay, and El Salvador. [35] Hope for the Future? Supporters of the free market approach have continued to counsel patience. They argue that stronger economic growth will eventually come, and that all will benefit in the long run. While neoliberal reforms might cause some short-term belt tightening, defenders explain that such adjustments, though sometimes painful, are necessary for the greatest good. We should not give in to “reform fatigue,” but should stay the course. [36] But neoliberal policies have been in place for over 30 years now. How long is the long run? How long must we wait? As John Maynard Keynes famously observed, “In the long run we are all dead.” In 1937 U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt observed, “We have always known that heedless self-interest was bad morals. We know now that it is bad economics.” [37] The age of neoliberalism is ending. It is time for some good economics.

#### Neoliberal expansion risks extinction

**Nhanenge 7** [Jytte Masters @ U South Africa, “ECOFEMINSM: TOWARDS INTEGRATING THE CONCERNS OF WOMEN, POOR PEOPLE AND NATURE INTO DEVELOPMENT]

There is today an increasing critique of economic development, whether it takes place in the North or in the South. Although the world on average generates more and more wealth, the riches do not appear to "trickle down" to the poor and improve their material well-being. Instead, poverty and economic inequality is growing. Despite the existence of development aid for more than half a century, the Third World seems not to be "catching up" with the First World. Instead, militarism, dictatorship and human repression is multiplied. Since the mid 1970, the critique of global economic activities has intensified due to the escalating deterioration of the natural environment. Modernization, industrialisation and its economic activities have been directly linked to increased scarcity of natural resources and generation of pollution, which increases global temperatures and degrades soils, lands, water, forests and air. The latter threat is of great significance, because without a healthy environment human beings and animals will not be able to survive. Most people believed that modernization of the world would improve material well-being for all. However, faced with its negative side effects and the real threat of extinction, one must conclude that somewhere along the way "progress" went astray. Instead of material plenty, economic development generated a violent, unhealthy and unequal world. It is a world where a small minority live in material luxury, while millions of people live in misery. These poor people are marginalized by the global economic system. They are forced to survive from degraded environments; they live without personal or social security; they live in abject poverty, with hunger, malnutrition and sickness; and they have no possibility to speak up for themselves and demand a fair share of the world's resources. The majority of these people are women, children, traditional peoples, tribal peoples, people of colour and materially poor people (called women and Others). They are, together with nature, dominated by the global system of economic development imposed by the North. It is this scenario, which is the subject of the dissertation. The overall aim is consequently to discuss the unjustified domination of women, Others and nature and to show how the domination of women and Others is interconnected with the domination of nature. A good place to start a discussion about domination of women, Others and nature is to disclose how they disproportionately must carry the negative effects from global economic development. The below discussion is therefore meant to give an idea of the "flip-side" of modernisation. It gives a gloomy picture of what "progress" and its focus on economic growth has meant for women, poor people and the natural environment. The various complex and inter-connected, negative impacts have been ordered into four crises. The categorization is inspired by Paul Ekins and his 1992 book "A new world order; grassroots movements for global change". In it, Ekins argues that humanity is faced with four interlocked crises of unprecedented magnitude. These crises have the potential to destroy whole ecosystems and to extinct the human race. The first crisis is the spread of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, together with the high level of military spending. The second crisis is the increasing number of people afflicted with hunger and poverty. The third crisis is the environmental degradation. Pollution, destruction of ecosystems and extinction of species are increasing at such a rate that the biosphere is under threat. The fourth crisis is repression and denial of fundamental human rights by governments, which prevents people from developing their potential. It is highly likely that one may add more crises to these four, or categorize them differently, however, Ekins's division is suitable for the present purpose. (Ekins 1992: 1).

#### Reject the plan on the ground that it is neoliberal

Dr Emmanuel **Broillet**\* Current Concerns > 20**10** > No 8, May 2010 > Latin America: The Advent of an Alternative to Neo-Liberalism and Authoritarian Socialism http://www.currentconcerns.ch/index.php?id=1028

A different world is possible and not utopian Building a different world can only succeed by political means, involving states and their governments – new states, anti-neoliberal governments, but also governments not entirely anti-neoliberal. In a different world social movements must not replace the productive field. Social movements have to engage in a new dialogue with politics. With a false understanding of this dialogue the social movements would exclude themselves from political processes of profound economic, social, political and cultural change. In Bolivia, Venezuela, Ecuador and some other countries the social movements might get into opposition that way and hold their corporative positions against the development of political alternatives. (I am not talking about non-government organizations, a much more severe case.) In the name of the “autonomy of the social movements”, which has developed into a fundamental issue in some cases, they exclude themselves from building a different possible world. If it is about the question of maintaining autonomy against the subordination of popular interests, there is no problem. But if social movements and the political level oppose each other, we fall back on corporatist positions – supposedly in the name of the ‘civil society’ – with the risk to give up the political struggle with the traditional forces, which reproduce the dominating system. This autonomy can be good to resist neo-liberalism but it is an absolute obstacle if we want to build another possible world and not only claim it to be possible. The best way to talk about it is to build it and that will be impossible without a new hegemonic model – economic, social, political and cultural, a new type of power, a new society, a new world in all its globality. Resuming the political struggle in a new manner means for the World Social Forum of Porto Alegre to focus on the fight against war above all. Moreover, it means to seriously take into account the new possible world which has started to be built in Latin America. Neo-liberalism tries to discourage any form of regulation by the state and to discredit the role of the policy and of all forms of government in favor of an expanded market. The quest for a different political practice is thus part of the struggle for another possible world, and Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador show that is at the same time possible and essential for the construction of a new type of society. Conclusion Liberalization To conclude, we can say that many developing countries in Latin America take the route of liberalization. We can also suppose that these countries will adopt a new developmental strategy because their leaders think that an approach favorable to the market is the “optimal” strategy. The selected strategy promises to cure two fundamental deficiencies simultaneously: the lack of financial means and the absence of a clear definition of the state’s role in this development. I claim that these two fundamental problems have not yet been solved, but short-circuited by the indetermination of the reforms during the current historical period, known as period of transition. The long period of transition, which the strategy based on liberalism or liberalization implies, requires important intervention by the state; whereas the launching of reforms undoubtedly does not allow meeting the financing needs of the economy, the social reorganization, the recognition of the cultural affairs as well as the freedom of expression, of thought and basic rights. This was the case in Chile. From the present analysis, we can draw the following conclusions: Phase 1: The transitional period is very long and difficult to manage. The liberalization of foreign trade, interior markets, and the social reforms related to the governmental structures, all these aspects are combined with those of acceptable political programs. Phase 2: The period of stabilization may last for a very long time, at least until the completion of phase 1, when the country will have restored its reputation of solvency. Phase 3: The period of determining the effects of certain measurements, because it is not true that the economy proves that liberalized markets are always the best. Phase 4: The period of stagnation and balance will only eventuate if the chronological order of the reforms has been applied. Ideology, utopia and identity I would like to add one last optimistic reflection which will put an end to my contribution. According to what I tried to show before, the ideas and the different interests of a whole people generally join in a sanguinary struggle for life. This “ideology” should be taken serious because, actually, with the appearance of the human consciousness of what is good and what is evil, the structure of our socio-cultural environment based on the finality of peace and non-violence is no longer a utopian dream, but also a necessary objective, both essential for all the Latin-Americans and the whole humanity. If this utopia determines the discussions of a group, it is not only an ideological unit, but also a mentality or a structure which organizes the dominant ideas – a transcendent ideal, and the rebellion of an oppressed class. The positive function of a utopia is thus to explore what is feasible, and to exploit the possibilities reality offers. Without closing too quickly, I would say that the significance of ideology and utopia enables us to illustrate the two sides of the dynamics between power and imagination. The problem of power and imagination remains, for me, the most attractive structure of existence. To open ourselves to the imaginary unexpected and unforeseen belongs to our identity. The identity of the Latin-American people and communities is also an unsettled prospective identity. This also applies to the structure of identity as a symbolic structure which constitutes imagination and which is reflected not only as ideology and utopia, but also as reality and fiction. My conviction is that we are always captured in this oscillation between ideology and utopia. Those who have neither projects nor objectives do not have anything to describe.

#### No warming impacts.

Burnett, 12 – Sterling, Ph.D., Senior Fellow in Environment and Energy at the National Center for Policy Analysis (NCPA), “Fraud and Heartland: A Scandal for Climate Alarmists, not Skeptics,” 2-22, http://environmentblog.ncpa.org/fraud-and-heartland-a-scandal-for-climate-alarmists-not-skeptics/.

Sadly (for him), Peter Gleick, the researcher at issue, could have obtained a good deal of the information he sought through a request for Heartland’s 990, a tax document that non-profits have to provide to any who request it. Rather than going through legitimate channels to obtain what information he could or, better still, questioning the veracity of the initial document he received — and there were many reasons to question that document, among them the fact that it was delivered to him anonymously — using someone else’s name, a Heartland board member — he requested internal documents. Despite all the sound and fury surrounding this episode over the last week, really, nothing new was learned in the memos. As Time Magazine summed it up: “The alleged memos seem to confirm that the Heartland Institute is trying to push it’s highly skeptical view of climate science into the public sphere, which is only surprising if you’ve paid exactly zero attention to the climate debate over the past decade.” Gleick admits that his actions were wrong and apologized but said he did it out of “frustration.” One has to ask, frustration over what? Is he perhaps frustrated with the fact that he and his fellow climate alarmists have, as of yet, been unable to convince Americans that the scientific case for climate action is settled and stampede them into calling for policies that forcibly restrict energy use? Daily polls show more American’s are coming to doubt the argument that human actions are causing a warming that would result in catastrophic climate change. Or perhaps he is frustrated with the fact that an increasing number of scientists – scientists with as good or better credentials and reputations as those who argue that humans are causing warming — continue to highlight the weakness, discrepancies and contradictions that continue to plague global warming theory and demonstrate that the case in far from closed. Perhaps Glieck and his ilk are frustrated because they constantly bray that scientists and think tanks that show skepticism concerning one or another critical point of global warming theory are exceedingly well-funded; when the reality is, and Gleick knows it, these scientists and think tanks are very modestly funded when compared to the billions that are spent to on climate research, politics and on politically favored technologies by governments, billionaires and corporations who will benefit from climate policies, and the non-profit foundations and think tanks that want to use fear of global warming to reshape the Western economic system into what they believe would be a more humane, equitable (socialist), global version of society. A society where international bodies, with bureaucracies staffed by “experts” beyond the reach of crass democratic politics and mass opinion will steer the ship of global-state in the direction of the “true” public good. Time magazine notes that if anything, the Heartland memos debunk the idea of a well-funded “. . . vast right-wing conspiracy,” behind global warming skepticism. Who says the Progressive era has passed?

#### Squo solves their internal links.

**Meyer 13** – Analyst in Latin American affairs for the Congressional Research Service (Peter J. Meyer, “Brazil-US Relations”, Congressional Research Service, 2/27/13, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33456.pdf)//js

Energy has been another important area of U.S.-Brazilian cooperation in recent years. Brazil is widely regarded as a world leader in energy policy for successfully reducing its reliance on foreign oil through the development of alternative energy resources and increased domestic production. In addition to being the world’s second-largest producer of ethanol (after the United States), Brazil currently generates 85% of its electricity through hydropower. Brazil also has recently discovered large offshore oil deposits that have the potential to turn the country into a major oil and gas producer and an important source of energy for the United States.106 To facilitate greater cooperation in the development of safe, secure, and affordable energy, President Obama and President Rousseff launched a Strategic Energy Dialogue in March 2011. Ethanol and Other Biofuels107 Brazil stands out as an example of a country that has become a net exporter of energy, partially by increasing its use and production of ethanol. In 1975, in response to sharp increases in global oil prices, the Brazilian government began a national program to promote the production and consumption of sugarcane ethanol. Brazil now produces some 390,000 barrels per day.108 Within Brazil, pure ethanol is available at nearly every fueling station and gasoline is required to include a 20% ethanol blend. About 90% of new cars sold in Brazil each year are fitted with “flex-fuel” engines capable of running on fuel blends ranging from pure ethanol to pure gasoline. As a result, ethanol accounts for over half of all fuel pumped in Brazil.109 On March 9, 2007, the United States and Brazil, the world’s two largest ethanol-producing countries, signed a memorandum of understanding to promote greater cooperation on ethanol and biofuels. The agreement involves (1) technology sharing between the United States and Brazil; (2) feasibility studies and technical assistance to build domestic biofuels industries in third countries; and (3) multilateral efforts to advance the global development of biofuels.110 Over the past six years, the United States and Brazil have moved forward on all three facets of the agreement. Presidents Obama and Rousseff signed onto a partnership agreement for the development of aviation biofuels in March 2011,111 and in October 2011, Boeing and Brazil’s Embraer announced plans to build a joint research center.112 Brazil and the United States have also worked together in a number of Latin American, Caribbean, and African countries. In March 2011, Presidents Obama and Rousseff agreed to commit $3 million to support the development of legal regimes and domestic biofuels production in the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, and Senegal.113 Additionally, the United States and Brazil are working with other members of the International Biofuels Forum (IBF) to make biofuels standards and codes more uniform. Brazil and the United States have taken steps to liberalize trade in ethanol over the past year. In December 2011, the Brazilian government issued a resolution to extend its duty-free treatment of imported ethanol until December 31, 2015.114 Similarly, the U.S. Congress allowed a 54-cent-pergallon duty on imported ethanol to expire at the end of 2011. Prior to its expiration, the duty served as a significant barrier to direct imports of Brazilian ethanol in most years. Although some Brazilian ethanol was allowed to enter the United States duty-free after being reprocessed in Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) countries, such imports could only account for up to 7% of the U.S. ethanol market. A 2.5% ad valorem tariff on ethanol imports to the United States remains in place permanently unless the Harmonized Tariff Schedule code is changed.

#### US Manufacturing competitiveness bounced back, the plan’s not sufficient, and the past 3 decades should’ve triggered your impacts.

IMFD 9/10, International Monetary Forum’s Interactive Forum, Around 10 quallified bloggers, “Hi-Fis and Low Gears: Manufacturing’s Bounce in the U.S.,” http://www.economonitor.com/blog/2013/09/hi-fis-and-low-gears-manufacturings-bounce-in-the-u-s/)//DR. H

It’s no secret that the manufacturing sector in the United States has been in decline for the past three decades. But a strong rebound in durable goods, such as cars and electronics, has helped revive the manufacturing sector and has supported the post-recession recovery.

As of early 2013, manufacturing output was only 4 percentage points below its pre-recession peak. Comparing across countries, the United States has performed more strongly than most of its G-7 counterparts, with the exception of Germany. Yet, the recovery in Germany has stagnated since mid-2011, while the U.S. recovery continues to gain steam.

Is this strong rebound in U.S. manufacturing here to stay, or just a temporary phenomenon?

A lopsided recovery

Our new study, The U.S. Manufacturing Recovery: Uptick or Renaissance?, looks at the U.S. manufacturing sector and shows that while the headline recovery numbers for U.S. manufacturing are impressive, they mask significant differences between the sectors producing durable goods and nondurable goods (such as food and clothing).

The post-recession recovery has been driven almost entirely by a rebound in durable goods production. On the other hand, nondurable goods have fared poorly—their production is still 10 percent below its pre-recession levels and only 6 percent above its trough.

Even within the durable sector, production growth rates have varied substantially. Automobiles, computers and electronics, and machinery have driven the majority of the rebound. However, the rebounds in machinery and automobiles have strong cyclical components (both had declined substantially during the crisis), while growth in the production of computers and electronics has been unrelenting over the last decade.

The energy revolution

What factors can explain the strong rebound in durable goods production in the United States?

Lower labor costs in the United States compared with those in emerging markets have been the most important factor in explaining the recent revival in U.S. manufacturing. But other factors, such as a more competitive real exchange rate (a depreciation of the dollar relative to other currencies, corrected for differences in inflation) and lower energy prices, may have also played a significant role.

The increasing U.S. production of oil and gas through unconventional extraction techniques—such as natural gas extracted from shale rock formation—could provide a boost to the manufacturing sector. However, our analysis suggests that the “pull” from the energy boom to manufacturing has been limited. Based on the scenarios in the 2013 Annual Energy Outlook by the U.S. Energy Information Administration, additional production of oil and gas would result in a positive contribution to manufacturing growth of around 0.1 – 0.3 percentage points per year through the end of the decade.

Nondurable goods, such as the production of chemicals or primary metals, would benefit much more than sectors that rebounded strongly from the recession, such as computers and electronics and automobiles.

#### Deterrence fails – 5 reasons.

**Wilson 1/13**/13 -senior fellow at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies (1/13/2013, “The Myth of Nuclear Necessity,” http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/14/opinion/the-myth-of-nuclear-necessity.html?pagewanted=all)JCP

There is also a small group of people who still believe fervently in nuclear weapons. President Obama had to buy passage of the New START treaty with Russia, in 2010, with a promise to spend $185 billion to modernize warheads and delivery systems over 10 years — revealing that while support for nuclear weapons may not be broad, it runs deep. **That support endures because of five** widely held **myths**. The first is the myth that nuclear weapons altered the course of World War II. Leaving aside the morality of America’s decision to drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, new research by the historian Tsuyoshi Hasegawa and other scholars shows that Japan surrendered not because of the atom bomb but because the Soviets renounced neutrality and joined the war. Sixty-six Japanese cities had already been destroyed by conventional weapons — two more did not make the difference. **Attributing surrender to the bomb was** also **convenient for Japan’s leaders,** allowing them to blame defeat on a “miracle” weapon. **Second is the myth of “decisive destruction.”** **Mass destruction doesn’t win wars; killing soldiers does**. No war has ever been won simply by killing civilians. The 1941-44 siege of Leningrad didn’t deter Soviet leaders from pressing the fight against Hitler. Nor did the 1945 firebombing of Dresden force Germany to submit. As long as an army has a fighting chance at victory, wars continue. Building ever more destructive weapons simply increases the horror of war, not the certainty of ending it. **Third is the myth of reliable nuclear deterrence**. Numerous leaders have taken risks and acted aggressively during nuclear crises. In 1962, President John F. Kennedy and his advisers knew that blockading Cuba risked nuclear war; they mentioned the possibility 60 times while debating their options. Yet they went ahead. Nuclear proponents might argue that no cold war crisis ever erupted into nuclear war, so deterrence must work. But they’re moving the goal posts. Originally it was claimed that nuclear weapons would assure success in negotiations, prevent any sort of attack — conventional or nuclear — and allow countries to protect their friends with a nuclear umbrella. When the Russians weren’t intimidated during talks after World War II, the claim about negotiations was dropped. When the Yom Kippur War and the Falkland Islands War showed that fighting against nuclear-armed countries was possible, the prevention of conventional war claim was dropped. The nuclear umbrella claim ought to have been dropped at the same time, but there was too much American foreign policy riding on it for anyone to make this argument. After all, if Britain couldn’t deter an attack on its own far-flung islands, how could deterrence prevent attacks on other countries? **Fourth is the myth of the long peace**: the argument that the absence of nuclear war since 1945 means nuclear weapons have “kept the peace.” **But we don’t accept proof by absence in any circumstance where there is real risk**. We wouldn’t fly an airline that claimed to have invented a device that prevented metal fatigue, proved it by equipping 100 planes with the devices for one year without a single crash, and then suddenly ceased all metal-fatigue inspections and repairs, and decided instead to rely solely on these new devices. **The last and most stubborn myth is that of irreversibility**. Whenever idealists say that they want to abolish nuclear weapons, so-called realists shake their heads and say, in tones of patient condescension, “You can’t stuff the nuclear genie back in the bottle.” This is a specious **argument. It’s true that no technology is ever disinvented, but technology does fall out of use all the time.** (If you don’t believe me, try to get tech support on any electronic device more than three years old.) Devices disappear either because they are displaced by better technology or because they simply weren’t good. The question isn’t whether nuclear weapons can be disinvented, but whether they are useful. And their usefulness is questionable, given that no one has found an occasion to use them in over 67 years. **NOT everyone wants nuclear weapons**. What most people don’t realize is that **12 countries have either abandoned nuclear programs, dismantled existing weapons**, as South Africa did in the early 1990s, **or handed them over**, as Kazakhstan did after the 1991 breakup of the Soviet Union. **By contrast, only nine have nukes today** (the United States, Russia, Britain, France, China, India, Israel, Pakistan and North Korea). It’s often assumed that Israel would be the last nation to give up nuclear weapons, given its history and a deep sense of responsibility to protect the Jewish people after the horrors of the Holocaust. But Israel has a powerful conventional military, is allied with the strongest country in the world and its leaders have a keen appreciation of military realities. They understand that nukes pose a greater danger to small countries than large ones. Twenty nuclear weapons used on Israel would do far more overlapping damage than 20 used on Iran. **Small nations have always been vulnerable. In a world without nuclear weapons they would preserve themselves as they always have: by forming alliances with the powerful and avoiding antagonizing neighbors**. France, not Israel, would most likely be the last country to give up nuclear weapons, which help preserve its image as a world power. In a nuclear-free world, France would just be another middle-size power with great cuisine. The real value of nuclear bombs is as status symbols, not as practical weapons. America and other nuclear powers must pursue the gradual abolition of nuclear weapons, but it will not be easy. Many leaders have little interest in giving up power, real or perceived. Any agreement would have to include stringent inspections and extensive safeguards. It would have to include all current nuclear-armed states in a complicated diplomatic process. But bans on other dangerous but clumsy armaments, like chemical and biological weapons, have been negotiated in the past. These bans — like laws — are sometimes broken. But the world is far safer with the bans than it would be without them. As Reagan knew, nuclear weapons make the world more dangerous, not less. Imagine arming a bank guard with dynamite and a lighter and you get a good idea of nuclear weapons’ utility: powerful, but too clumsy to use. Nuclear weapons were born out of fear, nurtured in fear and sustained by fear. They are dinosaurs — an evolutionary dead end. The trend in warfare today is toward smaller, smarter, more effective precision-guided weapons. Nuclear weapons — extremely dangerous and not very useful — are the wave of the past.

#### No China war.

**Rosecrance et al 10** – (Richard, Political Science Professor @ Cal and Senior Fellow @ Harvard’s Belfer Center and Former Director @ Burkle Center of IR @ UCLA, and Jia Qingguo, PhD Cornell, Professor and Associate Dean of School of International Studies @ Peking University, “Delicately Poised: Are China and the US Heading for Conflict?” Global Asia 4.4, http://www.globalasia.org/l.php?c=e251)

Will China and the US Go to War? If one accepts the previous analysis, the answer is “no,” or at least not likely. Why? First, despite its revolutionary past, China has gradually accepted the US-led world order and become a status quo power. It has joined most of the important inter-governmental international organizations. It has subscribed to most of the important international laws and regimes. It has not only accepted the current world order, it has become a strong supporter and defender of it. China has repeatedly argued that the authority of the United Nations and international law should be respected in the handling of international security crises. China has become an ardent advocate of multilateralism in managing international problems. And China has repeatedly defended the principle of free trade in the global effort to fight the current economic crisis, despite efforts by some countries, including the US, to resort to protectionism. To be sure, there are some aspects of the US world order that China does not like and wants to reform. However, it wishes to improve that world order rather than to destroy it. Second, China has clearly rejected the option of territorial expansion. It argues that territorial expansion is both immoral and counterproductive: immoral because it is imperialistic and counterproductive because it does not advance one’s interests. China’s behavior shows that instead of trying to expand its territories, it has been trying to settle its border disputes through negotiation. Through persistent efforts, China has concluded quite a number of border agreements in recent years. As a result, most of its land borders are now clearly drawn and marked under agreements with its neighbors. In addition, China is engaging in negotiations to resolve its remaining border disputes and making arrangements for peaceful settlement of disputed islands and territorial waters. Finally, even on the question of Taiwan, which China believes is an indisputable part of its territory, it has adopted a policy of peaceful reunification. A country that handles territorial issues in such a manner is by no means expansionist. Third, China has relied on trade and investment for national welfare and prestige, instead of military conquest. And like the US, Japan and Germany, China has been very successful in this regard. In fact, so successful that it really sees no other option than to continue on this path to prosperity. Finally, after years of reforms, China increasingly finds itself sharing certain basic values with the US, such as a commitment to the free market, rule of law, human rights and democracy. Of course, there are still significant differences in terms of how China understands and practices these values. However, at a conceptual level, Beijing agrees that these are good values that it should strive to realize in practice. A Different World It is also important to note that certain changes in international relations since the end of World War II have made the peaceful rise of a great power more likely. To begin with, the emergence of nuclear weapons has drastically reduced the usefulness of war as a way to settle great power rivalry. By now, all great powers either have nuclear weapons or are under a nuclear umbrella. If the objective of great power rivalry is to enhance one’s interests or prestige, the sheer destructiveness of nuclear weapons means that these goals can no longer be achieved through military confrontation. Under these circumstances, countries have to find other ways to accommodate each other — something that China and the US have been doing and are likely to continue to do. Also, globalization has made it easier for great powers to increase their national welfare and prestige through international trade and investment rather than territorial expansion. In conducting its foreign relations, the US relied more on trade and investment than territorial expansion during its rise, while Japan and Germany relied almost exclusively on international trade and investment. China, too, has found that its interests are best served by adopting the same approach. Finally, the development of relative pacifism in the industrialized world, and indeed throughout the world since World War II, has discouraged any country from engaging in territorial expansion. There is less and less popular support for using force to address even legitimate concerns on the part of nation states. Against this background, efforts to engage in territorial expansion are likely to rally international resistance and condemnation. Given all this, is the rise of China likely to lead to territorial expansion and war with the US? The answer is no.

#### No impact to competitiveness.

Ikenberry 08 – professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University (John, “The Rise of China and the Future of the West Can the Liberal System Survive?” Jan/Feb 2008, Foreign Affairs)

Some observers believe that the American era is coming to an end, as the Western-oriented world order is replaced by one increasingly dominated by the East. The historian Niall Ferguson has written that the bloody twentieth century witnessed "the descent of the West" and "a reorientation of the world" toward the East. Realists go on to note that as China gets more powerful and the United States' position erodes, two things are likely to happen: China will try to use its growing influence to reshape the rules and institutions of the international system to better serve its interests, and other states in the system -- especially the declining hegemon -- will start to see China as a growing security threat. The result of these developments, they predict, will be tension, distrust, and conflict, the typical features of a power transition. In this view, the drama of China's rise will feature an increasingly powerful China and a declining United States locked in an epic battle over the rules and leadership of the international system. And as the world's largest country emerges not from within but outside the established post-World War II international order, it is a drama that will end with the grand ascendance of China and the onset of an Asian-centered world order. That course, however, is not inevitable. The rise of China does not have to trigger a wrenching hegemonic transition. The U.S.-Chinese power transition can be very different from those of the past because China faces an international order that is **fundamentally different** from those that past rising states confronted. China does not just face the United States; it faces a Western-centered system that is open, integrated, and rule-based, with wide and deep political foundations. The nuclear revolution, meanwhile, has made war among great powers unlikely -- eliminating the **major tool** that rising powers have used to overturn international systems defended by declining hegemonic states. Today's Western order, in short, is hard to overturn and easy to join. This unusually durable and expansive order is itself the product of farsighted U.S. leadership. After World War II, the United States did not simply establish itself as the leading world power. It led in the creation of universal institutions that not only invited global membership but also brought democracies and market societies closer together. It built an order that facilitated the participation and integration of both established great powers and newly independent states. (It is often forgotten that this postwar order was designed in large part to reintegrate the defeated Axis states and the beleaguered Allied states into a unified international system.) Today, China can gain full access to and thrive within this system. And if it does, China will rise, but the Western order -- if managed properly -- will live on.

#### **No internal link.**

Boushey 12 – (Heather, Chief Economist at American Progress, where her research focuses on U.S. employment, social policy, and family economic well-being. She is also currently a visiting fellow at the Institute for Public Policy Research in London, “Tax Reform and the U.S. Manufacturing Sector Testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Ways and Means,” July 19th, 2012, Center for American Progress Action Fund, http://www.americanprogressaction.org/issues/general/report/2012/07/19/11949/tax-reform-and-the-u-s-manufacturing-sector/ //EH)

Second, there are a variety of ways that policymakers can support manufacturing, of which reforming the corporate tax code is one piece of the puzzle. Manufacturers make their investment decisions based on a variety of factors, not only the level of taxation. The research is clear that **any** set of **policies aimed at supporting U.S. manufacturing should include investments in education** and **training**, **infrastructure**, **basic and applied research** and **development**, **and improvements to basic data collection**. To support manufacturing, I recommend that this Congress focus on a few key items: **Pass comprehensive** business **tax reform that** both **eliminates loopholes and inefficient business tax expenditures without disadvantaging domestic manufacturing**. Currently, loopholes allow companies to avoid paying U.S. taxes by artificially shifting their profits offshore. Closing these loopholes by adopting strong provisions to prevent base erosion and will promote job growth in the United States and insure businesses are both competitive and fairly taxed. **Find a** fiscally **responsible way to make** the research and experimentation, or R&E, **tax credit permanent** in order **to** boost and **attract domestic investment in research and development**, or R&D, from the private sector. Studies have shown that the R&E tax credit stimulates as much research and development investment as a direct subsidy and that the social returns on R&D are greater than returns for private investors who finance R&D. The Obama tax proposal finances the credit exclusively through business tax reform. **Introduce** a **minimum tax on foreign earnings to prevent production from going** to tax havens **overseas**. This would also ease the tax code’s current bias towards foreign, as opposed to domestic, investment and level the playing field among competing businesses. I want to stress, however, that the level of taxation is only one piece of the puzzle and the statutory corporate tax rate is only one aspect of the corporate tax code and how it affects businesses. Supporting manufacturing requires a deeper policy commitment and while I will focus my time in my remarks specifically on tax policy, given the jurisdiction of this committee, there are also a variety of other ways that we can promote manufacturing and innovation in the United States—or least not disadvantage it relative to other industries—including: Improve infrastructure so that U.S. goods can be more easily transported and marketed at home and abroad. This will also make the U.S. more appealing to businesses and globally competitive. **Implement the Obama** administration’s **proposal** to start an $8 billion “Community College to Career Fund” **to** encourage collaboration and partnerships between community colleges and businesses in **train**ing **our future workforce**.

Two million workers would learn skills vital to working in burgeoning industries like advanced manufacturing and heath care. A highly skilled workforce would also give the U.S. and its regional economies further advantages over its global competitors. **Increase government investment in advanced manufacturing** by 19 percent, to $2.2 billion in fiscal year 2013, as outlined by the current administration. Manufacturing workers receive better pay and benefits, while the manufacturing sector is the driving force behind innovation in our economy. Additional investments in this area will benefit workers, improve our standard of living, and strengthen our economy. Follow through on President Obama’s plan to establish a National Network for Manufacturing Innovation. This network, comprised of up to 15 new manufacturing institutes, would facilitate and promote collaboration between companies and research universities, all with the aim of increasing and scaling up manufacturing production. Having a strong manufacturing industry in the United States should be at the top of our national economic agenda. Without a vibrant and innovative manufacturing base, we will not be a global leader for long. Moreover, as more of our energy future will rely on high-tech manufacturing, our economic competitiveness will be even more closely aligned with our ability to be an innovator and producer of manufactured goods. Further, this is an urgent national issue and one of those cases where success begets success. Economists have begun to study and show that the “industrial commons” matters for innovation and the extent to which we allow manufacturing processes to continue to go overseas, we only make it that much harder to regain our place as a global leader. As my colleagues Michael Ettlinger and Kate Gordon have put it, “the cross-fertilization and engagement of a community of experts in industry, academia, and government is vital to our nation’s economic competitiveness.”

#### No impact to off-shoring.

Heineman, 3/26 – (Ben, The Atlantic, 3/26/13, http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2013/03/why-we-can-all-stop-worrying-about-offshoring-and-outsourcing/274388/, "Why We Can All Stop Worrying About Offshoring and Outsourcing," alp)

Labor markets have for the past quarter century been at the center of the globalization disputes under the "off-shoring and out-sourcing" rubric. How many jobs were lost at home to cheap labor abroad? What were conditions for those overseas workers? But the rapidly changing nature of the global economy has changed much, though not all, of that "off-shoring/out-sourcing" debate. Today, cheap labor is only one of many factors leading global companies to choose where to do business in diverse nations across the world. Major economic changes like the internal growth of emerging markets have scrambled debates about the global economy, posed challenges for international business, stimulated contradictory public policies and confused the general public. It was often cheap labor in emerging markets that, more than two decades ago, led companies in developed markets to move company jobs away from the home country either to company owned facilities (off-shoring) or to third parties (out-sourcing) in developing markets. The broad idea was that less expensive manufacturing or inexpensive white collar workers would create goods and services in developing nations that would serve world markets. China, especially, would be the global product-manufacturing center; India, via the web, would be the global service provider. The well known debate ensued between free-trade (more competition, cheaper goods in U.S., growth in developing markets) and fair trade (only wealthy benefit, hollowing out of U.S. middle class, exploitive labor standards overseas). The **debate heated up** in political years (including 2012), **when "outsourcing" became a**n especially a **dirty word**.

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But, in addition to dramatic economic growth in emerging markets, **four** recent **trends** have significantly **modified this** old off-shoring and out-sourcing **schematic. First, labor costs** for many businesses **may no longer be** the **critical** or even primary factor **in global location decisions. Wages are rising** in many emerging markets **due**, in part, **to increased demand, new labor laws, and** greater **worker voice**. Wages are declining in developed markets like the U.S. where depressed economic conditions for workers have led to lower wage and benefit packages, especially for lower entry level workers, and often through negotiations with organized labor. New technology, such as **robotics**, and higher productivity have also **lowered** the **price of labor** as a percentage of total product or service costs. When labor cost differences are not as dramatic or important, other costs like materials, energy, transportation, currency, capital, government imposed costs (tariffs, regulation) -- which were always important -- may have as great (or greater) impact on the location as cheap workers. **Second, companies are** retaining but **modifying** their **global supply chains by** selectively **reversing** the long-term trend of **outsourcing. They are "making" important parts of** the **products** or services **rather than "buying**" from third parties, as described recently by U.S. business people and journalists, Companies are recognizing that closely interrelating, even co-locating, research and development, design and marketing, manufacturing and assembly close to the markets served can lead to much faster response to market shifts and to much faster innovation. The old practice of designing at home and then manufacturing abroad can slow the pace of innovation and product change to a crawl. So **companies are making complex trade-offs** between "making" and "buying" -- and between the need to develop technology at connected global R&D centers and the need to apply it in a variety of local settings in a variety of ways. Similarly, companies which were enamored of outsourcing key service functions like information technology to nations like India are discovering that these, too, are key to fast-paced innovation and should be "made" not "bought" -- bringing them back in-house, with corporate units integrated across the world under global/local management. The "de-verticalizing" outsourcing process - when a company sent many of its functions between raw materials and the finished product to third parties - is now being partially reversed with "re-verticalization." But, even with changes, global supply chains, even if owned more by the company and less by third parties, will remain critical.

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#### Solves the case.

Hsiang 09 (Antonio C. Hsiang, Associate Professor at Chihlee Institute of Technology in Taiwan China Rising in Latin America: More Opportunities than Challenges” Journal of Emerging Knowledge on Emerging Markets, Volume 1 issue 1 November 2009)-Karla

#### Because “many Latin American countries no longer look to Washington leadership,” the so- called Washington Consensus “has lost traction”.28 As a global rising power, China offers an alternative model for Latin America’s development. Even though China has been hurt by the 2008 financial crisis, “its economic and financial powers have been strengthened relative to those of the West. China’s global influence will thus increase, and Beijing will be able to undertake political and economic initiatives to increase it further.” 29 In fact, “Washington seemed to adopt a Chinese-style solution to its escalating financial problems: greater state intervention to restrict the movement of capital.”30 Thus, Beijing’s emergence as a global economic power is seen throughout Latin America as offering an alternative from the Washington Consensus model for economic development. The “Beijing Consensus” is the brainchild of Joshua Cooper Ramo, a former senior editor and foreign editor of Time magazine and later a partner at Kissinger Associates, the consulting firm of former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. According to Ramo, the Beijing Consensus has three features. The first is a commitment to innovation and constant experimentation in reforms. The second, a rejection of per capita GDP as the only measure of progress, as sustainability and equality also count. And the third, a commitment to self- determination. Less developed countries should therefore ensure their own financial integrity and keep great powers in check. 31 The Beijing Consensus has evolved to describe a plethora of alternative plans for economic development in the underdeveloped world. Ramo argues that China and India, who “most pointedly” ignored the World Bank and the IMF-championed Washington Consensus, “now have records that speak for themselves.” 32 Consequently, the so-called the “Beijing Consensus” has been attracting attention in Latin America because of “China’s distinctive development model, . . . [which] posits far more state intervention in the economy and a greater concern with political stability and strong government to guide the development process.” 33

#### Turns China war.

Fergusson 12 (Robbie, Masters in China In The International Arena from the University of Glasgow, e-International Relations, 7/23/12, “The Chinese Challenge to the Monroe Doctrine,” http://www.e-ir.info/2012/07/23/does-chinese-growth-in-latin-america-threaten-american-interests/)//DR. H

\*note: consistent with Security K – says US threat constructs china and attacks.

Washington has long asserted that it is the sole overlord of the Western Hemisphere and will not tolerate any perceived outside interference in the region’s affairs. The Monroe Doctrine of 1823 stated that Latin America and the Caribbean were not to be considered by the European imperialist powers as areas ripe for colonization. Since then, the region has been under the political, cultural and economic leadership of the United States of America, despite resurgent colonial interest from Spain, and laterally, the attempted ideological infusion of the Soviet Union.

Fast forward 178 years since the signing of the treaty, and there is a new potential adversary for the United States in the region. Chinese Premier Jiang Zemin’s 2001 visit to Latin America signified a new Chinese interest in the continent. He promised support, investment, and the deepening of trade links, as a growing China sought natural resources, political allies, and new markets for its rapidly expanding industrial sector. While more attention has been paid to China’s burgeoning relationship with African states, China has quietly built up its presence in Latin America, and the United States has begun to take notice and worry about the implications of this rise.

Why China?

However, before we get to details about Chinese involvement in Latin America, a simple question has to be asked first: Why the American pre-occupation with China? The answer is the concept of the ‘China threat’ theory, a theory which is as elusive as it is controversial. In this chapter we will examine parts of the China threat theory in an attempt to explain why the U.S feels so anxious about the rise of the PRC, and we will discuss how the theory applies to Chinese involvement in Latin America.

The China threat in theory: ‘othering’

In international politics, quite often we define who we are, by who we are not. This process, known as othering, is endemic in international politics as a whole, and is particularly prevalent in the thinking of the United States. Pan notes that “after the demise of the Soviet Union, the vacancy of other was to be filled by China, the ‘best candidate’ the United States could find in the post-Cold War, unipolar world.” [1] Without something to project against, the U.S loses some of its own sense of identity, as defender of the free world and chief exponent of democracy. Pan goes on to argue therefore that “the ‘truism’ that China presents a growing threat is not so much an objective reflection of contemporary global reality, per se, as it is a discursive construction of otherness that acts to bolster the hegemonic leadership of the United States in the post-Cold War world.” [2] From this we understand two things – that any ‘China threat’ is a matter of perspective, and that part of the United States consciousness needs to believe in the reality of this threat to justify its own behaviour. Essentially, this means that “so long as the United States continues to stake its self-identity on the realization of absolute security, no amount of Chinese cooperation would be enough,”[3] suggesting the potential permanence of the American reaction to the rise of China.

The Importance of Potential

Another key element in the discussion of China as a threat is potential. This is important for the realist argument, which deals only with capabilities, rather than intentions. China’s potential is multi-faceted, political, economic, and military, and it is the realisation of this potential that worries American policy makers. Indeed, “much of today’s alarm about the “rise of China” resolves around the phenomenal development of the Chinese economy during the past twenty-five years.”[4] An increasing number of American scholars are focusing on how this rise might manifest itself. A congress report found that “even if its international outreach is entirely benign and centred on economic growth, the PRC’s potential to expand quickly to consumption and production levels comparable to those of the United States presents profound challenges to American and global interests.”[5] The prescription then, is dealing with China as could be, rather than dealing with it as is. The obvious flaw in this reasoning is that political forecasting is notoriously unreliable, and dealing with capabilities often gives undue authority to speculation. Subsequently, within reason, the potential of a ‘China threat’ can be whatever you want or need it to be.

The China threat in practice

Latin America represents a good example of the China threat realised in practice. As Chinese involvement in the region is at a very early stage, analysis tends to focus on its goals which are described as “economic, geostrategic, and irredentist”[6] and its capabilities, with an eye to the worst possible repercussions for the U.S because Beijing is portrayed as “unhappy with the United States’ role as the sole global superpower,”[7] and many conclude that it “ultimately intends a direct challenge to U.S global power.”[8] In practice, this means “Beijing’s growing political and economic presence is increasingly perceived by the United States as a serious intrusion.“[9] This intrusion will not be ignored by Washington because it will be viewed as a fundamental challenge to its hegemony.

The United States is worried that the presence of China will destabilize the region “by presenting an alternative political and economic model – rapid economic growth and modernization alongside political authoritarianism.”[10] As it views itself as the defender of Democracy, Washington is irate that China presents a ‘no strings attached’ approach to Latin American trade and resource dealings, because it “undermines the U.S agenda to advance political reform, human rights and free trade in the region.”[11] The hegemon is not interested in alternatives to its rule – since the Monroe Doctrine, Latin America has remained “firmly within its sphere of influence.”[12] There are specific issues that Washington has genuine fears about, in particular, the rise of China is seen as complicating U.S efforts to “control illegal immigration, weapons shipments, the drug trade and money laundering because China is cooperating with Latin countries that are not especially friendly toward those efforts.”[13] The accuracy and validity of the claim is questionable but the fear behind the speculation is genuine. China is also often judged by the company it keeps, in particular it comes under fire for its close political and economic relationships with American adversaries old and new, Cuba and Venezuela, who “may try to use the Chinese alternative to challenge U.S hegemony.”[14] China may find itself guilty by association. The USA has a tendency to see things in black and white – to paraphrase, you are either with them, or against them.

#### Mexico is a key strategic partner for overall influence.

Dominguez 06. [Jorge, Professor @ Harvard’s Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, "China's Relations With Latin America: Shared Gains, Asymmetric Hopes" Inter-American Dialogue Working Paper -- June -- www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/china.pdf]

Mexico is one of China’s “strategic partners” ¶ in Latin America. Its overall trade importance ¶ for China is second only to Brazil’s in this ¶ region. It is China’s principal export market in ¶ Latin America. Compared to the four South ¶ American countries under discussion, China ¶ runs a substantial bilateral trade surplus with ¶ Mexico (see Tables 3 and 4). From 2000 ¶ to 2004, China’s exports to Mexico nearly ¶ quadrupled while its imports from Mexico ¶ quintupled. The dynamic of Sino-Mexican ¶ trade since 2000 is thus closest to that of ¶ Sino-Brazilian trade, except that China’s ¶ bilateral trade surplus with Mexico also tripled in those years. China is also a significant ¶ foreign direct investor in Mexico; in 2004, the ¶ stock of accumulated Chinese direct investment in Mexico exceeded $28 billion, with ¶ clothing manufacturing accounting for a third ¶ and plastic products nearly a fourth of the total.52 Mexico is the most important Latin ¶ American economy for Chinese investment, ¶ much of which is geared for sales throughout ¶ the North American Free Trade Agreement ¶ (NAFTA) area. China has good reasons to ¶ call Mexico a strategic partner.

#### Resources, Purchasing power, and Geographic Proximity.

Valencia 6/24 (Robert, Contributing Writer at Global Voices Online and the World Policy Institute, 6/24/13, “US and China: The Fight for Latin America,” http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2013/06/24/us-and-china-fight-latin-america)//DR. H

During the first weekend of June, U.S. President Barack Obama and Chinese President Xi Jinping met in California to discuss cyber espionage and territorial claims in the Pacific Rim. While tension on these topics has hogged the headlines, the fight for influence in another area could be even more important—Latin America. Other emerging markets in Africa, where China has an overwhelming influence due to foreign direct investment in mining and oil, also offer economic opportunities, but Latin America has an abundance of natural resources, greater purchasing power, and geographic proximity to the United States, which has long considered Latin America as its “backyard.”

The key question now is will Latin American countries lean more toward China or the United States, or will it find a way to balance the two against each other? Right now, Latin American countries are increasingly confident thanks to burgeoning economic and political integration by way of trading blocs, and they're demanding to be treated as an equal player.

As a sign of its growing importance, China and the United States have courted Latin America more than usual. In May, President Barack Obama visited Mexico and Costa Rica while Vice President Joe Biden visited Colombia, Brazil, and Trinidad and Tobago. Shortly after these trips, President Xi went to Mexico and Costa Rica to foster economic cooperation.

China’s active involvement in Latin American geopolitics can be traced back to 2009. Chinalco, China’s largest mining company, signed a $2.2 billion deal with Peru to build the Toromocho mine and a $70 million wharf in the Callao port. Since then, Peru has sent 18.3 percent of its exports to China, making China Peru’s largest trading partner. China’s imports to Peru, however, rank second with 13.7 percent of the market while the United States holds first place with 24.5 percent.

China has the upper hand with the Latin American leftist countries in terms of infrastructure and technology. In 2009, Chinese telephone manufacturer ZTE played an instrumental role in assembling the first mobile phone in Venezuela known as “El Vergatario” (Venezuela slang for optimal). Former President Hugo Chávez introduced this new phone to low-income families making it the world’s cheapest phone ($6.99 for a handset). Additionally, China landed rail construction projects in Argentina and Venezuela and has become a major buyer of farm products and metal in South America. Between 2011 and 2012, China purchased nearly 58.02 million tons of soy from Argentina, up from 52 million in 2011 and 2010.

#### 2. U.S. neglect, costs, and politics.

Fergusson 12 (Robbie, Masters in China In The International Arena from the University of Glasgow, e-International Relations, 7/23/12, “The Chinese Challenge to the Monroe Doctrine,” http://www.e-ir.info/2012/07/23/does-chinese-growth-in-latin-america-threaten-american-interests/)//DR. H

The Chinese economic threat to the U.S in the region

The U.S is still the most important economic partner for Latin America, but recently many in the region have felt neglected by Washington, whose focus on terrorism and the middle east and ‘rigid U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America has left regional leaders with no option but to look for other patrons. Net foreign direct investment in Latin America has fallen from $78 billion in 2000 to $36 billion in 2003.” [71] This economic neglect is exacerbating the political grievances of the likes of Hugo Chavez, but the more moderate social democratic governments of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, recently extended the designation of Market Economy Status (MES) to China, something the U.S and the E.U have still denied. MES “substantially diminishes the effect of anti-dumping legislation under World Trade Organization rules. Given the preponderance of non-market factors in the P.R.C.’s economy… there can be little doubt that the three countries made their decision almost exclusively on the basis of China’s growing political and economic influence.” [72] This highlights the politico-economic independence of the U.S that Latin America is exerting.

This is also symptomatic of a deep paradox in the American thinking about how to deal with China. On one hand, tying the nominally communist state to the world economy is expected to bring about economic maturity and gradual political change, but on the other, China is still a U.S rival whose influence China is competing against. The situation is reciprocal, as China views the U.S as “[using] its economic leverage to exert political pressure on China, which is one reason that China seeks to diversify its economic relationships.” [73] In this respect, the U.S has what it wants – China is intrinsically tied to the ideals of the open market – as a lower cost, less politicized alternative to the United States.

#### Flawed models.

Rojas, 13 (John-Paul Ford, “Global warming at a standstill, new Met Office figures show,” 1/3, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/earth/environment/climatechange/9787662/Global-warming-at-a-standstill-new-Met-Office-figures-show.html, bgm)

A new scientific model has revised previous figures for the next five years downwards by around a fifth. The forecast compares how much higher average world temperatures are likely to be than the “long-term average” from 1971-2000. It had been thought that this would be 0.54C during the period 2012 -2016 but new data puts the figure for the 2013-2017 period at 0.43C.

#### Even if it’s real, it's irreversible.

Spaeth, 12 [12/5, “Why it's probably too late to roll back global warming”, Ryu, The Week News, http://theweek.com/article/index/237392/why-its-probably-too-late-to-roll-back-global-warming

Two degrees Celsius. According to scientists, that's the rise in global temperature, measured against pre-industrial times, that could spark some of the most catastrophic effects of global warming. Preventing the two-degree bump has been the goal of every international treaty designed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, including a new one currently being hammered out at a United Nations summit in Doha, Qatar. But a new study published by the journal Nature Climate Change shows that it's incredibly unlikely that global warming can be limited to two degrees. According to the study, the world in 2011 "pumped nearly 38.2 billion tons of carbon dioxide into the air from the burning of fossil fuels such as coal and oil," says Seth Borenstein at The Associated Press: The total amounts to more than 2.4 million pounds (1.1 million kilograms) of carbon dioxide released into the air every second. Because emissions of the key greenhouse gas have been rising steadily and most carbon stays in the air for a century, it is not just unlikely but "rather optimistic" to think that the world can limit future temperature increases to 2 degrees Celsius (3.6 degrees Fahrenheit), said the study's lead author, Glen Peters at the Center for International Climate and Environmental Research in Oslo, Norway. What happens when the two-degree threshold is crossed? Most notably, that's when the polar ice caps will begin to melt, leading to a dangerous rise in sea levels. Furthermore, the world's hottest regions will be unable to grow food, setting the stage for mass hunger and global food inflation. The rise in temperature would also likely exacerbate or cause extreme weather events, such as hurricanes and droughts. There is a very small chance that the world could pull back from the brink. The U.N. could still limit warming to two degrees if it adopts a "radical plan," says Peters' group. According to a PricewaterhouseCoopers study, such a plan would entail cutting carbon emissions "by 5.1 percent every year from now to 2050, essentially slamming the breaks on growth starting right now," says Coral Davenport at The National Journal, "and keeping the freeze on for 37 years." However, the U.N. has set a deadline of ratifying a new treaty by 2015, and implementing it by 2020, which means the world is already eight years behind that pace. There are still major disagreements between the U.S. and China over whether the developed world, which industrialized first, should bear the bulk of the cost of reducing carbon emissions. And there is, of course, a large contingent of Americans who don't even believe climate change exists, putting any treaty's ratification at risk. Climate change is so politically toxic in America that Congress has prioritized the fiscal cliff over — no exaggeration — untold suffering and the end of the world as we know it. In other words, it isn't happening. And if that's not bad enough, keep in mind that the two-degree mark is just the beginning, says Davenport: Michael Oppenheimer, a professor of geosciences and international affairs at Princeton University and a member of the Nobel Prize-winning U.N. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, says that a 2-degree rise is not itself that point, but rather the beginning of irreversible changes. "It starts to speed you toward a tipping point," he said. "It's driving toward a cliff at night with the headlights off. We don't know when we'll hit that cliff, but after 2 degrees, we're going faster, we have less control. After 3, 4, 5 degrees, you spiral out of control, you have even more irreversible change." Indeed, at the current emissions rate, the world is expected to broach the four-degree mark by 2100 — at which point, we can expect even worse environmental catastrophes.

#### No modeling in China – it’s structurally impossible

Downs 8 Eric, Fellow @ Brookings, China Energy Fellow, Foreign Policy, John L. Thornton China Center U.S.-China Economic & Security Review Commission, China’s Energy Policies and Their Environmental Impacts, http://www.brookings.edu/testimony/2008/0813\_china\_downs.aspx

China suffers from a disconnect between the increasingly prominent position of energy issues on its domestic and foreign policy agendas and the capacity of the country’s institutions to manage the energy sector. Some Chinese commentators have even argued that the biggest threat to China’s energy security is posed by the very institutions responsible for enhancing it. Consequently, restructuring China’s energy policymaking apparatus has been a subject of intense debate in recent years as the country has grappled with an unexpected surge in energy demand, growing dependence on energy imports, rising global energy prices and periodic domestic energy supply shortages. Authority over China’s energy sector at the national level is fractured among more than a dozen government agencies, the most important of which is the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). Within the NDRC itself, responsibility for energy is similarly scattered among multiple departments. Prior to the restructuring in March 2008, the key component was the Energy Bureau, which had a broad mandate but lacked the authority, tools and manpower to fulfill it. In 2005, the government added another cook to the kitchen with the establishment of the National Energy Leading Group, an advisory body headed by Premier Wen Jiabao. While the leading group’s creation reflected recognition of the need to strengthen energy sector management, it did not eradicate China’s energy governance woes. China’s fragmented energy policymaking structure has impeded energy governance because there is no single institution, such as a Ministry of Energy, with the authority to coordinate the interests of the various stakeholders. For example, the implementation of energy laws is hampered by the fact that those laws often do not specify the government agencies responsible for implementation because of disputes over who should be in charge. Similarly, the fuel tax that the NPC approved in 1999 has not been implemented because of the failure of the relevant stakeholders to reach an agreement. The policy paralysis within the energy bureaucracy stands in sharp contrast to the activism of China’s state-owned energy companies. These firms are powerful and relatively autonomous actors. Their influence is derived from their full and vice ministerial ranks, the membership of some top executives in the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, industry expertise, internationally listed subsidiaries and profitability (at least until recently). More often than not, it is China’s energy firms who initiate major energy projects and policies that are later embraced by the government, such as the West-East Pipeline and the acquisition of foreign energy assets. The companies also have some capacity to advance corporate interests at the expense of national ones. For example, oil and power generating companies have periodically reduced their output to pressure the government to raise the state-set prices of refined products and electricity, which have not kept pace with increases in the market-determined prices of crude oil and coal. Similarly, China’s national oil companies have ignored guidance from the central government about where they should invest overseas. II. China’s “new” energy policymaking structure The recent changes to China’s energy policymaking apparatus are the latest in a series of institutional reforms aimed at improving energy governance. In March 2008, the NPC approved two additions to China’s energy bureaucracy – the State Energy Commission (SEC) and the National Energy Administration (NEA). The SEC, a high-level discussion and coordination body whose specific functions, organization and staffing have not yet been determined, will replace the National Energy Leading Group. The daily affairs of the SEC will be handled by the NEA, a vice-ministerial component of the NDRC, which is the successor to the NDRC’s Energy Bureau. In addition to the Energy Bureau, the NEA is also comprised of other energy offices from the NDRC, the Office of the National Leading Group, and the nuclear power administration of the Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense. The NEA has a broad mandate, which includes managing the country’s energy industries, drafting energy plans and policies, negotiating with international energy agencies and approving foreign energy investments. The NEA, like its predecessor, will struggle to fulfill its mandate because it lacks the authority, autonomy, manpower and tools to deal with the country’s energy challenges. Although the NEA’s capabilities in each of these areas are greater than those possessed by the NDRC Energy Bureau, they still fall short of what the NEA needs to do its job. Authority: The NEA has more political clout than its predecessor, but not enough to mitigate the bureaucratic infighting that undermines energy decision-making. The NEA is a vice-ministerial body, which is a step above that of the Energy Bureau, which was a bureau-level organization. However, the NEA still does not have the authority it needs to coordinate the interests of ministries, commissions and state-owned energy companies. One of the frustrations of officials in the NDRC Energy Bureau was that the energy companies often undercut their authority by circumventing the Bureau to hold face-to-face discussions with China’s senior leadership. The authority of the NEA is somewhat enhanced by the appointment of Zhang Guobao, a Vice-Chairman of the NDRC with full ministerial rank, as head of the NEA. While it was widely expected that Zhang would retire, his new position is a reflection of his substantial energy expertise. Zhang, who has worked at the NDRC since 1983, is a smart and skillful bureaucrat with encyclopedic knowledge of China’s energy sector. He has overseen the development of some of the country’s major infrastructure projects, including the West-East Pipeline, the transmission of electricity from west to east, the Qinghai-Tibet Railway and the expansion of Beijing Capital International Airport. Autonomy: The NEA is a creature of the NDRC. Some Chinese media reports speculated that the fact that the NEA’s offices will be separate from those of the NDRC and that the NEA will have its own Party Group – which will give the NEA greater autonomy in managing its affairs, including personnel decisions – are signs of the NEA’s independence. However, the fact that Zhang Guobao – an NDRC “lifer” – is head of the NEA and its Party Group indicates that the NEA’s room to maneuver will be constrained by the NDRC. Moreover, the NEA’s independence is limited by the fact that key tools it needs to effectively manage the energy sector are in the hands of the NDRC. Tools: Arguably the greatest constraint on the NEA’s ability to fulfill its mandate is the fact that is does not possess the authority to set energy prices, which remain the purview of the NDRC’s Pricing Department. The issue of who would end up with the power to determine energy prices was, in the words of Zhang Guobao, a subject of “constant dispute” during the bureaucratic reorganization. Although the NEA can make suggestions about energy price adjustments and should be consulted by the NDRC on any proposed changes, the shots are still being called by the NDRC (and ultimately the State Council, whose approval is needed for any major energy price changes). The fact that the NDRC retained control over energy prices is hardly surprising. The power to set prices is one of the NDRC’s main instruments of macroeconomic control, which it understandably is reluctant to relinquish, especially to a subordinate component which might be tempted to adjust energy prices in ways that run counter to broader NDRC objectives, such as combating inflation. The NEA’s lack of authority over energy prices makes its task of mitigating the current electricity shortages, which are partly rooted in price controls, especially challenging. Electricity prices are set by the state, while coal prices are determined by the market. The failure of electricity price increases to keep pace with soaring coal prices has contributed to the national power shortage because some electricity producers can't afford coal while others are unwilling to operate at a loss. With no pricing power, the NEA has little choice but to resort to administrative measures to achieve an objective that would be more effectively realized by raising and ultimately liberalizing electricity prices. Personnel: The central government is still managing the energy sector with a skeleton crew. Contrary to rumors that the NEA’s staff would be as large as 200, it ended up with just 112 people. This staff quota is certainly larger than that of the NDRC Energy Bureau, which had only 50 people, but it does not represent a major increase in the number of people directly involved in managing the energy sector at the national level. Moreover, some Chinese media reports have speculated that the NEA may face the problem of “too many generals and not enough soldiers” because at least half of the 112 slots at the NEA are for positions at the deputy department head level and above. The Party organ that determines the functions, internal structure and staff quotas for government institutions probably resisted calls for more personnel out of concern that if it approved a large staff for the NEA, then other government bodies would also press for more manpower at a time when the State Council is trying to streamline the bureaucracy. In sum, China’s new energy administration is unlikely to substantially improve energy governance. The organizational changes are tantamount to rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic. Although the energy bureaucracy looks a bit different, its limited capacities remain largely unchanged. Consequently, we can expect to see a continuation of business as usual: conflicts of interest will impede decision-making; the energy companies will remain important drivers of projects and policies; state-set energy prices will continue to contribute to periodic domestic energy supply shortfalls; and the NEA, with no authority to adjust energy prices, probably will resort to “second best” administrative measures to try to eradicate those shortages. The modest tinkering to China’s energy policymaking apparatus unveiled during the March 2008 NPC meeting reflects the conflicts of interest that stymie energy decision-making. Despite widespread recognition among Chinese officials and energy experts of the need to get the country’s energy institutions “right” and the growing chorus of voices calling for the establishment of a Ministry of Energy (MOE), there are powerful ministerial and corporate interests that favor the status quo. The opposition to the creation of a MOE, a hot topic of debate in Chinese energy circles in recent years, was led by the NDRC and the state-owned energy companies. The mere specter of a MOE strikes fear in the heart of the NDRC because it would deprive the NDRC of a substantial portion of its portfolio and important tools of macroeconomic control. The NDRC’s aversion is shared by the energy firms who are reluctant to have another political master and afraid that a MOE would limit their direct access to China’s leadership. Such opposition helps explain why the government was unable to forge a consensus in favor of more robust changes to China’s energy policymaking apparatus. Implications for the United States First, US policymakers should recognize that China’s fractured energy policymaking apparatus may constrain the Chinese government from doing all that US policymakers would like it to do – and indeed what Chinese leaders themselves might want to do – to enhance international energy security and combat climate change. If China falls short of our expectations it may not reflect a conscious decision by Beijing to shirk its global responsibilities but rather the limited capacity of its national energy institutions to bend other actors, notably firms and local governments, to its will.

#### 3. So are border key cards.

Hendricks 12, David, 11/8/13, “NADBank expands renewable energy portfolio,” http://www.mysanantonio.com/business/article/NADBank-expands-renewable-energy-portfolio-4021606.php)//DR. H

Directors of the San Antonio-based North American Development Bank on Thursday expanded the bank's portfolio of renewable energy projects with loans to a wind farm project in Imperial County, Calif., and a solar park project planned for Pima County, Ariz. NADBank executives also signed a 12-year, $50 million line-of-credit agreement with a German development bank that will be used to lend money to water and sewage projects in Mexico's border zone. NADBank is lending up to $110 million to the Ocotillo Express Wind Energy Project for a wind farm in Imperial County, Calif. Power from the 112 wind turbines will be sold to San Diego Gas & Electric. NADBank is lending up to $45 million to Davis-Monthan AFB Solar Park, which will provide electricity to the Tucson Electric Power Co. The two renewable energy loans are among five loans totaling more than $158 million in loans and grants approved at the joint annual meeting Thursday in San Antonio of the NADBank and the Border Environment Cooperation Commission, based in Ciudad Juárez, Mexico. The BECC certifies border projects for NADBank financing. NADBank, founded in 1994, only started lending to renewable energy projects in the last several years after devoting its first decade toward financing water, sewage, landfill and road-paving projects. Renewable energy projects now account for 29 percent of the bank's loan portfolio. The other projects approved for financing Thursday involve water and sewage. A $792,440 grant is being made to assist in water and sewage construction in San Agustín, a municipality within Ciudad Juárez. A loan of about $1.65 million was approved for a sewage collection system in Tijuana, Mexico. A $761,309 grant is being made for a sewage collection system in Bisbee, Ariz. NADBank will draw on its new $50 million line of credit from Germany's Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau, or KfW, over the next 12 years at an interest rate of 1.9 percent. The rate is lower than the 2.4 percent NADBank is paying for its most recent bond sales, which were conducted to raise more capital for loans, said Juan Antonio Flores, NADBank spokesman. The German bank's line of credit is accompanied by a grant fund of about $1.3 million that will be used for technical assistance with the projects financed by the loans. The grant fund will be administered by the BECC. NADBank currently has $504.45 million in outstanding loans for border projects. Ten projects with pending loans valued at a total of $27.7 million are in the pipeline through 2013, said NADBank Managing Director Gerónimo Gutiérrez.

#### Natural gas solves.

Matusky 8/27, Greg, 8/27/13, “How natural gas is helping shrink the U.S. manufacturing trade gap,” http://www.marcellusdelval.org/shale-news/how-natural-gas-is-helping-shrink-the-u-s-manufacturing-trade-gap/)//DR. H

The article cites data compiled by the Manufacturers Alliance for Productivity and Innovation showing that after years of losing manufacturing business to China, the U.S. trade deficit has finally started to shrink. In the first half of the year, this manufacturing trade gap went from $227 billion to $225 billion. The article moves on to point out that onshoring, or the return of manufacturing to U.S. shores, is spurring national economic activity and could generate anywhere from 2.5 to 5 million American jobs by 2020. That would go a long way toward reducing our stuttering unemployment rate, which has been stalled at 7.4 percent.

Dig deeper into the numbers and you’ll find that this reduction in the manufacturing trade gap is largely due to falling energy prices here in America, where shale-drilling technology is making U.S. manufacturing more cost-competitive against foreign players. In fact, the story quotes a Boston Consulting Group study that claims the U.S. is steadily becoming one of the lowest-cost countries for manufacturing in the developed world.

#### The methodology behind the 1ac is inaccurate – all their internal links cite the Wilson and Lee study which drew false data charts. The value of trade has increased but congestion hasn’t increased because the volume of trade is unchanged

The Economist 12 – (6/12/12, “Questions at the border,” http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2012/06/american-mexican-trade)JCP

THE border between America and Mexico is perhaps best known for the illegal trade and people passing though it. But the growth in legitimate things crossing over is the far bigger story. Last year the value of bilateral trade reached half a trillion dollars by one measure, without any fanfare at all. But a stiffening of controls since 9/11 has led to congestion and unpredictable delays that cost both countries billions of dollars a year in trade, according to a report\* released this month.

The study, by Erik Lee and Christopher E. Wilson of the Border Research Partnership, produces two interesting charts (which we have cut and pasted below). The problem is that they present a puzzling discrepency.

The first chart dramatically shows how the value of bilateral trade increased more than four-fold over the past two decades—almost entirely in manufactured goods; services have only increased a bit.

The second chart shows how personal vehicle and pedestrian traffic increased after the signing of the North American Free-Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1995, but retreated after 9/11.

The peculiarity is that lorry traffic, which the report states accounts for more than 70% of all bilateral trade, has actually grown slightly.

A reasonable chap might wonder why the value (albeit not volume) of trade can grow so tremendously while the number of border crossings to transport the goods has budged only barely.

How to square the seeming inconsistency? In short: more goods are crammed into lorries, and more valuable goods are flowing northward, particularly by other means than lorries. As Mr Wilson explains in response to our query:

"I take the growth in trade without a corresponding growth in truck traffic to be further evidence of the 'thickening' of the border. That is, with congestion and delays, there is an incentive to be as efficient as possible. Trucks are packing more value in the same space. As evidence, the number of loaded truck containers grew faster than the number of trucks crossings (since the 90s), and loaded containers increased much faster than the growth of empty truck containers.""

It also appear that trade by road has grown at a somewhat slower pace that trade by air, water, rail, or pipeline—again, likely related to the slowdown at the border crossings. Also, Mexico is moving away from industries like apparel and doing more things like flat screen tvs and medical devices. Seems likely that the value/volume ratio could be increasing. And, trade values are not inflation adjusted, so some growth of trade values without corresponding increases in vehicles or tonnage makes sense."

The point of the report is a call to invest more in infrastructure and revise procedures to improve the flow of traffic at border crossings—and thus trade between the countries. Yet what is subtly revealed by the data is that Mexico's economy is becoming more efficient and moving up the value chain.

#### turns all the impacts to their manufacturing advantage—competitiveness, deterrence, and China war all rely on the US looking strong

**Khalilzad 95** (Zalmay, chair of RAND’s project Air Force Security and Doctrine Program, “Losing the Moment,” Washington Quarterly, Sping, lexis)

The United States is unlikely to preserve its military and technological dominance if the U.S. economy declines seriously. In such an environment, the domestic economic and political base for global leadership would diminish and the United States would probably incrementally withdraw from the world, become inward-looking, and abandon more and more of its external interests. As the United States weakened, others would try to fill the Vacuum.

#### Economic growth key to solve warming

**Anderson 4** [Terry L. professor of economics at Montana State University, Ph.D. in economics http://www.perc.org/articles/article446.php]

Hansen's essay concludes on an optimistic note, saying "the main elements [new technologies] required to halt climate change have come into being with remarkable rapidity." This statement would not have surprised economist Julian Simon. He saw the "ultimate resource" to be the human mind and believed it to be best motivated by market forces. Because of a combination of market forces and technological innovations, we are not running out of natural resources. As a resource becomes more scarce, prices increase, thus encouraging development of cheaper alternatives and technological innovations. Just as fossil fuel replaced scarce whale oil, its use will be reduced by new technology and alternative fuel sources. Market forces also cause economic growth, which in turn leads to environmental improvements. Put simply, poor people are willing to sacrifice clean water and air, healthy forests, and wildlife habitat for economic growth. But as their incomes rise above subsistence, "economic growth helps to undo the damage done in earlier years," says economist Bruce Yandle. "If economic growth is good for the environment, policies that stimulate growth ought to be good for the environment."

**Obama will negotiate – insiders clarified his statement**

**Hughes, 9/18/13** (Siobhan, “Lew Meets Lawmakers, But No One Budges on Debt” Wall Street Journal,

http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2013/09/18/lew-meets-lawmakers-but-no-one-budges-on-debt/?KEYWORDS=debt+ceiling)

But Mr. Lew said the dynamics changed after 2011, when talks broke down and the government came close to falling behind on its obligations. He said the White House wasn’t going to negotiate on the debt ceiling, saying this was Congress’s responsibility.

Mr. Lew’s comments did leave a window open for budget negotiations, however, people familiar with the briefing said.

For example, he did not say the White House would not accept a deficit-reduction package that included an increase in the debt ceiling, people familiar with the meeting said. Rather, he said the White House would not engage in negotiations with Republicans if they use the option of refusing to raise the debt ceiling as leverage.

**Business pressure will change minds – but Obama’s capital is key to mobilizing it—even if Obama’s not directly involved in negotiating with Republicans**

**Sink, 9/18/13** (Justin, The Hill, “Amid fiscal fights, Obama courting business leaders”

http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/322883-amid-fiscal-fights-obama-courting-business-leaders)

President Obama will address the Business Roundtable (BRT) on Wednesday as he works to get corporate leaders on his side during this fall’s fiscal showdowns with the GOP.

The White House is hoping that Obama can rally the influential organization, made up of conservative chief executives from the nation’s largest corporations, to help build pressure on congressional Republicans.

According to a White House official, the president will ask business leaders "to help send the message to Congress that a default would be disastrous for our economy and for businesses across the country."

"Some Republicans in Congress are playing a reckless political game by threatening to leave the economy hanging in the balance for an ideological agenda that has no chance of becoming law—a game that last time had real consequences, hurting growth and business confidence," the official said.

Obama is expected to note that during debt ceiling negotiations in the summer of 2011, the stock market decreased 17 percent, the nation's credit rating was downgraded, and consumer confidence dropped to its lowest level since the financial crisis. He'll argue to the assembled corporate executives that failure to strike a deal would again endanger the economy — and their bottom lines.

“The president’s focus, as is always the case when he meets with this group, is what we can do together to keep the American economy growing,” White House press secretary Jay Carney said on Tuesday.

But **the sell will not be an easy one** — the association’s officials have been critical of the president, and members of the group are wary of the administration’s aggressive regulatory push on labor and environmental issues.

And congressional Republicans are accusing the president of employing "scare tactics" to gain leverage.

"No one is threatening to default," said Brendan Buck, a spokesman for House Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio). "The president only uses these scare tactics to avoid having to show the courage needed to deal with our debt crisis. Every major deficit deal in the last 30 years has been tied to a debt limit increase, and this time should be no different."

Obama has leaned on the organization in the past. Shortly after the president’s last visit in December for a speech and closed-door discussion, the CEOs sent a letter to congressional leaders arguing all options — including tax increases — should be on the table as negotiators sought a “fiscal-cliff” deal.

That gesture, a reversal from the group’s stance just five months earlier, ratcheted up pressure on congressional Republicans. The GOP subsequently stumbled, and Obama struck a deal that many Democrats embraced.

**Republicans will lose the Obamacare fight**

**Epso, 9/18/13** (David, “Dodge default, defund Obamacare, GOP leaders say” http://www.greenwichtime.com/news/texas/article/Dodge-default-defund-Obamacare-GOP-leaders-say-4825548.php)

WASHINGTON (AP) — House Republicans vowed Wednesday to pass legislation that would prevent a partial government shutdown and avoid a historic national default while simultaneously canceling out President Barack Obama's health care overhaul, inaugurating a new round of political brinkmanship as critical deadlines approach.

Obama swiftly condemned the effort as attempted political extortion, and the Republican-friendly Chamber of Commerce pointedly called on lawmakers to pass urgent spending and borrowing legislation — unencumbered by debate over "Obamacare."

The two-step strategy announced by House Speaker John Boehner marked a concession to his confrontational rank and file. At the same time, it represented a challenge to conservatives inside the Senate and out who have spent the summer seeking the votes needed to pull the president's cherished health care law out by its roots. They now will be called on to deliver.

"The fight over here has been won. The House has voted 40 times to defund, change Obamacare, to repeal it. It's time for the Senate to have this fight," said Boehner, an Ohio Republican.

As outlined by several officials, Boehner and the leadership intend to set a House vote for Friday on legislation to fund the government through Dec. 15 at existing levels while permanently defunding the health care law. The same bill will include a requirement for Treasury to give priority to Social Security and disability payments in the event the government reaches its borrowing limit and cannot pay all of its obligations.

A second measure, to be brought to the floor as early as next week, would allow Treasury to borrow freely for one year.

That same bill is also expected to be loaded with other requirements, including the construction of the Keystone XL Pipeline from Canada to the United States, a project that environmentalists oppose and that the Obama administration has so far refused to approve. Other elements will reflect different Republican budget priorities, including as-yet-undisclosed savings from health care and government benefit programs and steps to speed work on an overhaul of the tax code.

Prospects for passage of the two bills are high in the House, where Republicans have a majority and leaders pronounced the rank and file united behind the strategy.

But both measures are certain to be viewed as non-starters by majority Democrats in the Senate.

Some **Republicans appeared to concede** during the day that the legislation that eventually reaches the White House will leave the health care law in effect.

"I don't think that any reasonable person thinks there's anything to be gained by a government shutdown," said Sen. John Cornyn, R-Texas. "Rather than a shutdown of government, what we need is a Republican victory in 2014 so we can be in control. I'm not sure those are mutually compatible."

But a fellow Texas Republican, Sen. Ted Cruz said it was important to hold fast. He said Democrats appear at present to have the votes to restore funds for the health care law, adding, "At that point, House Republicans must stand firm, hold their ground and continue to listen to the American people."

Given the differences, it is unclear how long it will take Congress and the White House to clear the measures, and how close the government will come to a partial shutdown or a market-rattling default over the next three weeks.

**Syria doesn’t affect the DA—already accounted for**

**Gerson, 9/18/13 -** served as a senior adviser to President George W. Bush(Michael, Virginian Pilot, “The politics of paralysis” lexis)

The remainder of **legislative time and attention** that hasn't been spent on Syria this year will now be consumed by the budget and debt-ceiling debates - in which the best possible outcome is the avoidance of self-inflicted wounds.

Republican leaders seem prepared to combine the continuing resolution and debt-ceiling increase, extend both for a year with the budget at level spending, and impose a one-year delay in implementing Obamacare. They won't get the last part - Obama would veto anything including it - but the Republican base insists.

The Obama administration, in return, offers nothing. It is continuing the practice of starting a negotiation process by refusing to negotiate.

Coming to an eventual compromise between one side that demands the moon and the other side that demands and offers nothing at all won't be easy. The protection of Obamacare is the one "red line" the administration holds absolutely sacred.

But conservatives sense opportunity in a weakened president and a deeply unpopular law. And Speaker John Boehner's room to maneuver is extremely limited by a small faction of his party that is just big enough to paralyze him. It is a recipe for confidence-shaking, market-spooking, down-to-the-wire confrontation.

In the shadow of this conflict, little else will grow. According to Yuval Levin of the Ethics and Public Policy Center, "only things that have to pass - or else the government shuts down or the economy crashes - are going to pass this year."

#### gridlock link – the plan uniquely ensures GOP backlash

Irwin 13 — Neil Irwin, Washington Post columnist and the economics editor of Wonkblog, The Post’s site for policy news and analysis (Neil Irwin, Washington Post: Wonkblog, 02-11-2013, “Is Congress really going to miss its free lunch on infrastructure?”, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/02/11/is-congress-really-going-to-miss-its-free-lunch-on-infrastructure/, Accessed 08-01-2013 | AK)

\*the plan is massively unpopular, our Irwin evidence serves as a gridlock link, we don’t have to win our PC links from the 1nc – bipartisan deal-making over immigration reform exists now however new proposals on border infrastructure spending signals a return to the ugly politics of the last decade – despite support in several distinct lobbies, support for the AFF continues to hit a massive blockade of Republican bickering who hate any new major federal funding projects on infrastructure – causes them to unify and gridlock Obama on immigration reform

Since the election, there have been **hints** that we could be entering a period with some actual productive, bipartisan dealmaking, **most explicitly on immigration reform**. But the Republican reaction to Obama’s expected proposals on **infrastructure** in Tuesday’s State of the Union address may be a better indicator of whether we are in for a year of real legislative give-and-take—or a **return of the ugly politics** of the last several years.

It will also be an indication of whether the U.S. government is going to let a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to rebuild the nation’s roads and bridges more or less for free slip through its fingers.

The early buzz from the White House is that while Obama will discuss the current legislative hot-buttons of immigration and gun control, the economy is a major focus of his speech. In particular, he will call for new infrastructure investment—roads, bridges, power grid, that sort of thing.

The big question on infrastructure is whether the White House is **correctly reading the politics of the moment**. Could Congressional Republicans be ready to sign on to some form of large-scale investment in the nation’s transportation and energy infrastructure? Or is Obama **tilting at windmills** (literally, in this case).

It comes as we may be approaching the end of a five year period in which investing in the nation’s physical infrastructure has been something close to a free lunch. With interest rates near all-time lows and millions of construction workers unemployed, the last few years have been a time that it would have been a historical bargain for the United States to do upgrades to roads, bridges, and airports that will eventually need to take place anyway. It has been a **political breakdown**—in particular conservatives’ view of almost **any non-defense federal spending as wasteful**—standing in the way.

This graph shows total private fixed investment relative to the nation’s potential GDP, going back to 1949. (That’s how much the private sector is spending on both houses and commercial installations). After averaging 15.5 percent from 1949 to 2007, private investment fell as low as 10.6 percent in the economic collapse starting in 2008 (it was 12.2 percent at the end of 2012).

In other words, for the last few years private construction activity has been far below its historic norms. And so long as the private sector isn’t building houses and office buildings and factories, the government can build without crowding out private investment.

But that window might not last much longer; at the current pace, private investment will be back to its historical average in another few years. It’s not now or never, exactly, but it very likely will be cheaper now to spruce up the nation’s transportation and energy infrastructure than it will be in the not-too-distant future.

**In concept**, this is an area where there should be room for the two parties to work together. Business interests tend to favor new infrastructure spending, for both the benefits it brings for the companies that would like faster and more efficient ways to ship their goods and the construction companies that stand to make money actually building the stuff. Even small government conservatives want to have quality roads in their districts. Wisely chosen infrastructure spending should not increase the national debt over time, as upfront expenditures are paid back either through tolls and user fees, greater economic development, or both.

Over the last few years, though, those facts have **crashed headlong** into a widespread view in the Republican caucus that **any federal spending is wasteful**. “Anything that is akin to the stimulus bill is not going to be acceptable to the American people,” House Majority Leader Eric Cantor said in September 2011, after Obama proposed a series of job-creation measures centered around new infrastructure.

But a few things have changed since then. First, Republicans have seen electoral damage by their image as an obstruction-at-all-cost party, losing the White House and seats in both houses of Congress in the 2012 elections. Cantor himself delivered a speech last week aimed at presenting a more pragmatic face to the party. Second, the president has been re-elected, so there is no longer the odd dynamic where bipartisan dealmaking could make Obama look more statesmanlike and help his re-election chances.

Much of the Republican opposition to infrastructure spending has been rooted in a conviction that **all government spending is a boondoggle**, taxing hard-working Americans to give benefits to a favored few, and exceeding any reasonable cost estimate in the process. That’s always a risk with new spending on infrastructure: that instead of the Hoover Dam and the interstate highway system, you end up with the Bridge to Nowhere and the Big Dig.

**2). Essential to avoid concessions**

**Garnham, 9/17/13** (Peter, “Summers not over for dollar strength” Euromoney,

Full article: http://www.euromoney.com/Article/3255829/Category/16/ChannelPage/0/Summers-not-over-for-dollar-strength.html?single=true&copyrightInfo=true)

That is because seeking his confirmation in the US Senate could have cost Obama **valuable political capital.** As Geoffrey Yu, strategist at UBS, points out, that could have meant that reaching an agreement on raising the debt ceiling afterwards would have therefore **required even greater concessions from Obama** and created additional fiscal drag on the US economy. Overall, it would seem the ripple effects from Summers’ withdrawal from the race to become Fed chairman and the negative impact on the dollar could disappear quickly.

**Concessions will split the Democratic base and make a deal impossible**

**Cook, 9/17**/13 - Economic and Fiscal Policy Correspondent at National Journal (Nancy, “How Dangerous Is the Rift Among Democrats?” National Journal, http://www.nationaljournal.com/congress/how-dangerous-is-the-rift-among-democrats-20130917)

Remember that split among congressional Republicans on fiscal strategy? Well, now it seems the Democrats have the makings of a similar problem.

In recent weeks, congressional D's have been uncharacteristically independent, breaking with their leadership and the Obama administration. First they opposed military action in Syria, warning the president they would deny his request to strike. And then came Larry Summers, who was brought down by a handful of Senate Democrats who let the White House know they would not confirm him as Fed chief.

All this bodes quite poorly for President Obama (and Harry Reid and Nancy Pelosi) as the spending and debt fights approach.

If Obama's advisers take anything away from the Syria and Summers episodes, Capitol Hill aides and lawmakers suggest it should be the message that Democrats are not going to get in line with a budget deal that compromises their liberal positions. No longer should the White House feel free, as it has in the past, to consider tweaks to programs like Medicare or Social Security, for instance (unless, of course, Republicans agree to extract more money from taxpayers).

Reid and one of his primary deputies, Sen. Patty Murray, continue to oppose the "chained CPI" proposal that would change the way government benefits are calculated and make them less generous—one of the ideas the president offered up in past budget negotiations. House Democrats largely are not in favor of one of the president's other previous budget offers—to cut Medicare by $400 billion.

These concessions would be an incredibly hard sell to Democrats during a year where the country's annual deficit continues to fall, says a House Democratic leadership aide.

"A lot of our members were concerned about the drift of the negotiations during the fiscal cliff," the aide said. "Our sense is that any deal this fall would not be as large so there is not as much of a necessity to offer up those items."

The White House hasn't ruled those items out though; it's not really even engaging in the discussion at all yet. If lawmakers start to draw lines in the sand, the president will have fewer tools to use and fewer levers to pull to score a deal that keeps the government running and the United States current on its debt.

**3). Key to drumming up public support to pressure the GOP**

**Meet the Press, 9/15/13** (NBC News, lexis) **Woodward = Bob Woodward, investigative journalist.**

GREGORY: Well, we`ll see.

But I want to bring up a point with about a minute left. You know, Syria is now going to get mired in whether this agreement is lived up to or not. We`ve got a budget battle that`s brewing again with the debt ceiling.

But, you think this is the next crisis that Obama is facing with Congress. Are we going to raise the debt ceiling? Will he negotiate? He says...

WOODWARD: And this is really serious. Back in 2011, when the crisis visited them, the Secretary of the Treasury Tim Geithner was running around and saying if we don`t fix this, **we could trigger a depression worse than the 1930s**. And when I talked to Obama about this, he said, it was the most intense three weeks of his presidency. More than Osama bin Laden and so forth.

So -- and the Republicans are out here, a group of them in the House, essentially using extortion and blackmail methods to say, if we don`t defund Obamacare we`re not going to do the routine things of government.

PARKER: Well, we`re at a game of chicken at this point. And they are not -- no one thinks they`re going to defund Obama, not even the people pushing for it.

And at some point, you know, the Republicans are going to have to blink and they`re going to fund it. If they pass a bill that doesn`t include funding for Obamacare, then the Senate won`t pass the bill and, you know, somebody`s got to blink. We`re not going to shut down government. We can`t.

NAVARRO: But let`s be I think fair to the Republicans here. It`s not all Republicans saying let`s shut down the government if we don`t defund Obamacare. So I don`t think it`s fair to paint it as the Republicans, because the Republicans that have been here today, including John McCain, have been very much against this and saying...

WOODWARD: Yes, it`s the 40 extremists that`s who`s doing it.

PARKER: The insane caucus.

WOODWARD: You used it.

GREGORY: We`ll leave it there.

NAVARRO: You`re going to get a lot of flak from mental health advocates.

PARKER: Never had that happen.

GREGORY: All right, thank you all very much. We`ll leave it there.

Coming up next the future of our economy five years after the biggest financial crisis since the Great Depression. Among our guests, former Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson and CNBC`s Maria Bartiromo along with former Congresswoman Barney Frank on where we are five years later.

First our political collector Chuck Todd will be along with his "First Read Sunday." What to look for in the week ahead in politics. Back here in just a moment.

GREGORY: We`re back with more politics. Our political director Chuck Todd with his "First Read Sunday."

We just talked about the debt ceiling business. You`re looking at it this, this week. That of our poll.

CHUCK TODD, NBC NEWS CORRESPONDENT: We did. And we have a poll and we show the initial gauge of the public, the default position is don`t raise it. Look at this, 44 percent say no, 22 percent say yes. The White House pushing back on this poll saying you have to explain it to the people.

Well, this is the exact same place the debt ceiling was in April 2011.

Now, by the time if hit a crisis point, more of the public moved into in favor of raising the debt ceiling, but what this shows is the **president has to use political capital and time to flip these numbers**. It`s going to be a lot of work.

#### 4). business confidence

**McAuliff, 9/18/13** (Michael, “Debt Limit Showdown Could Be Catastrophic For Economy: Analysts” Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/18/debt-limit-showdown\_n\_3950890.html)

The House Republican plan to have showdowns over both funding the government and raising the nation's debt limit could have severe consequences for the overall U.S. economy, non-partisan analysts said Wednesday.

The concern surrounding a potential political fight over the country's borrowing cap next month was highlighted prominently by Moody's economist Mark Zandi, a former adviser to Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) who testified at a joint congressional hearing Wednesday on "The Economic Costs of Debt-Ceiling Brinkmanship.”

The debt limit, which stands at $16.7 trillion, authorizes the Treasury Department to pay for the spending that has already been authorized by Congress. Treasury officials warned in the spring that they had begun taking extraordinary measures to keep the government's bills paid, and would likely have to default on some payments in mid-October if Congress did not grant borrowing authority that equals the spending it has written into law.

Such a default would be devastating, Zandi warned.

"You need to raise the debt limit. There's no other option," he told lawmakers. "Otherwise, it's disastrous. It's counterproductive to your own goals because it's going to result in a recession, bigger deficits and raise the debt."

House Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio) argued earlier on Wednesday that the debt limit is often used as a negotiating lever for politicians, and Rep. Sean Duffy (R-Wis.) made the same point during the hearing, asking why Democrats shouldn't be more willing to talk over Republican demands.

Much like Democrats who released their own report on the topic, Zandi noted, however, that in the last showdown over the debt ceiling two years ago, the U.S. government's credit rating was downgraded and the stock market tanked.

"You can only put the gun to your head so many times before someone's going to make a mistake and pull the trigger, and it's to everyone's detriment," Zandi told Duffy.

He gave a crushing summary of the potential impacts of a default.

"If you don't raise the debt limit in time, you will be opening an economic Pandora's box. It will be devastating to the economy," he predicted. "If you don't do it in time, confidence will evaporate, consumer confidence will sharply decline, [as well as] investor confidence, business confidence. Businesses will stop hiring, consumers will stop spending, the stock market will fall significantly in value, borrowing costs for businesses and households will rise."

"We'll be in the middle of a very, very severe recession, and I don't see how we get out of it," he added.

#### Even if shielding blame used to be true, Obama is a Velcro – he’ll get blamed for unpopular policies

**Nicholas & Hook 10** Peter and Janet, Staff Writers—LA Times, “Obama the Velcro president”, LA Times, 7-30, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jul/30/nation/la-na-velcro-presidency-20100730/3

If Ronald Reagan was the classic Teflon president, Barack **Obama is made of Velcro.** Through two terms, Reagan eluded much of the responsibility for recession and foreign policy scandal. In less than two years, Obama has become **ensnared in blame**. Hoping to **better insulate Obama**, White House aides have sought to **give other** Cabinet **officials a higher profile** and additional public exposure. They are also crafting new ways to explain the president's policies to a skeptical public. **But Obama remains the colossus** of his administration — to a point where trouble anywhere in the world is often his to solve. The president is on the hook to repair the Gulf Coast oil spill disaster, stabilize Afghanistan, help fix Greece's ailing economy and do right by Shirley Sherrod, the Agriculture Department official fired as a result of a misleading fragment of videotape What's **not sticking** to Obama is a legislative track record that his recent predecessors might envy. **Political dividends** from passage of a healthcare overhaul or a financial regulatory bill **have been fleeting**. Instead, voters are measuring his presidency by a more immediate yardstick: Is he creating enough jobs? So far the verdict is no, and that has taken a toll on Obama's approval ratings. Only 46% approve of Obama's job performance, compared with 47% who disapprove, according to Gallup's daily tracking poll. "I think the accomplishments are very significant, but I think most people would look at this and say, 'What was the plan for jobs?' " said Sen. Byron L. Dorgan (D-N.D.). "The agenda he's pushed here has been a very important agenda, but it hasn't translated into dinner table conversations." Reagan was able to glide past controversies with his popularity largely intact. He maintained his affable persona as a small-government advocate while seeming above the fray in his own administration. Reagan was untarnished by such calamities as the 1983 terrorist bombing of the Marines stationed in Beirut and scandals involving members of his administration. In the 1986 Iran-Contra affair, most of the blame fell on lieutenants. Obama lately has tried to rip off the Velcro veneer. In a revealing moment during the oil spill crisis, he reminded Americans that his powers aren't "limitless." He told residents in Grand Isle, La., that he is a flesh-and-blood president, not a comic-book superhero able to dive to the bottom of the sea and plug the hole. "I can't suck it up with a straw," he said. But as a candidate in 2008, he set sky-high expectations about what he could achieve and what government could accomplish. Clinching the Democratic nomination two years ago, Obama described the moment as an epic breakthrough when "we began to provide care for the sick and good jobs to the jobless" and "when the rise of the oceans began to slow and our planet began to heal." Those towering goals remain a long way off. And most people would have preferred to see Obama focus more narrowly on the "good jobs" part of the promise. A recent Gallup poll showed that 53% of the population rated unemployment and the economy as the nation's most important problem. By contrast, only 7% cited healthcare — a single-minded focus of the White House for a full year. At every turn, Obama makes the argument that he has improved lives in concrete ways. Without the steps he took, he says, the economy would be in worse shape and more people would be out of work. There's evidence to support that. Two economists, Mark Zandi and Alan Blinder, reported recently that without the stimulus and other measures, gross domestic product would be about 6.5% lower. Yet, Americans aren't apt to cheer when something bad doesn't materialize. Unemployment has been rising — from 7.7% when Obama took office, to 9.5%. Last month, more than 2 million homes in the U.S. were in various stages of foreclosure — up from 1.7 million when Obama was sworn in. "Folks just aren't in a mood to hand out gold stars when unemployment is hovering around 10%," said Paul Begala, a Democratic pundit. **Insulating the president from bad news has proved impossible**. Other White Houses have tried doing so with more success. **Reagan's Cabinet officials often took the blame, shielding the boss**. But **the Obama administration is about one man**. Obama is the White House's chief spokesman, policy pitchman, fundraiser and negotiator. **No Cabinet secretary has emerged as an adequate surrogate**. Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner is seen as a tepid public speaker; Energy Secretary Steven Chu is prone to long, wonky digressions and has rarely gone before the cameras during an oil spill crisis that he is working to end. So, **more falls to Obama, reinforcing the Velcro effect: Everything sticks to him**. He has opined on virtually everything in the hundreds of public statements he has made: nuclear arms treaties, basketball star LeBron James' career plans; Chelsea Clinton's wedding. Few audiences are off-limits. On Wednesday, he taped a spot on ABC's "The View," drawing a rebuke from Democratic Pennsylvania Gov. Edward G. Rendell, who deemed the appearance unworthy of the presidency during tough times. "Stylistically he creates some of those problems," Eddie Mahe, a Republican political strategist, said in an interview. "His favorite pronoun is 'I.' When you position yourself as being all things to all people, the ultimate controller and decision maker with the capacity to fix anything, you set yourself up to be blamed when it doesn't get fixed or things happen." A new White House strategy is to forgo talk of big policy changes that are easy to ridicule. Instead, aides want to market policies as more digestible pieces. So, rather than tout the healthcare package as a whole, advisors will talk about smaller parts that may be more appealing and understandable — such as barring insurers from denying coverage based on preexisting conditions. But at this stage, it may be late in the game to downsize either the president or his agenda.